The Tasini Line stands majestically as a strong barrier in the Red River Delta

Mondo History Updated on 2024-01-19

The Battle of Vinh An ended quickly, and Tasini was keenly aware that the main direction of the Vietnamese army was the Red River Delta, and immediately began to build a complete defensive line - the famous Tasini Line. Its intention was clear, to deplete the Vietnamese army in the defense by consolidating the defense. The line was built along the edge of the Red River Delta, stretching from Hongji in the Beibu Gulf in the east, to the line of Yuechi and Yongan in the west, and to the line of Ninh Binh in the south. The entire line of defense consisted of small strongholds capable of supporting each other. By the summer of 1951, more than 600 strongholds had been built, and by the end of the year more than 600 had been added, eventually forming more than 1,300 strongholds of various sizes. The strength of the line encompassed 20 battalions, mainly the French. Tasini formed mobile clusters of freed French troops for critical battles.

In January 1950, France installed Paula as emperor and established a puppet regime. Emperor Bao Dai of Vietnam, named Nguyen Phuc Vinh Swe, was the emperor of Vietnam during the French colonial rule of Vietnam. When Japan occupied Vietnam, he became a puppet of Japan. When Hu Chi Minh established the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, he participated in the provisional ** of Vietnam as a civilian emperor, serving as ** adviser. However, after the French army drove out Ho Chi Minh, he again became a puppet of France. The man who had hoped to be a citizen of a free country was once again reduced to the emperor of a slave state.

The results of the battle in the middle reaches of the Red River showed that there were many disadvantages in the struggle with the French army in the plains, and it was difficult to carry out a decisive war of annihilation. After the battle, the Chinese advisers proposed to move to the northwest, but failed to convince the senior Vietnamese generals. The Vietnamese side initially proposed to attack Mong Cai, but after the increase in the defenders of Mong Cai, the Vietnamese side abandoned this plan and set its sights on the route of Highway 18 and decided to launch a northeast campaign.

The main battlefield of the Northeast Campaign was near the Keelung Coal Mine, 32 kilometers north of the northeastern coastal city of Hai Phong, a semi-hilly terrain dotted with water nets and rice paddies. The Vietnamese hero Hoang Hua Tan once fought against the French army here, so the Vietnamese side called this battle the Hoang Hua Tan Battle. The guiding ideology of the battle was still to encircle the point and send reinforcements, and the Vietnamese army formed the 316th Division on the basis of the original 174th Independent Regiment to attack the small town of Mao Xi. The 308th and 312th Divisions then lined up behind the 316th Division, ready to annihilate the enemy. In order to confuse the French army, the Vietnamese side ordered the 304th and 320th Divisions to make a feint attack south of the Tasini Line. The Chinese Affairs Advisory Group operated with the headquarters of the Vietnamese Army, and the campaign was scheduled to begin on March 20, 1951.

The initial phase of the campaign went smoothly, and on the nights of March 23 and 24, 1951, the Vietnamese army captured four small French strongholds of Lan Ta, Lu Nei, Mang Nei and Song Zhou. However, the French army remained motionless, and the Vietnamese feint in the south prevented Tasini from understanding the true intentions of the Vietnamese army, and he ordered the French army to hold on to Mao Xi. The Vietnamese army waited for three days and found that the French army was not moving, so they ordered one regiment each of the 308th and 312th Divisions to capture two small strongholds on Highway 18, Mi Ze and Changbai. The French army sent three light destroyers and two small landing ships of the river fleet to bombard the Vietnamese attacking troops with naval guns from the waterway, causing the Vietnamese army **.

Although the French still did not move, the offensive of the 308th Division at Maoxi was also very difficult. A French paratrooper battalion braved Vietnamese artillery fire to support Mao Xi, and several Vietnamese attacks were repulsed. However, at 2 a.m. on the 30th, the 308th Division concentrated its artillery to bombard Mao Xi, and the Vietnamese troops launched an assault on Mao Xi. Part of the Vietnamese army successfully entered the town and engaged the French in street fighting. The French ** team cut off the Vietnamese attack through heavy artillery fire, so that the Vietnamese troops attacking Mao Xi could not be supported, but were surrounded by the French army and suffered huge losses. Before dawn, the Vietnamese army threw a regiment into Mao Xi, but the regiment strayed into the preset firing position of the French river fleet, was hit by the artillery fire of the French ** team, and finally withdrew from the battlefield after dawn. In the first battle of Maoxi, the Vietnamese army was heavy, and the sporadic fighting lasted until the beginning of April, and the food of the Vietnamese army was in trouble, and it was finally decided to withdraw from the battlefield. Due to the lack of strength of the French army, they were unable to pursue it, and the Northeast Campaign ended.

Before the battle began, Wang Yanquan, a Chinese adviser to the 308th Division, advised the Vietnamese not to attack in this direction, as the rivers in the area were networked and the French could be reinforced at any time. However, Wei Guoqing told him: "The General Military Commission of the Vietnamese Army has decided on this matter, so we won't say more." We are here as advisers, and our work is complex, and we must pay special attention to solidarity with our Vietnamese comrades. On the way back, Wang Yanquan said to Wei Guoqing: "We have fought two battles in the plains, both of which are not ideal, and we should not fight like this in the future." Wei Guoqing responded: "* sent us here to try to help the Vietnamese army as much as possible. It is not uncommon for the two sides to have different opinions on the campaign plan. We should be patient and not rush. We will learn from experience, and I believe that the Vietnamese side will also learn from the battle. ”

The bloody battle at the Maoxi Coal Mine: The Vietnamese army marched forward bravely, and the French army dealt with it smartly.

In the Northeast Campaign, the Vietnamese army failed to realize its campaign intentions, and originally planned to destroy 5 enemy battalions, but as a result, it barely defeated 2 enemy battalions. There are two obvious problems at the command level: first, in the timing of the attack on Mao Khi Town, the Vietnamese army did not launch an offensive when Tacini hesitated, but chose to launch an offensive after the arrival of French reinforcements, does this mean that the Vietnamese army thought that the defenders of Mao Khe were too weak?Secondly, the Vietnamese army did not deploy troops to attack the French river fleet, although they knew that the river fleet would be reinforced, but ignored it

In this campaign, the French army seems to have become smarter. Finding and exploiting the weakness of the Vietnamese army, Tacini ordered the French to hold their positions at night by relying on strong fortifications or strongholds, taking advantage of their superiority in equipment. Once the Vietnamese army was unable to resolve the battle at night, as soon as it was dawn, the French concentrated their forces and launched a fierce counterattack. The Vietnamese army suffered no small losses as a result, which was very similar to the tactics of the American troops on the Korean battlefield.

In the Northeast Campaign, the Vietnamese Army Headquarters concluded that they had killed and wounded a total of 1,175 French troops (including the Bao Da Army) and more than 1,700 of their own ** (the French army called the Vietnamese Army ** more than 3,000 people). The ** of the Vietnamese army was mainly caused by French ** artillery, for which the Vietnamese lacked experience, and the same was true of the Chinese advisers, because before that, the squadron ** had not had a fierce confrontation with the navy at all.

Whether it was victory or defeat, the Vietnamese army continued to grow and grow in battle after battle. Both command ability and combat effectiveness have been enhanced. This young army still has a long way to go if it wants to grow into a mighty army.

This article vividly depicts a fierce battle in the Vietnam War, with a particular focus on the construction of the Tasini Line and the course of the Northeast Campaign. Through in-depth analysis of the article, I have gained a clearer understanding of the military strategy and tactical execution of the Vietnamese and French armies.

First of all, the detailed description of the Tasini Line shows the great effort and strategic ingenuity of military construction. Tacini formed a mobile group of freed French troops, skillfully using limited resources to form a powerful military system. This solid defensive line not only hampered the Vietnamese attack, but also provided the French with mobility that allowed them to quickly counterattack in a decisive battle. The article illustrates how Tacini took advantage of the advantages of the night by describing the night battle, highlighting the tactical ingenuity and flexibility of the French army.

Secondly, the description of the Northeast Campaign gave me a deeper understanding of the strategic thinking of the Vietnamese army and the difficulties encountered in its implementation. The Vietnamese army adopted the tactics of encircling the point to send reinforcements in an attempt to annihilate the French army. However, during the battle at Mao Khi Coal Mine, the Vietnamese encountered a series of problems, such as the poor timing of the night attack and the failure to effectively respond to the reinforcements of the French river fleet. These problems show that the Vietnamese army still has some deficiencies in the planning and execution of the campaign, which needs to be continuously improved through experience.

I was also intrigued by the depiction of Chinese consultants in the article. The role of Chinese advisers in the Vietnam War was a special and important existence. They showed patience and understanding in their communication with the Vietnamese military leadership, and at the same time, in the dialogue on the way back, they reflected their tactical thinking and summary of experience. This illustrates the complexity of international military assistance and cooperation, as well as how to coordinate and cooperate in armies in foreign lands.

Overall, the article demonstrates the military strategy and tactical execution of the Vietnam War through vivid depictions of scenes and detailed campaign processes. The performance of the Vietnamese and French armies in this battle gave me a deeper understanding of the complexities and variables of warfare. At the same time, the article's description of international aid and cooperation provided me with a more comprehensive understanding of the complex entanglements behind international relations and war.

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