The Vietnamese army firmly believes that active offensive is the core of military thinking, and regards it as the most fundamental, main and universal mode of warfare. They believe that attacking is the prerequisite for creating conditions for defense, and that only by resolutely and continuously attacking can the opposing side's combat strength be effectively weakened.
In carrying out offensive battles, the Vietnamese army followed the guiding ideology of careful preparation, surprise, close encirclement, and multi-directional and multi-channel attacks. They adopted the tactics of surprise attacks, flanking from inside and outside, quickly annihilating the enemy's head, opening a breakthrough, and then resolutely penetrating, interspersed and dividing the enemy, tightly controlling the situation, and carrying out rapid and continuous attacks to divide and crush the enemy.
During the 10-year-long war against China, the Vietnamese army has always implemented the above-mentioned guiding ideology and has continuously carried out offensive battles in actual combat. Through precise planning and execution, they effectively weakened their opponents' resistance and achieved a series of important victories. The successful implementation of this tactic enabled the Vietnamese army to display strong combat effectiveness and tactical flexibility on the battlefield.
Troops were deployed one after another, and frontal attacks were carried out in turns. The Vietnamese army stressed that when conducting offensive battles, it is necessary to rationally organize and use its forces in accordance with its mission, determination to fight, terrain, and enemy situation, as well as its own strength and equipment capabilities. They focus on the targeted deployment of forces, concentrating them on the main directions that are easy to maneuver, command and coordinate. At the same time, they sought to avoid excessive dispersion of forces, but to maintain reserves in the main directions and, if necessary, quickly put them into battle.
In actual combat, the Vietnamese army often adopted the tactics of multi-directional, multi-troop routes, and multiple attacks to attack the opponent's positions in various directions. For example, in the battle of Kuolin Mountain, they carried out an eight-way assault on Heights 30 from three directions.
The Vietnamese army also implemented the tactics of continuous assault. Once the attack is frustrated, they will retreat to their original starting position in time, readjust their formation, replenish their forces, and prepare to attack again. In the assault on the No. 80 heights of Kuolin Mountain, they carried out 11 consecutive assaults, which lasted more than six hours.
In terms of deployment, the Vietnamese army showed rapid changes and flexible tactics. As a rule, they will attack first with a frontal attack, and if they do not achieve the desired results, they will attack both the front and the flanks. For example, in three of the 12 attacks on the unnamed heights southeast of Yono, flank and flank attacks were used to complement the frontal attack.
The Vietnamese army has successively invested troops, showing the characteristics of "a sharp head and a thick tail". They started with fewer troops and gradually increased in size. Their battle formations are often scattered in squads and groups, and they do not take group attacks, and although they have a resolute will to attack, their assault capability is relatively weak.
When attacking the Fakashan position, they initially attacked with squads and platoon-sized troops, and then gradually expanded to company and battalion sizes, but as the battle progressed, the attack power gradually weakened, and finally fell into almost one collapse after another.
Focusing on the assault effect of firepower is an important strategy of the Vietnamese army in battle. They stressed that the offensive battle must make firepower and ** maneuver in time, guarantee the continuity of the battle through fierce suppression in a short period of time, and ensure that the enemy is taken by surprise. Particular attention was paid to the role of artillery in the offensive, including artillery preparation, support and cover in battle, which was an integral part of their offensive operations.
When using artillery fire, the Vietnamese army often adopted the tactic of attacking a large number of times. For example, in the attack on the No. 3 heights in the Dainai area, they carried out 77 shellings in just 5 days, an average of 15 per day. There is no fixed pattern for the frequency of shelling, with an average of 20 to 30 shells fired in a single shell, and the number varies, sometimes from a few to a dozen, sometimes from a few hundred to several thousand. The fuses of artillery shells use two methods: instantaneous and short-delayed, in order to achieve the purpose of destroying the enemy and destroying fortifications. In the battle of Ku Lam Mountain, the Vietnamese army even fired more than 2,000 shells to the No. 30 heights in just one day.
Vietnamese artillery attacks tend to last longer. For example, they carried out 18 hours of continuous shelling before the counterattack on Mount Fakka on 10 May 1981. The main targets of the shelling were the points of the front line of our army's defense, and at the same time suppressed and disrupted fire was carried out at deep targets. According to statistics, 74 percent of the more than 20,000 artillery shells fired by the Vietnamese army at the Phaka Hill position were concentrated at key points along the front.
Shelling and shock are often combined. During the assault on the unnamed heights southeast of Dai Nai, the Vietnamese army usually launched an infantry attack as soon as the shelling stopped, and sometimes even after the infantry assault began. Although the artillery support was relatively timely and coordinated with the infantry relatively closely, the accuracy of the artillery bombardment was poor, the firepower was scattered, and the threat to our army was not great. For example, during the assault on the 480 and 544 heights in the Ban Lao area, the Vietnamese army carried out artillery bombardment for more than 8 hours, but did not cause any damage to the living forces of our army.
Night battles were highly valued by the Vietnamese army. They believed that night combat would help limit the enemy's weapons and technological superiority, and that they could achieve the effect of taking them by surprise and attacking them unprepared, so they often chose to attack at night. Of the dozens of assaults on various positions in the Dai Nai area, about half of the Vietnamese army chose to do so at night. In the night offensive, the Vietnamese army focused on concentrating its main forces in the main direction, taking advantage of the gaps in the opponent's defensive positions to carry out infiltration and sneak attacks.
For example, when the 8th Company of the 109th Regiment of the 37th Division captured the 154th Heights, the Vietnamese army infiltrated the position at night and carried out a sneak attack, causing 23 of our troops**, and at the same time damaging a recoilless gun, a rocket launcher and two machine guns. In order to keep operations secret, the Vietnamese army usually did not prepare for artillery fire when attacking at night. For example, during the night counterattack on the Phaka Hill position, the Vietnamese army adopted a multi-pronged assault without preparing artillery fire before launching the attack.
Accustomed to stealthy attacks. The Vietnamese army focused on stealthy tactics, combining sneak attacks and brute attacks. When they sneak attack, they take cunning actions, use a variety of methods, and often adopt the tactic of attacking the east and west, so as to confuse the real with the false. They usually choose to attack at night or by taking advantage of twilight, dawn, and bad weather conditions. For example, three of the four counterattacks on the Mount Fakka area were sneak attacks at night, and only after the sneak attacks were unsuccessful did they turn into a strong attack.
Their activities are quite frequent. In the 30 days that the 7th Company of the 126th Regiment defended the No. 80 heights of Kuolin Mountain, 27 days were attacked by the Vietnamese army. The scale of these sneak attacks was not large, and most of them were squad-sized, and the Vietnamese army successively carried out dozens of squad-sized sneak attacks on the Phaka Hill position.
In order to distract the enemy and pin them down, their sneak attacks are often directed at the flank, flank, or secondary direction of the position. During the attack on the Kayaka position in the area of Mount Faka, they even used part of their forces to sneak up on their positions on the western flank.
Sometimes they resort to make-up sneak attacks. For example, when the 9th Company of the 379th Regiment of the 127th Division was defending the unnamed heights southeast of the 540th Heights, the Vietnamese army had about a squad of troops, with a white cloth tied to its left arm (consistent with the identification mark of the 9th Company the night before), approached the front of the position in the posture of pretending to be a navigator, trying to pass through the pass in a muddled and carry out a surprise attack, but was detected by our sentry in time.