The three major battles in the War of Liberation are the key battles that determine the outcome of the whole war, and the Kuomintang army invested 550,000, 600,000 and 800,000 combat troops in the Northeast, North China and East China battlefields respectively, with a total strength of 1.95 million, most of which are the main force of the ** army, including 4 of the five major American weapons aces. If the intensity is so great, why was it that more than 1.5 million people were annihilated, and not even a battle was fought? Let's break it down.
The first reason is that the tactics of command conflict are not uniform. In none of the three major battles, the command and the commander of the theater reached a complete agreement, and the tactical thinking was chaotic in the actual operation execution, and the battlefield performance of the first corps was a mess in this case. Taking the Liaoshen Campaign as an example, Wei Lihuang, the commander-in-chief of the suppression, advocated concentrating his forces to defend the strongholds of the three cities, while Lao Jiang insisted on mobilizing more than 200,000 mobile troops to advance east and west, with Jinzhou as the center to annihilate the main force of the Northeast Field Army. Regardless of which tactic was more reasonable, the disunity between Wei Lihuang and the General Headquarters seriously affected the tactical execution of the subordinate troops, and Liao Yaoxiang, as the commander of the 9th Corps in charge of operations, even took it upon himself to adopt the conservative tactic of going north to cut the supply line in Dongye after leaving Shenyang, delaying the precious fighter planes. Not only in the Northeast Battlefield, but also in the Pingjin Campaign and the Huaihai Campaign, there were also obvious conflicts between the tactical ideas of Lao Jiang and Fu Zuoyi, Du Yuming and other theater commanders, which had a negative impact on the overall battle situation.
The second reason is the frequent use of the most taboo method of refueling in large corps operations. In the Huaihai Campaign, this kind of wrong style of play was embodied to the extreme. In this battle, the Kuomintang army had a conservative overall operational idea, and each corps relied on two north-south railway lines to try to protect itself with Xuzhou as the center, and had no intention of fighting a decisive battle. In the actual course of the operation, the Kuomintang army was cut and surrounded by our army on the three battlefields of Nianzhuang, Shuangduiji and Yongcheng, and did not take advantage of the advantage of the total strength of its own 800,000 participating troops, but instead sent another corps to the rescue after the local corps was surrounded, and it was never able to form a joint force of a huge combat cluster and fight a decisive battle with the main forces of Huaye and Zhongye. Huang Wei's corps and Qiu Lisun's corps were all killed in this backward style of play. In fact, ** is not good at large corps operations, as early as 1937 in the Anti-Japanese War of Songhu Battle has been reflected, after a lapse of 11 years, ** in the Huaihai Campaign to a large extent still defeated in the use of "refueling tactics", the essence of the military commander's gains and losses, lack of courage.
The third reason is that factional contradictions are reflected on the battlefield. Factional strife was a chronic disease in the history of the Kuomintang army, and it was particularly evident during the three major battles. In the Liaoshen Campaign, the 60th Army of the Dian Army was oppressed by the new 7th Army in Changchun City, and could not distribute military rations, which directly led to an uprising; In the Huaihai Campaign, Qiu Qingquan and Li Mi's corps refused to do their best to rescue Huang Baitao's corps, which was from a miscellaneous background and was besieged in the Xudong area; The Pingjin Campaign was the most obvious, Fu Zuoyi, the commander-in-chief of the North China Suppression, completely separated the troops of the ** Army and the troops of the Suiyuan lineage, half of which were deployed on the eastern front and half on the west front, in order to make the ** army as cannon fodder (in fact, the battle of Tianjin reflected this), and the descendants of the Western Front could return to Suiyuan's hometown at any time. With such a ghostly operation, which strategic decisive battle do you expect to win?
Finally, the intelligence front was a complete failure. From Hou Jingru, commander of the Eastern Advance Corps in the Liaoshen Campaign, to Fu Dongju, the daughter of Fu Zuoyi during the Pingjin Campaign (even Chen Changjie's city defense map before the Tianjin Campaign was obtained in advance by Siye Yesi), and then to He Jifeng and Zhang Kexia's uprising during the Huaihai Campaign, Liao Yunzhou's 110th Division of the 12th Corps rebelled: **The rout of the intelligence front during the three major battles was far greater than the collapse at the military level, and it can even be said that it was defeated before the battle, and it is not surprising that more than 1.5 million people were annihilated in the three major battles.