**: WSJ, translation: RMB Trading & Research
Editor's note: The latest RMB Tracker data compiled by the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) shows that the renminbi's share of international payments by value in November 2023 increased from 36% to 461%, a record high. As a result, the renminbi surpassed the yen to become the fourth most active currency for international payments. The top three are the US dollar (4708%), Euro (22.).95%) and the pound (7.).15%）。If international payments within the Eurozone are not included, the RMB will be worth 3The 15% share ranks fifth in the world.
Hong Kong accounts for 80% of offshore RMB payments, while the UK accounts for 531% compared to 2 in Singapore75%, 226%, France 144%。
In the international ** financing market tracked by SWIFT, the US dollar is priced at 83The 97% share is the first place, followed by the renminbi at 57% and 5 for the euro61%。
The following is a recent analysis article related to WSJ, translated by "RMB Trading & Research".
China's assets have had a difficult year, but the renminbi's status as an international payment option is rising.
The global currency status of the renminbi is still facing a huge stumbling block to China's own capital controls, even so, once China is sanctioned because of the conflict with the West in the future, as long as the willingness of the outside world to use the renminbi is increasing, it is at least possible to protect the Chinese economy to a certain extent. Even assuming weaker-than-expected growth in China's economy in the coming years, this willingness could provide structural support for the yuan. 
The overall data is surprising. Official data from China's central bank and commerce ministry show that since mid-2020, the monthly amount of cross-border RMB settlements for Chinese goods** has more than doubled and now accounts for more than a quarter of the total value of China's major commodities**. This is up from about 13% in 2019 and back to levels at the end of 2015, when the unexpected depreciation of the renminbi and tighter capital controls set back the internationalization of the renminbi. According to the international financial information system "Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication" (abbreviated as SWIFT), in October, there were 36% of international payments are made in RMB. This figure is up from less than 2% in January and slightly lower than 3An all-time high of 7%. The actual figure is likely to be higher because some RMB transactions will not be conducted through SWIFT, especially those involving entities sanctioned by the United States. Much of this is due to the Russian effect. After the outbreak of the war in Ukraine and the imposition of sanctions by Western countries, Russia replaced Saudi Arabia as China's largest oil country and became a major market for Chinese cars. Currently, most bilateral settlements between China and Russia are in yuan: By the end of 2022, nearly two-thirds of Russia's imports to China had been issued payment notices in yuan, according to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Many of China's other international partners will take note of this, especially those developing countries that are unlikely to side with the West in any hypothetical conflict. 
A few important caveats. Sanctions will still cause massive disruption to financial flows outside of ** and could hit China's ability to deploy dollar reserves. The renminbi accounts for 36%, which is still a drop in the bucket compared to the 47% share of the US dollar and the 23% share of the euro. Capital controls will limit the attractiveness of the renminbi as an investment tool, which will continue to hamper the renminbi's role as a reserve asset, especially in developed countries. In addition, European countries remain important markets for China: in the event of a crisis, many US allies may join US sanctions and refuse to accept the yuan. But this does not mean that the rise of the renminbi's status is a trivial matter, especially given that in the context of the "de-risking" of Western relations with China, the world is replanning. Places like Southeast Asia are increasingly becoming important hubs, where Chinese goods are assembled into final products that are then shipped to the United States. In the future, it is not difficult to imagine that the proportion of Chinese parts exported to these places will be denominated in renminbi will increase, and some of these intermediate countries will choose to hold more renminbi reserves as a result. At present, China's economy is struggling, but it is still a major exporter. The world, which is caused by political factors, has also begun to shift to payment systems. This could have far-reaching implications for Asia and further afield in the years to come. Pay attention to Changping Investment Research - freedom of wealth creation