[Text: Observer Network columnist Xue Kaihuan].
What if Trump returns to the White House?
Perhaps it is not China and Russia that need to think about this issue the most, but the allies of the United States, especially Europe.
In the face of Trump's possible return, the European Union, the Five Eyes Alliance, Japan and South Korea have all begun to plan ahead of time to prepare for the prospect of Trump entering the White House again. Some countries have even begun to "bet in advance", among them, the United Kingdom has been revealed to have contacted Trump, and Japan has been revealed to be trying to contact Trump and asked him to "not reach any agreement with China".
Of America's traditional allies, the European Union is the most concerned about Trump's possible return. Against the backdrop of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Trump's ascension to power will bring new problems and severe tests to the European Union.
For now, Trump's public statements on his foreign policy during the campaign have been vague and have not given a clear direction. Still, memories of his previous four years in office have created enormous uncertainty and anxiety for America's European allies and the American diplomatic establishment.
In Trump's first term, his foreign policy was unabashedly America-First. As a U.S. leader, Trump has called the European Union, a traditional ally of the United States, an "enemy" and openly questioned whether NATO should continue to exist. The conflict between China and the United States that broke out during his term of office is well-known, but the United States under his leadership has also adopted a policy of protectionism and maximum pressure in its relations with the European Union. However, the relative decline of the United States has determined that Trump's approach has not played a big role. Although Biden inherited Trump's policy on the Sino-US conflict and announced the "return of the United States" in a high-profile manner, the ability of the United States to interfere in other countries and exert influence abroad has further decreased during the Democratic administration.
For the EU, the most pressing question will be whether the United States will continue to aid Ukraine to the end. Trump has publicly stated that if elected, he will end the Russia-Ukraine conflict "within 24 hours." The share of US military aid to Ukraine accounts for two-thirds of the total amount of Western aid to Ukraine, and it is completely decisive in the field of information and intelligence. The EU fears that if Trump "comes to an agreement with Putin," they will have no choice but to accept the course of events.
Since the Russia-Ukraine conflict, only 31 billion of the 64 billion euros in financial aid promised by the West to Ukraine have actually been successfully received, of which the United States has not fulfilled the agreement as well as the European Union.
In addition, NATO's framework will also be under attack. In early December 2023, the New York Times published an article pointing out that Trump has been believing for three decades that NATO is a "parasite" that wastes US resources to survive. During his tenure, he repeatedly threatened to withdraw the United States from NATO. His campaign also stated in black and white that "we must complete the process of fundamentally reassessing NATO's goals and missions, and this process will begin under my leadership." ”
This is precisely what the EU fears: once it leaves the United States, Europe's "self-defense" will remain only at the level of rhetoric. Two-thirds of NATO's military spending comes from the United States, which has 85,000 troops stationed in Europe and provides most of the critical capacity for military transportation and space reconnaissance. In Europe, on the other hand, the coordination of the first teams outside the NATO chain of command is very poor, and the military-industrial complex of the EU countries, although capable of producing advanced **, lacks the ability to expand production capacity. There are optimists who believe that Europe can solve all these problems in "ten years", but it is clear that no one can ** what the world will be like in ten years, and this self-consoling rhetoric is not convincing.
As a result, ambassadors to the United States and think tank experts from various European countries have recently sought to reach out to Trump's circles to understand his intentions. In interviews conducted by various Western countries** over the past few months, more than six current and former European diplomats interviewed spoke on condition of anonymity for fear of retaliation against Trump for his victory. They said that European politician circles are increasingly worried not only about the Russia-Ukraine conflict, but also because of the United States' abandonment of interfering in the affairs of the Eastern Hemisphere and even undermining the Western alliance.
Another reason why the EU is worried about Trump's return is economic. After the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, under the pressure of Biden**, the EU took the initiative to cut off most of its energy exchanges with Russia and instead relied on the energy of the United States**, which played into Trump's hands. Due to the loss of cheap Russian energy, EU countries, including Germany, the "locomotive" of EU industry, are facing serious deindustrialization difficulties until sufficient alternatives are found. Under the enormous pressure of the energy problem, industrial enterprises in the EU have stopped production or even gone bankrupt. European companies have been forced to relocate to the United States en masse, in line with Trump's "America First" strategy of returning industry.
In addition, green energy may also be a card that Trump will play. While Trump has been skeptical of climate change, he certainly won't miss the opportunity to intensify protectionism under the pretext of tackling climate change. The conflict between Europe and the United States over "environmental subsidies" began to ferment during the current Biden administration, and this economic conflict may cause a rift between the United States and Europe that may outweigh the differences caused by any geopolitical conflict. Once Trump recognizes the competitive threat posed by Europe's cleantech industry to the United States, he is likely to inherit Biden's policies, just as Biden has inherited his tariffs on China.
There is no essential difference from Trump's last term of office, the differences and divisions among EU member states on many issues are still serious, and although Germany and France frequently emphasized the importance of independence and self-determination at that time, some countries in the EU cannot afford the price of economic competition with the United States, and the "drag effect" is very serious. In the face of Trump's aggressive posture, there is not even a consensus within the EU on how to unanimously respond to Trump, which greatly limits the EU's room for maneuver. Trump is well aware of the weakness of the balance of power and the mutual lag in the EU, and there is no doubt that he will use every opportunity that can divide the EU to implement the "America First" policy approach.
Once Trump comes to power, the EU will face the risk of losing competitiveness in the face of a new round of protectionist measures by the United States. With an economically struggling economy, a lack of military self-reliance, and growing competition from the United States, China, and some emerging countries, the EU's international standing could be shaken. If Trump fulfills his promise to "strip the United States from Europe", the EU will face a difficult situation: it will have to maintain both internal integrity and international influence.
At the 2018 G7 summit, Trump was "besieged" by German Chancellor Angela Merkel and other leaders, which has also become a classic portrayal of Europe-US relations.
In the face of Trump's threat, Europe does not seem to have found the question "What to do?" The answer to this question. For many in the EU, the straightforward solution is, of course, for Trump to lose the election, just as the EU almost universally supported Biden's position at the end of Trump's first term. Some European leaders have privately communicated with Biden in the hope that Trump will be bound by Congress. However, some EU countries have said that it is necessary to try to establish a more moderate and certain bilateral relationship with Trump, and try to use Trump's "pride" or his "business instincts" to maintain the stability of US-EU relations by increasing the purchase of US **, energy resources and other "protection fees".
It can be seen that the EU does not lack the will to be strategically autonomous, and the crux of the matter is how to embark on this broad road of independence. Even during the Cold War, when Western Europe was relatively united, the inefficiency caused by the differences between many countries on strategic issues has been a problem for the Western European bloc.
In Trump's first term, then-German Chancellor Angela Merkel played the role of the EU's independent flag-bearer. With the passage of time, Merkel's political legacy is long gone, and her successor, Scholz, has since lost credibility due to his weak performance on issues such as Russian energy and the Nord Stream pipelines, despite declaring that he will welcome the "change of times" in Germany's foreign policy strategy in February 2022, while France is not trusted by many EU countries due to historical issues. As for the countries of Eastern Europe, they are not keen on the ambitions of Germany and France. Central and Eastern European politicians are accustomed to relying on the United States, believing that the United States is the only counterweight to the "great powers".
The EU is not without cards to play, even the best Europe can play a few diplomatic cards, but the effect is likely to be unsatisfactory. Whoever occupies the White House, the Republican Party's attitude towards China will be as tough as Biden's, if not tougher. If it wants to successfully isolate China, it is difficult for the United States to do it alone, the United States needs the help of Europe, and so far, Europe is only seeking to reduce its dependence on China, and has not dared to join the United States in the chariot of comprehensive containment of China, so Europe has the capital to be sold at a price, but not much.
Everyone in Europe understands that Trump's possible return to the White House will have a huge impact on Europe and even potentially change the political landscape of Europe as a whole, but still no one knows what to do.
Optimistic realists believe that the United States will drift away from Europe due to changes in strategic priorities and resource constraints, but while Trump is "dangerous" and his logic is "understandable" to Europeans, his actions are a practical application of the realist paradigm of international relations. As Trump himself said, "interests first" is greater than "values first". While this style of behavior is uncomfortable for Europe, there is always something to be gained in naked interests than in the vague "diplomacy of values".
However, knowing the rules and being able to follow them are certainly not the same thing, and being able to think of them is not the same thing as being able to do them, and even if they can see the logic of Trump's policies, the lack of capacity will be the core problem that limits the flexibility of EU policy, which is the dilemma facing Europe today: even if it knows what to do, it is not able to do it.