Introduction
It should be an indisputable fact that China's credit card has entered the era of stock, and the customer activity rate has been declining in the past two years, and the customer switching cost is low. How to operate better than others in the stock era is a topic that the credit card centers of various banks and the Chinese credit card industry need to face. When the traditional model of strange visits fails, the engine of customer acquisition growth is in? How to use limited resources to motivate customers to use cards, we need to have three souls: what to invest? Cast**? Vote for whom? Through the DuPont analysis system, you need to move from finance to business, and summarize the operation of credit cards into four aspects: attracting new users, promoting activation, risk control, and profitability, and decompose them layer by layer to find the driving factors of performance growth. In these aspects, although there are no cases to learn from, we can still gain inspiration through the development of American Express and the development of Japanese credit cards, and calmly face the second half of the uncertainty of the credit card industry.
February** Dynamic Incentive ProgramAbout the AuthorBao Xiaolin graduated with a major in law and has national legal professional qualifications. From 2006 to 2010, he worked for KPMG as an auditor. He is a non-practicing member of the Shenzhen Institute of Certified Public Accountants. Since 2010, he has been working in the credit card center of joint-stock commercial banks. Among them, from 2010 to 2018, he worked in the middle and back office departments such as the legal compliance department, the customer experience department, and the network channel department. 2018 In 2020, he took the initiative to apply to go to the front line to lead the team, ** institutional management. He served as the general manager of the bank's credit card Huizhou branch. Since August 2020, he has served as the deputy general manager of the Shenzhen branch of the bank's credit card center. He has personally experienced and participated in the growth of a bank's credit card customers from 5 million to 63 million, and is also a witness to the development of China's credit card industry in the past 10 years.
Table of Contents
Chapter 1 The Underlying Business Model of Credit Cards.
The traffic giant Meituan has issued more than 10 million cards, which is the future of the industry or a flash in the county.
Deciphering the Money-Making Logic of Credit Cards: A Credit Card Lifecycle Profit and Loss Analysis.
Redefining the business model of credit cards.
There are four key drivers of the credit card camp: two ratios**, two ratios.
The flywheel of credit card camp from the perspective of DuPont analysis.
Whether traditional banks should learn the "money burning" model of the Internet?
Chapter 2 Attracting New Customers: How to Acquire New Customers in the Stock Era.
Stock game: 21 years is the first year of credit card stock camp.
Taking History as a Mirror: The Development History and Industry Logic of China's Credit Card.
New mode of customer acquisition: offline + intensive farming.
Traffic: The customer acquisition practices of various banks and traffic platforms.
Direct Selling Channels: The Dilemma and Transformation of Direct Credit Card Sales.
Banking channels: The significance of bank outlets for credit card drainage.
Insurance channel: ** The size of the team is declining in the throes of pain.
Transformation: Bank of Qingdao Credit Card Camp Enlightenment.
Sinking market: Whether there is a sinking market for credit cards.
Anti-monopoly: Will the "barbarians at the door" leave?
Consumer Psychology: Credit Card Sales Skills.
Chapter 3 Activation: How to make customers use credit cards frequently.
Current status and share of credit card customers.
How to enhance the activity of new customers: equity securitization and intertemporal + sales of "new infrastructure" + enterprise assistance.
How to increase the activity of existing customers.
Chapter 4 Profitability: How to increase the yield of a credit card.
Proportion of interest-bearing assets: the core of China's credit card profitability.
Dividends disappear: the scale of loans and the proportion of interest-bearing assets both fell and rebounded.
Product grip: revolving credit, bill installment, single installment, reserve, cash installment.
Marketization of credit card interest rates: from penalty to free pricing.
Free Pricing: The Circuit and Regulation Loop of Credit Card Red Sea Competition.
Marketing reach: SMS, telemarketing, customer service, APP, sales force.
Chapter 5 Risk Control: How to Reduce Customer Default Rate.
South Korea's credit card crisis.
Year: A quiz in China's credit card industry.
Customer group structure: the background color of credit card risk management.
Sales as risk control: How to put risk indicators in front of the sales line.
Chapter 6 The Second Half of Credit Cards: How to Face an Uncertain Future.
Digital Transformation: Experience, Efficiency, and Cost.
Data assets: an opportunity to improve the industry's revenue structure.
Stones from Other Mountains: How to Get It Right.
Postscript Who is the lord of ups and downs.
Summary:
In June 21, I interviewed a candidate for a branch of the Bank of Shanghai in Shenzhen, and she planned to leave her job, one of the reasons is that the traffic of bank outlets is too small and the business is difficult to do.
At her branch, the customer flow is mainly from customers who have activated their Meituan credit cards at the outlets. You heard it right, the offline traffic is mainly for customers who apply for Meituan credit cards online.
Cooperation with traffic giants has been a small trend in credit card customer acquisition in the past two years, especially regional commercial banks. Since 18 years, Meituan has broken the circle and opened a bank in the field of credit cards, cooperating with city commercial banks to issue Meituan co-branded credit cards (see Figure 1-1). According to Meituan's data disclosure, as of October this year, in just two years, the issuance of Meituan credit cards exceeded 10 million, and the top banks in issuance, including Bank of Shanghai, Bank of Qingdao, Bank of Hangzhou, etc., a total of 12 city commercial banks "got on the bus".
Some people are anxious, and some people are excited.
Taking Bank of Shanghai and Bank of Qingdao as examples, they cooperated with Meituan to issue co-branded credit cards, and cardholders sold them with a discount of 6 yuan per day, which was valid for 60 consecutive days (Bank of Qingdao 90 days). At the same time, you can also earn pocket money by spending money with your card.
If a customer enjoys a discount of 6 yuan per day for 90 consecutive days, not counting consumption and pocket money, who will pay for the 540 yuan?
The wool came out of the sheep, and obviously, the bank must have taken the money.
Not only that, for each co-branded card issued, the bank has to pay an additional 100 yuan for Meituan's hair fee, you see, the bank obtains customers through the Internet platform, and the cost is really not low.
What about Meituan? What is the picture in the cooperation, the 100 yuan given by the bank?
By no means. Meituan did not take the 100 yuan into its own pocket, but gave it back to customers. The pocket money that customers consume and earn is from this 100 yuan**.
Meituan doesn't want the 100 yuan card issuance fee, so what does it want? What it wants is to take a slice of your revenue.
It is understood that the cooperation between Meituan and a city commercial bank is based on the scale of loans, and a certain proportion of the bank's operating income is distributed from low to high. When the balance of credit card loans of city commercial banks reaches 30 yuan, Meituan takes 3% of its operating income every year; If the loan size reaches 50 yuan, take 5%; 80 yuan to take 8%; More than 1 yuan, 12% will be shared.
Note that this is not a share of profits, but of operating income.
What's the difference?
You can simply understand that no matter whether the bank's business is profitable or losing, Meituan will take 3 12 points from the bank's revenue to ensure income in drought and flood.
After Meituan takes 3 5 points, does the bank credit card still make money?
If you understand the ROE in the credit card industry today, the answer is obvious. The average ROE in the credit card industry is only about 3%, and if you take 3 points, the bank will not be profitable. Does it hurt?
In this cooperation, Meituan and City Commercial Bank are looking forward to a win-win cooperation. Banks ...... with the help of the wings of the Internet