[Text: Observer.com, Li Zexi].
According to the Dutch "**8** told the details of an old case - the United States and Israel used an insider of the Dutch intelligence service in 2007 to inject computer viruses into Iran's nuclear research and development facilities, so that Iran's nuclear industry progress was delayed for more than a year. According to the report, a number of Dutch intelligence officers said that the Dutch intelligence department actually did not know about the specific plans of the United States and Israel for the "war act" in which the Netherlands participated, and the Netherlands was even more kept in the dark.
In 2007, Dutch spy Erik van Sabben reportedly took advantage of access to Iran's Natanz nuclear facility to drop the Stuxnet virus into the facility's computer system, causing nearly 1,000 nuclear centrifuges to explode and causing a major setback to Iran's nuclear industry.
Back in 2003, Western intelligence agencies confirmed that Iran had plans to enrich uranium. In 2004, the U.S.** Intelligence Agency and Israel's Mossad formally requested the Netherlands' Directorate of Intelligence and Security (AIVD) whether the Netherlands could help the two countries gain access to Iran's Natanz nuclear facility. The United States and Israel chose to use Dutch intelligence agents because they were "too conspicuous" to have access to the Natanz nuclear facility, while Dutch intelligence officers were known to be "creative," "unnoticed," and "experienced in nuclear industry intelligence."
In 2008, the then Iranian ** Mahmoud Ahmadinejad visited the Natanz nuclear facility (Source: Iran** Office).
In 2005, after the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iran intensified its attacks on the United States and Israel, and increased investment in nuclear research and development, and the United States and Israel also intensively pushed forward actions to sabotage Iran's nuclear industry. In the same year, the Dutch Directorate General of Intelligence and Security contacted Van Saben, an engineer working for a logistics company in Dubai, which was shipping parts used in industries such as oil and gas to Iran in defiance of Western sanctions.
In 2006, Michael Hayden, then director of U.S. intelligence, personally went to the Dutch Military Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD) to stress to the Dutch personnel the need to bring some "pumps" into Iran's Natanz nuclear facility, saying that these "pumps" would cause nuclear centrifuges to self-detonate. According to Dutch officials present at the time, Hayden described the "pumps" as spending more than a billion dollars to develop. * said Hayden himself recently admitted that the meeting took place.
** reported that although the Dutch intelligence services knew that they were involved in the plan to sabotage Iran's nuclear weapons, they did not know exactly how the United States and Israel used their intelligence personnel to sabotage the Natanz nuclear facility, except for the "water pump" statement of the United States. It is not known whether Van Saben introduced the virus to Iran's Natanz nuclear facility via a water pump or another USB, according to different intelligence agency personnel interviewed.
**" quoted a number of Dutch intelligence officers as saying that "the Americans took advantage of us ruthlessly". One of the Dutch intelligence officers directly involved in the operation said that "we should have asked more questions at the time".
The report pointed out that the most dissatisfying thing for the Dutch was that they seemed to have carried out "acts of war" against Iran in a "vague way". A Dutch intelligence and security executive said the ministry had been "protecting the prime minister's reputation" and not informing him of risky actions that could have political consequences. In addition to the Prime Minister, the report said that the Dutch Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, which is part of the Intelligence Service, and the relevant parliamentary committee responsible for overseeing the Intelligence Service, had no knowledge of the Dutch involvement in the operation. One ** said that it was "unbelievable, the intelligence bureau thought it could do whatever it wanted, as if it were God." ”
Netherlands Directorate of Intelligence and Security.
Wim Kuijken, then secretary general of the Dutch Ministry of General Services in 2007, said he was also unaware of this, believing that it was one of the professional responsibilities of the intelligence agency to inform superiors and ministers, partly because such an operation would require high-level coordination, and partly because such an operation could have significant geopolitical implications.
The real names quoted in the report are all former**. No current Dutch senior ** has commented on the report, but some members of parliament have called for an investigation to find out why ** did not know about it. Both Dutch and U.S. intelligence agencies declined to comment. The prime minister at the time, Jan Peter Balkenende, said he "did not want to recall his tenure as prime minister" and could not comment on classified information.
In addition to the Netherlands and Israel, Germany and France were also involved in the operation. It is reported that Germany provided the technical parameters of the Siemens system used by Iran to control the nuclear centrifuge;It is not yet known how France will participate in the operation, but it has the most advanced nuclear industry and nuclear technology in Europe. Since five countries were involved in the operation, the operation was codenamed "Olympic Games", which stands for the Olympic rings. In addition, the British were also involved in the operation, but they were not counted as part of it.
In addition to being involved in the creation of the computer virus, Israeli intelligence agents were responsible for ensuring that Van Saben's company won the bid, Iran** agreed to allow personnel, including Van Saben, to install perimeter facilities for the Natanz nuclear facility, and Israel ensured that Van Saben himself had access to the Natanz nuclear facility several times in 2007.
Van Saben data map (Source: "*
This "Olympic operation" spans the US administrations of George W. Bush and Barack Obama, and it is reported that both men personally commanded the operation.
Using the intelligence obtained by Van Saben and the information provided by their allies, the United States and Israel devised a specific plan: create a computer virus that would close the valve at a critical moment, so that the nuclear centrifuge could not produce gas, and all of them would explode due to high air pressure when the system showed that everything was normal. Between 2009 and 2010, nearly a thousand Natanz's nuclear centrifuges malfunctioned, bringing nearly 20% of Iran's nuclear centrifuges off the assembly line, which analysts believe delayed the development of Iran's nuclear industry for about a year and a half. Later, as the United States and Israel adapted the virus to replicate itself, Stuxnet quickly spread to the Internet, becoming known to the world in 2010, and during the time it dealt an even more severe blow to Iran's nuclear industry, Siemens then made updated software for its own systems to remove the virus.
Van Saben himself did not end well. At the end of 2008, just as his Iranian wife was preparing for the New Year, he suddenly "panicked" and asked to leave Iran immediately, and Van Saben's relatives in the Netherlands were very puzzled by the sudden change. On January 16, 2009, Van Saben was riding a motorcycle in Dubai when he overturned and died instantly. After learning of Van Saben's involvement in intelligence work, his mother, although still believing that Van Saben's death was an accident, also said that she finally understood his strange behavior before his death.