Why did the Autumn Harvest Rebel Army go to the mountains to guerrilla
In 1927, in the face of the low tide of revolution, our army resolutely launched the Nanchang Uprising, the Autumn Harvest Uprising and the Guangzhou Uprising. These three major uprisings are the inevitable result of our army's rising to the occasion and accumulating steadily.
In addition to the progressive elements of the old army, there were also peasants and workers who participated in the Autumn Harvest Uprising. The three major uprisings were carried out in an environment where the enemy was strong and we were weak, and the people's wisdom was not yet opened, and guerrilla warfare was obviously the best strategy, but it was not easy to carry it out.
In fact, only the Autumn Harvest Uprising led by the chairman successfully climbed Jinggang Mountain, while the seven and three marshals who participated in the Nanchang Uprising and the Guangzhou Uprising were exhausted in the transfer and holding of the city.
Why is this so? There are several main reasons for this.
The Autumn Harvest Uprising (data photo) Reason 2: The background of the three major uprisings is closely related to the revolutionary influence of the Soviet Union. With the help of the Soviet Union, Mr. Zhongshan founded the "Whampoa Military Academy" and eliminated Chen Jiongming's rebels through the Eastern Crusade.
After Mr. Zhongshan died of illness, in 1926, the Guangzhou authorities and the Wuhan authorities launched two Northern Expeditions one after another, eliminating the main forces of the direct warlords Wu Peifu and Sun Chuanfang, and cooperating with Feng Yuxiang of the Northwest Army to defeat the Feng warlord Zhang Zuolin, which can be said to have achieved brilliant results.
Under the guidance of Moscow, the Chinese revolutionaries also participated in it and had a deep understanding of the Red Revolution of the **. In 1927, Chiang launched the "April 12" Incident in Shanghai, and the "Ma-Ri" Incident broke out in Wuhan, followed by the "Ning-Han Confluence" and colluded to kill revolutionaries.
At the critical moment, our party decided to draw on the successful experience of the "October Revolution" and launch an armed uprising in large cities where conditions permit. Of course, one of the successful experiences of the "October Revolution" is the "theory of urban centers".
* Revelation of the October Revolution: The capture of the central city was the key to the success of the revolution. ** The victorious experience of the October Revolution consisted in the realization of the alliance of workers and peasants, the armed insurrection and the insurrection through the central cities.
However, for a long time in the history of our party, it was bound by the "theory of urban centrality" and tried to attack big cities. Some leaders, such as Chen Duxiu, Xiang Zhongfa, Wang Ming, Bogu and others, are all practitioners of the "city center theory".
Thus, the goal of the three uprisings was the same: to seize the central cities and thus spread the revolution throughout the country. However, due to the disparity in the strength of the enemy, after the success of the Nanchang Uprising, the enemy army was copied in all directions, and the staff group had no choice but to draw up a plan for going south to Chaoshan; The Autumn Harvest Uprising led by the chairman, although it captured Liuyang County, was difficult to hold, let alone attack Changsha; The Guangzhou Uprising knew that the enemy army was besieging the city on all sides, but it still held on, and as a result, the defenders were almost wiped out in three days, and the rest of the troops withdrew from Guangzhou.
The successive failures of the three uprisings show that the "urban center theory" does not work in China.
The Nanchang Uprising was the first step for the Communist Party of China to independently create an armed force, but because our army had not yet gotten rid of the old-style army mode of thinking at that time, its development was difficult.
The main forces of the Nanchang Uprising mainly came from the progressive forces of the old army, including Ye Ting's 11th Army and 24th Division, the mobilized 25th Division and the 20th Army.
Although the Autumn Harvest Uprising and the Canton Uprising had the participation of the Workers' Red Guards and the Peasant Self-Defense Army, their forces were relatively weak and could not compete with the old army. This also left a lesson for the later failure of the Great Revolution.
Zhang Tailei's reason four: The three major uprisings show the deepening cognitive process of our army's "barrel of the gun". During the Nanchang Uprising, our army waved the banner of Zhang Fakui's Second Front Army and hoped that he would launch an uprising, but the failure of the uprising showed that it was unrealistic to hope for the old warlords.
During the Autumn Harvest Uprising, the chairman was deeply aware of this and waved the banner of "the first division of the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army", and the division commander was Yu Shandu, an old soldier, but his defection in the middle of the middle once again proved that the old soldiers could not be completely relied on.
The Canton Uprising further deepened the understanding and established the Soviets, with Zhang Tailei as its president. Reason 5: The command of the three uprisings had different degrees of control in Moscow.
Between 1924 and 1927, the Soviet Union had a great influence, such as General Gallen, the general adviser of the National Revolutionary Army of the Northern Expedition, who later became Marshal Blyukhel, and the Soviet adviser of the Yeting Independent Regiment to the later Marshal Chuikov, as well as Borodin.
In July 1927, Borodin suggested that Chen Duxiu and Tan Pingshan go to Moscow to attend a conference. This actually led to the weakening of Chen Duxiu's leadership, Zhang, Li Weihan, Zhou Gong, and Li Li.
3. Zhang Tailei formed a new "Fifth Standing Committee."
Before the Nanchang uprising, Zhang tried to postpone the uprising in the name of Moscow, but was met with Zhou Gong and Li Li.
3. The opposition of Tan Pingshan and other people. The Autumn Harvest Uprising was an armed uprising led by the chairman, and Moscow's influence was relatively small.
In the Canton uprising, Moscow provided $300,000 in funding and Neumann intervened directly. The trio of the uprising were Zhang Tailei, Huang Ping and Zhou Wenyong, but the commander-in-chief was Ye Ting, and the deputy commander-in-chief was *** The chief of staff was Xu Guangying.
However, Neumann vetoed Ye Ting and ***'s correct suggestion to evacuate Guangzhou and insisted on holding on, resulting in heavy losses.
After the failure of the three major uprisings, only the chairman took the lead in proposing the strategy of "going up the mountain", and after the Guangzhou uprising, some high-ranking figures shifted the responsibility to the commander-in-chief Ye Ting, which was unfair and unobjective.
In the Jiangxi Soviet region, the blind command of the "foreign adviser" Li De hastened the Red Army's loss of base areas. So, in the Nanchang Uprising, which did not involve the participation of "foreign advisers", why did not it think of "going up the mountain"?
The Nanchang Uprising created seven of the top ten marshals and three of the top ten generals: commander-in-chief, former enemy commander-in-chief Ye Ting, director of the Public Security Bureau and commander of the 9th Army, Zhu Lao, head of the staff group, former secretary of the enemy military committee, chief of staff of the 4th Army, and party representative of the regiment, battalion commander Chen Geng, company commanders Lin Zong, Xu Guangda, and squad leader Su Yu.
These famous generals from professional classes didn't even think of "going up the mountain". It was not until the Nanchang uprising troops experienced the division of troops in Sanheba, the defeat of Chaoshan, and the uprising in southern Hunan that Mr. Zhu, Wang Erzhuo and ** led the troops to Jinggangshan and successfully joined forces with the Autumn Harvest Uprising.
The chairman's leadership is incomparably great, leading our army to brilliant results in mountain battles. After meeting in Jinggangshan, a new era was opened; With the support of Luo Xiaoshan, it successfully repelled the enemy army four times of "encirclement and annihilation"; The Long March of 10,000 miles demonstrated the fearless spirit of our army, spanning thousands of rivers and mountains; At the foot of the Pagoda Mountain, the chairman and others commanded the prelude to the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression and the War of Liberation.
Under the command of the chairman, the founding generals were as powerful as a bamboo, and the Eighth Route Army captured Taihang Mountain, Yimeng Mountain, and conquered Changbai Mountain and Dabie Mountain; In the end, the People's Liberation Army, which was dominated by workers and peasants, planted the red flag all over the 100,000 mountains, the Tianshan Mountains and the Himalayas!
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