In the second half of 49, the Liberation War was coming to an end, but there were still strong military forces such as Hu Zongnan Group, Song Xilian Group, and Bai Chongxi of the Gui Department and the Second Horse of the Northwest Army. Among the remnants of the enemy, the situation of Qinghai and Ningxia Majia Army in the northwest is relatively special, and the historical relationship with our army is deep, with the cruel ** Red Army West Route Army before the Anti-Japanese War as a typical example.
Our army and the Ma family army did have a blood feud, the West Route Army of more than 20,000 people, only more than 400 reached Xinjiang, and more than 7,000 people were lost in the course of the battle. The key point is that of the more than 10,000 people who were captured, only more than 4,000 officers and soldiers were successfully rescued through repeated mediation, while more than 6,000 were killed and humiliated by the enemy (female soldiers) after becoming prisoners of war. In terms of cruelty and barbarism, no local warlord in China at that time could compare with the Ma Hui army.
As a result, there is a saying about Ma Jiajun, especially on the Internet recently: In 49, the offensive and defensive situation on the domestic battlefield was completely reversed, and our army was strong and strong, and when the army of 300,000 troops liberated the five northwestern provinces, the Military Commission clearly required the First Field Army to severely punish Ma Jiajun and not accept the other party's uprising. Such a statement is similar to "blood debts and blood repayment", which sounds like there is a certain basis, but judging from historical common sense, "not allowing the uprising" is obviously contrary to our army's liberation war policy, is it true?
After checking the information from many parties, the above statement is basically an emotional rendering of the clouds, which has been out of shape and has no solid historical basis. Ma Jiajun, especially Qinghai Ma Bufang, does have major contradictions with our army, especially the Ma army, its primitive army characteristics and fear of our army's revenge, so that the hostility before the Lanzhou Battle in 49 became more and more intense, Ma Bufang and his son gathered nearly 100,000 heavy soldiers (including 20,000 elite cavalry), in a vain attempt to use Lanzhou city defense and the Yellow River to fight to the death with our army.
However, the Ma army chose to fight a decisive battle, not because Yiye did not allow them to revolt, but because of the misjudgment of Ma Bufang, Ma Jiyuan and others on the war situation, and more importantly, the long-term nomadic and family territory concept of the northwest warlords. The Central Military Commission has never issued an order to the First Field Army of the Northwest Front that "all the Majia Army will be annihilated and no uprising shall be accepted." In fact, the Central Military Commission combined the characteristics of the southern part of Hu Zong, the ** army in the northwest region, and the entrenchment of the Hui army, and put forward the strategic idea of "giving priority to the annihilation of the Ma Hui army", but this was only a matter of operational priority, and there was never an official document or telegram asking Yiye not to let the Ma Jiajun revolt or surrender.
After Yiye liberated Lanzhou, he ordered to protect the buildings and temples of ethnic minorities, and give preferential treatment to Ma Jiajun's prisoners as in the Northeast and East China battlefields; What is more important is that the officers and men of Qingning Erma are mainly ethnic minorities, and the ethnic composition in the northwest region is far more complex than that in the Central Plains, which has a bearing on social stability, and our army has adopted the most tolerant policy toward this region, and the officers and men of the uprising can give corresponding guarantees, and there is no such situation of "rejecting the uprising of the Ma army."
As a matter of fact, Ma Hongbin, a member of the Ma Jiajun in Ningxia, actively responded to the uprising after many contacts with our side, and Ma Hongbin himself became the vice governor of Gansu after the founding of the People's Republic of China. The last uprising in Ningma was as many as tens of thousands of people (**81st Army), and the so-called rumors prohibiting the Ma army from uprising were directly self-defeating.