For a long time, Zhuge Liang's Second Northern Expedition has generally been regarded as a negative teaching material for "fighting under the fortified city", and capturing Chen Cang without falling has become the laughing stock of some netizens. But a military operation can never be judged solely by the number of people killed or wounded and the number of territories captured. The most important criterion for judging a military operation is whether or not we have achieved the intended goal, and as long as this goal is achieved, even if we do not achieve large-scale casualties, it can still be regarded as a victory. If we look at Zhuge Liang's second Northern Expedition from this perspective, we can find that Zhuge Liang did not aim to capture Chencang, but had a deeper strategic purpose, and he himself skillfully achieved the combat goal through flexible maneuvering, which can be said to be worthy of the name of a military strategist.
1. The failure of the First Northern Expedition and the evolution of Zhuge Liang's military thought.
There is no doubt that the First Northern Expedition, which began in 228, failed in just a few months, which was certainly bad news for the Shu Han Empire. According to the records of the Chronicles of the Three Kingdoms: Book 17 of Wei, after Zhang Hebu launched a surprise attack on Ma Tanbu, it had the effect of "breaking the great destruction"[1], and Cao Wei greatly exaggerated the victory of this battle, and they even wrote an edict, smugly calling it "the tiger ministers chase the north, and the corpses are involved in blood"[2]. Although the First Northern Expedition suffered a major defeat, Zhuge Liang did not lose confidence, on the one hand, he deeply reflected on the profound lesson that "the army was more than thieves in Qishan and Keigu"[3] but failed to achieve victory, and on the other hand, he was also lying dormant and waiting, closely following the current situation.
Of course, there were many reasons for the failure of the First Northern Expedition, such as the misuse of Ma Tan, the extremely fast speed of the Wei army, and so on. And Zhuge Liangfang's deployment was not flawless. For example, the reason why the Ma Tan Department went out of the street pavilion to fight with the battle-hardened Zhang He was largely because the intention of the Shu Han army to occupy the three counties had been detected by the other party, which triggered the "first-style effect - the border incident, Emperor Wei Ming immediately drove the expedition in person and rushed from Luoyang to Chang'an to command the overall operation. Zhang He's corps retreated from Jingzhou and went to Longxi to engage the forward troops of the Shu Han army, intending to open the gap. Therefore, it led to the consequence that Ma Tan went out of the street pavilion in front of him and was finally defeated.
Figure 1: The situation of Zhuge Liang's Northern Expedition in early 228 AD - Cao Wei sensed that the three counties were not guaranteed and sent troops to defeat Ma Yan.
Zhuge Liang was not unaware of the situation of the enemy army rushing out to aid Longxi after "leaving Qishan and cutting Liangzhou", and he ordered Zhao Yun to divide his troops into the valley in the first Northern Expedition, creating the illusion of attacking the hinterland of Cao Wei to cover up his intentions. Zhao Yun is one of the only remaining generals of the Shu Han side after the death of famous generals such as Guan, Zhang, Ma, and Huang. And Zhuge Liang himself led the main force of the Shu Han army to besiege Qishan and attack Tianshui and other three counties. After Cao Wei noticed the changes on the border, he judged that Zhuge Liang's purpose was to occupy the three counties, and for Zhao Yunbu, Cao Wei only ordered the general Cao Zhen to hold on to Yixian, but did not ignore Zhuge Liang's attempt to occupy the three counties and divide Liangzhou. Zhang Hebu led his army to the aid of Longxi, crushing Ma Tan's front and forcing the opponent to retreat in one fell swoop - although there were many deep reasons for the defeat of this battle, Zhuge Liang's strategic intentions were also a factor that could not be ignored by the other side.
Figure 2: Zhao Yun's route out of the valley.
In addition, although Zhuge Liang's "division of troops" briefly confused Cao Wei's side, Zhao Yunbu did not play much role after that. After the rout in the front of the horse. Zhao Yunbu was also attacked by the Wei army, and still suffered defeat in the case of "more soldiers than thieves". It was thanks to Zhao Yun's own outstanding ability to command troops and the practice of burning the plank road[4] that it was preserved. In other words, after Zhuge Liang's front (Ma Tan) was defeated and retreated, Zhao Yunbu did not play a covering role, basically sitting back and watching the defeat of the Chinese army and being held back, and he could only be anxious while he could not protect himself.
Of course, it would be extremely unfair to simply blame Zhuge Liang himself on a mistake in arrangement, because Yizhou was surrounded by mountains, and in ancient times, when it was all dependent on manpower, Zhao Yunbu could neither know the battle situation, nor could he cross the mountains to aid the Chinese army. It can be said that due to geographical reasons, Zhuge Liang's division of troops in the first Northern Expedition did not have the best effect. The "Meridian Valley Conspiracy" discussed by many people is actually difficult to realize due to geographical reasons, Zhuge Liang and Wei Yanruo's soldiers are divided into two roads, separated by hundreds of miles, and in the case of not being able to contact each other, it is very likely that Wei Yan's department will be destroyed, and Zhuge Liang's department will continue to advance due to information lag, and then be killed by the other party. Therefore, because of the terrain restrictions of the dense mountains on the border of Sichuan and Shaanxi, Zhuge Liang's strategy of "dividing troops" must be better considered in order to produce the corresponding effect, otherwise it will be scattered in vain and give the opponent an opportunity to take advantage of.
Therefore, for Zhuge Liang, the next Northern Expedition must cover up his own strategic intentions, confuse the other party as much as possible, and make the other party make wrong judgments. On the other hand, even if Zhuge Liang divides his troops, he must ensure that the two armies can cover each other and avoid the consequences of being broken by each one before.
2. The war between Wu and Wei in 228 A.D. and the military cooperation between Sun and Liu.
After the failure of the first Northern Expedition, Zhuge Liang did not act rashly, and at this time, there was another change on the border between Wu and Wei. After Cao Pi's defeat of Wu, Cao Wei's coveting of Jiangnan did not stop there, but they began another expedition. In the second year of Taihe (228 AD), Cao Wei launched the war against Wu again, and the southern conscription was divided into two routes, Sima Yi was in charge of the Jingzhou front, and the great Sima Cao Xiu was in charge of the Jianghuai front. Not only that, Cao Wei even thought that the troops were not enough, so he recalled Zhang He's troops, who had just left Jingzhou and rushed to the aid of Longxi to defeat Ma Tan, and once again supported Jingzhou's campaign to conquer Wu (Zhang He: ??And Zhang He was already in Jingzhou as early as when Emperor Ming ascended the throne. [5]
Figure 3: In the second year of Taihe (228 AD), Cao Wei prepared before the invasion of Wu.
Although the Soochow side achieved a great victory at Shiting in August, Zhang He was still stationed in Jingzhou in the winter of that year, but because the water was shallow and could not sail, he could not advance, so he returned to Fangcheng for a temporary rest. In any case, for Sun Wu, military pressure was always there. For this reason, Sun and Liu will definitely start this. However, it is impossible for the history books to make a detailed record of such a matter as discussing military secrets, and we have no way of knowing when and what Sun and Liu agreed upon. However, we can still get some clues from some historical materials, in the letter with his brother Zhuge Jin, Zhuge Liang said:
There is a small valley in Suiyang, although the mountain cliff is extremely heavy, the stream is vertical and horizontal, and it is difficult to use the march. Cylo waits to come and go, and the road leads to it. Now let the former army cut off this road, in order to Chen Cang, it is enough to turn the thief into a situation, so that those who cannot divide the army to the east are also.
In other words, the purpose of this Northern Expedition was to "turn the thieves into a situation and make those who could not divide their troops to the east", in other words, to contain Cao Wei's forces and reduce the pressure on the Eastern Wu side. Therefore, the Shu Han side had to do everything possible to find ways to create all kinds of movements to endanger Cao Wei's borders and even the hinterland, so that he had the illusion that "the border areas are in danger", and then ordered the heavy army group on the Jingzhou front to quickly retreat to avoid further action by Zhuge Liang. Therefore, Zhuge Liang wisely realized that this operation should be a "quick attack", and the faster he was, the less military pressure on the Eastern Wu side. On the other hand, there was a time lag between the victory of Eastern Wu in the Battle of Shiting in August and the battle of Zhuge Liang in November, but it is understandable considering the communication conditions at that time. However, this also planted a disaster for Zhuge Liang's military operations - he only had less than two months to prepare, and the gathering of troops, the preparation of grain and grass, and the preparation of armaments had to be completed during this time.
3. The outbreak of war - besieging Chen Cang and Zhang He's rush to help.
In the winter of 228, Zhuge Liang's army sent from Han ** as promised, and then attacked Cao Wei, and the troops pointed directly at Chen Cangcheng. Although Chen Cang's geographical location was extremely important, it was not Zhuge Liang's goal. Zhuge Liang sent troops to Chen Cang with his own intention to assist his allies, but this did not mean that he must occupy Chen Cang. The most important reason for this is that the attack on Chencang can only take the Chencang Road, which is narrow and difficult to walk, and Zhuge Liang's preparation time is only less than two months, even if all kinds of siege equipment have been completely built in these two months, how to go to the destination through the Chencang Road, which is known for its ruggedness and difficulty, is also a big problem, in other words, Zhuge Liang does not have the material conditions needed to take a "strong city" at this time.
Figure 4: Schematic diagram of Chencang Road.
Chencang's geographical location is certainly dangerous, it can be used as Cao Wei's forward base, Chencang can get reinforcements from Chang'an and Longxi, even if he captures Chencang in the future, Zhuge Liang will also fall into the dilemma of being attacked by two ways, and it is very likely to be "one pot" by the other party. What's more, Chen Cang is Cao Wei's advance base rather than Shu Han's, if Shu Han wants to ensure control of Chen Cang, it needs to continuously deliver all kinds of supplies and **, which will increase Zhuge Liang's loss on the one hand, and on the other hand, give the opponent the opportunity to cut off his grain route, Zhuge Liang will never be stupid enough to stick to the dead city and let others slaughter him.
Figure 5: If Zhuge Liang captures Chencang, it is very likely that he will fall into the danger of being attacked from both sides.
After marching to Chencang, Zhuge Liang immediately began the siege operation, and the two armies began a tragic tug-of-war. However, considering what was said before, the Shu Han army may not be able to bring so much ** equipment, so the words of "Wei Luo" cannot be fully believed. On the one hand, the Shu Han army could not capture it after more than 20 days of siege, but the attack was very fierce, "Zhang He Biography" said that Zhuge Liang "rushed to attack Chencang", and Hao Zhao even mentioned to his son when he died of illness many days later: he had dug graves in order to make tools for defending the city, and used coffins as raw materials for utensils. Although this is not appropriate, on the other hand, it also reflects the urgency of the current situation, and it is not too much to describe it as "urgent".
On the other hand, Zhuge Liang divided his troops into Yi County, and the troops were directed at the hinterland of Cao Wei, and the border was in full swing for a time [7]. The reason why Zhuge Liang used the method of onslaught to fight, rather than encircling but not fighting, was that he needed to make enough movement on the border, the bigger the better, only the bigger he made trouble, the more tense the spirit of Cao Wei's high-level side would be, and the desire to withdraw troops and return for reinforcements would be stronger. Although Zhuge Liang failed to capture Ercheng, the movement on the border was so great that Emperor Wei Ming himself believed that Chen Cang must rely on a strong reinforcement army to avoid the fate of falling. [8] However, by this time, Cao Wei's army had already rushed to the Jingzhou and Jianghuai fronts to fight Sun Wu, and the Battle of Shiting had already damaged Cao Xiu's vitality, and he himself died soon after. Sima Yi remained in Jingzhou to prepare for the next military operation. At this time, only Zhang He's department could be used, and Emperor Wei Ming immediately issued an edict ordering Zhang He and his Guanzhong army to turn around and rush to the aid of Chen Cang. Not only that, but General Fei Yao was also ordered by Cao Zhen to lead his army from Guan**, preparing to block Zhuge Liang's army.
Figure 6: Zhuge Liang attacked Yixian, and the border war had already ignited at this time, and Cao Wei could not ignore this.
Before Zhang He set off, Emperor Wei Ming and Zhang He had the following conversation:
The emperor was fortunate in Henan City, put wine to send He, sent 30,000 soldiers from the north and south and sent Wu Wei and Hu Ben to make Wei He, because he asked: General Chi arrived, and the light was so bright that Chen Canghu had no choice but to do it!He knew that the army of Liang County had no valley and could not attack for a long time, so he said: Bichen has not arrived, and Liang has gone;It is not ten days for the light of the fingers. He entered Nanzheng at night and retreated. [9]
Zhang He judged that Zhuge Liang's "grain is not more than ten days", which means that the grain and grass Zhuge Liang carried on this trip are limited, which should be a very accurate judgment. Most of Zhuge Liang's subsequent Northern Expeditions took more than a year to prepare. In ancient times, in order to start a war, it was necessary to gather troops, train soldiers, raise enough food and grass, arrange logistics and transportation, and other preparations, which could not be completed in a short time. The large-scale expeditions launched by Zhuge Liang lasted more than two months in 231 and 233 respectively, but behind this was more than a year of preparation. Zhang He's judgment that Zhuge Liang was short of food was actually difficult to call prescient, because the Shu Han army had just experienced a major defeat and hastily raised troops, and it was completely expected that the lack of food was brought in. After Zhang He received the military order, Emperor Wei Ming increased his troops, and conservatively estimated that his strength was more than 30,000 people. With such a huge heavy army group, together with Fei Yao's ** army, quickly went to Chencang to relieve the siege, it seemed that a big battle was inevitable. [10]
Fourth, the aftermath of the war - Zhuge Liang retreated, and the second county fell.
After the two armies set off, the situation was as Zhang He expected, Zhuge Liang had already evacuated before Zhang He arrived, and even killed the pursuing cavalry general Wang Shuang. Zhang Hebu did not catch up with the war at all, and Zhuge Liang's second Northern Expedition was over. On the one hand, Cao Zhen's prediction that "the Shu army will attack Chencang" a few months ago has been confirmed, and he himself has obtained a boastful capital. [11] Zhang He's judgment of Zhuge Liang was also very accurate, and he didn't have to travel thousands of miles to Chencang to relieve the siege, but just settled in Nanzheng. Subsequently, Zhang He entered Beijing to report the situation, and the "Shu thief" Zhuge Liang had been "defeated", which could not but be said to be a big "victory", and it seemed that everyone who participated in the war could sit back and relax.
On the one hand, although Chen Cang was saved, Zhuge Liang did not intend to completely take Chen Cang, but through a series of deceptive actions, Zhang He's army was transferred from Jingzhou thousands of miles away. Succeeded in relieving the military pressure on the Soochow side. With the defeat of Cao Xiu and the departure of Zhang He, the war against Wu was over, and Sun Wu was of course fearless, and even changed the Yuan to "Huanglong" in 229 AD, which shows its momentum.
Figure 7: A schematic diagram of the condensed version of the activity trajectory based on the Biography of Zhang He. Note: The part where Zhang He returned to Tunfang City is omitted here.
More importantly, Zhuge Liang did not die down after retreating, in the spring of 229 AD, Chen Shi was ordered by Zhuge Liang to send troops to Wudu and Yinping, Guo Huai led a large army to meet the enemy, but what he did not expect was that Zhuge Liang's heavy army group suddenly appeared in the Jianwei area, and Guo Huai had to withdraw. Of course, this can be regarded as a wise decision, once it is not withdrawn, the Wei army is likely to face the dilemma of being attacked on both sides, and it is more likely to open the door of Shangqi and other hinterlands, giving Zhuge Liang a chance to take advantage of the situation.
But examining the previous actions, we can find that at the end of 228, Zhuge Liang was still besieging Chencang, and appeared in Jianwei in the spring of the second year, if he returned directly along the Chencang Road, then who gave him time to prepare grain and grass in just three months, replenish the losses, and then march to Jianwei to resist the Wei army?Therefore, we believe that @大内义兴's inference is more accurate, that is, Zhuge Liang did not directly arrive in Hanzhong after returning along the Chencang Road, but changed to the Qishan Road halfway, received supplies at Hechi, and then went north to meet the enemy after Chen Shi sent troops, so he forced the enemy to retreat, and the two armies were no longer separated from each other and unable to help each other as they were during the first Northern Expedition. On the other hand, Zhang He had already returned to the capital to face the saints, and the army under his command had been frequently traveling between Jing and Liang during the two years from the end of 227 to 229, and was already exhausted, so it was not surprising that he could not come to Guo Huai's aid in time.
Figure 8: Schematic diagram of Zhuge Liang's third Northern Expedition, if you follow the annotation of this map, how did Zhuge Liang complete the action of returning to Hanzhong, reorganizing armaments, and leaving Wudu in the west in just three months?
Figure 9: Schematic diagram of Zhuge Liang's Northern Expedition drawn by Ouchi Yoshixing, the arrival of Jianwei from Qishan Road is more reasonable in time.
As for the two counties of Wudu and Yinping, although there have been many debates about whether they are "rich" or "poor", the description of "Zhuge Liangji" and the important role of Wudu and Yinping in geography can still be glimpsed at the value of these two places, at least not as simple as "wasted effort".
Figure 10: Geographical location of Wudu and Yinping.
V. Conclusion. In the Second Northern Expedition, Zhuge Liang attracted Cao Wei's attention through flexible troop mobilization, and forced Zhang He, who was stationed in Jingzhou, to return to help by besieging Chen Cang, thereby reducing the pressure on Eastern Wu and helping him crack the large-scale Wu invasion launched by Cao Wei in 228.
But on the Internet, I don't know when a countercurrent of "Zhuge Liang is not a military strategist" has arisen, as if he is not a military strategist if he has not achieved the record of killing and injuring hundreds of thousands of people like Bai Qi. In this Northern Expedition, Zhuge Liang was able to gather troops, prepare grain and grass in a short period of time, march to Chencang and launch military operations, forcing Emperor Wei Ming to think that Chencang was in danger, so he had to send Zhang He, who was preparing for the invasion of Wu, to return to Chencang, and the subsequent military operations were also in vain due to Lu Xun's resistance and Zhuge Liang's disturbance. What's more, Zhuge Liang was able to calculate the time of the enemy's arrival after creating a movement, and before that, he organized a retreat in an orderly manner, and at the same time defeated the pursuing enemy vanguard while retreating, and then cooperated with Chen Shijun to capture the second county. Organization and coordination, strategic deception, and mutual surprise, if Zhuge Liang, who is proficient in this way, is not a military strategist, then what kind of person is a military strategist?