On April 18, 1946, Marshall returned to China. On April 23, with Marshall's participation, representatives of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party held negotiations to discuss the Marshall Plan.
The Kuomintang stated that it resolutely rejected the Marshall Plan and proposed a plan drawn up by Chiang Kai-shek himself.
Chiang's plan did not let up on key issues, such as recognizing the position of the CCP in the northeast, but only raised political issues related to the areas controlled by the squadron, which should be resolved through negotiations between the Kuomintang representatives and the CCP representatives.
Obviously, the Communists could not accept this plan either, so the two sides soon became unable to negotiate, and the problem was once again put on the battlefield.
On May 20, the Kuomintang army occupied Changchun, and the troops as a whole advanced towards North Manchuria and East Manchuria, and there was a great tendency to occupy the entire northeast in one fell swoop.
After the squadron lost the big city and retreated to the countryside, the guerrilla warfare that could be brought into play was precisely its own advantage. On the contrary, the Kuomintang occupied large cities and some areas along the railways, and its advantages also turned into disadvantages, and it was burdened with an excessively long front and a failure of command.
At the end of May and the beginning of June, the squadron gave full play to the flexible and changeable characteristics of guerrilla warfare, quickly launched an offensive against the Kuomintang troops, dealt a heavy blow, and recaptured some places occupied by the Kuomintang troops, and the Kuomintang troops showed a tendency to be defeated and retreated.
Under these circumstances, Marshall once again advised Chiang Kai-shek to seize the opportunity to negotiate with the Communists to solve all problems, and Chiang Kai-shek, who was at a loss, accepted Marshall's suggestion and publicly announced on June 6 that the truce would be 15 days from June 7, and demanded that the following three issues must be completely resolved during the armistice
1) A detailed approach to the complete cessation of the conflict in the Northeast.
2) Detailed measures and progress for the full resumption of domestic transportation.
3) To obtain a definite basis for the speedy implementation of the agreement of 25 February this year on the demobilization and reintegration of the entire ** Force.
Around the above-mentioned issue of Chiang Kai-shek, the Kuomintang and the Communist Party began intense negotiations. Because the Chinese Communists made concessions on some issues, the two sides agreed on Chiang Kai-shek's proposal.
Consensus was quickly reached on the first and second issues.
Third, on the third issue, the Kuomintang put forward a draft proposal on the deployment of the armed forces that was unacceptable to the Chinese Communists, requiring that the Chinese armed forces could only be mixed with the Kuomintang troops, and that they could only be stationed in a few poor and remote areas far away from the big cities.
Apparently, this was a "vicious plan to expel the CCP troops from the major cities and railway lines during the reorganization of the army in order to eliminate them", and the CCP representative authorities severely rebuked the Kuomintang representatives, leaving Marshall in an embarrassing position.
Although the Chinese Communist Party adheres to principles and does not budge on key issues, it has approached the negotiations with great patience and made it clear:
We are sincere and straightforward in our negotiations, and although we regret the ultimatum-style document, we will not let go of any glimmer of hope for peace and seize the opportunity. Wherever there is a possibility of a truce and peace talks, we will not refuse to participate in them, but we will also promote their further development and quickly bring about real peace.
Originally, the Kuomintang and the Communist Party were already deadlocked in the talks, but on 14 June, US Secretary of State Berners submitted a "bill on military aid to China" to the Senate, openly proposing military aid to the Kuomintang, which emboldened Chiang Kai-shek even more.
On June 17, representatives of the Kuomintang made an even more absurd demand to the Communists: a deadline for the withdrawal of Communist troops from some parts of North China and the occupation of Kuomintang troops. At the same time, it also demanded that the Kuomintang troops be allowed to enter Harbin, Mudanjiang, Baicheng, Andong, Tonghua and other places.
At this point, Chiang Kai-shek was already a poor dagger. To put it bluntly, it is to use the means of negotiation to force the Communist Party of China to submit step by step, and finally when the strength of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party changes completely in favor of the Kuomintang, the Communist Party will be eliminated in one fell swoop.
In the course of several decades of struggle against Chiang Kai-shek of the Kuomintang, the Communist Party of China has clearly realized that the army and the base areas are the lifeblood of the party and the people, and there is nothing more important than this, and the CPC will not be able to survive without the army and the base areas.
Therefore, the CCP resolutely refused to accept Chiang Kai-shek's unreasonable demands, and at the same time left some leeway, saying that it could make certain concessions on the issue of northern Jiangsu and Shandong, and the CCP had done its best to be benevolent and righteous.
Chiang Kai-shek pressed forward step by step and did not budge. On the morning of 30 June, just a few hours before noon on the truce, Marshall approached Chiang Kai-shek in the hope of making a last-ditch effort to bring an agreement to the talks.
Marshall told Chiang whether it was possible to continue to maintain a compromise based on local **, but Chiang Kai-shek refused, saying that there was no room for negotiation. Marshall's last hope was dashed.
The truce talks in the northeast have broken down, and the see-saw situation of talks, fights, and talks since the CPPCC meeting has come to an end.
For this stage of the negotiations, ** later made this analysis:
In March, April, and May, the Northeast fought a major battle, from Shenyang to Changchun, and the armistice and the CPPCC were destroyed. But why is there another June truce?Because after the Kuomintang occupied Changchun, the forces were very scattered, and there were no troops to advance again.
At that time, we occupied a favorable position in the northeast, and Shandong and Shanxi recovered several cities occupied by the puppet army, so that the Kuomintang needed to implement a few months of rest in the northeast, and then started to fight in the Guannei, so there was a truce in the northeast.
During the 23 days of talks, many issues were discussed, and we intend to give up one or two more places in order to preserve the vast liberated areas. Many concessions were made on such issues as stopping the war in the northeast, resuming communications, and reorganizing the army, but the result was still a rupture, and the central issue was still the issue of political power and base areas.
Chiang formally wanted me to withdraw from Suzhou, Anhui, Chengde, Andong, and eastern Hebei, but he only admitted the two provinces of Heilongjiang and Xing'an, and the half of Nenjiang, and North China was only a few regions such as Linyi, Daimyo, and Shangdang, and wanted to completely separate us, first limit ourselves to these areas, and then come and eliminate us."
Marshall had a thought-provoking comment about the failure of the June truce talks, in which he wrote:
Whatever the reason, it seems clear that in the negotiations during the truce, the Communists were more willing to agree on the cessation of the conflict, while ** put forward such harsh conditions that it was unlikely that the Communists would accept them.
It is also clear that the strength and power of certain Kuomintang civil and military leaders are aimed at a solution by force, and their conviction is that an all-out war is better than the present state of semi-war accompanied by economic and political stagnation."
Since the truce negotiations between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party failed due to the sabotage of the Kuomintang authorities led by Chiang Kai-shek, they were inevitably replaced by a full-scale civil war.
On June 26, the Kuomintang army launched a large-scale attack on the liberated areas of the Central Plains, and a nationwide civil war was in full swing.
War of Liberation [No. 19].
The military trio signed an armistice.
About the Author. Since I was a child, I liked words, and when I was a primary school student, I often used to do sample essays. During the literary youth, many articles won awards. After decades of wind and rain, his hobby has not changed, he likes to read literature and history, insists on writing, and welcomes exchanges.