This article**[Privy Council No. 10];
After the disgraceful downing of the second A-50 AWACS aircraft by the Russian Aerospace Forces, the West and Ukraine began to celebrate the fact that "Russia is about to lose or has lost its all-weather airborne early warning capability." Regardless of whether these statements are exaggerated or not, there is no doubt that the Russian Aerospace Forces have been tossed to the ground for this......
The American "Forbes" ** said on the 25th that according to the report of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, the Ukrainian army and the Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense acted together and used S-200 long-range anti-aircraft missiles to shoot down an A-50U large early warning aircraft flying over the Kra**dar Krai of Russia on the east coast of the Sea of Azov on the 24th. Circulating on social media shows that the plane caught fire after it crashed. This is already the second A-50 shot down by the Russian army, and the third lost in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict.
As a force multiplier in modern air warfare, early warning aircraft have always been valued by the air forces of various countries. As early as the 80s of the last century, the Soviet Union began to develop and equip the A-50 large early warning aircraft, claiming that it could track up to 150 targets at the same time within a range of 230 kilometers, and its main performance was comparable to the American E-3 large early warning aircraft. After entering the new century, the Russian army has launched its improved model A-50U, which mainly upgrades the airborne avionics equipment, thereby speeding up data processing and greatly enhancing signal tracking and target detection capabilities.
The problem is that the number of A-50 series AWACS aircraft equipped by the Russian army is really limited. According to public data, before the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, the Russian army had only 9 A-50 series AWACS aircraft in service. According to Forbes**, "The problem for the Kremlin is that to cover the 600-mile front line of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, it needs three AWACS systems that are constantly patrolling the air: one in the south, one in the east and one in the north." According to the report, in accordance with the principle of "three-three system", that is, one aircraft patrols in the air, one is on standby at the base, and one is under maintenance, the Russian army theoretically needs at least three sets of a total of 9 A-50s to support long-term all-weather surveillance of the front line of the Russian-Ukrainian battlefield. Now 3 A-50 early warning aircraft have been damaged in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, which means that the number of A-50 early warning aircraft that the Russian army can use has been reduced to 6, which is equivalent to destroying the entire air surveillance system of the Russian army in a single direction, "forcing the Kremlin to decide which area of the front line is no longer covered by airborne early warning radar." The American magazine Newsweek came to a similar conclusion. According to the report, Budanov, head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, claimed at the "Ukraine 2024" forum that after shooting down two A-50s in succession recently, only 6 A-50 AWACS aircraft are still in operation in the Russian army. He said that if one more A-50 is shot down, the Russian army will lose the ability to deploy "at any time of the day."
Judging from the actual situation, the A-50 actually did not perform very well in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Although they have been providing uninterrupted air alert in the Kursk, Voronezh, Crimea and Black Sea directions, monitoring the whereabouts of aircraft and missiles rising from deep Ukraine, and directing Russian Aerospace Forces fighters and ground air defense forces to intercept, in fact, the Ukrainian army's long-range drones and missiles have repeatedly bypassed the interception to launch strikes on targets in depth of the Russian army, and the obvious omission of the A-50 to these air targets may be related to the poor low-altitude detection performance of the old mechanical scanning radar equipped with the aircraft.
Despite this, the A-50 is the only airborne early warning platform available to the Russian army. Of course, although the loss of three A-50s in a row is enough to make the Russian army feel painful, it will not make the Russian army "lose its all-weather early warning capability". In the short term, it may be possible to extend the mission time of each air patrol of the A-50 AWACS aircraft in exchange for "all-weather surveillance" of the frontline zone, but this will increase crew fatigue and wear and tear on onboard equipment, and is unlikely to be sustainable in the long term. The Russian army has also previously mothballed a number of old A-50 early warning aircraft manufactured in the 80s of the last century, and theoretically the Russian army can refurbish them to have air duty capabilities, at least the workload and time required for refurbishment is much less than the rebuilding of a new AWACS aircraft. In addition, the Russian army's new generation A-100 large AWACS aircraft has been completed and is scheduled to be delivered this year. Compared with the mechanical scanning radar used by the A-50 series early warning aircraft, it has greatly improved its detection range, target refresh rate and tracking accuracy, and claims to have a maximum detection distance of up to 600 kilometers for air targets. Thus, the delivery of this aircraft can also partially replenish the losses of the existing AWACS fleet.
It's just that the hardware is easy to make up, but the two groups of trained air managers on board the two downed A-50 AWACS aircraft are not so easy to replenish. Romanenko, director of the National Aviation Museum of Ukraine, believes that the aircraft usually carries about 10 experienced air command and dispatch personnel, who are responsible for coordinating the exchange of information between the AWACS aircraft and other aircraft in the air and ground radar stations and directing coordinated operations. "These specialists require years of training, which is really a serious loss for the Russian army. ”