The year end chapter, the main objectives of the Russian army s winter offensive, and the campaign d

Mondo Finance Updated on 2024-01-29

"Military Subplane" Author: Big Ivan.

Continuing from the previous article, we are in the article "Year-end Article!".An in-depth analysis of the main objectives of the Russian army's winter offensive and the Ukrainian army's campaign defense (above) gives you a brief introduction to the basic campaign and tactical situation of the Russian army on all fronts as of the end of December 7. Big Ivan believes that the most important tactical directions of the Russian army at present are the two directions of Artemsk and Avdeyevka

The Russian army has mobilized a large number of troops in these two directions, and has reached the level of a composite group army of all arms, and has the nature of a campaign and engagementAs for the front line of the Sinkivka and Zhelebetsy rivers, the forces used by the Russian army in the two tactical directions have not yet reached the level of the combined army group of all arms, and there may only be advanced tactical corps, so they belong to the combat level rather than the campaign level;As for the Zaporozhye front, although the Russian army has the existence of the 58th Guards Army of the Southern Military District, and the scale of the nearly 58 episodes is extremely large, and it has reached the level of the combined army of the two arms, there is no big campaign action at present.

Therefore, based on the analysis of the current battle situation, Big Ivan believes that the main campaign direction of the Russian army's winter offensive is still in the two campaign directions north and south of Donetsk, and the two campaign directions are linked to each other, which can be regarded as the overall battle situation at the army level in one aspect.

Artemsk direction.

Analysis of the battle in the west of Artemsk: the Russian army formed the first offensive axis along the road from Dubovo-Vasylivka to Bodanivka and Kromovo to O-0506, the end of the offensive axis should be the Donets Ridge, with the aqueduct as the demarcation line of the campaign, and the second offensive axis was formed in Krischivka in the south, and the end point of the offensive axis should also be the irrigation canal on the Donets Ridge.

The campaign intention of the Russian army is to push the Artemsk front as a whole towards the Donets Ridge, with the Donets Ridge as a new line of contact. On the one hand, it is convenient to build a more favorable defense line, and on the other hand, it is convenient to play an important role as a transportation hub in Artemsk, and a large number of supplies will be transferred from Severodonetsk, Komunarsk and other places to Artemsk as a starting point for attacks. This is the important position of Artemsk in the western Donetsk battle situation, which we have analyzed many times in the first half of this year, and it is also the campaign operation that we have been expecting for half a year, when the Russian army rushes to the watershed and seizes the "city wall area".

To this end, the Russian army is expected to seize Bodanivka, Griholivka, Krischivka and other villages in the winter war, and expel the Ukrainian army units to Chasov Yar. The difficulty of the campaign lies in the attack on Ivanivsk, which was not taken down by the Wagner cluster with great effort in March and April of this year, and is also the main point on the T-05-04 road from Artemsk to Chasov Yar. In this year's winter offensive, the Russian army may form a flanking attack on Ivanivsk from the three directions of Bodanivka, Kromovo and Krischivka.

For the main direction of attack in the western Artemsk campaign, the Russian army may implement tactical actions of flank support. For example, this is true for the offensive of Orekhovo-Vasylivka and Visel, the former can push the Russian army's defense line on the E40 road further forward to the Donets Ridge, and the elevation advantage of Orekhovo-Vasylivka will put the Russian army in an advantageous position at the commanding heights;And the latter can ensure the depth of the defense of the Russian army on the T-02-13 road.

As for the city of Seversk, Big Ivan believes that it is unlikely to be fought, after the loss of Artemsk, Seversk has lost its significance as a threat to Severodonetsk, not only can it not be used as a starting point for attacks, but it does not even have an advantage in terrain. At present, the reason why the Ukrainian army is still surviving in Seversk is entirely because the Ukrainian army in the Shebryansky Forest has ensured the transportation line from Redman to Seversk by sending people with their lives, and this transportation line is not very reliable.

Therefore, instead of playing a game of coloring in Seversk, it is better to concentrate on running to the city walls in Artemsk, as long as the Russian army pushes its troops to the valley of the Kazinitoretsy River, and at the same time the Russian army on the northern flank pushes to Redman, Seversk is a dead place that must be abandoned. In the case of the limited forces of the Russian army in the Artemsk direction, the priority of capturing the city wall rather than attrition in Seversk is the primary campaign option.

Avdeyevka direction.

Judging from the battle situation in the two battle directions of Artemsk and Avdeyevka, the Russian army is currently most eager for Avdeyevka (also known as Avadiivka), and the capture of Avdeyevka will bring two significant battle advantages to the Russian army:

One is to connect with the Marinka fortified area in the south and push the Donetsk city defense from the city close to the city of Avdeyevka-Pervomysik-Staromykharyivka-Maryinka. This will give Donetsk city a defensive depth ranging from 10 to 20 kilometers, which is enough for most of Donetsk cities to be relieved of the eight-year-old Ukrainian artillery attack, at least the Ukrainian army can no longer use howitzers to hit Donetsk city casually, which is the first battle advantage obtained by the Russian army in the Battle of Avdeyevka.

The second battle advantage is that the Russian army has the starting point for the attack to go north to Constantinovka on the Don River, or to the west to the Red Army City. This will create extremely favorable conditions for the Russian army to launch the final chapter of the Donetsk campaign, the western Donetsk campaign, that is to say, Avdeyevka is in a sense the "topic" of the Russian army.

However, it is not easy to capture Avdeyevka, especially when the Ukrainian army has now mobilized heavy troops and must push the Russian army back from the periphery of Avdeyevka, the battle of Avdeyevka will inevitably be similar to the Battle of Artemsk from the end of last year to May this year, which will become both long and bloody. The Russian army may first have to carry out a fatal blow to the counter-shock forces mobilized by the Ukrainian army through continuous fire strikes before it can advance. Of course, this also gives the Russian army another opportunity, that is, the 9th Army, the 10th Army and other NATO-equipped troops of the Ukrainian Army may use the flesh mill of Avdeyevka to eliminate another wave of living forces of the Ukrainian army, and it is expected that the Russian army will not let go of such a good opportunity.

Therefore, the Russian army's current campaign intentions in Avdeyevka, Big Ivan believes that it has a dual nature, not only to seize Avdeyevka itself, but to use this point to strike at the Ukrainian army's counter-shock forces, effectively destroy the Ukrainian army's living forces and technical equipment, and create good conditions for future operations. Therefore, the battle of Avdeyevka will inevitably be very long.

The difficulty of the Russian army in the Battle of Avdeyevka lies in the duration of the battle and the losses of the Russian army: the duration of the battle has nothing to do with the Russian army, mainly in how many Tianling covers the Ukrainian army's Admiral Syrsky intends to fill in;The losses of the Russian army directly determine whether the Russian army has enough strength to switch to the offensive in the future. Big Ivan thinks that we must also prepare for the battle of Avdeyevka for half a year and until May 2024. Of course, this also means that the Russian army wants to do more things in the winter campaign, such as the possibility of leaping forward to the Red Army City or Constantinovka on the Don River, which is to ensure that the Donetsk city will no longer be shelled by Ukrainian military howitzers in 2024.

However, if the Russian army can take the "walled" area of Artemsk in the winter campaign and at the same time capture Avdeyevka, then the Russian army has the ability to stab Slavyansk in the back of the defensive arc. On the Avdeyevka side, the Russian army can move north along the H20 road, while the Russian army in Artemsk can attack Chasov Yar to pose a serious threat to Constantinolovka-Dzerzhinsk on the Don River, thus breaking the southern flank of the Slavyansk defensive arc. That's why Big Ivan believes that the battles of Artemsk and Avdeyevka may have a certain synergistic effect and can be considered as a full-fledged front-level campaign. Of course, it's too early to talk about this, the Russian army's offensive has just begun, and there are too many variables later.

The rest of the directions. In addition to Avdeyevka and Artemsk, Big Ivan believes that the Russian army on other fronts should not be looked at for the time being:

For example, on the Luhansk front, the Russian army can take Sinkiivka in the winter offensive, approach the Kupyansk encirclement, or break through the first defensive zone of Redman, which can be regarded as an extraordinary performance. After all, in the case that the battle of Slavyansk has not yet begun, the significance of the campaign to capture Redman is limited, and keeping the left bank of the Oskil River is conducive to the Ukrainian army continuing to send meaningless heads inside, so since this is the case, it is better to continue to keep.

The same is true for the Marinka and Fleda directions, after the failure of the Eastern Military District to attack Fleda in early 2023, it proved that the defense of the Ukrainian army on this side is still relatively strong. In the case that the main forces of the Russian army have been mobilized to Avdeyevka, this side does not have the conditions for a large-scale campaign offensive, and it is already considered a complete task to completely take Maryinka and consolidate the Marinka defensive line. After all, if Mariinka is taken, the south of Donetsk will be safe.

Big Ivan believes that the most variable at the moment should still be Zaporozhye. With the withdrawal of Ukrainian troops one after another, the Zaporozhye front has not only ushered in a long-lost tranquility, but more importantly, the Russian army is gradually gaining an advantage on this front. So, if the balance between the Russian and Ukrainian armies on the Zaporozhye front is further broken, will the Russian army launch a new round of campaign offensive?This is something that needs to be questioned. All in all, the Russian army's winter offensive from 2023 to 2024 has just begun, and what the follow-up situation will be, let's continue to observe.

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