Truman admits defeat, Stalin cheats, ** Anger: Don't think!
On January 16, 2004, the China Archives was officially opened to the public, containing more than 80,000 declassified Chinese diplomatic archives. These archives have attracted the attention of organizations and individuals from various countries.
Among these archives, there is a special document that attracts attention. It is not a diplomatic document, nor is it an official document, but an article that was published in an American newspaper by the famous American journalist Edgar **
1.Edgar ** is a household name in China, one of the most legendary journalists of the 20th century, who accurately reported the outbreak of the Soviet-German war and the U.S.-Japan Pacific War.
On April 9, 1949, he boldly predicted that China would become a great power governed by the Communist Party and not following the baton of the Soviet Union, a prediction that was groundbreaking at the time.
However, history has proven that his prophecy has once again come true. Is this just luck, or is it an accident of history?What kind of intriguing message did Sino-Soviet relations in 1949 reveal?
2.In January 1949, the War of Liberation entered its third year. The Huaihai Campaign and the Pingjin Campaign were coming to an end, and the million-strong People's Liberation Army was preparing to move south.
In the face of this situation, the people of Nanjing hoped that the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain and France would mediate the civil war and realize the peace talks between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. However, **saw through the intentions of the people**, so the CCP refused to negotiate peace.
It was at this time that Truman in Washington and Stalin in Moscow made different noises.
As early as 1948, the United States had already lost confidence in the Chiang Kai-shek regime. The report submitted to the White House by the U.S. Parliamentary Advisory Group states: "This regime is corrupt to the core, and there is a possibility of failure.
After that, Truman terminated aid to Chiang Kai-shek. At this time, the United States was faced with a major strategic consideration: how to deal with the CCP and the Soviet Union in the future.
Truman's diplomatic think tank believed that the Soviet Union did not consider the CCP to be its reliable ally;There were huge contradictions between the CCP and the Soviet Union, especially the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance signed between Chiang Kai-shek and Stalin, which was a clear betrayal of the CCP;The CCP is not without a favorable impression of the United States;The future relations between China and the USSR could become the next Yugoslavia, and *** could become the next Tito.
Therefore, Truman made the decision to extend an olive branch to the CCP and make it clear that he would not participate in the mediation proposed by the Kuomintang. However, this decision of the United States is aimed at its national strategy, trying to protect its interests in China, and imagining that it will still be able to enjoy the privileges it had in the old society in China in the future.
At the same time, it should also be noted that the United States is only trying to make direct contact with the CCP, and is not completely betting on our side, but also looking for new ** people within the KMT.
While Truman admitted the failure of his China policy and tried to reach out to the CCP, Stalin made the exact opposite. It's an intriguing story.
The day after the Soviet Union received the note from the people, Stalin sent a telegram to the people under the pseudonym Filippov to suggest that the people's request for peace talks be agreed. Although Stalin was well aware of the CCP's position of not wanting peace talks through his ** liaison with the CCP, he still hoped to mediate.
Stalin's intentions were clear, and the message he contained in his memorandum to Moscow of 27 December 1948 could explain his thoughts.
The memorandum mentions that the change in US policy towards China, which may lead to direct contact with the Chinese Communist Party, sensitized the Soviet Union to fear that the United States will contact and control the Chinese Communist Party and thus lose China and the entire Far East.
Therefore, the peace talks proposed by the national ** provided Stalin with an excellent opportunity to control the situation.
Stalin's suggestion made *** very dissatisfied, and he remembered the scene when Stalin asked him to go to Chongqing to negotiate during the victory of the Anti-Japanese War. Unexpectedly, when he was about to achieve a national victory, Stalin once again asked the CCP to compromise with the Kuomintang.
Therefore, we resolutely oppose the mediation of any external forces and refuse to participate in any form of negotiations. He even drafted a reply to the Nationals on behalf of the Soviet Union**, stating that there would be no mediation between the two sides of the civil war in China.
At the end of the long telegram, it was emphasized that the People's Liberation Army would attack Nanjing, and that there seemed to be no need for any more political roundabouts. Stalin's hard-line attitude surprised and embarrassed Stalin.
However, after much deliberation, Stalin finally said that he would not intervene in mediation. However, Stalin's statement did not mean that he had abandoned his attempts to control the situation. When the People's Liberation Army crossed the Yangtze River and conquered Nanjing, the Soviet ambassador to China followed Chiang Kai-shek to Guangzhou, while the American ambassador to China remained in Nanjing.
Stalin realized that *** was not an adversary that could be controlled, and that New China would not become a satellite of the Soviet Union. On July 1, 1949, "People**" published the first "On People's Democracy**", announcing that New China would "fall one-sided" to the socialist camp led by the Soviet Union.
This news made the United States furious, and immediately recalled Situ Leiden, and the connection between the CCP and the United States was completely severed. It seems that Stalin has pulled back another game and completely seized the initiative, but in fact it is not.
At that time, New China had not yet been founded, and the domestic situation was complicated, and it was in a state of ruin. Taking into account ideological and geopolitical factors, ** rejected the olive branch thrown by the United States and chose to "one-sided" the USSR.
This is in China's national interest. Although the Western countries led by the United States extended an "olive branch" at that time, the so-called "goodwill" of the United States was based on the fact that New China had to recognize the unequal treaties of the past.
In the face of such "goodwill", China will remain the original semi-colonial country. And if it turns to the United States, the nascent China will face a serious threat from its powerful neighbor to the north.
Therefore, the Soviet Union became the only option for us to restore our development and strive for international assistance.
** Putting all the grievances of the past behind him, he forgot all kinds of Soviet indifference and betrayal to him, forgot about Stalin's repeated refusals, forgot about Soviet attempts and actions, and even forgot about Stalin's prejudices.
In the end, he decided to turn New China into the socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union and implement a "one-sided" policy. However, this does not mean that he will be completely subordinate to Stalin's command.
The contest with Stalin has only just begun, and Truman will join the fray. In this major historical event that affected the 20th century, Stalin will truly appreciate the wisdom and courage of ***.
The author of this article is the Black Mamba, without the permission of the author and "This is war", any**, self**shall not**, violators will be held legally responsible. Editor's profile: Wang Zhengxing, a former officer of a field unit of the People's Liberation Army, has served in infantry detachments, headquarters, logistics departments and other units, is committed to the study of war history and tactics, and has unique insights into army tactics and non-war operations.