Recently, a private equity firm issued an announcement to change the performance remuneration accrual plan, emphasizing that the product can only be accrued under the premise of achieving "positive returns". In addition, after the performance remuneration is accrued, the customer income must be positive, otherwise it cannot be accrued. Personally, I think that the private placement initiative is worth emulating in the public offering industry.
After the "barbaric" development, the scale of the private equity industry has long been incomparable. For example, data from the China Investment Industry Association shows that as of the end of the second quarter of this year, the number of private equity products has reached 152298, and the product scale has exceeded 20 trillion. Although there is still a certain gap with the scale of public offerings, the private equity industry has broad development prospects, and private equity has gradually become an important investment force in the capital market.
It is precisely because of the rapid development of the private equity industry that the degree of competition in the private equity industry has become fierce, and the development of the industry has also shown a mixed phenomenon. For investors, the only purpose is to obtain income from private placement products. In order to be in an advantageous position to the competition, certain private placements often introduce different initiatives to attract investors.
Compared to some private placements that extract management fees based on scale, or compare them with the underlying index before extracting performance compensation or management fees, it is obviously more attractive to extract performance compensation only after achieving positive returns. However, this will also test the private equity's own R&D capabilities and investment decision-making capabilities.
Compared with the private equity industry, the management fee extraction model of the public offering industry has long been questioned and criticized by investors. The management fee extraction model of drought and flood protection makes the public offering like a "flower" in the greenhouse, and also makes some ** companies make a lot of money. Due to the continuous downturn in the capital market for many years, public offering ** investors often suffer perennial losses. This is obviously very unfair.
In the early stage of development, the regulatory authorities took good care of the public offering. For example, when new shares were issued, a certain number of new shares would be placed to the public offering**, which is completely different from the current placement after being qualified by participating in the inquiry. Public offering** extracts 15% management fee, regardless of whether the profit or loss is realized. Therefore, for the ** company, its income is guaranteed, but the income of the holder is not guaranteed.
Public offering is not only an important investment force in the capital market, but also played a mainstay role in the stability of the capital market. However, with the development of the market, there are more and more aspects of public offerings. On the one hand, some public investments have become more specialized. The annual turnover rate of some publicly offered ** products is even far higher than that of the general **. Due to the large size of its positions, frequent stock swap operations will not only exacerbate the volatility of the relevant **, but also magnify the investment risk of the market.
On the other hand, the role of public offerings in market stability is becoming more and more limited, and in some cases it has even become the culprit of smashing. Due to the role of financial management on behalf of others, in some cases, out of the need for hedging, public offerings will also be smashed, which is obviously very unfavorable to the stability of the market.
In addition, in some new share issuances, public offerings are often the driving force behind the issuance of shares. The results of the inquiry of many new shares show that public offerings play a prominent role in the pricing of new shares. Its ultra-high ** has also significantly increased the issuance of new shares**. Regardless of whether there is anything behind it, its blind reporting behavior is obviously inconsistent with its role in managing money on behalf of others, and it also puts the interests of holders at risk.
It is also based on the problems in all aspects of public offering that the reform of public offering management fees needs to be put on the agenda. Although the reform of public offering ** management fees has been launched since July this year, and the rate has also declined, it is obviously far from enough.
Previously, there were also some ** companies that tried management fees. For example, the management fee will not be withdrawn for a certain period of time for the relevant product, and it will be restored once the time limit has passedor the return of the relevant ** product is linked to a comparable index;Or preferential subscription and redemption rates, and so on, and so on. But such attempts fail to get to the root of the problem, and doubts in the market are still heard.
In the mode of extracting management fees for drought and flood protection, the company has a soft spot for scale expansion, but it has done an unsatisfactory job in terms of R&D investment and protection of the interests of holders. If the management fee can only be withdrawn on the premise of achieving profitability, it will not only help protect the interests of the holders, but also inhibit the impulse of the company's scale expansion. Moreover, it will force the public offering industry to pay more attention to R&D investment and pay more attention to improving investment decision-making capabilities. This will be of great benefit to both the holders and the public offering industry.