49 years ago, the Americans made a secret visit to China .

On the evening of July 8, 1971, Dr. Kissinger suddenly clutched his stomach in pain.

Henry Alfred Kissinger, of Jewish descent, emigrated to the United States in 1938 and was a Ph.D. from Harvard University. At this time, he was the assistant to Nixon in the United States, and he was assigned by the United States to conduct a 10-day visit to South Vietnam, Thailand, India, and Pakistan.

Kissinger

At this time, Yahya, who was Pakistani on the side, announced loudly that he would let Kissinger go to his own private villa north of Islamabad to recuperate for two days.

One of Kissinger's men was immediately sent there to play the front station. When Kissinger was resting in the hotel after the banquet, the ** called**:

The villa here doesn't seem to be inhabitable. ”

Kissinger said he knew, but then sent another request to Yahya**

Help me keep that ** there, at least for two days. ”

Afterwards, Kissinger and a handful of entourage immediately packed their bags and headed straight for the airport.

He didn't eat a bad stomach at all, and it was impossible for him to go to that villa to recuperate, he was going to a country in secret.

A country that has severed diplomatic relations with the United States for 22 years.

Now, we can push the clock forward a little bit and sort out a thread.

On February 9, 1969, ** suddenly received a notice.

This notice is to ask him to go to a meeting. Also notified of the meeting were three other marshals: ** and ***

The convener of the meeting is the content of the meeting, and it is also set by him:

Let's look at international issues. ”

Was there anything wrong with the international situation at that time? There are indeed big problems :

Beginning at the end of 1968, the Soviet border guards began to constantly provoke the Chinese border guards on Zhenbao Island, and several armed conflicts occurred between the two sides.

For a detailed article about Treasure Island, please refer to [Further Reading 1].

Of course, the four old marshals also understand the purpose of *** letting them hold a meeting to study:

The "Romance of the Three Kingdoms" between China, the United States, and the Soviet Union has already appeared a new plot, and in the face of the attacking Soviet Union and the shrinking United States, does China have any new "cards" to play?

After repeated discussions, the four veteran commanders successively handed over two reports: "Preliminary Estimate of the War Situation" and "Views on the Current Situation," in which they put forward their views

In the current triangular relationship between China, the United States and the Soviet Union, for China, the contradiction between China and the Soviet Union is greater than the contradiction between China and the United States. As far as the Soviet Union was concerned, the Soviet-American contradiction was greater than the Soviet-Chinese contradiction; As far as the United States is concerned, the contradictions between the United States and the Soviet Union are greater than the contradictions between the United States and China.

Therefore, China is actually in a strategic initiative position - both the United States and the Soviet Union want to play the "China card".

And the advice given by the four old marshals is: "Donglian Sun Wu, and reject Beicao together".

In other words, it is necessary to "strive to break the deadlock in Sino-US relations."

Marshal

According to the idea of ***, the relationship between China and the Soviet Union has gradually reached a dead end for various reasons, and the two sides may even meet each other in arms. The powerful Soviet Union, which was geographically located north of China's borders, was actually far more of a threat to China than the United States.

Under such circumstances, China, which may fall into a "two-sided attack," must make a move, that is, to "strive for hegemony."

Which "hegemon" to strive for? **And *** the same idea:

Nixon was slightly calmer than Bonezhlev's head. ”

Of course, this kind of thing, a bowl can't be knocked.

In fact, the Chinese have long received the "code".

On October 26, 1970, Ceausescu attended a welcome banquet.

As Romania's head of state, Ceausescu came to Washington, D.C., to attend the General Assembly to celebrate the 25th anniversary of the founding of the United Nations. And at this banquet, Nixon, the United States, as the host, used a title that surprised Ceausescu very much:

Nixon used the term "People's Republic of China" for the first time when referring to China.

Before that, all the official wording in the United States was "Communist China".

Ceausescu quickly understood.

In June 1971, Ceausescu visited China and shook hands with ***. Ceausescu was the general secretary of the Romanian Communist Committee and the Romanian Socialist Republic, and the ending is also embarrassing, and it is worth writing a single article next time.

And this is no longer the first time that Nixon has "secretly sent autumn waves".

As early as 1967, Nixon, who was still preparing to run for the first election, published "Asia after Vietnam" in the US "Foreign Affairs Quarterly" in October, in which he first proposed:

We can't be isolated from the CCP forever."

During the election campaign the following year, he told reporters again:

We must not forget China, and we must always seek opportunities to negotiate with it, as we did with the Soviet Union. ”

After taking office in the United States, Nixon expressed his desire to establish ties with China on many occasions, in various forms, and through various channels. In October 1970, when American reporters appeared on the Tiananmen Gate Tower together during the National Day, Nixon even said this to the reporter of Time magazine:

If there's one thing I have to do before I die, it's to go to China. If I can't go, I want my children to go. ”

Nixon

From 1969 to 1971, the United States partially relaxed the travel restrictions for American citizens to China, resumed Sino-American negotiations at the ambassadorial level in Warsaw, and repeatedly sent messages through the leaders of Romania and Pakistan expressing their willingness to improve relations with China.

As for the information conveyed by the US side, in fact, the Chinese side has been paying close attention to it and has made a posture of "moving in the same direction". In particular, the "ping-pong diplomacy" incident that occurred in March 1971 and the invitation to the US table tennis team to visit China in April made people see the dawn of "China-US icebreaking".

"Ping Pong Diplomacy" can be found in [Further Reading 2].

Few would have imagined that things would later move so fast.

Late at night on July 6, 1971, Zhang Ying was woken up by her husband who had just returned from work.

Zhang Ying was working in the *** News Department at the time, and her husband's name was Zhang Wenjin, who was the director of the Department of Western Europe and North America at that time.

Zhang Wenjin said to his wife:

Prepare me a few clothes for business trips, and remember to bring a few more white shirts. ”

Zhang Ying immediately knew: that important guest was coming.

Zhang Wenjin (first from right) and Zhang Ying (second from left), with Kissinger in the middle. Zhang Wenjin later served as ambassador to the United States and vice minister.

It is very likely that the US side will send a secret delegation to visit in the near future.

As a very small number of insiders, Zhang Wenjin and his wife immediately stayed at the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse and began to prepare for the reception. By the beginning of June, all the reception staff had moved in, and it was stipulated that:

All those involved in the reception were not allowed to return home for a month - for the sake of secrecy.

The reception and arrangement of the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse was personally led by ***. From the layout of the room to the furnishings, from the specifications of the reception to the guards standing guard, ** all made clear instructions and emphasized:

Since we welcome people, we should be warm, otherwise it will be too rude, but we should not impose it on others. ”

**The selected guest will stay in Building 5 of the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse. This small building is not the largest, but the location is relatively remote, which is convenient for secrecy and security work. And because the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse during the "Cultural Revolution" almost no longer receives foreign guests, the courtyards of many buildings have been deserted, and Building 5 is relatively tidy because it will come to work and rest.

Today's Diaoyutai State Guesthouse Building 5

In terms of the guests' diet, the Chinese side consulted the US side in advance, and the US side said that Western food can be eaten at any time in the United States, so it asked for Chinese food.

However, for the sake of safety, the Chinese side still sent people to purchase "cheese" (cheese), which Diaoyutai does not usually prepare, and prepared various seafood. **In particular, guests should be allowed to try Peking duck. Since it was impossible to go out to eat in restaurants, the Chinese side specially invited an old chef from Quanjude to come to Diaoyutai and built a small oven to make roast duck.

At the beginning, including some reception staff, I didn't know who the "American senior **" was to be received this time.

Later, I learned that it was the *** affairs assistant of the United States, Henry Alfred Kissinger.

At 8 p.m. on July 8, 1971, Tang Longbin met Pakistan's Yahya.

Tang Longbin was the deputy director of the State Guest Reception Department of the Protocol Department at that time. In the early morning of July 8, together with Wang Hairong (deputy director of the protocol department) and Tang Wensheng (translator), he was led by Zhang Wenjin to Pakistan by plane with only one mission:

After a welcome dinner for Kissinger in Pakistan, he took Kissinger to China.

Before the dinner began, Yahya** explained the plan to the Chinese team of four:

Kissinger will pretend to have a bad stomach later, and then he will go to the airport with you. However, because he was afraid that the news would leak over time, the entire trip of Kissinger and his entourage in China could only last 48 hours.

Yahya Khan, 3rd Pakistan**

At around 4:25 a.m., two black cars drove up, and six people got out of the cars: Kissinger and his three assistants, plus two **.

When he visited Pakistan, Kissinger brought more than 100 people with him, including his entourage, technicians, reporters, and reporters — and Kissinger dumped them all.

After a brief introduction, the two sides shook hands. Tang Longbin later recalled:

Kissinger's hand was thick and large, he shook hands vigorously, and his demeanor was shrewd. I couldn't help but think that this person might be a tough one to deal with. ”

What neither China nor the United States expected was that at that time, a Pakistani-British reporter from the British "Daily Telegraph" at the airport recognized Kissinger and inquired that Kissinger was going to China. The reporter rushed back to his office and sent an urgent telegram to the newspaper office in London, but the manuscript was immediately "shot" by the editor on duty in London

Was the journalist drunk? How could Kissinger go to China? Ridiculous! ”

Kissinger and Nixon. At that time, Kissinger named this secret visit to China "Polo-1." This name has two meanings: first, it means "Mark Polo", and second, with "No. 1", it is natural to hope that there will be "No. 2".

When the plane began to fly smoothly, China and the United States moved to a small long table: the American side sat at one end and the Chinese side sat at the other, which was a standard negotiation posture.

Tang Longbin noticed that the two ** on the US side looked highly nervous, and they both locked their hands with handcuffs and the handle of the black document bag.

He later learned that the two ** were told to accompany them to China more than an hour before boarding.

The tense atmosphere was broken by Kissinger.

He said to Tang Wensheng, the Chinese translator

It was a pleasure to meet Miss Nancy Tang. ”

When the Chinese side felt a little dazed, Tang Wensheng, who was born in New York, explained that this was her name when she was in the United States.

At this time, the Chinese side understands in its heart that the US side has actually made a detailed background understanding of them.

Kissinger then made another joke:

Ms. Tang can run for the United States**, but I can't (Yaqiu's note: The requirement to run for the United States** is that you must be born in the United States). ”

Everyone immediately laughed, and the atmosphere was relatively relaxed.

When the plane was about to fly into China, Tang Longbin saw one of Kissinger's assistants suddenly stand up and walk to the front of the cabin.

The assistant's name was Winston Lorde. Later, Tang Longbin learned that the American side was highly secret about this trip, so Lord did not even tell his wife the destination of the trip. His wife's name is Bao Baiyi, a Shanghai-born female writer. Lord later recalled to himself

The night before departure, I could only give her one hint, and that was to stand in front of the window for a long time, facing east. ”

Winston Lord was only 35 years old at the time and was Kissinger's special assistant. He later served as U.S. Ambassador to China from 1985 to 1989

I knew that I was about to enter China, and I wanted to go as far forward as I could, so that Dr. Kissinger would have to admit that I had entered China before him. ”

At noon on July 9, 1971, Huang Hua felt a little sweaty on his face.

Huang Hua had already been appointed ambassador to Canada at that time, but before taking up his post, he was given the task of receiving Kissinger, and he was "retreated" in Building 4 of the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse for more than a month to prepare.

Kissinger's plane arrived at Beijing's Nanyuan Airport at 12:20 p.m. on July 9. In addition to Huang Hua, there were also Han Xu, deputy director of the Protocol Department, Ji Chaozhu, translator Ji Chaozhu and others.

Huang Hua, later served as Minister and Vice Premier

At the height of the Cultural Revolution, revolutionary slogans were hung everywhere in Beijing. The reception team had previously asked for instructions on this matter, and the reply was:

Leave it as it is. ”

On the way from the airport to Diaoyutai, there were many slogans "Down with US imperialism and all reactionaries", Huang Hua was sitting in a car with Kissinger's assistant and senior ** in charge of Southeast Asian affairs, Holdridge asked Huang Hua, what were those slogans written about?

Huang Hua translated truthfully, and the expression on Holdridge's face was a little uncomfortable.

After arriving at Building 5 of the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse, as soon as he put down his luggage, Kissinger immediately took several assistants to the courtyard for a "walk." Although it is said to be a walk, it is actually a discussion. And when they are indoors, they usually don't discuss, and when they do, they turn on the radio and turn up the volume.

All this is to prevent eavesdropping.

However, Kissinger's nerves were quickly dispelled by their initial arrival, and they were informed not long after they moved in: **The prime minister was coming to visit them soon.

At 3 o'clock in the afternoon, ** and *** took a car to the front of Building 5 of the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse, and Kissinger and his entourage, who had been waiting in line before, immediately greeted him and shook hands with ***.

Kissinger with ***

According to diplomatic procedures, the host country will generally receive visiting delegations in the ** building, especially if the difference in the titles of the heads of the two sides is so large (my title of *** assistant is equivalent to deputy minister, which is 3 levels lower than ***). ”

When shaking hands with Kissinger's entourage, he was able to say a word to each of them.

On shaking hands with Lorde, **said:

I've heard that you learned a lot of Chinese from your Shanghai lady. ”

While shaking hands with Holdridge, ** said:

You can also speak Cantonese. ”

While shaking hands with another assistant, Dick, ** said:

I've read your article about the situation in Japan. ”

Even shaking hands with two American ** personnel, ** made a joke:

Our Moutai is very powerful, you have to be careful! ”

Due to the tight time, the guests and hosts immediately sat down in the conference room after shaking hands and greeting each other, and the first round of communication began.

Kissinger took out the speech document from his briefcase, which surprised many people present: it was 7 centimeters thick.

And in front of *** is a page with several outlines on it.

Everyone listened patiently as Kissinger read the speech he and Nixon had drafted. **Said with a smile:

Why do you need to read according to the script? ”

Kissinger also smiled embarrassedly, but quickly rounded the scene:

I've been reading at Harvard for so many years, and I haven't used a lecture script, and the most I can do is make an outline. But this time it's different, I can't keep up with the manuscript when I read it, and I can't keep up with it if I don't read the manuscript. ”

Everyone laughed.

Kissinger said as soon as he opened:

A few of us are happy to be in this mysterious country. ”

**Immediately interject:

When you get to know the country, you won't feel mysterious anymore. ”

At noon on July 11, 1971, Kissinger raised a glass of Moutai.

In the past 48 hours, Kissinger and his entourage have held a total of two talks with *** and his entourage for a total of six meetings.

In the final analysis, the purpose of Kissinger's secret visit to China is only one: to find out the truth about Nixon's visit to China, which may become a reality in the future-the reason why it must be "kept secret" is also because once the investigation fails, Nixon will not lose face.

Although the Chinese side has obviously thrown out an olive branch, the small details under the common framework are still worth going to and communicating one by one.

Judging from the later declassified archives, among the two talks, the one that was mentioned most frequently and the discussion took up the longest time was the "Taiwan issue."

Prior to Kissinger's visit, the United States had already made a certain gesture:

terminate the Seventh Fleet's patrols in the Taiwan Strait; a squadron of air tankers was withdrawn from Taiwan; reduce the size of the Military Advisory Panel by 20%; Prepare to withdraw the 2 3 Army, which had nothing to do with the defense of Taiwan, after the end of the war in Indochina.

However, China's attitude is categorical

The premise for the normalization of Sino-US relations is to recognize the People's Republic of China as the sole legitimate representative of China and that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China.

Kissinger made it clear:

The United States does not support "and" and does not support **, and will not repeat the "theory that Taiwan's status is undecided."

When the two sides reached an agreement on the Taiwan issue, the next issue will be much simpler, and the two sides also exchanged views on the Korean issue, the Vietnam issue, the Japan issue, the issue of relations between major powers, and the issue of the South Asian continent.

Negotiations with Kissinger's party

Nixon had one conviction that the powerful developing People's Republic of China did not pose a threat to any fundamental interests of the United States.

The United States will not take any significant steps that affect your interests without discussing it with you and without taking into account your views. ”

It is worth mentioning that Kissinger's visit to China did not ask to meet *** He later mentioned in his own "On China":

Because I knew very well that Nixon **wanted to be the first to see *** in the United States**.

The last meeting on the morning of July 11, which lasted from more than 8 a.m. to more than 10 a.m., had long exceeded the scheduled time for the talks, and Kissinger's original scheduled departure time in Beijing was 12:20.

When it was almost 11 o'clock, the door of the conference room finally opened, and the Chinese and American personnel walked out with smiles on their faces. Kissinger accompanied *** to the gate and helped him open the car door.

After the premier's car left, Tang Longbin, who had been waiting outside, looked at the Chinese translator who had just attended the meeting, and the interpreter nodded to him gently, Tang Longbin knew:

The agreement should have been reached.

Next is the last send-off wine, accompanied by ***.

At this meal, the tense and serious atmosphere of the past two days was swept away, everyone at the dinner table talked and laughed, and everyone drank Moutai.

A meal to welcome Kissinger and his entourage

I'm sorry this time, I can't welcome you in a public way, and I'll make up for it later. Next time, you don't need to hide here, you can go outside, you can go to the roast duck restaurant to eat roast duck, you can also go to Donglai Shun to eat shabu shabu, and you can also buy some souvenirs for your family. ”

In fact, despite the rush of two days, *** still arranged for Kissinger and his entourage to visit the Forbidden City - for which the Forbidden City was specially closed for half a day.

And Kissinger admitted afterwards:

They don't seem to be in a hurry to reach any agreement. ......It can be said that such a chic attitude of the Chinese side has given us a kind of psychological pressure. ”

Several of Kissinger's entourage sighed at the banquet:

Today's meal is the most fragrant meal we have had in Beijing. ”

Although they have also taken Moutai before, out of work needs, these people do not drink at all, and they are highly nervous. This time, they all drank Moutai, and even the two ** personnel opened their rings and put aside the file boxes that they were carrying. When the Chinese personnel reminded them to pay attention to the document box, they said directly:

Not anymore. ”

The time has finally come to break up.

The person in charge of the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse, the waiters and chefs in the building all lined up outside the building to see them off, and everyone shook hands with each other warmly. The Chinese side presented some handicrafts and their photo albums in Beijing to the US side, and the US side took the initiative to ask for a few bottles of Moutai liquor for the two days of "People**", saying that it was "to bring ** and his wife to taste".

At 12:20 p.m. on July 11, Kissinger and his entourage left Beijing on time.

Before and after, exactly 48 hours.

After leaving Beijing, Kissinger sent Nixon an urgent telegram with one word:

eureka！(Found it!) ）

On July 15, 1971, an announcement was made that shocked the world.

This announcement was issued by both China and the United States at the same time

The Prime Minister and Nixon's adviser to Henry Kissinger met in Beijing from July 9 to 11, 1971.

It was learned that Nixon** had expressed his wish to visit the People's Republic of China, and that the Prime Minister, on behalf of the People's Republic of China**, had invited Nixon to visit China at an appropriate time before May 1972. Nixon happily accepted the invitation.

The purpose of the meeting between the leaders of China and the United States is to seek the normalization of relations between the two countries and to exchange views on issues of mutual concern. ”

Nixon personally went to the airport to greet Kissinger, who had returned from a secret visit to China

The Chinese side put forward the word "knowing of" to avoid the question of who took the initiative to visit China, so that the US side felt appropriate and decent.

And Kissinger reciprocated, adding a "happily" between "Nixon**" and "accepted the invitation".

As soon as this report came out, it undoubtedly shook the whole world.

Since then, Sino-US relations and the entire world pattern have begun to prepare to turn a new page.

End of text) Yaqiu said.

In shopping malls, especially on the Internet, there is such a saying:

The eldest and the second are fighting, and the third is the easiest to die. ”

However, this sentence at least does not apply to the "Romance of China, the United States and the Soviet Union" in the early 70s of the last century.

We must admit that China's "great shift" half a century ago was inseparable from the vision, courage, and skill of the team of national leaders, but it was indeed in line with the real interests and long-term vision of China and the United States.

When I was looking for information, I found an interview written in the United States by my former colleague Zai Fei, who was our correspondent in the United States at the time, and interviewed Robert Hormats, then US Deputy Secretary of State.

A few words from Hormats at the time were impressive:

We should use China's rise as a driving force to improve America's competitiveness. ”

In today's world, no major issue can be solved without U.S.-China cooperation. ”

Our goal has never been to impose American rules on China. ”

And the most touching sentence is:

I often think back to the '70s, when who would have thought that 40 years after Nixon's visit to China, the U.S.-China relationship would be what it is today? ”

When Homac was interviewed by Zaifei, it was in 2012. What he meant by this remark must be that Sino-US relations have advanced by leaps and bounds, becoming "you have me, and I have you."

And eight years later, if he could interview Hommats, he would probably say something similar:

Who would have thought that just eight years later, the U.S.-China relationship would be what it is today? ”

Indeed, there were probably not many people who could think of it at that time.

Some people are optimistic, and I don't think it's necessary. There is nothing that cannot be acknowledged that the United States is the recognized number one power in the world today, and if the differences continue to widen, we will certainly not be able to retreat from the United States.

And some people are pessimistic, but I don't think it's necessary. As long as you don't take the initiative to cause trouble, don't be afraid if it still comes. At the beginning, we came through such a difficult situation step by step, and in a thousand words: China has a way.

But reading this history, I can't help but sigh:

It is really not easy for the ancestors of both sides to establish such communication and trust across thousands of mountains and rivers back then, and what our descendants should do is to cherish and maintain, not to deviate and destroy, and then separate thousands of mountains and rivers.

I believe that the pattern of China-US relations today is something that most Chinese and Americans do not want to see, and most people in the world do not want to see.

Therefore, I still hope and believe that the two giant ships will eventually be able to move in the same direction.

Because I'm sure everyone will eventually figure it out:

Together, both are beneficial, and fighting is hurt.

[This article mainly refers to**].

1. "The Announcement of Kissinger's Secret Visit to China and Nixon's Visit to China" (Huang Hua, "Centennial Tide", 2007.07).

2. A Particularly Mysterious Diplomatic Mission - A Posthumous Account of Receiving Kissinger's Secret Visit to China (Part I) and (Part II) (Tang Longbin, "International Talent Exchange", Issue 02, 2006).

3. "1971: I Witness Dr. Kissinger's Secret Visit to China" (Zhang Ying, "Happy Old Age", 2009.04).

4. "Kissinger's Special Assistant Lorde: **I Want to See Nixon Right Away**" (Winston Lorde, Southern Weekly, September 28, 2015).

5. "On China" ([United States] Henry Kissinger, Publisher: CITIC Press, Edition: January 2012, first edition. ）

6. Discourse Analysis and International Negotiation Research: A Case Study of Kissinger's Secret Visit to China (Zheng Hua, Journal of Tongji University (Social Science Edition), No.02, 2009).

7. "Investigation of Sino-US Secret Channels before Nixon's Visit to China" (Mao Wenting, "Studies in Chinese History", 2016.05).

8. "Before Kissinger's Secret Visit to China, the United States "Loosened" Its Ties on China**, Liberation**, February 26, 2012).

9. "Kissinger's First Visit to China to "Hide" from ** Communist Party Members, No. 14, 2012).