The real Russian nuclear threat Putin s target is not Ukraine, but the whole of NATO

Russian ICBM systems at a military parade in Moscow in May 2023, Shamil Zhumatov Reuters.

Article source: Foreign Affairs

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This is a mistake, the United States ** got it wrong. Actually,It is highly unlikely that Russia**Vladimir Putin will use nuclear ** on the battlefield in Ukraine, but it is highly likely that he will use nuclear ** against NATO. Unlike Western countries, Putin may not be afraid of a nuclear confrontation: he is well acquainted with Russia's nuclear arsenal and the principles of nuclear deterrence, and may consider himself well suited to a nuclear crisis. And Putin has also consistently stated that Russia is willing to use nuclear ** against NATO to defend its interests in Ukraine. Even eight years ago, in a television interview a year after Russia's invasion of Crimea, Putin declared that he was ready to put Russian nuclear forces on alert to prevent Western forces from interfering with Moscow's takeover of the Crimean peninsula.

Russia's use of nuclear ** is not imminent. But if Putin does escalate the war, such as attacking NATO with a conventional **, he is likely to act quickly so as not to give the United States a chance to get out of the crisis. It will be difficult for Washington to contain such an emboldened Kremlin. Ukraine is too important for the Kremlin's ambitions and too secondary for the United States, and Putin will not believe in any American threats. So at the end of the day, Putin will expect the United States to back down before a nuclear conflict breaks out over land far from home.

To avoid the worst, the United States needs to find new ways to prevent Russia from using its nuclear arsenal. The United States must convince Russia, including the military chain of command, to subvert and thwart decisions that could lead to a nuclear attack. It needs to convince the Russian elite that Russia can make concessions on the Ukraine issue without suffering a catastrophic defeat. It must unite other countries, especially neutral countries, to delegitimize the use of nuclear weapons and convince Putin that it would be a terrible mistake if he used his nuclear arsenal. This must be done now if the United States can avoid making dangerous decisions in the future under the enormous pressure of a nuclear standoff.

Russia is not secretive about the presence of its nuclear arsenal. From the very beginning of the invasion, Moscow has sought to intimidate the globe by flexing its muscles. Shortly before the invasion of Ukraine, Russia conducted an unusual exercise of its nuclear missile launch system. Then, in February 2023, Russia announced the suspension of the New START Treaty, which sets a cap on the number of nuclear weapons that Moscow and Washington can hold. In March, the Kremlin announced plans to transfer part of its nuclear ** to Belarus. In October, Putin hinted that Russia might restart nuclear tests. At the same time, Russia's *** also threatened a nuclear attack, such as the former ** Dmitry Medvedev's remarks in July,Claims that Russia has the ability to use nuclear ** to end the war in a matter of days.

The United States** is concerned about these threats, but it is not entirely convinced. They believe that Moscow may use so-called small tactical nuclear ** on the battlefield, but it is unlikely to use large strategic nuclear ** against NATO countries. Adviser Jake Sullivan told U.S. experts in February that there was no great concern about the possibility of Russia using strategic nuclear weapons in Ukraine or against Western countries, although some still expressed concern about Russia's use of tactics, according to Politico. They believe that Putin may use these ** to help the Russian army stop the Ukrainian offensive to retake Crimea, or inflict a major setback on it, which in turn may force the Russian army to withdraw from eastern Ukraine.

However, the growing complacency of the United States is based on a misreading of Putin's rhetoric and its motivation to prevent Moscow from using nuclear weapons. When Putin mentions his nuclear arsenal, he is not warning Russia that it may use tactical nuclear ** in Ukraine. On the contrary, his rhetoric was intended to threaten NATO itself. This is a clear warning sign that reminds American decision-makers: in order to achieve victory in Ukraine, Moscow is ready for a nuclear confrontation with Washington.

To understand this, we first need to consider the situation on the battlefield. Tactical nuclear ** will not help Russia much to break through the stalemate on the battlefield. The Ukrainian army is well defended on a front line of about 600 miles, and even if it has dozens of tactical cores**, it will not be enough for the Russian army to break the encirclement. In addition, Russia lacks the necessary maneuverable reserves to take advantage of any breakthrough caused by these **. Of course, a nuclear attack would be extremely terrible for the Ukrainians, but it would still not be enough to break the will of the Ukrainians, or force Kyiv to surrender. The great courage shown by the Ukrainian people in the face of all these atrocities shows that even a tactical nuclear strike is just another record of Russian atrocities. According to the Munich Security Conference and a Ukrainian think tank, the Ukrainian public is reluctant to surrender to Moscow or stop fighting, even in the face of a nuclear threat.

In fact, if Russia were to carry out a tactical nuclear strike, it could instead hurt its war efforts. At a time when the West's willingness to support Ukraine is beginning to wane, such an attack is likely to strengthen the West's willingness to support it (which has a strong incentive across the political spectrum to ensure that nuclear weapons are never used in war). In addition, a nuclear strike could prompt China and India to abandon Russia. Both Beijing and New Delhi have issued public statements dissuading Moscow from using nuclear weapons. If Putin turns a deaf ear, they will be very unhappy.

For Putin, the use of nuclear ** in Ukraine is more than worth the cost. In fact, he currently believes that there is no benefit in using nuclear ** anywhere. Putin believes that Russia can achieve victory in Ukraine by conventional means. Speaking at a press conference on December 14, he said: "To put it modestly, our armed forces are improving their situation almost on the entire front. He also noted that Western support for Kyiv appears to be dwindling, and claimed that soon, "aid" to Ukraine will be "exhausted." As long as Putin remains optimistic about Russia's odds, he is unlikely to take a risky escalation to shake the status quo.

But Putin doesn't always think so. If the West again makes a strong commitment to support Kyiv's efforts to retake all the occupied territories and provide Ukraine with long-term financial support and a strong defense industry, Putin may decide that he may not be able to crush Ukraine through a war of attrition. Moreover, if Western economic sanctions finally begin to wreak havoc on Russia's economy, Putin may conclude that time is not on his side. Russia** may decide to redouble its efforts instead of waiting for the collapse of Ukraine. That's when the real escalation risk begins.

For the United States and its allies, the risk of a first round of escalation may be more of a bluff. For example, the Kremlin may first move its large long-range nuclear-armed aircraft carriers to deployed and dispersed locations, rather than its normal bases that are vulnerable to U.S. attacks. It can send most of the ballistic missile submarines out to sea, transfer a large number of strategic missile forces into the vast Russian forests, and load nuclear ** onto strategic bombers. These actions are far from the actual use of nuclear bombs, but they will still be deeply alarming. They will undoubtedly attract the attention of Washington,Sharply escalate tensions and immediately force Western leaders to consider the risk of nuclear war in their decision-making.

Based on this, Moscow may really begin to exert force pressure on NATO. It could shoot down a NATO aircraft in allied airspace or international airspace, or attack NATO ships in the Black Sea. Another possibility is that it attacked ** convoys that claimed to be bound for Ukraine, and these convoys were passing through a country on NATO's eastern flank. These moves will rapidly expand the scope of the conflict and draw NATO into the war. Moscow may also intensify this operation by conducting a nuclear demonstration on the high seas.

In the worst-case scenario, the Kremlin is trying to shock the world with this and force the world to quickly end the war in Ukraine on Putin's terms that Russia could launch nuclear directly into NATO territory**. While Putin appeared to be lukewarm about the approach at an annual forum in October, claiming that Russia does not need to lower the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons, it still seems necessary if the war situation is significantly unfavorable to Russia. Eighty percent of U.S. military aid to Ukraine is channelled through an air base in eastern Poland, so this base is likely to be a prime target. If that happens, the United States could retaliate with a nuclear strike that would push the world to the brink of destruction.

It may not take too long from Putin's escalation to ordering a nuclear strike, from issuing a sharp nuclear threat and a conventional attack to actually ordering a nuclear strike. If Putin slowly escalates, launches smaller attacks and observes NATO's response, then he runs the risk of triggering a conventional conflict in which NATO forces may intervene directly in Ukraine, and possibly even inside Russia where the West has a clear advantage. NATO's conventional power is superior to Russia's, so Putin does not want to give Washington time and space to play to its advantage. Therefore, he may want to quickly escalate to the nuclear level At the nuclear level, Russia is equal to the United States.

The United States certainly does not want Moscow to resort to nuclear, although they do not seem to believe that Putin will do so. As a result, they are trying to deter Russia's escalation by threatening "catastrophic consequences" if Putin uses his nuclear arsenal, as the White House said in September 2022. But such warnings are unlikely to intimidate Russia**. Putin may see this threat as a bluff;He understands that, in the final analysis, Washington does not want to provoke a nuclear conflict over the Ukrainian issue. At the same time, Putin is so determined to achieve victory in Ukraine that he may choose to escalate quickly even if he thinks the United States may respond with force. He may be suspicious of the gravity of the U.S. threat and believe that Washington will ultimately choose to compromise rather than launch a nuclear strike on Russia, which could lead to a nuclear counterattack on the U.S. homeland.

Unfortunately, Washington has not been able to prevent Putin from escalating to the use of nuclear ** as a result of the war in Ukraine. While Putin will not downplay the importance of such an escalation and the serious risks to Russia, he may expect to win a battle of wills in a nuclear crisis. Therefore, if Washington wants to avoid a nuclear confrontation, it will have to adopt a different strategy. Instead, U.S. policymakers should pursue policies aimed at subverting Russia's decision-making, and once Putin orders escalation, he will face internal counterattacks. This means strengthening the capabilities of Russia** that wants to deter Putin from taking any nuclear action. Given the extremely poor relations between the United States and Russia, this is not an easy task. But Washington can start by increasing its engagement with Moscow, as offensive as it may seem. The only way for the United States**, including the intelligence services, is to establish more direct contacts to foster dissent in Russia**.

The United States must also convince Russia** that the path out of Ukraine can be both a victory and a humiliating defeat. For example, Washington could suggest that only the highest level ** would be punished for unleashing the war, that any reparations to Ukraine would be limited, and that there would be the possibility of lifting sanctions against Russia and allowing it to reintegrate into the international community. But it is not too clear what such an outcome will bring. Russia's top brass only need to know that their options are not limited to capitulation or nuclear escalation.

Still, the United States cannot count on Russia alone to prevent Putin from using nuclear weapons. At the same time, they must unite neutral countries and put pressure on Moscow to avoid nuclear escalation. They need to push these countries to make it clear in their dialogue with Russia that any use of nuclear ** is illegal and will lead them to cut off all direct and tacit support for Russia's war effort. China's and India's public warnings about a nuclear strike are a positive sign, but they and other countries, such as Turkey, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, can do more.

This is a necessary measure. Nuclear brinkmanship is an extremely dangerous game, especially for a leader like Putin. Now is not the time for complacency. To avoid nuclear war, the nations of the world must convince Moscow that the cost of a nuclear war in Ukraine is not worth it, and that the world should not be pushed to the brink, let alone crossed.

Peter Schroeder is an adjunct senior fellow in the Transatlantic Security Program at the Center for a New American Security. From 2018 to 2022, he served as the chief deputy national intelligence officer for Russia and Eurasia at the U.S. National Intelligence Council and was a member of the Advanced Analytics Division of the Intelligence Agency.