The second anti encirclement and suppression created the military dialectic of the Red Army s war

Mondo Culture Updated on 2024-01-28

The Second Anti-"Encirclement and Suppression"** Outline (May 16, 31, 1931). Information**.

At the beginning of February 1931, Chiang Kai-shek sent Minister of Military Affairs He Yingqin to concurrently serve as the commander-in-chief of the army, navy and air force and the director of the Nanchang camp, acting as the commander-in-chief, and began to organize the second "encirclement and suppression" of the Red Army and the ** revolutionary base area.

In view of the lessons learned from the failure of the first "encirclement and suppression," Chiang Kai-shek doubled the strength of the "encirclement and suppression" to a total of 200,000 troops, and decided to "concentrate troops, closely encircle, and slow advance as the main purpose." First of all, he would gather troops around the base areas, implement an economic blockade, and cut off all materials from entering the base areas, and then adopt the operational policy of "fighting steadily and steadily, step by step," and use the main forces to attack together and coordinate with each other, with a view to "annihilating" the Red Front Army and "destroying" the revolutionary base areas.

He Yingqin ambitiously declared: We already have a complete and precise plan for the "suppression of the communists" this time, and we have absolute superiority in both material and spiritual aspects, and there is certainly the possibility of "extermination."

With 200,000 enemy troops pressing the border, the situation is very critical. At this time, the Red Army had only more than 30,000 men, and in the face of the huge disparity in the strength of the enemy and us, how could we defeat the more with less, defeat the strong with the weak, and break the second "encirclement and suppression"?In view of the enemy's strategic intentions, it was decided to still adopt the policy of the first anti-"encirclement and suppression": "lure the enemy into depth," concentrate superior forces, look for the enemy's weak points exposed during the march, and attack each one.

At the beginning of April, just as the revolutionary base area was preparing for the anti-"encirclement and suppression", the delegation sent after the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee arrived in Qingtang, Ningdu County, Jiangxi Province. In the middle of the year, the ** Bureau of the Soviet District of the Communist Party of China held a meeting in Qingtang to discuss the principles and tactics of the second anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaign. At the beginning of the meeting, there was a fierce debate about whether to fight or not. Some were shocked by the heavy pressure and tight encirclement of the Kuomintang army, believing that the disparity in strength between the two sides was so great that the Red Army could not break the "encirclement and suppression" and advocated withdrawing from the base areas and seeking other developmentSome put forward the strategy of "dividing the forces and retreating from the enemy" in an attempt to "disperse the forces and make the enemy's encirclement empty."Some people once said that Sichuan was the most ideal base area in China and should be the "sword of Shangfang", and advocated abandoning the ** revolutionary base area.

Neither agreed with the withdrawal of the Red Army from the base areas, nor with the strategy of "dividing troops and retreating from the enemy". He insisted on adopting the principle of "luring the enemy into depth," luring the enemy into the base area, taking advantage of the conditions in the base area, looking for an opportunity, and concentrating forces to defeat each other. At the meeting, there were differences of opinion, and the parties were at loggerheads. What to do?** It was proposed that the meeting be expanded to include the commanders, political commissars, chiefs of staff, and directors of the political departments of the armies, and said: Let the comrades who are at the front line to direct the campaign and battle have more opinions.

At this critical moment, many high-ranking cadres of the Red Army generously expressed their views on the basis of ironclad facts on the battlefield and bloody lessons, supported the views of the Red Army, and resolutely advocated breaking the second "encirclement and suppression" in the base areas. The responsible persons of the special committees of southern Jiangxi and western Fujian also resolutely disagreed with the withdrawal of the main force of the Red Army from the base areas. In this way, the opinion of ** has changed from a minority to a majority.

The issue of "whether to fight or not" has been resolved, and the operational policy and tactical issues such as how to fight and which enemy to strike first have again become the focus of discussion at the meeting. Some advocated attacking the 19th Route Army of the Kuomintang Army first, and then fighting from the south to the north, on the grounds that the 19th Route Army had only two divisions, and it was stationed in Xingguo in isolation, far away from the other Route Army, and it was the most combat-effective unit in this "encirclement and suppression."Some advocated fighting the 6th Route Army of the Kuomintang Army first, on the grounds that the 6th Route Army was Chiang Kai-shek's cronies in the miscellaneous army.

This time, **'s opinion has become a minority again. He held that among the enemy troops participating in the "encirclement and suppression," the Kuomintang Army's 19th Route Army was relatively strong, and there was no certainty of victory in attacking them, while although the Kuomintang Army's 5th Route Army was the main force in this "encirclement and suppression," it came from the north and was not Xi of fighting in the southMore importantly, after defeating the 5th Route Army of the Kuomintang Army, sweeping eastward can expand the base area in the Jianning area at the junction of Fujian and Jiangxi, so as to facilitate the breaking of the next "encirclement and suppression";The Red Army must fight as many battles as it can win with certainty, and not fight battles that it is not sure ofIt is necessary to choose the enemy's weakness and break the "encirclement and suppression". * It is believed that striking a weak enemy first and then a strong enemy is a basic principle that must be grasped in a situation where the enemy is strong and we are weak for a long time. After discussion, the meeting adopted the operational policy of "attacking the weak enemy first" and decided to attack the 47th and 28th divisions of the 5th Route Army of the Kuomintang Army in the Futian area first.

On the 19th, as soon as the meeting of the CPC Soviet District Bureau to discuss the anti-"encirclement and suppression" was concluded, the Red Army immediately issued the "Pre-War Troop Concentration Order" of the Red Front Army, requiring all armies and divisions to concentrate in the central part of the base area and wait for the opportunity to annihilate the enemy. On the 23rd, the armies were concentrated in the Longgang and Shanggu areas southeast of Ji'an. Subsequently, the troops advanced 20 kilometers west from Longgang and assembled covertly in the Donggu area.

Donggu is located in the south-central part of Jiangxi, at the junction of five counties, Ji'an, Jishui, Yongfeng, Taihe and Xingguo, and is also known as "Dongjinggang". Donggu is surrounded by lofty mountains, and there are only 5 winding roads that lead to the outside of the mountain. Since the Kuomintang Fifth Route Army arrived in Jiangxi, it has been very unaccustomed to the climate, language, and living Xi; especially after penetrating deep into the base areas, it has often been attacked and harassed by the Red Army and local guerrillas, and its fear is abnormal and its morale is depressed. After the army reached the Tomita area, it could not hold out.

It is necessary to draw the enemy out and annihilate him in the movement, which is the firm policy of destroying the 5th Route Army of the Kuomintang Army. In order to select and arrange the battlefield for destroying the enemy, ** and *** went to Baiyun Mountain between Donggu and Futian to inspect the terrain. **Say to ***: The 4th Army and the 3rd Army of the Red 1st Army will fight frontally, and your Red 3rd Army will all be packed and copied, and the enemy will definitely collapse.

More than 30,000 Red Army troops hid in the Donggu Mountains and forests for more than 20 days, but there was still no sign of the enemy's eastward advance. At this time, many Red Army commanders and fighters became impatient because of their eagerness to fight. In order to be cautious and ensure that the first battle is successfully fought, ** presided over a meeting of leading cadres of the Red Front Army to further analyze the situation on both sides of the enemy. He said: Although there are many troops encircling us, there are many weaknesses, such as the inconsistency between the warlords and the warlords, the lack of unity of command, the inconsistency of officers and men, the reluctance of the soldiers to fight the Red Army, the lack of mass conditions, the unfamiliarity of the terrain, and the difficulty of supplying and transporting suppliesAlthough we have a small number of people, we have many advantages: First, the Red Army is good, the fighting mood of the soldiers and the masses is very high at this time, the cadres are very enthusiastic, the unity of the Red Army is very strong, and everyone is gearing up to fightSecond, the masses are good, the masses have received the benefits of the agrarian revolution and have been crushed by the enemy, and of course they are in a good mood for struggle, and they are extremely supportive of the Red ArmyThirdly, the terrain is good, we are very familiar with the terrain in this area, and we can occupy superior terrain to attack the enemy.

The in-depth ideological work has unraveled the ideological knots of those comrades who are impatient. More than 30,000 Red Army troops gathered in the deep mountains and valleys of Donggu, built strong fortifications, and decided to fight the first battle of the second anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaign.

On May 13, as expected, a brigade of the 28th and 47th Divisions of the Kuomintang Army finally left Futian and attacked the Donggu area by two routes. At 10:15 p.m. that night, the order was given to destroy the enemy attacking Donggu.

On the evening of the 14th, the radio station of the headquarters of the Red Army intercepted the radio station of the 28th Division of the Kuomintang Army stationed in Futian and the radio station of the division's garrison in Ji'an. Divisional radio: "We are now stationed in Tomita and will leave tomorrow morning." Ji'antai asked: "Go to **?."The divisional radio replied: "Donggu." "The 28th Division of the Kuomintang Army thought that the Red Army did not have a radio station as in the past, so it blatantly sent a report in clear code. At the same time, ** also learned that the 28th and 47th Divisions of the Kuomintang Army were advancing eastward in two ways, the 47th Division was advancing along Guanyin Cliff and Jiucunling to Donggu, and the 28th Division was advancing along Zhongdong to Donggu. Tomita and Donggu are separated by 20 kilometers, and only two avenues are connected, both of which have a steep mountain pass.

After obtaining information, it was decided to take a bold action: the main force of the Red Army immediately advanced westward from the 25-kilometer gap between the 43rd and 60th divisions of the Kuomintang Army, and suddenly attacked the enemy's back by outflanking on both flanks, destroying the 47th and 28th divisions of the Kuomintang Army. The Red Army was ordered to set out early in the morning and march quickly. That night, ** went to the military headquarters of the Red 3rd Army, and together with the army commander Huang Gongluo, he found a guide to investigate the route. They found a path on the south side of Donggu leading to Jungdong Avenue;The main forces of the 3rd Red Army advanced by this path and surrounded the enemy's right flank. This discovery and change played an important role in the entire campaign.

At noon on the 16th, the main force of the Red 3rd Army of the Central Road, which had secretly advanced from this path, had entered the south side of Zhongdong and occupied favorable terrain, and when the rear of the 28th Division of the Kuomintang Army left Zhongdong, it suddenly launched a fierce attack from the mountain to the bottom of the mountain. The 28th Division was suddenly attacked and plunged into chaos. The main force of the Red 3rd Army took advantage of the momentum to bravely rush and kill, divided and surrounded the enemy, and fought fiercely until about 17 o'clock, annihilating most of the 28th Division. At the same time, the Red 4th Army and the Red 12th Army on the right annihilated most of a brigade of the 47th Division of the Kuomintang Army in pursuit. The 3rd Red Army Corps and the 35th Red Army on the left road, which were responsible for the roundabout mission, captured Donggu, annihilated the 28th Division station, and occupied Futian that night. On the 17th, the Red Army triumphantly rendezvoused at Tomita. The success of the first battle of the second anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaign created very favorable conditions for continuous operations in the future.

On the 19th, the Red Army swept eastward and annihilated a brigade of the 43rd Division and a brigade of the 47th Division of the Kuomintang Army at Baisha, Jishui County, winning the second victory in the second anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaign. On the 22nd, the Red Army annihilated most of a brigade of the vanguard of the 27th Division of the Kuomintang Army that came to reinforce at Zhongcun. This was the third victory in the second anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaign.

On the 23rd, after the Red Army was stationed in the Southern Regiment of Dongshao, Ningdu County, the ** Bureau of the Soviet District of the Communist Party of China decided to reconstitute the Provisional General Front Committee of the First Front Army of the Red Army of the Communist Party of China, which was the secretary of the Communist Party of China. On the 26th, ** presided over a meeting of the Provisional General Front Committee to study the battle plan. According to the situation that the three divisions of the 6th Route Army of the Kuomintang Army had all concentrated in Guangchang, the meeting decided to change the original deployment and first concentrate the main force to attack Guangchang. On the 27th, after a day of fierce fighting, the Red Army seized the county seat of Guangchang and annihilated the 5th Division of the Kuomintang Army. This was the fourth victory in the second anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaign.

On the 28th, in view of the fact that the three divisions of the 6th Route Army of the Kuomintang Army had retreated to Nanfeng, ** presided over a meeting of the Provisional General Front Committee. At the meeting, it was decided to concentrate forces to attack the 56th Division of the Kuomintang Army and seize the county seat of Jianning, so as to raise funds after the victory. On the 31st, the Red 3rd Army Corps, with the cooperation of the main force of the Red 12th Army, suddenly attacked Jianning City by surprise, annihilated more than three regiments of the 56th Division of the Kuomintang Army, captured Jianning City, and seized a large number of Western medicine and other military supplies. This was the fifth victory in the second anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaign.

Within 15 days, under the command of ***, the Red Army swept more than 700 miles from west to east, won 5 battles in a row, annihilated more than 30,000 Kuomintang troops, captured more than 20,000 pieces of various ** and a large number of military supplies, and happily broke the second "encirclement and suppression" of the Kuomintang army.

After the victory of the second anti-"encirclement and suppression", ** made this evaluation:The second anti-"encirclement and suppression" was "a model of defeating the strong with the weak, breaking the enemy individually, and combining the internal and external lines, thus creating the military dialectic of the Red Army's war."

Edit|Shen Lihong Producer|Zhao Jie.

*:China**Net-People's Liberation Army Daily.

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