Stalin telegraphed six times, but Mao skillfully responded to it, and only after the war did he know that he was wise
The relationship between China and the Soviet Union is complex and unique, full of sweet memories and painful experiences. The same was true of the relations between the leaders of the Chinese and Soviet parties, Stalin's feelings for *** were unpredictable, both warm and cold.
In the same way, ** has very mixed feelings for Stalin, who expressed admiration for Stalin's great exploits and at the same time disgusted by Stalin's great-power chauvinism.
In his evaluation of Stalin, he gave an evaluation of "seven points of merit and three points of excess". In general, ** did not have a particularly favorable opinion of Stalin, but he still insisted on carefully handling relations with Stalin in the interests of the party, the state and the people, and as much as possible to maintain the independence of our party and state and avoid becoming a vassal of the USSR.
This is the embodiment of his remarkable political wisdom. If you want to know how clever *** is, just look at his clever response to Stalin's six telegrams to China to send troops.
In June 1941, Nazi Germany suddenly launched an attack on the Soviet Union, and the Soviet-German War broke out. Although the Soviet Union made some preparations before the war, the war fell into crisis from the beginning of the war due to a misjudgment of the timing of the outbreak of the war and the direction of the German attack, coupled with the negative impact of the Great Purge.
What made the Soviet Union even more troublesome was that Japan was ready to move in the Far East and was preparing to attack the Soviet Union from both sides with Germany. At this time, although Britain and the United States gave the Soviet Union some support, the Soviet Union's hope of counterattacking Japan could only be pinned on China.
After the outbreak of the Soviet-German war, the Chinese Communist Party reacted quickly by issuing a statement in support of the Soviet Union and its willingness to assist the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War.
In July 1941, Stalin first requested Chinese support. His main request was for China to send troops to pin down the Japanese near the Great Wall, as there was a possibility that the Japanese on this line would attack the Soviets.
**Responded positively to this. On July 2, **telegram to the North China Front that if Japan attacked the Soviet Union, our army should be ready to cooperate with the Soviet army.
Some people questioned the Eighth Route Army's ability to cooperate, but the wisdom and foresight of *** are admirable. He stressed that this coordination is strategic and long-term, not combative and temporary.
This was due to the fact that the strength of our army at that time was limited and could not cooperate with the Soviet army in a large-scale campaign. However, *** believed that if Japan attacked the Soviet Union, it was bound to clear the rear, and their rear was the Eighth Route Army in North China.
Therefore, our army could contain the Japanese army for a long time, thereby providing the USSR with maximum cooperation. This synergy is at the strategic level and long-term.
Stalin was anxious and hoped that the chairman would come up with a clear plan of action. Uncarried by the passion, the chairman told Stalin unequivocally: "If Japan were to attack the Soviet Union, our military cooperation might not be very great."
If we fight back at all costs, we may be defeated and unable to hold on to our base for a long time, which is detrimental to either side. "The chairman's strategic vision is indeed unique, he clearly sees the disparity between the forces of the enemy and us, and a blind attack on Japan will not only fail to help the Soviet Union, but will put itself in a difficult situation.
Only by protecting oneself and containing the enemy can one really help the Soviet Union. Not only Stalin, but also our comrades were a little impatient. The *** and ** of the military headquarters of the New Fourth Army telegraphed ** to launch a large-scale offensive against the Japanese army in the near future in order to cooperate with the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union.
However, the chairman rejected their opinions, holding that the large-scale operation of the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army was still not suitable, and what we needed was the strategy of staying up for a long time and fighting a protracted war, because the conditions of our army were weak, and a large-scale operation might damage our vitality and be detrimental to both us and the Soviet Union.
At the same time, the chairman also instructed that immediately after the outbreak of the Soviet-German war, we will intensify reconnaissance and prepare for the destruction of communications, by which we will pin down the enemy, and we are determined to help the victory of the Soviet Red Army as much as possible under the existing conditions. ”
Generally speaking, the chairman's strategic intent is very clear: the military assistance of our party and our army to the Soviet Union is indirect and long-term, and we will extensively launch and carry out guerrilla warfare to contain the Japanese army by consolidating the anti-Japanese base areas behind enemy lines, so as to strategically cooperate with the Soviet army, instead of making a desperate bet and blindly attacking and bringing ourselves down.
The President's strategic vision is unparalleled.
Stalin twice asked for help, but he firmly stated that the central task of our army in 1942 was to accumulate strength, recover strength, and consolidate the interior, not to directly send troops to aid the Soviet Union.
Neither Stalin nor Dimitrov could force China to send troops directly to the aid of the Soviet Union, and Stalin's second telegram was again in vain.
** The rejection of the Soviet offer of aid was due to the extreme difficulties in the anti-Japanese base areas controlled by the Chinese Communist Party behind enemy lines. The Japanese army's frantic sweep of North China and the upsurge set off by the Kuomintang made it difficult for all units of the Eighth Route Army to operate, and the distribution of military salaries, ammunition and clothing was suspended, and material support was difficult.
Under such circumstances, the dispatch of troops to the north to aid the Soviet Union, a long-distance attack, insufficient supply, and lack of support will only lead to a disastrous defeat, which will be unfavorable to China's War of Resistance against Japan and the Soviet Union.
Therefore, ** rejected Stalin's request and insisted on cooperating with the Soviet army in a planned and step-by-step manner.
At a critical moment in the Battle of Stalingrad, the dynamics of the Soviet Union and Germany in the Far East deeply disturbed Stalin. He sent a fourth telegram to Chairman ***, asking China to send troops to cooperate.
Stalin gave a few "sweet dates" and proposed to transfer one or two divisions of the Eighth Route Army to the border area of Inner Mongolia and Outer Mongolia to accept the new ** equipment provided by the Soviet Union.
Many people wonder why Stalin did not equip China before, and only now. In fact, the Soviet Union began to aid China a long time ago, and there were quite a few of them, but they were all given to the Kuomintang.
Stalin saw that *** had refused to send troops several times before, so he took out **equipment**. However, ** still held his own opinion, replying to Stalin: "* Of course we need to, but it is unthinkable to take the forces of one or two divisions through the Mongolian steppe to the border **.
The enemy has an air force, and our troops will be wiped out before they reach their destination. This solution is difficult to implement. ”
Stalin's phone call was politely rejected five times, and it was only then that he finally realized how powerful he was. However, he still hoped that *** would help him strengthen his resistance to the enemy in the Manchurian-Mongolian border area.
Although the conditions were getting lower and lower, *** still refused his request. However, at the beginning of 1943, the Soviet army launched **, and Stalin was thinking about how to deal with the Japanese on the Eastern Front.
Although the first five times failed, he still decided to call *** this time for the sixth time, ** decided to send troops to the front line inside and outside the Great Wall in order to contain the Japanese army.
This shows the cleverness of ***, who always paid attention to the situation on the world anti-fascist battlefield and realized that Stalingrad's ** would be a turning point in the Second World War.
In this decisive battle, despite the difficulties, it was crucial to take into account the overall situation and contain the Japanese as much as possible.
Why is it deployed on the front line of the Great Wall? Because the Great Wall is a natural defense line between North China and the Mongolian Plateau and Northeast China, controlling this defense line can not only help the Soviet Red Army contain the Japanese troops in North China and Saibei, but also rely on the anti-Japanese base areas along the Great Wall to carry out guerrilla warfare, avoid a head-on decisive battle with the enemy's main force, and reduce unnecessary losses.
From a tactical point of view, this is a flexible and mobile deployment, but from a strategic point of view, it is a brilliant deployment. ** At the same time as the deployment of troops, a secret mission was arranged, preparing for an opportunity to infiltrate the northeast region.
This decision not only took into account the current war situation, but also foresaw the civil war between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party after the victory of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, so that our army could get close to the water and quickly send troops to the northeast to seize strategic points.
Under the deployment of the first country, the Japanese army in China never dared to act rashly, and the Soviet army had no worries and successfully annihilated the besieged German army at Stalingrad, winning the victory in the Battle of Stalingrad, and the entire Soviet-German battlefield and even the world anti-fascist battlefield began to shift from strategic defense to strategic offensive.
From then on, the situation of the German army was getting worse day by day, and the Japanese army was also losing and retreating in the Pacific theater, taking care of itself, and not being able to attack the Soviet Far East, Stalin's heart finally let go of ......It wasn't until after the victory of the Anti-Japanese War that we realized how brilliant our political wisdom was.
For Stalin's 6 calls for help, ** each time it was handled very skillfully, so that Stalin could not find fault. He did not refuse to cooperate with the Soviet Union, but only chose what he thought was the most appropriate way of cooperation, and by leading the guerrilla war in the battlefield behind enemy lines, he pinned down hundreds of thousands of Japanese troops, so that the Japanese army fell into the vast sea of people's war and was unable to launch an attack on the Soviet Union, thus indirectly aiding the Soviet Union, which is the so-called long-term and strategic cooperation.
**'s decision-making is not only based on personal emotions or random thoughts, but always insists on taking the reality of China's War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, long-term revolutionary interests and the world anti-fascist war as a whole.
He insisted on both the overall situation and independence, and was not swayed by the dictates of Stalin and the Comintern. History has proven that he neither gives up the interests of the motherland nor sacrifices the interests of the nation, nor does he care only about the interests of his own nation and does not care about the future of the world revolutionary movement.
** He was a staunch proletarian internationalist and a national hero of patriotism.