Reading guide:Too far away from Tesla,Too close to Toyota。
Author: Li Motian.
Editor: Boss Dai.
Article**: Yuanchuan Automobile Review (yuanchuanqiche).
In 2012, the Model S was launched, and it was a huge hit, and Tesla breathed a sigh of relief. But as the one at the helm, Musk has new anxieties.
At that time, the mass-produced Model S had already consumed 10% of the world's total batteries, and once the follow-up planned Model X and Model 3 were launched, Tesla's battery demand would increase tenfold
As a result, Musk intends to build a huge battery factory in the United States, with more output than all other battery factories in the world combined. But the problem is that it will cost $5 billion to build the factory, and Tesla, which is still burning money, simply can't afford it.
At this time, Musk has not yet been on the list of "old friends of the Chinese people", so he can only fool another buddy: Panasonic.
Panasonic was once Tesla's staunchest supporter. The fate of the two companies began in 2009, when Panasonic, which was full of plasma TVs, decided to bet on electric vehicles and began to supply Tesla**18650 batteries through the acquisition of Sanyo Electric. On the eve of Tesla's listing in 2010, Panasonic brought capital into the group and generously invested $30 million.
However, the huge investment in the battery factory made it difficult for Panasonic, which has always been financially conservative, to dispel the concerns of his old friend, Musk found a vacant lot in a place in Nevada, moved dozens of bulldozers to work overnight, and invited Panasonic management to see the construction progress [3].
In fact, there is no specific plan for the whole project, but the bulldozer pretending to work has given Panasonic executives a clear signal: Tesla's factory is "going big and fast", and after this village, there will be no such store.
Panasonic executives who were tricked immediately reported to the Japanese headquarters, and President Kazuhiro Tsuga decisively invited Musk to come to Japan and invested $1.6 billion in the super factory project. At the press conference, Kazuhiro Tsuga even slapped Musk's sycophants for a while[3]:
We're too conservative, and we have to think like Elon did.
Kazuhiro Tsuga is 14 years older than Musk, but he belongs to the "young Zhuang faction" within Panasonic, and has accumulated huge prestige by leading the company out of the financial crisis. At that time, electric vehicles were not favored by the market, and Panasonic signed a 6The ** agreement of 400 million 18650 battery cells is a fateful friendship.
In this gamble, although the financial returns obtained by Panasonic in the early days were limited, the strategic returns were huge. By binding and investing in Tesla, Panasonic has become the world's largest power battery manufacturer, and it can even be said that Panasonic got the first ticket in the global ** chain in the era of electric vehicles.
But this story of shared suffering did not come to a happy ending.
The watershed between the two sides came in 2019, when Tesla's Shanghai factory started construction in January and began to explode production capacity at the end of the year, Chinese consumers lined up to buy a localized Model 3, and Tesla's stock price soared 80% in the fourth quarter, crushing a crowd of Wall Street bears with high blood pressure.
But at the same time, Panasonic was an awkward absentee. So much so that the industry has repeatedly asked in the future: why did Panasonic, which took all the lead, give up the world's largest new energy vehicle market to LG and CATL?
At present, Panasonic has slipped from the position of the world's largest power battery manufacturer to the fifth place. Of course, although the fifth place result is not bad, whether it is the speed of capacity expansion or the pace of revenue growth, Panasonic has been left far behind.
Panasonic's regret is not how decadent it is, but in the century change from fuel vehicles to electric vehicles, it had the opportunity to become the global leader in power batteries - it drew a good deck of cards, but was eventually intercepted and counter-killed by the old rivals China and South Korea.
This is not only the regret of Panasonic, but also the regret of Japan.
In 2013, the American automotive magazine Motor Trend awarded the "Car of the Year" to the Tesla Model S, an honor that was once monopolized by Japanese automakers. Later, the Model S was delivered in Japan, and Musk blew a circle of Japanese rainbow farts at the press conference.
Speaking of emotion, Mr. Ma came directly to [2]: The heart of Model S is Japan (The Heart of Model S is Japanese).
If the power battery, which accounts for nearly 30% of the cost of electric vehicles, is compared to the heart, then the heart of the Model S is indeed located in Japan, to be exact, the Panasonic headquarters in Osaka, Japan. Half of the credit for the success of the Model S goes to Panasonic.
Model S released in Japan, Musk with Panasonic Executive Vice President Yoshihiko Yamada, 2014.
Panasonic's deep accumulation in power batteries does not come from the Japanese automobile industry, but from the electronics industry, which is collapsing.
In the 80s and 90s of the last century, Japan's automobile and electronics industry was the two major nails in the eyes of the United States, small Japanese cars, cheap chips, and fashionable Walkmans swept the United States, so American folks smashed both Toyota's cars and Toshiba's radios.
Despite the fact that the United States has launched rounds of ** sanctions, the competitiveness of Japan's automobiles and electronics has not been damaged, but has continued to strengthen, and in the nineties of the recession, it has played the two major pioneers of foreign trade, continuously creating foreign exchange earnings.
But the two went their separate ways after the new century, and the first represented by the two fields continued to win, but the electronic brands retreated on a large scale, and Sharp's TVs, Toshiba's air conditioners, Panasonic's refrigerators and Sony's mobile phones disappeared one after another.
Although the brand has declined, the foundation of parts technology and technology has not been lost, and lithium batteries are a valuable legacy left by the Japanese electronics industry. Before 2000, Japan's global share of lithium batteries was stable at more than 95%. Panasonic's 18650 lithium battery for the Model S** was originally used in laptops.
Of course, whether it is technical difficulty or production difficulty, power batteries have increased by several orders of magnitude compared with consumer-grade lithium batteries.
In the name 18650, 18 stands for a diameter of 18mm, 65 for a length of 65mm, and 0 for a cylindrical shape, which is not much larger than a No. 5 battery. The original battery pack of the Model S was filled with more than 7,000 18650 batteries.
Due to the early downstream application, the 18650 battery process is mature and low, which is deeply favored by the bargaining madman Musk.
After the launch of the Model S, in order to solve the production capacity problem, Tesla and Panasonic renewed the agreement in 2013 to expand the number of battery cells** to 1.8 billion.
Later, Musk went to Japan and pulled Panasonic to invest in the Nevada factory, in addition to solving the production capacity problem that has plagued Tesla for a long time, another purpose is to upgrade the 18650 battery to the 21700 battery with higher energy density.
21700 battery refers to a cylindrical battery with a diameter of 21mm and a height of 70mm, which has an energy density increase of more than 20% compared with 18650, and due to the reduction of the number of cells in the battery pack, the production cost is further reduced, and the difficulty of power management is also reduced.
Inside the doggy Panasonic, the bet on Tesla has been controversial. In addition, Panasonic is not like Volkswagen, and there is a miracle assist in exhaust emission fraud, which is used as an opportunity to transform new energy. Therefore, Kazuhiro Tsuga's internal voice largely depends on the mass production of 21700 batteries and Tesla's sales.
With the successful production of the 21,700 battery at the Nevada plant, the last hurdle for the low-cost Model 3 has been removed. In 2016, Tesla officially announced the Model 3, received 320,000 pre-orders within a week, with an order value of more than 14 billion US dollars, and in 2017, the Model 3 began to be delivered, and Kazuhiro Tsuga can finally breathe a sigh of relief.
But neither Musk nor Kazuhiro Tsuga may have expected that the Model 3 would be the starting point for the two companies to part ways.
In July 2018, Musk was a guest on the podcast of talk show actor Joe Rogan, when Tesla experienced production hell and recorded the largest single-quarter loss in history, and the gloating Wall Street bears lined up to open positions. Speaking of emotion, Musk took two puffs of the "cigarette containing **" in Joe Rogan's hand.
The next day, the ** clip of Musk smoking a big cigarette was transmitted to the Panasonic headquarters in Osaka, Japan, 9,000 kilometers away, and the hearts of a group of Japanese executives rose to their throats.
In Japan, it is a crime to smoke **, and smoking ** by public figures is a stain on life that cannot be washed away. Musk's actions quickly caused unease at Panasonic, with one executive asking during the meeting [1]: What would our investors think?
Musk smoking in front of the camera, 2018.
At that time, the much-anticipated Model 3 was a huge hit when it was released, but production capacity problems followed. The multi-billion-dollar fully automated production line failed to function[4], more than 30 executives lined up to leave, 20 Model 3 bookers demanded refunds due to the delay in delivery dates, and Jim Chanos, the big short-cut who sent Enron's CEO to prison for 24 years, also pointed the finger at Tesla.
As a close comrade-in-arms, Panasonic took the initiative to take the blame in 2017, saying that the frequent bounces in Model 3 deliveries were mainly due to problems with its own battery production capacity. Kazuhiro Tsuga himself went to Nevada once a year to investigate the progress of the project, which was later changed to once a quarter [5].
But in fact, the rift between the two sides has already begun to grow.
Musk has an almost pathological obsession with controlling production costs, so that the cost per unit energy of Panasonic's batteries was once lower than that of Chinese companies. Kazuhiro Tsuga once complained about Musk [1]: Elon has asked for a lower ** many times, and once I responded to him that if this happens again, we will consider removing the Panasonic employees and equipment of the Gigafactory.
According to a report by Wall Street, Musk Xi used to call or text Tsuga Kazuhiro directly, asking for a price reduction [1]. In the former's plan, as Tesla's production increases, the cost of batteries will be rapidly diluted on a large scale.
Panasonic's positioning of the battery business is just the opposite, they have just gradually recovered from huge losses, and they are extremely sensitive to the wind and grass of performance indicators. Therefore, once Tesla starts to make a profit, Panasonic will quickly raise prices and recoup its investment.
In the process of building the battery factory, Panasonic's investment gradually exceeded the original $1.6 billion, and Tesla also occasionally defaulted on battery procurement fees due to its poor financial condition.
With the groundbreaking of the Shanghai Lingang Gigafactory in early 2019, the contradictions between the two sides gradually became public.
According to the plan, the initial target production capacity of the Shanghai plant is 500,000 units, which means that it needs to match the battery production capacity. Tesla's long-term goal is to produce locally and sell locally, which means that Panasonic needs to take another gamble with Tesla - invest in battery production lines in China. Otherwise, Tesla is bound to introduce new ** merchants.
At the end of 2018, after Tesla acquired land in Shanghai, Musk hinted that he would introduce new ** merchants in China, but he intimately remarked "including Panasonic". Panasonic generously said that "men love to play":
The multi-merchant structure makes sense for Tesla, but that doesn't mean our relationship has been hurt and become unstable, and we have a very, very strong relationship with Tesla.
However, Panasonic said that he was willing to go to China with Tesla, but there was no substantive action.
In March 2019, the future explosive model Model Y was released, and a month later, Musk publicly accused Panasonic on Twitter of not increasing battery production capacity as planned. Kazuhiro Tsuga retorted through the earnings conference, saying that the Nevada battery production line was not at full capacity, implying that the responsibility was on Tesla's production level.
The substantive difference between the two sides is that Tesla, after a series of troubles such as short carnival, production capacity hell, and delivery delays, is ready to rely on the "Chinese green card" of the domestic Model 3 to make a big move, but Panasonic, which has been running for almost ten years, has not made a penny.
Musk hopes that Panasonic will continue to invest and produce 4680 batteries with higher difficulty and greater energy density for Tesla, but Panasonic is no longer willing to face the distant losses of the battery business, so that the century-old store, which has always been calm, can openly turn over with major customers.
From God's point of view, Panasonic couldn't bear it on the eve of Tesla's skyrocketing.
In October 2019, Panasonic's financial report for the second quarter (fiscal year) was released, and the battery business was still the main loss-making force. But in the same period, Tesla made a rare profit of 1$4.3 billion, and it was achieved in the face of declining revenues - which obviously poked Panasonic's lungs.
With the start of the production line of the Shanghai factory, LG became the most important battery manufacturer, and then introduced CATL. Panasonic, feeling betrayed, said bluntly that it has no plans to build new production capacity in China. When asked if he regretted investing in the Gigafactory in Nevada back then, Kazuhiro Tsuga replied
Yes of course. ”
Panasonic's parting of ways with Tesla is often mentioned, and Panasonic's hesitation at the last moment is also embarrassing. But it's easy to overlook another key player: Toyota.
In January 2019, the Shanghai factory broke ground, and Panasonic's patience with Tesla ran out. At the same time that Tesla contacted the domestic battery manufacturer, Panasonic and Toyota announced that they planned to establish a joint venture in 2020 to produce prismatic batteries that are different from Tesla's cylindrical batteries.
Panasonic has been complaining about the battery business at the expense of losses and Tesla's expansion of production capacity, and Tesla's search for a new love has completely destroyed the pie that Kazuhiro Tsuga painted for Panasonic.
In a 2020 Nikkei interview, Panasonic executives clarified a new strategy: to leverage Toyota, introduce diversified customers, and build a TTP system – that is, Tesla, Toyota, and Panasonic.
Toyota is the world's largest car company in terms of sales, and it is also the leading brother in Japan. If Toyota invests heavily in new energy vehicles, it will also drive the development of the entire Japanese automobile chain, and the biggest beneficiary is undoubtedly Panasonic.
Akio Toyoda and Kazuhiro Tsuga.
Obviously, Toyota didn't play that role well.
In April this year, the Nihon Keizai Shimbun interviewed former Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry bureaucrat Shigena Koga on the topic of "Why Toyota's Electric Cars Have Made This Virtue." The predecessor of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry was the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, which made great contributions to Japan's economic take-off, and its positioning was similar to that of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology in China. Koga Maoming worked in it for 30 years, becoming a member of the official cabinet and reporting directly to the Minister of Economy and Industry.
In the interview, Shigena Koga revealed many of Toyota's decision-making mistakes in the process of transitioning to electric vehicles [14]:
Toyota initially did not look at electric vehicles, and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry also favored hydrogen vehicles. However, hydrogen energy vehicles have long been unable to solve the high cost of hydrogen energy storage, transportation and use, and European, American and Chinese car companies have coincidentally chosen the electrification route.
Toyota thinks that it has a large scale, a thick foundation, and strong technology, although it is one step behind, but 800,000 beats 600,000, and the advantage is in me. That is, many netizens like to say "as long as the traditional brand makes a force".
Later, Toyota made a force, but the captcha models represented by the BZ4X could not be sold at all. BYD's success has also deeply stung Toyota, and it even wants to poach people from BYD to alleviate poverty through technology - something that the Japanese could not imagine before.
The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry once wanted to force local car companies to transform through the introduction of BYD, a "foreign force", but the Japan Association did not plan to save face for the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, and made it clear that it "will not support a ** [6] that does not subsidize hybrid vehicles".
Who was the president of this association at the time: Akio Toyoda.
A series of hesitations and hesitations created the host's soul torture at the beginning of the show: If you can't sell Tesla, why can't you even sell the public?
According to Koga Shigena, the crux of Toyota's problem is not in its technical capabilities or R&D level, but in its strategy: it wants to make pure electric vehicles, but it is unwilling to give up fuel vehicles. While selling electric vehicles, he said that "hybrids are also new energy" and "I like cars that smell of gasoline".
"It may not affect Toyota's sales, but it will bring a serious consequence to the industrial chain: the technical route of the terminal products is ambiguous, and the upstream merchants do not know which direction to invest."
In highly capital-intensive manufacturing industries such as automobiles, photovoltaics, and semiconductors, production line investment requires astronomical capital expenditures, which makes the certainty of downstream orders crucial. BOE has been able to withstand the pressure for 14 consecutive years because of the annual increase in LCD panel orders for downstream TVs and mobile phones. The announcement of the cessation of engine research and development by the old car companies is not only a demonstration of the determination of transformation, but also a direction of investment for the huge upstream ** chain.
Japan has almost the most complete automobile industry chain in the world, which was originally the advantage of Japan's transformation, but Toyota, as the downstream hegemon, has been vacillating for a long time, which has turned this advantage into a disadvantage.
Like many components, batteries rely heavily on large-scale production to reduce costs. At a time when Panasonic is setting a profit deadline for its battery division, both Chinese and South Korean companies are expanding production capacity at a loss. In the face of "Chinese speed", two years is enough to widen the gap.
Toyota's statement is to protect the best businessmen, so it cannot radically transform to electric vehicles. But Toyota's conservatism failed to protect anyone, as Shigena Koga said
All models have to be done, and the first business has to invest in all directions, which is a huge burden. If Toyota had switched to electric cars earlier, Panasonic would have increased its investment in batteries, and the company would have stopped the research and development of fuel vehicle parts.
Toyota hesitated, and Panasonic did not dare to invest in production capacity. But China and South Korea are desperately investing, and in the end, Toyota will have to buy batteries from BYD and CATL.
Toyota is still the world's largest car company in terms of sales, but the huge automotive industry chain has been left behind.
Nissan's battery division, AESC, was sold to Chinese wind power giant Envision, and separators and cathode and anode materials were once monopolized by the Japanese chemical industry, but in recent years have been overtaken by Chinese companies that have hitched a ride on new energy sources. Once upon a time, companies such as Nichia Chemical, Hitachi Chemical, and Ube of Japan were present in every corner of the industry.
In 2008, Nissan and NEC formed a joint venture to form AESC, a battery production company, which was later acquired by a Chinese company
Compared to these disappointed people, Panasonic looks like a winner.
People describe Mexico's sadness as "too far from heaven, too close to the United States", and to put this phrase on Panasonic is "too far from Tesla, too close to Toyota".
Panasonic's reverse textbook is displayed in a place that Kazuhiro Tsuga may not have heard of: Ningde, Fujian.
The "strong gambling" in Zeng Yuqun's office is often talked about, and in parallel with it is China's long-term and continuous investment in the new energy track.
Although there have been some ridiculous problems of deception, it must be admitted that China has shown absolute policy determination and planning ability in the industrial planning of new energy vehicles, and more than ten years of Taoguang Yanghui is divided into two stages:
From 2013 to 2016 is the peak of subsidies for new energy vehicles in China, the subsidy method is simple and rude to sell a supplement one, ** to make up for the local supplement, to make more to make up more, all kinds of various deception routines are also emerging under the unrestrained subsidy ideas.
Simple and crude subsidies, with the consideration of the cost gap between trams and oil vehicles, from the perspective of efficiency, the subsidy to the terminal can also take care of the upstream of the industry. However, with such a strong subsidy, the core is to use real money to smash a new track, so that the upstream of the huge industrial chain has stable expectations and dares to invest in production expansion.
Around 2015, more than 1,000 lithium battery manufacturers once emerged in China, which is also the background of the continuous adjustment of the second phase of industrial policy
From the sunshine subsidy to the elimination of backward production capacity, with the help of capacity scale, energy density and technical route and other indicators, the meaning of eliminating the small and leaving the big to eliminate the weak and support the strong is obvious. The three-year whitelist also leaves a catch-up window for domestic companies.
In June 2018, CATL's VIP channel in the long IPO queue flashed, and domestic manufacturers gradually stuck in the core three-electric technology. It was at this time that I dared to put Tesla in as a catfish.
The popularization of a new technology must be low enough, and financial subsidies are only one way, and ultimately it will depend on the scale of production to reduce costs. The pure electric route can be popularized, and the subsidized factor also lies in the fact that a large amount of capital has been invested in the upstream of the industry, and a large number of parts and components with a market value of 10 billion yuan and ** chain enterprises have been born.
The lithium battery industry represented by CATL has risen from the ground, and the gambling spirit is strong, but the important thing is that the chips on the gambling table are big enough - China has successfully created a market where the sales of new energy vehicles account for 60% of the world's total, which can provide a steady stream of orders and profits for the upstream of the industrial chain.
In 2018, the white list began to loosen, and Samsung and SK, which had been blocked outside, made a comeback, but Panasonic and Tesla went their separate ways.
Objectively speaking, compared with China, Japan does not have the regret and unwillingness of being controlled by the three major parts of fuel vehicles, nor does it have the financial ability comparable to China.
However, as mentioned above, Japan has a deep technology accumulation and a complete automotive industry chain, and the Toyota Prius is the world's first hybrid car to sell more than 5 million units, which could have been Japan's advantage in the pure electric wave.
However, in the era of aggressive expansion of Chinese and South Korean companies, Japan has repeatedly wandered in front of the three paths of hydrogen energy, hybrid and pure electric, squandering the window period of transformation.
In the interview, Koga Maoming gave an example: Nidec and Nidecso have very strong motor production capacity, but due to the long-term indecision of the terminal brand, the empty technology cannot sell the product, and the R&D iteration has become empty talk.
After the sale of the battery division, Nissan's electric models are long overdue, and the battery supplier is the Chinese company SunwodaThe battery of Honda's electric car comes from CATL, and the motor and electronic control come from the Chinese company JEE Technology.
Automobiles are the holy grail of industry and technology, but after all, it is a game that relies on economies of scale to dilute costs. As the world's highest-selling car company, Toyota has enough power to create a table with a lot of chips so that Panasonic doesn't have to completely depend on Tesla, but they failed to do so, making Panasonic a helpless victim.
In the same year that Toyota and Panasonic announced the establishment of a joint venture battery company, Toyota also invited actor Teruyuki Kagawa (the "big brother and sister-in-law" in "The Devil is Coming") to promote his own hydrogen energy model mirai with Akio Toyoda.
In 2018, when the Nevada battery production line was launched, Kazuhiro Tsuga, who single-handedly managed the battery production project, said, "Panasonic and Tesla are partners in a community with a shared future."
Wall Street** has quoted Panasonic's management as saying that although Kazuhiro Tsuga believes that the cooperation between Tesla and Panasonic is still worth investing in, there are fewer and fewer internal supporters, so much so that Kazuhiro Tsuga himself has doubts about it.
In 2020, Panasonic sold Tesla** in its hands, and Vice President Keiji Sato stated [7]: "We and Tesla are not a community with a shared future, but different companies. We will judge calmly. ”
At that time, Kazuhiro Tsuga had already decided to step down as president and end his 41-year career at Panasonic. In the cooperation with Tesla, Kazuhiro Tsuga has always faced many resistances: internal suspicion, long-term losses, Tesla's bargaining, Toyota's hesitation, and Japan's confusion.
And the enemy in front of Musk is only physics.
The "visible hand" of industrial policy and financial subsidies was Japan's forte, and it was also used in the revival of every East Asian economy after the war: in Japan, it was the bureaucracy of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry and the Ministry of FinanceIn South Korea, it is the chaebol and the Park Chung-hee model;In China, it is *** and the five-year plan.
The 1982 edition of MITI and the Japan Miracle detailed how MITI outlined a blueprint for Japan's industrial development and guided large companies to compete with a rigorous top-level design.
"Made in America" by MIT professors compares Apple as a representative of Silicon Valley companies with Sony, and prescribes a prescription for Apple: Apple should Xi learn from Sony.
Thirty years later, "The Economic History of Postwar Japan" was written, and Yukio Noguchi sighed in the book: "Looking at Apple and Japanese electronics companies now, it really makes people feel like they are in the sea." ”
In the days when Japan's economy was booming, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry and the Ministry of Finance were like two engines with excellent performance and perfect coordination, but they were not drivers after all.
When the technological wave is in the ascendant, the top-level design of industrial policy and the vertical and horizontal of financial mobilization always complement each other, but the core force to promote progress is always the participant in every specific link of the industrial chain.
Sooner or later is not a problem, with strong production and manufacturing capacity to catch up with the latter is the ability of East Asian countries, but the cost of indecision is often underestimated.
Objectively speaking, Toyota is still the world's No. 1 car brand, and Panasonic will also be among the top ten battery manufacturers in the world for a long time, and is Tesla's most important business in North America.
But the regret is that they could have seized more opportunities, instead of allowing the industrial chain to shift to China and South Korea;The hidden concern is that whether pure electric is the answer to the car or not, electric drive must be the direction of the future, and the speed of transformation may be much faster than imagined.
This is also the concern expressed by Koga Shigena at the end of the interview: automobiles are the absolute pillar industry in Japan, accounting for about 20% of manufacturing sales, driving 82% of employment. When semiconductors, home appliances, and consumer electronics fall one after another, Japan has little to lose.
At the recent Tokyo Motor Show, Akio Toyoda passed by BYD's booth in a ferry, and his complicated expression was accurately captured by the cameras present. The dense ** and the highly topical look up to U8 at BYD's booth added a bit of drama to this scene.
Earlier at the G7 summit, Akio Toyoda, who had stepped down as president, once again said something meaningful[15]: The automotive industry is following the same path that Toyota has tried – implying that Toyota launched pure electric models in the 90s.
But what is the new road, the industrial chain behind him is still anxiously waiting for the answer.
The swaying Toyota and the wandering Panasonic are a notch on Japan's ***, and the manufacturing ship takes on the appearance of what Metternich wrote in a letter before the European Revolution of 1848[11]: The end of old Europe has begun, and I am determined to die with it. (The author of this article, Li Motian, ** Yu Yuanchuan Automobile Comment, Web3 Boss has been authorized by the author, edited and published by Web3 Boss, the views in the article are the author's views and do not represent the views of Web3 Boss.) ）
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