Gort would rather evacuate
However, Goth did not expand the results of the attack on Arras and, contrary to the common strategic plan agreed with the French, ordered the British to retreat to Dunkirk, the intended area of retreat.
As Churchill recalled, in late May, the British cabinet was in the dilemma of having to choose between two options: either let the British troops unite with the French at any cost and jointly attack the Somme, or let the British retreat to Dunkirk and retreat from the sea under the bombardment of enemy planes, regardless of the inevitable loss of all artillery and other heavy equipment. The British Wartime Cabinet, on the advice of General Gott, adopted a decision on the withdrawal of the British Expeditionary Force. In doing so, London plunged its ally France into the most critical moment of war.
The proposal to withdraw the British Expeditionary Force was made by Gort as early as 18-19 May, at the height of the battle with the Germans on the shores of the Strait of La Manche. The "Gort Plan" coincided with the plans of the British wartime cabinet and Churchill's views. True, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Ironside, at first disagreed with Gott's proposal to withdraw the British Expeditionary Force. He had hurried to France, and when he met Goth, he asked Goth to prepare an offensive campaign south in the direction of Arras to join the French army. As we know, Gott was not enthusiastic about this, and he carried out this order only partially with the strength of 2 divisions, because he knew that the British cabinet supported his retreat.
On the morning of May 20, the British Cabinet held a secret meeting to discuss plans for the withdrawal of the British Expeditionary Force from the mainland. "The Prime Minister is of the view that, as a precautionary measure, the Admiralty must collect a large number of small vessels and prepare them for sailing into the ports of the French coast," the minutes of the meeting read.
Keeping absolute secrecy not only from the German High Command, but also from its allies, the French, the British set about hastily drawing up plans for retreat. On 20 May, a secret meeting was held in Duvre with the participation of all persons concerned, including representatives of the Merchant Marine Department. The participants in the meeting discussed the issue of "the urgent withdrawal of a large number of troops from Calais, Boulogne and Dunkirk via Ramance". The first fleet included 30 steamboats, 10 naval drifting fishing vessels and 6 offshore vessels. British naval transport officers from Harwich to Weymouth were ordered to register all applicable vessels with a displacement of up to 1,000 tons. All vessels are fully inspected in all harbours in the UK. This plan to withdraw the British Expeditionary Force from the mainland to Britain had a code name, the Battle of Dinamo.
Dark clouds condense
While the French were fighting bloody battles in the area of the Somme and carrying out a counter-assault in the direction of Cambrai in northern France, General Gort actually withdrew several British divisions to the line of Gravoline-Saint-Omer, the purpose of which was to cover the port of Dunkirk, from which the British expeditionary force was to be evacuated. In the early morning of 22 May, Churchill flew again to Paris, accompanied by General Diere, Deputy Chief of the Imperial Staff.
A secret meeting was held at the French stronghold at the Château de Vincennes. In addition to Prime Minister and Minister of War Renault, the meeting was attended by Weygand and Deere.
The situation in France is very serious.
Throughout the country, including in the army, state organs and within Renault**, the "5th Column" was active. Some officers abandoned their units. Some entire divisions and divisions of troops fell into a situation of lack of ammunition. The roads were crowded with cars, bicycles, horse-drawn carriages and strollers with the furniture and belongings of the refugees. Hungry women and children cried incessantly, and many fainted.
But Renault was still counting on "strange things" to save France. "If tomorrow someone tells me, - he exclaims,-- movingly, something strange is needed to save France, then I will answer in the affirmative: I believe in strange things, because I believe in France".
However, there was no strange thing like the "Strange Incident on the Marne" in 1914, when the Russian army saved Paris with an attack on East Prussia. True, at the Vincennes Conference, Renault advocated the approval of the "Weiygand Plan" adopted at the Ypres Conference - a plan for the breakthrough and convergence of British and French armies. But the hypocrisy of the British Prime Minister was fully exposed here, and on 23 May, when Gort's army had retreated to Dunkirk, Churchill sent a letter to Renault, firmly and formally, demanding that Renault "immediately carry out the Weygand Plan" in order to "turn defeat into victory". "Time is of the essence!"- Churchill shouted movingly. Churchill sent a copy of this letter to Renault to General Gott. Gort understood Churchill's cunning diplomatic skills very well. Gort asked London for an explanation, and the answer was left unquestionable: the British General Staff did not even think about it**.
On May 24, Churchill received a coded telegram from Renault. The telegram said: "You call ......You have given instructions to General Goth to proceed with the Weygand plan. But now Wei Gang informed me that ......While our army from the South was advancing smoothly to the north, the British retreated 25 miles from where they were supposed to join their allies to the port. This move by the British forces is a direct sabotage of the official order approved by General Weygand this morning".
Even Renault was forced to unequivocally accuse Britain of grossly breaking its obligations to the Alliance.
The retreat of the British troops in the Dunkirk direction disrupted plans to close the gap and restore an uninterrupted front.
The situation of the retreating British Expeditionary Force was serious. Before May 24, the British Expeditionary Force had very little hope of being saved.
On 4 June, at the moment when the threat of a complete rout at Dunkirk loomed, Churchill admitted in his speech in the House of Commons: "I am afraid to be painfully declared by me the greatest military defeat in our entire long history." I think ......It is possible to successfully evacuate 2-30 thousand people. It seemed inevitable that the French 1st Army and the British Expeditionary Force would ...... in its entiretywill be routed in uncovered battles, or will be forced to surrender".
The Anglo-French army, squeezed in a small triangle (Gravelinne-Ternice at its base and Cambrai at its apex), seemed bound to be annihilated by the Germans. But, suddenly, the German fist, raised for a resolute blow against the British and French troops, swung into space.
9 Hitler's "Order to Cease and Advance."
When, on the morning of 24 May, the Kleist tank group reached the line of Gravoline-Saint-Omer-Bettinne, waiting only to complete the final blow along the coast and cut off the retreating British and French troops from the sea, Hitler issued an incomprehensible "order to halt the advance". In agreement with the commander of Army Group "A", Rundstedt, Hitler ordered the tanks of Kleist and Hoth at Dunkirk to stop their advance and prohibit them from crossing the canal-line.
At 11:42 a.m. on 24 May, the British High Command intercepted a non-cipher telegram from the German offensive on the Dunkirk-Azbruke-Melville line.
On the same day, the Wehrmacht High Command issued Directive No. 13, stipulating that the task of destroying the enemy group should first be carried out by the infantry divisions of Army Group "B".
Directive No. 13 said: "The next operational objective is to carry out a centripetal attack on the right flank of our army, to annihilate the French, British and Belgian forces encircled in the Artois and Flanders regions, and to quickly seize the coast of La Manche in this area".
From this directive, it can be seen that Hitler did not mean to stop the offensive altogether. All he said was a change in tactical plans. Accordingly, the task of assaulting the British and French troops has been changed from the tank corps, which previously played the role of the main assault force, to the infantry divisions and aviation units.
In a letter to Mussolini dated 26 May 1940, Hitler explained the reasons for his suspension of the tank cluster offensive. "I consider it necessary to halt our offensive for the time being, even at the risk of the withdrawal or breakthrough of the British and French troops, before issuing a final breakthrough towards Ramance. We can use the 2 days we have earned to put the road in order. ......So now we don't have to worry about any difficulties in supplying the army. At the same time, infantry divisions ......It is now possible to re-engage with tank and motorized corps......”
Hitler's decision was fundamentally contradictory to the order of the Army General Headquarters given by Brauchitsch the night before. For Brauchitsch had thought it necessary to continue the offensive against the Allies in order to cut off their connection with the coast;At the same time, Brauchitsch also put the tank corps on the main assault mission.
Many experts on World War II believe that the cancellation of the order of the commander-in-chief of the army was a miscalculation of Hitler's campaign.
What was the military-tactical point of view that guided Brauchitsch's decision after the leader lifted his order (the political motives for which will be discussed below)?On this point, Rundstedt can attest, he once wrote: "Hitler's decision was based on the fact that, from the map he used in Berlin at that time, the terrain around the port was swampy and inconvenient for the movement of tank troops. Given the small number of tanks, the inaccessibility of the terrain, and the fact that the French army to the south had not yet been wiped out, Hitler decided to abandon the tank shock because he thought it was too risky". According to Rundstedt, Hitler maintained the forces for the main assault to the south, "with the aim of capturing Paris and completely suppressing French resistance." It can be seen from this that Hitler's troops at Dunkirk were insufficient and could not accomplish the task of annihilating the British and French armies.
10 Afraid of swamps?
The question arises as to whether the reasons that prompted the German High Command to stop the operations of the tank corps at the decisive moment of the campaign are entirely reasonable, for which it may be argued: some say that the reasons are very convincing;Some say that this was a mistake by Hitler and his generals. There is a lot of debate on this issue. According to Hitler, Rundstedt and Keitel, one of the motives for the suspension of tank operations was that "there are too many swamps in Flanders for tanks to pass through".
Of course, Hitler's army had enough engineering support to be able to open up a path for tanks on undulating terrain filled with trenches, obstacles, and canals. However, this would lead to significant losses to the tank corps, which would have increased immeasurably in the possible street battles in Dunkirk. According to the code of the German High Command, the use of tanks in street fighting was absolutely prohibited, including the use of tanks in street fighting for Dunkirk. At that time, Halder also expressed his opposition to the use of tanks in street fighting, because he believed that street fighting should be conducted by infantry divisions. The losses of German tanks in the battle of Arras amounted to 50%. After the Boulogne-Calais-Yper-Lille campaign, the Kleist tank cluster was even more sluggish. From May 10 to 30, the Germans lost nearly 466 tanks.
After two weeks of fierce attacks, the German tank corps was in great need of a respite and needed to change its deployment.
Hitler's resolve was also influenced by arguments made by military advisers close to him, such as Keitel, Jodl, and Goering. Göring was particularly adamant in his efforts to give the Air Force the "honor" of the complete defeat of the encircled British and French armies. Göring's jealousy of the victories of his generals had tarnished his reputation, but he still tried to fight for the first victories for himself and his cronies.
Undoubtedly, all these circumstances played a certain role in Hitler's decision to suspend the operation of the Kleist tank cluster. Hitler wanted to maintain his strength in order to survive the decisive phase of the French war and to defeat France.
In the above-mentioned Directive No. 13, it was stated: "The army campaign (i.e., the decisive phase 2 of the offensive against France) should be carried out as soon as possible after the implementation of the air assault. The aim is to eliminate ......enemy forces". Halder wrote in his diary on May 25: "...The political leaders believed that the decisive battle would not take place in Flanders, but in northern France".
Thus, as the document says, Hitler's current strategic goal at the end of May and early June 1940 was to crush France, not neutral Britain.