The tactics have been constantly polished and refined by our army in the decades of war, and by the end of the War of Liberation and the period of resisting US aggression and aiding Korea, it has reached the realm of supernatural perfection.
For example, in the process of Huaye's encirclement of the reorganized 74th Division, Wang Bicheng led the six columns to "fly and ferry", and rushed 200 miles in 40 hours to capture Duozhuang, cutting off the only way for the 74th Division to retreat. Since then, Zhang Lingfu can only lead the 74th Division to Meng Lianggu and wait for help;
In the second battle to resist US aggression and aid Korea, the 113th Division of the 38th Army interspersed 70 kilometers in 14 hours in the ice and snow, and cut off the retreat of the joint ** in Sansholi and Longyuanli. Let Mr. Peng call "Long live the 38th Army".
On November 18, 1962, a 1,500-strong interspersed force of the People's Liberation Army forcibly marched for 6 days and 5 nights along the Bailey Trail discovered by the British, and appeared on November 18 between Derangzong and Bomdila. When the Indians saw the PLA soldiers coming down from a cliff dozens of meters high, they were about to come down from a rope, as if a divine soldier had descended from the sky, and their spirits suddenly collapsed.
In 1962, the People's Liberation Army interspersed with a squad of 1,500 people, from.
I believe that the reason why tactics occupy such an important position in our army's battles is closely related to our army's operational guiding principles and the execution of our ranks. Of these two aspects, one is why is it so fighting? One is can you fight like this?
As everyone knows, there is a guiding ideology for operations: "It is better to cut off one finger than to hurt the enemy's ten fingers" and to "concentrate superior forces and destroy living forces." In practice, the way to achieve this tactical goal is generally to set up a pocket formation in an ambush or quickly interspersed with detours to complete the encirclement.
Under this guiding ideology, the greatest risk on the battlefield is not non-combat attrition, but letting the enemy run away. In the Battle of Changjin Lake, the 26th Army missed the planes of the 1st Marine Division because of its late departure and bad weather, and many officers and men were punished.
Correspondingly, the Kuomintang army did not have this kind of determination and courage, and their tactics generally relied on superior forces to push flat. Since the Northeast Democratic Alliance Army was released after the fourth draw in World War II, they have never had a chance to turn the tables.
If you want to say that in the history of war, there are only our army who rely on the two legs of soldiers to intersperse tactics into the realm. The enemy runs fast, and our army must be faster. The troops marched 50 or 60 kilometers a day in formation, and this kind of execution was really not something that ordinary armies could do.
This requires the military to have strong organizational and executive capabilities. Looking at the memories of the veterans, when they marched in a hurry, they were extremely tired and often slept while walking. At this time, if someone in front suddenly stops, the person behind will not have time to brake and fall down a lot.
General Yang Chengwu recalled that when the 4th Regiment of the 1st Red Army flew to capture the Luding Bridge in an unprecedented hurry (245 miles in 25 hours on a rugged and slippery mountain road), their party meetings were all completed on the run
In the marching column, suddenly a group of people gathered together. As soon as the group dispersed, more people appeared, running and talking excitedly. As far as the Kuomintang army and other national armies are concerned, it can really be said that "it is necessary to do nothing, but it is really impossible to do it"!