During the Seventh National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 1945, when he spoke, he made a profound review of his mistakes such as improper command and "self-righteousness" in the "Battle of the Hundred Regiments".
**Ask Shi Zhe: "Did you listen to the speech at the conference that day?"What do you know and think?”
Shi Zhe said: "I listened attentively to his speech, and I felt that it was okay, not only touching on substantive issues, but also making self-examination, and the attitude of admitting mistakes was also sincere ......”
** said: "You are right, but he is very reluctant to admit his mistakes!”
The chairman's words made Shi Zhe a little puzzled, he knew that ** had a positive attitude towards the Battle of the Hundred Regiments. Shi Zhe remembers very well that after the end of the Battle of the Hundred Regiments, ** called Mr. Peng and said: "The Battle of the Hundred Regiments is really exciting, can such a battle be organized once or twice?"”
Shi Zhe didn't understand, how could the battle of the hundred regiments, which turned out to be "gong", become a "pass" five years later?
Why did Mr. Peng review the launch of the Hundred Regiments War?Should the Battle of the Hundred Regiments be fought?Will it have a positive or negative impact?How to evaluate this big war?
The plan for the battle of the 100 regiments, formulated in late July 1940, although it was formulated in the name of Mr. Zhu and Mr. Peng, but Mr. Zhu was not on the front line at that time, but was led by the deputy commander-in-chief of the Eighth Route Army and the commander-in-chief of the front, and jointly planned by Zuo Quan, chief of staff, and political commissar of the 129th Division, commander and political commissar of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region.
In May 1939, Tada Jun became the commander of the North China Front of the Japanese Army, and the new officer took office three times, and Tada Jun proposed a new tactic - "cage warfare".
The main point of this is to build a three-dimensional blockade of the anti-Japanese base areas on railways, highways, and other major transportation routes, and at the same time implement the "three lights" policy of burning, killing, and robbing all of them to compress the living space of the Eighth Route Army, so that our base areas will face the test of life and death.
If you want to survive, you can only break the cage.
At the same time, in response to the national **, the Japanese also changed their thinking, no longer insisting on Chiang Kai-shek**, but determined to negotiate with Chiang Kai-shek, and launched the "Tong work" plan to lure Chiang Kai-shek to surrender.
The Kuomintang also openly expressed its hope for a "glorious peace," and in November 1939 sent representatives to Hong Kong to hold secret talks with Suzuki Zole of the Japanese General Staff Headquarters on behalf of the Kuomintang**.
In short, the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression has reached the most critical moment, if the Eighth Route Army in North China can break the cage of the Japanese army and fight some beautiful battles, it will not only improve the living environment of the Eighth Route Army, but also contain the Japanese army in North China, and will be able to boost the morale of the Chinese people, so that the Kuomintang can see hope and dispel the idea of peace talks with the Japanese army.
So, how to fight the Battle of the Hundred Regiments?How to break the cage of the Japanese army?
The top brass of the Eighth Route Army believed that it should be mainly a sabotage war, that is, the destruction of the enemy's communication lines.
In this regard, our army has successful experience.
As early as January 1940, Liu Deng's 129th Division successfully carried out several sabotage battles.
At that time, Chief of Staff Zuo Quan went to the 129th Division for investigation and praised Liu Deng's sabotage battle. Therefore, the Battle of the Hundred Regiments decided to popularize the experience of the 129th Division's sabotage warfare, expand the scope of the sabotage attack, and carry out an unprecedented large-scale sabotage attack on the entire Zhengtai Road, smashing the "cage" of the Japanese army in one fell swoop.
After research, preparations for the Great War began in late July 1940, and the start time was set for August 20.
Since it is a sabotage warfare, it is different from positional warfare, and the focus is on destroying the enemy's communication arteries, not fighting the enemy's regular army, and not taking the number of enemies destroyed as the main indicator.
The target of the Zhengtai Road raid was the railway, and the rails on which the train was running were completely removed, not a single sleeper was left, and not a single bridge was allowed to exist.
However, after the start of the war, the direction in which the battlefield situation develops will not depend on the will of the people. We advocate engaging the enemy, but the Japanese army cannot stand idly by during the attack, and must send troops to strike, and at this time we can only meet the battle. Therefore, in the later part of the raid battle, it became a stormy battle and an encounter battle, and more and more troops were invested, deviating from the originally predetermined track.
According to the original plan, the Zhengtai Road Raid was mainly participated by Liu Deng's 129th Division and ***'s Jinchaji, and the troops invested were 22 regiments.
However, at the beginning of the battle, the enemy was taken by surprise, the battle was very effective, the enthusiasm of the participating troops was high, the commander also began to get excited, and the 120th Division also asked to participate in the battle, and was allowed.
In the 120th division alone, more than 20 regiments were invested.
Before you know it, 105 regiments have already entered the battle, which is more than 5 times the estimated strength, and the scale of the battle is beyond expectations.
In December 1940, the five-month Battle of the Hundred Regiments came to an end.
The Battle of the Hundred Regiments was the largest and longest-lasting strategic offensive campaign launched by the Eighth Route Army in North China in the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, leaving a strong mark in the history of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression.
The Japanese army's "cage policy" was completely broken, and the base areas developed in an all-round way
After three and a half months of fierce fighting in the Battle of the Hundred Regiments, the Eighth Route Army fought more than 1,820 large and small battles, killing and wounding 2 Japanese soldiers20,000 people, more than 5,100 puppet troops, and more than 50,000 enemies were annihilated.
In addition, more than 2,900 Japanese strongholds were uprooted, and more than 470 kilometers of railways and more than 1,500 kilometers of highways were destroyed. After this battle, the Japanese army's cage of Tada Jun existed in name only, and the base areas of Shanxi, Hebei, Luyu, and Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei were expanded, and they were almost completely opened.
Boosting the morale of the Kuomintang, the Japanese army's policy of inducing surrender was declared bankrupt
The Battle of the Hundred Regiments brought great shock to the Japanese army, and they had to increase their troops to North China, and in the spring of 1941, one division of the 11th Army and one division of the 13th Army was transferred from Wuhan, Nanjing, Shanghai and Hangzhou to North China.
As a result, the military pressure on the frontal battlefield was sharply reduced, the morale of the people and the army was greatly boosted, and the top level of the Kuomintang in Chongqing chose to turn a blind eye to the olive branch thrown by the Japanese side.
In this regard, the Japanese side's "History of Army Operations in the China Incident" also admits that it was the Battle of the Hundred Regiments that caused the "Tong Work" plan launched by the Japanese army in 1940 to lure Chiang Kai-shek to be aborted.
The slowdown of the Japanese in the Pacific theater eased the pressure on the Allied battlefield
The Battle of the Hundred Regiments shook the Japanese army, and it had to draw a large number of troops from central and southeastern China. As a result, the pace of the Japanese army's southward advance into the Pacific Ocean also slowed down.
In this sense, without the deterrent power of the Battle of the Hundred Regiments, the Japanese army would have been more unscrupulous in moving south.
In short, the Battle of the Hundred Regiments was of great significance and the results were brilliant, so the chairman who was far away in Yan'an was very excited, and sent a special message to the headquarters of the Eighth Route Army to congratulate him, and said that such a battle "can be organized once or twice".
The Battle of the Hundred Regiments caused huge attrition to the Eighth Route Army
As we all know, the Kuomintang is only responsible for the first ammunition of about 50,000 people in the three divisions of the Eighth Route Army, and the rest mainly comes from capture, and the amount of ammunition captured is pitifully small, so the Eighth Route Army can only fight guerrilla warfare.
In the Battle of the Hundred Regiments, a total of 700,000 rounds of ammunition were consumed, and only 360,000 rounds were captured. Consumes a variety of shells90,000 rounds, only 3,000 shells were captured. Grenades consumed 120,000 grenades, and only 5,000 were captured.
This is to collect firewood for a thousand days and burn it a day, and all the savings of our army for many years will be exhausted at once, and when we fight the Japanese army again, the ammunition will be stretched thin.
The main forces of our army were exposed, and the frenzied retaliation of the Japanese army was provoked
Originally, the Eighth Route Army was mainly a guerrilla war, mainly on a small scale, and the enemy could not figure out the strength of our army at all.
The battle of 100 regiments rushed forward and dispatched more than 100 regiments, which was very eye-catching, which made the Japanese army in North China more aware of the threat of the Eighth Route Army, and regarded our army as a confidant and no longer took it lightly.
The Eighth Route Army was launched in North China"Battle of the Hundred Regiments"Later, the Japanese army immediately formulated the "Outline of Methods for Suppressing the Communists", determined to take revenge frantically and exterminate the Eighth Route Army in North China.
It was also from 1941 that the anti-Japanese resistance in North China entered the most difficult stage.
The May Day Sweep in 1942 caused the Eighth Route Army to suffer heavy losses, some units were wiped out as formations, and the masses in the base areas also suffered greatly.
The Battle of the Hundred Regiments shocked Chiang Kai-shek, and a new round of ** climax was set off
Before the Battle of the Hundred Regiments, not only did the Japanese army not know how many Eighth Route Armies there were in North China, but Chiang Kai-shek himself did not know. After the war, the Japanese army was shocked by the strength of the Eighth Route Army, and Chiang Kai-shek agreed to feel the thrill.
At the beginning of the Anti-Japanese War, the Eighth Route Army had only 3 divisions and 450,000 people, an increase of about 10 times in just 3 years.
If this continues, Japan will be defeated at that time, and the Communist Party will not be able to lose its tail, and the Kuomintang will lose power, so how can Chiang Kai-shek not be extremely afraid?
Therefore, Chiang Kai-shek began to make things difficult for the Eighth Route Army, and the Eighth Route Army did not pay 60,000 legal dollars per month for each division: Who made you develop so fast?
Not only that, the Kuomintang diehards set off a ** climax, framed the rebellion of the New Fourth Army in the south of the Yangtze River, and launched the "Southern Anhui Incident" in the same room.
In addition to what was said above, the consumption of the Eighth Route Army is too great, and the follow-up ammunition is difficult to maintain, mainly for three points:
First, the propaganda is fanfare and too high-profile;The second is tactical distortion;The third is that he did not ask for instructions and made his own claims.
In the Battle of the Hundred Regiments, the troops invested by our army were originally "secret", as long as our army did not publicize it, the Japanese army and Chiang Kai-shek would not know about it.
Because the Battle of the Hundred Regiments launched a sabotage battle, and most of them were carried out at night, not a decisive battle, and the number of troops could not be counted. If it is not advertised, the Japanese army can only judge by feeling.
Moreover, the sabotage war can be participated in by both military personnel and civilians (men, women, and children). In fact, during the raid, many militiamen and villagers from the base areas did come to help.
In short, we do not advertise, and the enemy does not know how many troops we have dispatched. However, the headquarters of the Eighth Route Army carried out propaganda on the Battle of the Hundred Regiments with great fanfare, repeatedly emphasizing that we had dispatched "one hundred regiments".
** At the time of the "Seventh National Congress", he made no secret of saying that he was very dissatisfied with the propaganda work of the Hundred Regiments War.
During the Yan'an rectification, ** criticized that this kind of propaganda completely exposed our strength, caused the Japanese aggressors to re-understand our strength, and made the enemy concentrate his forces to attack us. At the same time, Chiang Kai-shek increased his vigilance against us, and you advertised that 100 regiments would participate in the war, and Chiang Kai-shek panicked.
He has always had the mentality that he is afraid that we will expand our forces behind enemy lines, and in his opinion, our development is a threat to him.
The second is that the tactics are out of shape and they do not measure their own strength
Our army does not have enough ammunition, so it can only choose to conduct guerrilla warfare.
There were no problems with the tactics at the beginning of the Battle of the Hundred Regiments, the main "sabotage battle". Later, however, he began to attack strongholds and pillboxes and confront the enemy, deviating from the principle of "independent mountain guerrilla warfare" and attacking the enemy's strengths with his own shortcomings.
The third is that he did not wait for a reply and made his own claims
The biggest controversy in the Battle of the Hundred Regiments is not in the battle itself, if it is ** that decides to launch a campaign, Mr. Peng does not need to review.
So, has the Hundred Regiments Battle been asked for instructions *** Is there any approval?
There must be instructions, Peng is always a party member, Liu Deng and *** are also party members, the party's organizational principle, subordinates obey superiors is the minimum.
On July 22, 1940, 30 days before the launch of the Hundred Regiments War, the Field Headquarters of the Eighth Route Army submitted a report on the launching of the war to the ** Military Commission.
However, this report did not involve 100 regiments, but 23 regiments.
Later, according to the changes in the situation, it gradually developed to 100 regiments, and only then did it come into being called the "Battle of 100 Regiments".
When it began to invest in the scale of 100 regiments, it was not officially approved by the first class, and it was lacking in organizational principles.
Although the Battle of the Hundred Regiments had been asked for instructions in advance, it was launched without the approval of **, Comrade ** also frankly admitted it.
He said: "After the decision of the headquarters, a telegram was sent to the districts on July 22 and reported to the Military Commission. "The original attack plan started in early August, in fact, it started in late July, ten days earlier than the original plan, and all started without waiting for the *** reply to arrive.
The reason why Mr. Peng did this was mainly from the consideration of capturing fighters.
The warplanes on the battlefield were fleeting, and late July was the time when the green gauze tent was at its thickest.
First of all, at this time, the Japanese puppet army was worried that the Eighth Route Army would use the green gauze tent to retreat from our base area in advance.
Therefore, all our military regions and military sub-divisions should be prepared in advance, and when the enemy withdraws from the pillbox fortifications, they should seize the rare opportunity to destroy the enemy in a hearty and vigorous manner, and destroy the pillboxes and blockade ditch walls they have built.
In order to prevent the enemy from discovering and to ensure a simultaneous surprise attack in various places, so as to give the enemy a greater shock, it began about 10 days earlier than scheduled, that is, in late July. "So without waiting for the approval of the Military Commission (which is not right), the battle was launched early. ”
At that time, it was normal to have a reply and not to reply, because Mr. Peng initially prepared for a "Zhengtai Road" sabotage battle, and did not deviate from the consistent guerrilla warfare principle of the Eighth Route Army.
Of course, even if the scale was later expanded and the big battle of 105 regiments was put into action, judging from the reaction of ***, it was also recognized, otherwise it would not have been said "organize one or two more times".
However, it is our party's tradition to sum up lessons and lessons after the war. It is also necessary to "summarize and reflect" and "dig deep into problems" during the rectification period and the Seventh National Congress of the Communist Party of China. Therefore, Shi Zhe, as the director of the office, cannot understand the chairman's good intentions, and it is normal for him to not figure it out.
However, Mr. Peng was handsome and had little communication with the chairman, so it was not surprising that the chairman criticized Mr. Peng's review as "very reluctant" from a work perspective.
Mr. Peng, who felt aggrieved, took the initiative to go to the chairman's cave for a long talk, and also called Vice Chairman Zhou to go with him.
The chairman took the initiative to "make three chapters" with Mr. Peng: first, without reservation, he spoke thoroughly;Second, you can scold your mother but you can't hold grudges;Third, the review should not affect the work.
** also smiled and said: "The first article of the gentleman's agreement is to speak thoroughly, don't miss this opportunity." ”
Then the chairman apologized to Mr. Peng: The responsibility for such a consequence lies with himself, he did not communicate with you in advance, and did not explain to you afterwards.
The chairman's humility and introspection made Mr. Peng moved after listening, ** understanding and trust is better than any reward, he sighed: There are the chairman's words, even now I am called to die without regrets, I used to have a misunderstanding and complaining about you, and please forgive me, because I am a rough person.
As soon as the two of you say a word to me, the estrangement between each other suddenly disappeared.