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On January 26, 1949, Mikoyan, a special envoy of the Soviet Union and a member of the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, made a secret visit to Xibaipo. Mikoyan's trip was specially arranged by Stalin in place of *** visit to Moscow.
Since it was a very important and extremely secret visit, it was very mysterious. To unravel the mystery of this visit and evaluate the results of this visit, it is necessary to start with the visit to the Soviet Union.
The proposed visit to the Soviet Union was in April 1948, after he was transferred from Shanxi to Nanwangzhuang, Fuping County, Hebei Province, and was decided through joint discussion with *** and Ren Bishi.
On April 22, he informed Orlov, the liaison officer between the Communist Party of Brazzaville and the Chinese Communist Party, that he was scheduled to go to Moscow in early May, accompanied by his wife and daughter, as well as Shi Zhe.
On April 26, ** personally called Stalin and said:
"I decided to leave for the Soviet Union as soon as possible. It was scheduled to depart from Fuping County in Hebei Province (100 km north of Shijiazhuang) in early May and pass through the Pingzhang Railway (about 100,000 Kuomintang troops were concentrated on this section of the road) under the cover of the army. If possible, you can arrive in Harbin in early or mid-June. Then he will transfer to your country in Harbin.The trip is expected to take 1-3 months. Considering that he was not in good health, he hoped to bring two Soviet doctors sent to Yan'an by Moscow, and then bring them back to Yan'an after the visit.I was accompanied by Comrade Ren Bishi, a member of the Politburo of the Communist Party of China, who had been to Moscow many times and was fluent in RussianAfter arriving in Harbin, I will invite another member of the Politburo to go with me. He now heads the work of northeastern industry and trade unions, having worked in the Soviet Union in 1936.
In addition, there were two secretaries, several coders and a telegrapher.
I brought so many people to the USSR because I would consult with the comrades of the Communist Party of Brazzaville and seek instructions on political, military, economic and other important issues. In addition, if possible, I would like to go to some countries in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe to look at the human lines and other forms of work there. ”
Three days later, Stalin replied, agreeing to the plan to visit Moscow.
However, on May 10, the caller said that there were safety problems on the way and suggested that the journey be slowed down** On the same day, Stalin was telegraphed and agreed to be suspended.
On July 4, ** sent another telegram to Stalin from Fuping, Hebei Province, asking Stalin to send a plane from Dalian to Hebei, or send a ship to the Shandong Peninsula to pick him up in Dalian, and then go to the Soviet Union via Harbin. If it was difficult to get him by sea and air, he planned to leave north around the 15th of that month, and in mid-August, he longed to arrive in Harbin, from where he would take a plane to Moscow.
On 14 July, Stalin replied that the Soviet leading comrades would go to various places in August to requisition grainIt is recommended that the visit to the Soviet Union be postponed until the end of November.
In this way, starting in the first half of 1948, **'s request to visit the Soviet Union went through two repeated processes, namely, agreeing to postpone and then agreeing to postpone again, and the reason for the final postponement was actually to requisition grain.
This naturally caused *** unpleasantness.
At that time, the Liaoshen Campaign was about to begin, and the Chinese revolution was at a critical moment of seizing national power.
But why did *** insist on visiting the USSR at this time, and what questions did he want to talk about with Stalin?
On July 28, 1948, Arlov, an intelligence officer sent by the Soviet Union to Yan'an (who was in Xibaipo at the time), sent a telegram back to Moscow saying that he had spoken to him and that he would go to Moscow to seek advice on a number of issues and to seek assistance if possible.
The questions are:
(1) Relations with small democratic parties (democrats). On the convening of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.In summarizing all of the above, ** emphasized:2) On the alliance of the revolutionary forces of the countries of the East and the links between the communist parties of the countries of the East (and with the parties of other countries).
3) On the strategic plan of the struggle against the United States and Chiang Kai-shek.
4) Explain to Moscow the needs of our (the Chinese Communist Party) regarding the restoration and establishment of industry in China, including (especially) military, mining, transport (road and rail) transport.
5) On the issue of a $30 million ** loan.
6) Policy (line) on the establishment of diplomatic relations with Great Britain and France.
7) A series of other problems.
"It is necessary to negotiate the question of complete harmony between our political policy and that of the Soviet Union".These are all issues concerning the fundamental strategic principles for the founding of the People's Republic of China, as well as the issues of the international communist movement, especially the communist movement in the East (at this time, the question of the status and role of the Communist Party of China and itself in the Communist Parties of the Eastern countries after the victory of the Chinese revolution has already been taken into account). Domestic military issues have of course been relegated to a secondary position compared to the above-mentioned issues. Prior to this, marked by the signing of the "Sino-US Commercial Treaty," Chiang Kai-shek had taken the lead in implementing a "one-sided" policy toward the United States.
The United States contributed money and guns to help Chiang Kai-shek fight the civil war, especially at this moment when the war of liberation was about to be won, and the pattern of isolating, blockading, and strangling New China in the Western camp led by the United States had already taken shape.
In order to break the isolation and blockade of the West, the only way to rely on the peaceful democratic camp headed by the Soviet Union is to rely on it, so the CCP must first achieve political "complete coordination with the Soviet Union", that is, politically "one-sided" to the Soviet Union. To do this, it is best to visit the Soviet Union in person and talk to Stalin personally.
But the repeated postponement of the trip caused *** unpleasantness. Stalin then sent Politburo member Mikoyan to Xibaipo to listen to the opinions of *** in lieu of ***'s visit to the Soviet Union.
In addition, there is another important background that prompted Mikoyan to come to China. It was Stalin who caused a "misunderstanding" on the issue of mediating the civil war between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party.
On January 14, 1949, at a meeting of the Politburo of the Communist Party of Brazzaville, Stalin decided to send Mikoyan to China instead of visiting the Soviet Union
He made this decision because he was afraid that the news would leak during his visit to the Soviet Union, and that the West would use the excuse of attacking the people in Moscow would damage the prestige of the Chinese CommunistsThe second is that a formal revolution led by *** will soon be established.All three of Stalin's words express his true thoughts. However, it should be added that if the news of the visit to the Soviet Union leaks out, it will inevitably trigger serious negotiations by the Kuomintang. Because the visit to the Soviet Union means that the Soviet Union has violated the provisions of the "Yalta Agreement" and the "Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance", and will inevitably damage its own interests in China. On January 14 and 15, Stalin sent two telegrams informing *** of the decisionAt that time, he will visit China as the head of China, "on the contrary, it will enhance the prestige and credibility of the Chinese revolution, and it will be of great international significance".
Third, although his visit to the Soviet Union has been repeatedly postponed (causing him unhappiness), "because a member of the Politburo of our *** committee is going to China, this unfavorable aspect can be eliminated."
From the CCP's side, before mid-January 1949 was not the best time for Soviet guests to visit.
At that time, the enemy on the Tianjin side had not yet been resolved, and the enemy troops in Zhangjiakou and Nankou were ready to move, and the enemies in Baoding and Zhengding threatened to send cavalry to invade the south and attack Shijiazhuang and other places. In view of this, preparations were also made for a transfer in order to deal with a surprise attack by the enemy.
After the liberation of Tianjin on January 15, the victory of the peace talks in Beiping was in hand, and the safety of Xibaipo was foolproof, so that the CCP was in a position to receive Mikoyan.
On January 17, ** called Stalin:
"(1) I decided to postpone my trip to Moscow for the time being. (2) We very much welcome you to send a comrade from the Politburo to China. The arrival location is Shijiazhuang.The above situation shows that Stalin and Mikoyan's visit to Mikoyan was well thought out. Mikoyan made serious preparations for this trip, and in the course of the talks, whenever he encountered major problems, he could directly consult Stalin by telegram (in fact, Stalin was the main protagonist who was not present at the talks). Two days after this telegram was sent, two additional items were added to the review of the draft instructions on the diplomatic work of the Chinese Communist Party:Here, he can talk about many issues with our five comrades (at present, the main issues are the CPPCC, the joint ** issue, and the foreign policy issue), and the time to come is the end of this month or the beginning of next month. ”
1. The embassies, legations, consulates and their affiliated diplomatic organs and staff of capitalist countries shall not be recognized until the People's Republic has established formal diplomatic relations with these countries, and shall only treat them as foreign nationals.These two stipulations show that the Chinese Communists do not deal with any capitalist country for the time being, but only develop relations with the Soviet Union and take care of the needs of the Soviet Union. Without a doubt, this was the best gift to welcome the arrival of Soviet guests.Military attachés of these countries should be treated on an equal footing with diplomats. U.S. military attachés should be sent to monitor and not be given freedom. The attitude towards the embassies and consulates of the Soviet Union and the new democracies, as well as their diplomatic offices and personnel, should be fundamentally different from that of the capitalist countries. However, since diplomatic relations have not yet been established, informal diplomatic exchanges can be conducted.
2) No foreign country or the United Nations will be allowed to interfere in China's internal affairs.
By the end of January 1949, the three major battles of Liaoshen, Pingjin, and Huaihai had just been completed, and the victory of the CCP was a foregone conclusion.
So Mikoyan assumed the name Andreyev, and on January 26, together with Kovalev, Deputy Minister of Communications of the Soviet Union and later sent as the representative of the Communist Party of China to the Communist Committee of the Communist Party of China, took off from Moscow and arrived at Xibaipo via the Port of Arthur. The first meeting with *** was held on January 30, and the visit was completed on February 8.
During this period, ** Ren Bishi held talks with Mikoyan.
He introduced the situation and characteristics of the Chinese revolution and emphatically explained the upcoming meeting of the new Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and the establishment of a coalition with the participation of all democratic parties.
Individual talks were held on issues such as post-war economic recovery, the overall plan and vision for the establishment of a new one, foreign relations, foreign trade management, and China's democratic parties.
At the time of the talks, **, the supreme leader of the Communist Party of China, and at the same time the supreme leader of the soon-to-be-founded New China, that is, the supreme representative of the interests of the entire Chinese nation, could not but raise the issue of the Soviet Union's infringement of China's sovereignty, although these issues were very sensitive and complex.
The first is about the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance.
This treaty is actually an unequal treaty.
Although it played a major role in defeating the Japanese Kwantung Army and ending the anti-fascist war ahead of schedule, the provisions on the Port of Arthur as a Soviet naval base, the Sino-Soviet joint operation of the Zhongchang Railway, and the independence of Outer Mongolia from China seriously undermined China's sovereignty.
China is the country that suffered the greatest victim of Japan's war of aggression and has also made the greatest contribution to the war against Japan's aggression. ** Of course, it is impossible to accept this treaty in its entirety as the legal basis for the relations of New China with the Soviet Union.
However, the internal and external circumstances at that time did not allow *** to explicitly propose the abrogation of this treaty:
The war of liberation has not yet been completely won, the peace treaty with Japan has not yet been concluded, and the situation in which the United States blockades and strangles the revolutionary regime has already taken shapeThe Soviet Union has indeed shown a strong desire to form a friendly alliance with New China (such an alliance has in fact been formed in the northeast).In this particular case, it is impossible not to pay attention to the way in which the question is raised. On the issue of Port Arthur.
On February 4, 1949, ** held talks with Mikoyan, ** attended by Ren Bishi. ** Said that the Soviet Union stationed troops at Port Arthur to protect against Japanese fascists. When China was consolidated and able to independently defend itself against the danger from Japan, the Soviet Union itself would not need the Port Arthur base.
At the same time, he suggested that a Kuomintang legislator had openly said that if the Communists could return Lushunkou to China from the Soviet Union, it would be a great cause. ** added that the legislator does not understand politics.
** Very tactful on the questions, but very clear on the issues of principle:
First, Lushunkou must be returned to China, otherwise it will not be able to pass among the democratic partiesSecond, there is no need to return it immediately for the time beingThird, when the Chinese revolutionary regime is stable, it must be returned.On the question of Outer Mongolia.
"Mikoyan first asked, how do you deal with the issue of the reunification of Outer Mongolia and Inner Mongolia."Ren Bishi immediately followed up with ***'s words, Inner Mongolia has 3 million residents, while Outer Mongolia has only 1 million people. On the Xinjiang issue.**said, "He believes that Inner and Outer Mongolia should be unified and incorporated into the territory of China." "In the past, it was the Kuomintang that was in power," and now it is the Communists who are in power, and Outer Mongolia has become a member of China and unified with Inner Mongolia.
** Doubts about the Soviet Union's intentions toward Xinjiang. He said:
"There is an independence movement in the Ili region of Xinjiang, which is under the jurisdiction of Urumqi**, and there is also a Communist Party there."He also said that when he met Bai Chongxi in Chongqing in 1945, Bai Chongxi told him that in the Ili region, local insurgents had Soviet artillery, tanks and aircraft.
Here, ** borrowed Bai Chongxi's words, pointing out the background of the independence of the three regions of Xinjiang with the support of the Soviet Union.
On the above several major issues related to China's territorial sovereignty, ** told Mikoyan in a euphemistic way:
The Soviet Union should clarify its position on the old Sino-Soviet treaty, correct the parts that are detrimental to China's territorial sovereignty, and should not continue to do things that are detrimental to China's sovereignty.Mikoyan took the question raised very seriously. Immediate replies to all questions on which the CPB has already taken a decision;On the question of inaccuracy, Stalin was promptly consulted.
Stalin, for his part, sent a telegram in time to ***
On 5 February, Stalin sent a telegram directly to Mikoyan.
Regarding the Port Arthur Agreement, the telegram said:
"With the Chinese Communist Party taking over power, the situation will change radically. The Soviet Union decided to withdraw this unequal treaty. Once a peace treaty was concluded with Japan, as long as the US troops withdrew from Japan, the Soviet Union would also withdraw its own troops from Arthur. However, if the Chinese Communist Party considered it appropriate to immediately withdraw Soviet troops from the Port of Arthur, the Soviet Union would be ready to meet this demand of the Chinese Communists. ”On February 6, Mikoyan said to ***
"We consider the Soviet-Chinese Agreement on Port Arthur to be an unequal treaty designed to thwart the Kuomintang in collusion with Japan and the United States in the liberation movement against the Soviet Union and China. This treaty brought certain benefits to the Chinese liberation movement.On the Xinjiang issue, Mikoyan unequivocally stated to *** that the Soviet Union "does not support the independence movement of the Xinjiang people, and has no ambitions for the territory of Xinjiang, and we (the Soviet Union) believe that Xinjiang will be included and should be included in the territory of China."But now, with the Chinese Communist Party taking over, the situation in the country is fundamentally changing. Therefore, the Soviet Union has decided to abrogate this unequal treaty and withdraw its troops from Port Arthur as soon as a peace treaty is concluded with Japan. If the Chinese Communist Party considered it appropriate to withdraw its troops immediately, then the Soviet Union was ready to fulfill this desire of the Chinese Communist Party.
As for the medium-long railway agreement, we do not consider it an unequal treaty, because this railway was mainly built using the capital of **. It is possible that the principle of equality in this treaty has not been fully fulfilled, but we are ready to discuss this issue with our Chinese comrades and resolve it in a fraternal way. ”
But on the issue of Outer Mongolia, Mikoyan made it clear that he was against ***. Because of the importance of the matter, Mikoyan sent a special telegram to Stalin.
Stalin replied:
"The leaders of Outer Mongolia advocated the union of all Mongolian regions of China with Outer Mongolia to form a unified Mongolian state under the banner of independence. The Soviets** expressed opposition to the plan because it would divide a series of areas from China. Although this plan did not threaten the interests of the USSR. We do not think that Outer Mongolia will give up its independence and be willing to achieve its own autonomy within China's territory, even if all the Mongolian regions are united to form a single whole. It is clear that the decision on this matter should belong to Outer Mongolia itself. ”Mikoyan repeated the contents of the call to *** again in accordance with Stalin's call.
He said that the Chinese Communist Party respects the wishes of Outer Mongolia, and if they are unwilling to reunify with Inner Mongolia, we are not against it, "Of course, we do not approve of Han nationalism."
Stalin gave satisfactory answers to all the questions raised by ***, except for the question of Outer Mongolia.
In particular, with regard to the Port Arthur issue, Stalin went so far as to admit that the agreement was an unequal treaty.
On the Xinjiang issue, Stalin also made suggestions on the future ethnic policy of the Chinese Communist Party, which Mikoyan relayed
"I advise the Communist Party of China not to be too relaxed in its ethnic policy, and not to grant independence to ethnic minorities, because doing so will result in the shrinkage of China's territory due to the rights of the Chinese Communists, and the ethnic minorities should be given autonomy, not independence. ”Stalin's position on Arthur and Xinjiang, as well as his proposals for minority policy, indicate:
With the exception of Outer Mongolia, which has become independent, the Soviet Union will safeguard China's existing territorial and sovereign integrity and will not take advantage of the national question to reunify China.This is more important to *** than anything else. From Sun Yat-sen to the leader of the Chinese revolution, he led the Chinese people not to fear bloodshed and sacrifice, and struggled for decades, and their fundamental goal was to establish unification.
First, a strong new China, let the Chinese people really stand up!The above position of Stalin provided a guarantee for the realization of this goal.
Therefore, when Mikoyan made the above representation, he could not contain his surprise and joy.
Unlike on the Lushunkou and Xinjiang issues, Stalin was extremely harsh on the Outer Mongolia question.
His telegram is actually a warning to ***: if you insist on the return of Outer Mongolia, it is possible that your Inner Mongolia and other Mongolian regions will also be "independent" from China, just like Outer Mongolia!
** Certainly understand the weight of this telegram, he indicated to Mikoyan:
The Chinese Communists "certainly will not adhere to the chauvinist line of the Han people, and will not raise the issue of Mongolian reunification in the future." ”It should be noted that the issue of Outer Mongolia is much more complex than the issue of Xinjiang. The reason why Outer Mongolia was able to become independent from China was, in the final analysis, a product of Tsarist Russia's aggression against China.
As early as 1913, by forcing Yuan Shikai to sign the "Sino-Russian Declaration Document", Tsarist Russia almost deprived China of its national sovereignty in Outer Mongolia in terms of internal affairs, foreign affairs, and military garrisons. After the October Revolution, the Soviet Union actually inherited the historical rights of Tsarist Russia to Outer Mongolia.
On the one hand, it supported the revolution in Outer Mongolia, and on the other hand, it obstructed China from restoring the sovereignty that Outer Mongolia should exercise. It is precisely with this historical background that the issue of Outer Mongolia was raised.
However, since the founding of the Mongolian People's Republic, the Mongolian people have embarked on their own path of development, and the Communist Party of China has always supported it. In 1945, the Mongolian People's Army also sent troops to the northeast together with the Soviet Red Army without asking for any compensation.
The reason why Stalin pulled Outer Mongolia to send troops was, first, that the Red Army had to pass through the Inner Mongolia region of China, and that there were troops of the same ethnic group as Inner Mongolia, so it was easy to open up relations with the local people; second, it was to honor the Yalta agreement and obtain bargaining chips.After the victory of the Anti-Japanese War, Outer Mongolia held a referendum in accordance with the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, and thus gained independence.
On October 20, 1945, a referendum was held in Outer Mongolia, and 487409 citizens voted in favor of independence, accounting for 98 of the citizens entitled to vote4%, with no negative votes.At that time, the Kuomintang and the Communist Party could not differ from each otherIt is precisely this complex historical process that has caused the complex psychology of the Chinese people to the outside world.
**As the leader of the nation-state, of course, it cannot be ruled out that he proceeds from safeguarding the interests of the nation and demands compensation for the damage caused by China's long-term oppression and humiliation in order to appease the national feelings.
But after World War II, it was precisely the period of rapid expansion of Stalin's nationalism in Great Russia, and Outer Mongolia had long been included in the Soviet Union's "strategic security zone".
The request touched his nerves, so he played the trump card of "referendum", which means that the outside *** is the manifestation of his national will.
As a communist, *** had no choice but to say that he would no longer mention the issue of Mongolian reunification.
(End of text).
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