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Vainly attempting to turn Northeast China into a Japanese colony is the first goal pursued by Japan's mainland policy, but in what way? When will this be achieved?
In Japan, there are various opinions on the "solution of the Manchurian-Mongolian problem."
By the time of the September 18 incident, Japan had formed a mature and complete plan for waging war.
Seishiro Itagaki of the Kwantung Army's senior staff officer summarized it into the following four types:
"(1) Seeking to make Manchurian and Mongolian a territory or protectorate; (2) Resolving unresolved vested interests such as commercial lease issues and railway issues is actually a further expansion of existing rights and interests; (3) Wanting to passively safeguard the de facto rights and interests of the present and to develop exclusively in the economic field; (4) They want to give up their current political and military rights and interests and adopt a new mode of economic development. ”In fact, these four opinions can be essentially divided into two types: one is armed occupation; The second is economic encroachment. The former represents the opinion of the radical forces of the Army, especially the Kwantung Army; The latter is the opinion of some department or other forces.
Seishiro Itagaki further elaborated on his opinion
"We are convinced that the ultimate goal is to make Manchurian and Mongolian territory, and even if the second option is adopted, we must be prepared to make the leap to the first option. ...But it goes without saying that there are many knowledgeable people in the country, and there are by no means a few people who hold the same opinion as the first plan; Not only that, but the domestic ** has also made rapid progress in the past two years, and even in the inland villages, such positive opinions have appeared. ”Against this background, the Japanese Army stepped up its planning to invade Northeast China. According to the practice of the General Staff Headquarters, the annual situation judgment is made in April every year, and the "Showa 6 Annual Situation Judgment" was completed under the chairmanship of Major General Miji Kenkawa, Second Minister.
Present at the meeting were Hisao Watara, chief of the European and American section of the General Staff Headquarters, Chiaki Shigeto, chief of the Chinese squad, Hiroshi Nemoto, the head of the Chinese squad, and Shingoro Hashimoto, the head of the ** squad.
When considering how to deal with the Manchurian and Mongolian issues, Hashimoto first spoke: "It is better to provoke an incident in Manchuria and wait for the army to be mobilized." ”In this way, the General Staff Headquarters formulated a "Situation Judgment" with the solution of the Manchurian and Mongolian issues as the central content.No one immediately echoed Hashimoto's proposal, and he continued: "If an incident is provoked and Japan does not implement it, there will be no hope of success, what will happen then?" ”
Still no one agreed, at this time Hashimoto should be Jianchuan's request and said: "If ** does not follow, it is necessary to resolutely implement the administrative mutiny with the strength of the army, so that the problem of Manchuria will be solved very easily." ”
The "Situation Judgment" divides the settlement of the Manchurian-Mongolian issue into three stages:
In the first stage, we will open up the current situation in which the legitimate rights and interests acquired by our country under existing treaties and contracts are hindered by China's perfidy and illegal acts, and ensure the practical effect of our rights and interests, and then strive to expand them. To this end, a pro-Japanese regime was established to replace the Zhang Xueliang regime.With the approval of the three army chiefs, a secret committee was established at the Ministry of War and the General Staff Headquarters on June 11 with the approval of War Minister Minamijiro. The committee is chaired by Miji Kenkawa, director of the Intelligence Department of the General Staff Headquarters, and the committee members are Tetsuyama Nagata, chief of the Military Division of the Ministry of the Army, Ninji Okamura, chief of the Alternate Division, Masataka Yamawaki, chief of the Establishment Division of the General Staff Headquarters, Hisao Watari, chief of the Europe and the United States Section, and Chiaki Shigedo, chief of the China Division.In the second stage, the regime could be separated from China's sovereignty and made it an independent state.
The third stage is to realize the occupation (possession) of Manchu and Mongolia.
Later, Imamura Jun, Tojo Hideki, and Isoya Ryosuke also joined one after another, so there are "five section chief meetings" and "eight section chief meetings".
After many studies, on 19 June, on the basis of the "Situation Judgment," the committee formulated the "Outline of Policies for Resolving the Manchurian-Mongolian Problem."
This program defined the policy and strategy for armed occupation of Northeast China, and was a programmatic document for Japan to launch the "18 September" incident.
The content of the outline is:
(1) To cooperate closely with the foreign affairs authorities and strive to achieve a relaxation of the anti-Japanese policy of the Zhang Xueliang regime; The Army Department made efforts to give full guidance to the Kwantung Army and make it act prudently.2) Despite these efforts, if the anti-Japanese movement continues to develop, it may eventually have to take military action.
3) In order to solve the Manchurian-Mongolian problem, it is absolutely necessary to obtain internal and external understanding; The Minister of War shall endeavour to keep the Ministers informed of the situation on the ground through cabinet meetings.
4) The work of making the people of the whole country, especially the press, aware of the actual situation in Northeast China is mainly undertaken by the Military Affairs Bureau, with the assistance of the Ministry of Intelligence.
5) The Military Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of the Army and the Intelligence Department of the General Staff Headquarters shall cooperate closely with the relevant bureaus and divisions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to make the countries concerned aware of the actual situation of the anti-Japanese campaign in Manchuria and to understand the determination of Japan in the event that our army must take military action, so that the countries will understand Japan's determination and refrain from undue opposition or oppression; To this end, it is necessary to establish a thorough work plan in advance and obtain the approval of the supervisor in advance so that it can be carried out smoothly.
6) The amount of troops required for military operations shall be planned by the War Department after consultation with the Kwantung Army and approved by the higher authorities.
7) Policies to seek internal and external understanding should be implemented in a period of about one year, i.e., in the spring of next year.
8) Let the headquarters of the Kwantung Army be familiar with the policy and intentions of the Kwantung Army, and for the next year bear full self-respect, avoid getting involved in disputes arising from the anti-Japanese action, and in the event of a dispute, deal with it only partially, and strive not to expand its scope.
The "Outline of Policies" mainly clarifies the following points:
The first is to take the "anti-Japanese struggle" in northeast China as an opportunity and a pretext to carry out military operations to invade and occupy northeast China; The second is to actively seek the understanding and support of ministers other than the War Department for this policy; Third, in order to avoid internal and external opposition during military operations, the focus should be on doing a good job of publicity; Fourth, the period of armed occupation of Northeast China was determined; Fifth, special emphasis has been placed on the thoroughness of military operations.If the "outline of the policy" can be summed up in one sentence, it is that the Army Department is determined to occupy Northeast China by force and to win the understanding and support of all quarters for this decision. Article 7 of the "Guidelines" states that "the time limit for seeking internal and external understanding is about one year, that is, in the spring of next year."
In this regard, later historians had two views, one was that there was a gap between the understanding of the army and the Kwantung Army, and that "judging from the "Situation Judgment" and the "Outline", there was a considerable gap between the army's strategy for solving the Manchurian and Mongolian problems and the plan of the Kwantung Army."
One view it is a tactic "to make a hypocritical gesture that Japan is sincere in easing Sino-Japanese relations, thereby shifting the blame for the stalemate in Sino-Japanese relations to China in order to have an excuse if Japan 'has to take military action.'"
From the formation of the "Outline" on 19 June to the occurrence of the "September 18" incident, it was a full three-month period, more than half a year ahead of the timetable set in the "Outline."
In the past six months or so, it is impossible to explain how big the gap is between the plans of the army and the Kwantung Army, and both the army and the Kwantung Army are eager to use force to solve the Manchurian and Mongolian problems, and this is completely consistent on this point.
If there is a gap, it is that the army has taken into account the support of **; If we talk about the gap in strategy, the army ** wants to wait for the opportunity, and the Kwantung Army "wants to take the initiative to create opportunities".
However, the Army** and the Kwantung Army soon converged, as evidenced by the speech delivered by the Minister of Southern Continent at a meeting of army commanders and division commanders on August 4.
He said:
"The land of Manchuria, whether in terms of national defense, politics, or economy, is closely related to the survival and development of the empire, but the situation in this area is developing in an unsatisfactory direction for the empire in recent times. ...In this autumn, those who serve in the military should serve wholeheartedly. ”This was in fact a straightforward mobilization for war, as the Tokyo Asahi Shimbun editorial put it at the time: "The tone is very similar to the scorching autumn sun." ”Before the Army Department made the decision to invade Northeast China by armed force, the Kwantung Army had already begun to plan a plan to invade and occupy Northeast China.
Seishiro Itagaki, senior staff officer of the Kwantung Army, and Ishihara, chief of staff and chief of operations of the Kwantung Army, were mainly in charge of the planning plan.
Both Itagaki and Ishihara were transferred to the Northeast after Zhang Zuolin was killed in the bombing, and after they arrived in the Northeast, they immediately began to plan a plan to occupy the Northeast by force.
In order to formulate this plan, from July 1929 to July 1931, the Kwantung Army organized three large-scale staff trips.
The first "North Manchurian Trip" was an attempt to study the issue of offensive and defensive operations near Harbin.In the name of staff travel, the Kwantung Army conducted an investigation, which was actually a spy espionage activity. In the name of organizing staff officer trips, he went to some important military areas in northeast China to conduct on-the-spot reconnaissance, collect intelligence, draw up operational plans, and make military preparations for armed invasion and occupation of northeast China. On July 5, 1929, the third day of the first "North Manchurian Trip," Ishihara proposed a "Fundamental National Policy for Reversing the Fortunes of the People's Republic of China -- A Plan for Solving the Manchurian and Mongolian Problems" during a seminar held in the car.The purpose of the second "trip to southern Manchuria, western Liaoxi" was to study the problem of fighting near Jinzhou.
The third trip was aimed at "the end of the war against the USSR."
A few days later, Ishihara proposed in Manchuria the "Kwantung Army Command Manchurian and Mongolian Plan". The "Plan" and the "Plan" are both basic, general and first-class programs, which are still very incomplete.
In order to "solve the Manchurian and Mongolian problems," a more detailed and complete plan is needed.
As a result, the Kwantung Army decided to have Captain Ryo Sakuma, director of the Kwantung Army Headquarters, further study and formulate a more detailed plan.
Under the leadership of Itagaki and Ishihara, Lieutenant Ryo Sakuma produced a 228-page tome document in September 1930 entitled "A Study on the Rule of the Manchurian and Mongolian Occupations."
Its main contents are:
First, the purpose of the invasion and occupation of Northeast China.
The first was to "quickly occupy Manchuria and a part of Mongolia through war, and bring them completely under our influence, so as to obtain the source of resources necessary for foreign wars";Second, the policy of occupation and domination.The second is to "nurture our forces to promote the development of the people of the empire in Manchu and Mongolia after the current situation is resolved, and to open up the dilemma of the empire in terms of food problems and ideological problems".
The third stated that it would "enforce good governance and ensure law and order in the occupied territories in order to enhance the well-being of the Chinese, Xian, Mongolian and other Manchurian peoples, and to regard Manchu and Mongolia as a true state of happiness for coexistence and common prosperity."
The first is to demand that "on the one hand, the army quickly annihilate the first army in Manchuria, on the other hand, occupy important political, communications, and economic areas, first take most of Manchuria as the first phase of the ruling area, implement a unified military administration, and then according to the situation, expand the occupied areas and the first part of the army to Mongolia";Third, the implementation of the policy of colonial rule.The second is to "implement military administration in the occupied areas, fully meet the requirements of the first battle, and at the same time oversee all the administration of the occupied areas, and build the foundation for the future imperial rule of Manchu and Mongolia";
The third is to "provide self-sufficiency in the occupied areas and not affect the general finances of the Empire, and then seek to develop the sources of wealth in the occupied areas, so as to fully supply the resources needed for our Empire's war and ease the Empire's finances."
The first rule over the occupied territories was exercised by the commander of the Manchurian Army.This "study" was formed on the basis of the "plan" and "plan" put forward by Ishihara, and was the most detailed and complete plan for the Kwantung Army's invasion and occupation of northeast China before the "September 18" incident.To this end, the Manchurian Army Headquarters has set up additional ministries of civil affairs, finance, police, and justice
Second, the Kwantung Army was responsible for maintaining public order
Third, the legislation and judiciary were under the control of the commander of the Manchurian Army
Fourthly, the finances of the occupied territories shall be self-sufficient in the occupied territories and shall not affect the general finances of the Empire;
Fifth, transportation, communications, and railways in the occupied areas were first managed and operated by the Field Railway Supervision Department, and then by the "Manchurian Railway", and mail and communications were managed by the Mail Bureau subordinate to the military commander
In terms of its six industries, agriculture is the foundation, and the following guidelines are followed: Promote the agriculture of the Bang people to enter Manchuria;Make Manchuria the best place for grain, resources and industrial raw materials for Japan;Directing and regulating mining and forestry;Industry promotes the use of local raw materials with the aim of not threatening the industries of our empire
Seventh, it is necessary to make a plan for the changes in the industrial state of the war and the relationship between the war, and to plan for the measures that need to be taken.
Its core content is two parts, namely, how to occupy the Northeast and how to rule the Northeast.
Both the purpose of the occupation of Northeast China and the policy of post-occupation rule stipulated in the plan clearly expressed their intention to make Northeast China a colony under the direct rule of Japan.
The "good governance" and "coexistence and common prosperity" mentioned in it are an important part of the colonial policy, in order to confuse the Chinese people and the people of the world, which is essentially another expression of the meaning of colonialism.
The "Study on the Rule of the Manchurian and Mongolian Occupied Territories" formulated by the Kwantung Army, as a general plan for the Kwantung Army's invasion of Northeast China, focused to a large extent on post-occupation rule.
Therefore, after the Kwantung Army finished formulating the "Study," it formulated the "Case for Handling the Manchurian and Mongolian Issues" in the spring of 1931.
The "Handling of the Case" proposes three ways to solve the "Manchurian and Mongolian problem":
First, a direct solution.
As in previous years in the negotiations between Japan and China, a request was made to China** or the four northeastern provinces** for the settlement of outstanding cases between Japan and China, and an ultimatum was submitted.
Japan's position is broadly as follows:
the guarantee of free economic conduct of the people of Manchuria; Solving the railway problem. However, it remains to be studied whether to put forward a requirement of the level of "Article 21" or, further, the nature of a protectorate. At that time, if the Chinese side did not agree, it would overthrow Zhang Xueliang** in one fell swoop** and implement a plan of Manchurian rule, or at least use force as a backup to suppress him and implement the aforementioned proposition.Second, take advantage of the change in political situation. Take advantage of the opportunity of the conflict between Zhang Xueliang and Chiang Kai-shek or the third force to promote the development of the conflict and put Zhang Xueliang in a predicament, and then support Zhang Xueliang and implement our policy. or to provide assistance to the invaders, and under the condition of strict agreement with them, expel Zhang Xueliang and support the newcomers. The plan is outwardly in line with the natural situation, so that it can avoid the interference of the great powers, and, if done properly, has the hope of turning Manchurian and Mongolian into a protectorate in one fell swoop.
Third, create solutions that can take advantage of opportunities.
Such as: (1) **North Manchurian riots; (2) The anti-Japanese riots.In the first case, as a result of the destabilization of the current regime, there will be some kind of opportunity to exploit. In the second case, due to the breach of public order, the use of force can be justified, and then the opportunity to be solved in one fell swoop by the division of punishment and punishment. In any case, under extraordinary circumstances, the Kwantung Army should be prepared to make a decisive decision to overthrow Zhang Xueliang's regime and occupy Manchu and Mongolia.
There is no difference in essence between the above three options, the first two of which are to turn Northeast China into a Japanese colony in stages by the threat of force, and the third is to turn Northeast China into a Japanese colony by means of armed occupation.
The so-called difference is only a difference between priority and urgency, and the Kwantung Army put forward these three plans in preparation for changes in the objective situation.
The Kwantung Army's original intention was to favor the third option, and on May 29, 1931, Seishiro Itagaki made this intention clear in a speech to officers at the rank of captain and above of the 2nd Division.
After enumerating several options, he said:
"The solution of the Manchurian-Mongolian problem is a matter related to the safety of the empire. If the country and its citizens have such a firm conviction, they can make an honest announcement to the world and take resolute action to resolve the issue in one fell swoop. If it cannot be implemented for various reasons, it is only a gradualized solution in stages. Even in this case, we must seize every opportunity and be determined to make a leap forward towards solving the problem in one fell swoop. However, the arrival of its opportunity is, of course, dependent on the initiative and the change of the situation; It is difficult to obtain without the use of troops (most of the Kwantung Army). ”It can be seen from Itagaki's speech that at the beginning of the Kwantung Army's formulation of the plan, it was only the first to make the plan.
The first and second options serve as a backup, and the first two options of a "phased and progressive approach" are adopted only when the third option cannot be implemented for various reasons.
The core element of the third option is to create opportunities for armed occupation.The Wanbaoshan Incident was triggered by the expansion of Japan's aggressive forces in Northeast China, specifically caused by the Japanese using the traitor Hao Yongde to steal and rent farmland.
After the Japanese forces entered the northeast, they began to carry out a plan to encroach on the land in the northeast, and planned to open a large farm in the area from Changchun to Nong'an, open a canal to grow rice, and accommodate the Korean peasants. In the past, the Northeast of China has repeatedly issued decrees prohibiting the transfer of land** or leasing to foreigners.
In this case, Japan allowed traitors or Koreans to buy or rent land for them. Hao Yongde's illegal land lease not only violated the current policy of the Northeast region, but also seriously infringed on the interests of local Chinese farmers because of the opening of the canal, which eventually led to the Wanbaoshan incident.
Japan used the incident to incite a large-scale anti-Chinese wave in North Korea. The Japanese consul in Changchun instigated Kim Li-san, a reporter from the Changchun branch of "North Korea**", to report false news
"200 compatriots were injured in clashes with more than 800 Chinese officials and civilians", "600 Chinese horse teams were dispatched, and compatriots are in danger."As a result, a violent anti-Chinese wave was caused in North Korea, and in the entire Korean anti-Chinese **, 142 overseas Chinese were killed, 546 were injured, 91 were missing, property losses were more than 4.13 million yen, and 1 evacuee60,000 people. "Before the riots, Japan privately distributed leaflets and instigated Koreans to beat up overseas Chinese, and those who did not obey were severely beaten. There are also those who wear Korean costumes, ** overseas Chinese".
A reporter from the DPRK's "East Asia**" said to Li Zhonggang, director of the Chinese Consulate General in the DPRK
"This ominous incident is not the intention of the North Koreans, let alone the people of Pyongyang, and the people who saw it in person were all hired by a certain Chinese from another place to do this. ”While inciting anti-Chinese violence in Korea, Japan is also further creating an anti-Chinese atmosphere in Japan and creating an armed invasion of Northeast China. If Japan is using the Wanbaoshan incident to create a wave of anti-Chinese movement, the use of the Nakamura spy incident is to create an invasion of China**.
In May 1931, Nakamura Shintaro, who was in charge of the military station operations at the General Staff Headquarters, accepted the "secret mission of collecting information on the decisive battle against the Soviets and the operations in the Khingan Reclamation Area."
Then, he "concealed his identity" and fraudulently obtained his passport, and in early June, he fled to Harbin, Angangxi, Hailar, Manzhouli and other places.
On July 26, Nakamura and his entourage were captured by the 3rd Regiment of the Xing'an Reclamation Army in the Su'e Mansion, and after search and interrogation, it was learned that Nakamura was a Japanese spy.
After confirming Nakamura's identity as a military spy, on June 27, Guan Yuheng, the head of the Third Regiment, ordered Nakamura and others to be brought to justice on the spot.
According to the fact that Nakamura concealed his identity as a soldier, fraudulently obtained his passport, infiltrated China's military restricted area, and carried out reconnaissance activities, our third regiment arrested him and brought him to justice on the spot, which is a normal act in line with international law, and it is also an act of a sovereign state to safeguard its dignity and dignity.
Nakamura and others were secretly executed by our garrison army. However, after learning of Nakamura's disappearance, in late July, he sent Katakura Chen, a staff officer of the Kwantung Army, to Taonan to investigate and search in the Xing'an Tun Reclamation Area.
In the end, I learned the basic clue that Nakamura was executed by the Reclamation Army.
On August 17, the Japanese side issued a statement on the Nakamura incident and made diplomatic representations to China.
During the negotiations, the Japanese side put forward four demands:
(1) Apologize; (2) punish the person responsible; (3) compensation for damages; (4) Guarantee of the future.In interpreting Article 4, it is required to ensure that the de facto blockade imposed on Japanese travelling to the Taosuo area is lifted and that the Chinese side must protect Japanese travelers to the area. Negotiations began on 17 August and were held more than 10 times until the outbreak of the "918" incident.
Japan's Kwantung Army and War Ministry took advantage of the Nakamura incident to speed up preparations and pace for the armed occupation of Northeast China.
Before the Japanese side negotiated with the authorities in the Northeast, the Kwantung Army worked out a plan for an armed investigation.
On August 10, Mitsuharu Miyake, chief of staff of the Kwantung Army, sent a letter to Eguchi Jotashi, vice president of the Manchu Railway, saying that the Kwantung Army was preparing to negotiate with the Mukden Military Ken in the near future regarding the death of Nakamura Shintaro.
The Kwantung Army demanded that the Manchurian Railway prepare as many as 110 vehicles of various kinds.
On August 24, the Ministry of War formulated a "Plan for Handling the Nakamura Incident When the Chinese Side Denies the Fact of the Killing or Fails to Reach a Satisfactory Solution."
The scheme provides:
"When the Chinese side denies the fact of the killing, or does not deny the fact of the killing, but is unable to promptly accede to our demand, it immediately dispatches a unit with an infantry brigade as the backbone to Taonan and resolutely occupies Taosuo Road. ”If the Chinese side is still unable to meet the Japanese demands, "the empire will implement permanent occupation"; And clearly stated:
"In the implementation of this plan, if there is a strong resistance from the Chinese side, it will lead to a fundamental solution to the Manchurian-Mongolian problem. ”From the thrust of the program, it can be concluded that the Kwantung Army combined "military operations in support of the Nakamura Incident Negotiations" with actions to launch armed aggression. On September 14, Seiichi Kawakami, captain of the Fushun garrison of the Japanese Railway Garrison, held a temporary security meeting attended by the chairman of the military in the township, the chief of the police, the captain of the gendarmerie, and the head of the Fushun station, and announced:
"As part of the military operation to support the Nakamura Incident negotiations, it is planned to depart at around 11:30 p.m. to 40 p.m. on September 18 and get off at Niu Xiangtun to cross the Hunhe River and attack the Chinese airfield. ”On September 18, the second group of investigators sent by Mukden returned to Fengtian and submitted a report. Rong Zhen immediately explained to the Japanese consul Morioka how Nakamura was killed, and showed Nakamura's espionage documents. According to this, Rong Zhen should have proposed solemnity to the Japanese side, and Rong was a peacemaker, but he actually told Morioka that he would convene a military court conference to formally interrogate Guan Yuheng.
However, this kind of compromise and concession negotiations with Japan did not cancel the Kwantung Army's decision to occupy the northeast by force.
The Kwantung Army began to plan an armed occupation of Northeast China after the Huanggutun Incident, and when the Wanbaoshan Incident and the Nakamura Incident occurred one after another, the anti-China tide set off in Japan gave the Kwantung Army the best support for the planning of the armed occupation of Northeast China; It has also enabled the preparation stipulated in the "Outline of Policies for Resolving the Manchurian Problem" drawn up by the Ministry of War ** to be completed in Japan.
At this time, the Kwantung Army was trying to persuade the Army Department to "start immediately" in the timing of launching an armed invasion.
(End of text).
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