In November 1937, Wang Ming returned from Moscow, and under the banner of the "Comintern," he concentrated on the erroneous tendencies of right-leaning capitulationism that appeared in the party in the early days of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, the report on the Luochuan Conference of the opposition party and the situation and tasks of the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression after the fall of Shanghai Taiyuan, and the correct line of the opposition party. On December 9, Wang Ming made a speech at the meeting of the Political Bureau of the People's Republic of China (How to continue the national war of resistance and strive for the victory of the war of resistance?).report. After the meeting, he went to Wuhan to serve as the secretary of the Yangtze River Bureau. On 27 December, he published "The Key to Saving the Current Situation" in the "Yangtze River," and in March 1938, he made a report entitled "Summary of the March Politburo Meeting." His reports and articles, which put forward a right-leaning capitulationist line, the main mistakes were:
First, it denies the existence of class differences and class struggle in the united front and obliterates the essential differences between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. They believe that in the united front, there is only a distinction between the anti-Japanese faction and the pro-Japanese faction, and there is no distinction between the leftists, centrists, and rightists. Nonsense is that the KMT and the CPC are both "the aggregate of a large part of China's outstanding and progressive youth," and the relationship between the KMT and the CPC is one of "sharing good and bad and relying on each other for their lives." Touted Chiang Kai-shek as an "immortal national hero" and a "leader of the War of Resistance". They only talk about the national struggle and do not talk about the class struggle, and they completely deviate from the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism, which is the root of a series of mistakes in the right-leaning capitulationist line.
Second, proceeding from the above-mentioned erroneous viewpoint, in their united front work, they vigorously oppose the principle of the party's independence and autonomy and renounce the party's leadership. They put forward the erroneous slogans of "everything goes through the united front" and "everything obeys the united front," but in fact everything goes through the Kuomintang and everything obeys the Kuomintang. They advocate "unification," "unification of the army," and "unification of mass organizations," and in essence they want to unify the democratic, people's army, and revolutionary mass organizations under the leadership of our party into the reactionary, reactionary, and reactionary organizations of the Kuomintang. They completely renounced the party's leadership in the anti-Japanese national united front.
Third, on the question of the focus of military and party work, they despised the development of the people's army and the revolutionary base areas, and the role of guerrilla warfare led by the Communist Party, and fantasized about relying on the Kuomintang army for a quick victory. They absurdly proposed the practice of "unified command, unified establishment, unified armament, unified discipline, unified treatment, unified combat plan, and unified combat action," but in fact handed over the people's army under the leadership of our party to Chiang Kai-shek and gave up our party's military leadership over the War of Resistance Against Japan. They opposed Comrade ***'s strategic principle of "basically conducting guerrilla warfare, but not relaxing movement warfare under favorable conditions," put forward the erroneous policy of "universally practicing movement warfare, coordinating positional warfare, supplemented by guerrilla warfare," and advocated attacking the enemy's major cities and major communication routes. Therefore, their opposition parties focused their work on the war zone and behind enemy lines, and became obsessed with the legitimate struggle in the areas ruled by the Kuomintang, catering to the demands of the Kuomintang, and attempting to promote the Kuomintang's war of resistance with so-called "suggestions" and "sponsorship".
Fourth, pinning the hope of victory in the War of Resistance against Japan on the Kuomintang and extremely misestimating the future of the War of Resistance. They held that the Kuomintang was "the largest political party fighting for the national survival of the Chinese people" and that victory in the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression could only be the victory of the Kuomintang and not the victory of the people's revolution. In December 1937, Wang Ming shamelessly said in his article "The Key to Saving the Current Situation": "Those who listen to the rumor that 'the victory of the anti-Japanese resistance is the world of the Communist Soviets' are not only too isolated from the actual situation in China, but also have no confidence in the fighting strength and bright future of the Chinese Kuomintang. ”
Fifth, in terms of organizational discipline, Wang Ming and his gang seriously undermined the party's principle of democratic centralism and turned the Yangtze River Bureau under his control into an independent kingdom that confronted the party. They stubbornly rejected the correct instructions of ** and imposed a right-leaning capitulationist line. Without the consent of the People's Republic of China, they published articles and declarations that violated the correct line in the name of the People's Republic of China, and they were not allowed to publish the article "On Protracted War" in the name of the People's Republic of China.
In short, the fundamental mistake of Wang Ming's right-leaning capitulationist line lies in the fact that it denied the basic Marxist-Leninist viewpoint on class struggle and automatically gave up our party's leadership over the War of Resistance Against Japan. They cater to the interests of the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie, but run counter to the fundamental interests of the proletariat and the broad masses of the people.
It was no accident that Wang Ming's right-leaning capitulationist line emerged in the early days of the Anti-Japanese War. On the one hand, it was because the Kuomintang's strategy toward the Communist Party had undergone a major change, from a military "encirclement" to a strategy of plotting against the Communist Party through "cooperation" under the cover of the word "friend" in the War of Resistance Against JapanOn the other hand, it is the inevitable result of impure elements and unbalanced theories within the party. Wang Ming has long rejected the transformation of his world view, and has always taken subjectivism and metaphysics as his ideological characteristics. After the outbreak of the Anti-Japanese War, with the formation of the cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party and the change of the Kuomintang's strategy, he jumped from one extreme to the other, advocating "all unity, denial of struggle". However, the existence of a large number of petty-bourgeois elements in the party, the low theoretical level, and the lack of experience in the cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party during the Great Revolution made Wang Ming's erroneous line have a certain market.
Wang Ming's new capitulationist line seriously interfered with and undermined the implementation of the party's correct line, and caused serious losses to the revolutionary cause in the work of the Yangtze River Bureau under the responsibility of Wang Ming and the work of the Southeast Bureau under the responsibility of Xiang Ying. For example, after the fall of Xuzhou in May 1938, in light of the imminent fall of Wuhan, he pointed out on 22 February in the "Instructions on the Work in Central China after the Fall of Xuzhou" that it was necessary to shift the focus of work from the cities to the rural areas, prepare for and launch anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines, and create anti-Japanese base areas in Central China, so as to integrate with North China. However, Wang Ming and others adapted to the requirements of the Kuomintang, stubbornly refused the instructions of **, and called back that the center of work should be "defending Wuhan", not in the countryside, and that the strategic policy should be regular warfare, and "suggested" that the Eighth Route Army in North China concentrate on attacking the city. As a result, the great opportunity to develop the New Fourth Army and revolutionary base areas in the Yangtze River valley was lost, and it was fully adapted to the Kuomintang's counterrevolutionary conspiracy to use the Japanese invaders to wipe out our army. Obviously, if this erroneous line is not overcome in time, the party's cause will be undermined, and the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression will be in danger of complete defeat.