In the Russian-Ukrainian war, both sides have invested in prestigious air defense and anti-missile systems, including the American-made "Patriot" PAC-2 3 and Russian-made -300 2 and -400, etc., to protect important high-value targets. However, judging from the actual combat effect, these "artifacts" with high hopes seem to have failed. Not only did they fail to complete the task of air defense in important areas, but they even suffered considerable losses.
During the Cold War era, the Soviet Army had an almost paranoid obsession with ground and surface air defense, and not only developed its own air defense system, which was very advanced at that time. And along with the export of technology, it has also had a profound impact on many countries. However, the poor performance of the air defense forces of the Russian Aerospace Forces cannot help but remind people of the "strange words" of "air defense and air defense, ten defenses and nine air". In the face of the threat of unmanned aerial vehicles, cruise missiles, stealth cruise missiles and hypersonic missiles in the new era, whether those countries that learned from the Soviet Union in the early years and later introduced many Russian-made air defense systems have become a problem.
First of all, it must be made clear that what we are going to discuss today is the issue of air defense in key areas, so we will not mention matters that fall under the category of field air defense for the time being. As a result, the front line of the fierce exchange of fire between the two sides has been skimmed, and we have set our sights on the protection of the deep areas in the rear.
In trying to eliminate the exaggerated propaganda of the warring parties in the first battle, and adopting the method of official release combined with multi-party corroboration, it can be determined that the most valuable targets, including the advanced air defense system of the Russian army, have suffered losses in air defense operations in the following examples.
July 17, 2022, in the village of Lazulny, Skadovsky district, Kherson region (N46°04'02.).6’’ e32°32’25.8'') 1 48 6 1 low-altitude blind radar deployed forward was hit by an AGM-88C HARM anti-radiation missile, and the antenna trailer, command cabin and power supply vehicle were damaged.
On August 29, 2022, on the south coast of the Gagarin district of Sevastopol, Crimea, 1 5 56 long-range warning radar on alert duty was destroyed by AGM-88G. In addition, another 48 6 1 low-altitude blind radar deployed at the same time also suffered damage.
On August 23, 2023, a Russian C-400 surface-to-air missile position in Olenovka, Crimea, was attacked by the Ukrainian army's P-360 "Neptune" anti-ship missile, and the supporting 1 48 6 1 low-altitude blind radar and 1 5 85 2-01 launch vehicle were completely damaged.
On September 14, 2023, a position of the -300 2 anti-aircraft missile system of the Russian Aerospace Forces on the outskirts of Yevpatoria in Crimea was attacked by -360 "Neptune" anti-ship missiles launched by the coastal defense forces of the Ukrainian Navy, and at least one 5 85 launcher was destroyed. At the same time, the heavily protected Ordzhonikidze ( shipyard, which is located in Sevastopol, includes 1 Type 775 tank landing ship and 1 636The Type 3 conventionally powered submarine, including the most valuable targets, was seriously damaged in the air attack. The above is the most typical example since the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian war, which has very important reference significance.
It is undeniable that most of the ammunition in each air raid launched by the Ukrainian army was intercepted by the air defense forces of the Russian Aerospace Forces. Among the intercepted munitions, in addition to a large number of cheap improvised cruise missiles, there are also high-tech munitions such as the Scape-EG Storm Shadow stealth cruise missile and the 9K79-1 tactical ballistic missile. If these munitions are not intercepted in time, the losses of the Russian side do not know how much more.
Although the air defense forces of the Russian Aerospace Forces also resisted most of the incoming ammunition, a large number of first-class targets were still damaged, and it cannot be said that the air defense operation on the Crimean peninsula achieved the expected goals. The root of the problem lies in the operational organization and troop allocation.
In the face of the new military reform, the Russian army appears pedantic and conservative in the top-level design of strategy and tactics, and fails to grasp the main contradictions and foresee potential problems. For example, the problem of electromagnetic spectrum management. In the air defense operations at key points, in fact, the Russian air defense forces successfully resisted the dense penetration of the Ukrainian army's drone swarm through radio frequency interference many times. However, while jamming the enemy, it often affects its own vigilance detection and communication contact, etc., giving the Ukrainian army the opportunity to use it in vain, and has repeatedly used drone swarms and decoy bomb swarms to cover cruise missile penetration.
The Russian army's ability to coordinate operations across services and arms is insufficient. The most obvious manifestation is the serious lack of intelligence and reconnaissance capabilities in depth against the enemy, and the inability to detect the movements of Ukrainian fighters and tactical missiles in a timely manner, resulting in the early warning being a virtual reality. Not only the lack of reconnaissance satellites and AWACS aircraft, but also the inefficiency of decision-making due to the compatibility of automated command systems. Originally, the performance of the equipment supported echelon defense, but it turned out to be a hasty engagement.
Due to the long-term lack of investment, the Russian army has long fallen into a vicious circle of "the decisive theory of main battle equipment" in the field of equipment construction. Although a number of new types of equipment with excellent paper performance have been developed, the degree of perfection of mutual support is very low. For example, the 4th Air Defense Group Army of the Southern Military District of Russia, which is responsible for air defense along the Black Sea coast, has the 31st Air Defense Division and the 51st Air Defense Division under its jurisdiction, and has eight C-400 anti-aircraft missile battalions (sets) and two C-350 air defense missile battalions (sets), but the 96K6 air defense system used for the defense at the end of the position is currently only equipped with one company (set), and 12 companies (sets) are directly missing. It is not surprising why, when the Yevpatoria base was attacked, the C-400 was lost due to the lack of an integrated defense system for the position.
From the territorial air defense system of the Soviet era to the air defense of key battlefields where the Russian army is leaking and smoking everywhere today, there are too many lessons to be learned. Seeing the price of blood paid by others, we must take caution to avoid the recurrence of the same problem in ourselves.
Thankfully, we are clearly better prepared for the challenges of new military changes. However, no matter how adequate the material preparation is, it needs to be operated by people before it can play a role. Therefore, we still need to make persistent efforts, and only by maintaining the state of "man and gun unity" can we gain an invincible position.
Project Sword