(Delivered by Chen Jian, a specially invited expert of Tiandao Industry Research Institute) The Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China proposed to actively promote the reform of mixed ownership, elevate it to the height of the national economic development strategy, and encourage all types of ownership enterprises to cross-sharehold and non-public enterprises to participate in the reform of state-owned enterprises.
On August 24, 2015, the Communist Party of China issued the "Guiding Opinions on Deepening the Reform of State-owned Enterprises" (hereinafter referred to as the "Guiding Opinions"), which made major arrangements for deepening the reform of state-owned enterprises, which is a programmatic document to guide and promote the reform of China's state-owned enterprises in the new era, and pointed out the direction for deepening the reform of state-owned enterprises. At the same time, it is also a document closely related to the development of the private economy.
Focusing on the goal of realizing the reform of state-owned enterprises, the "Guiding Opinions" proposes to develop a mixed-ownership economy, introduce non-state-owned capital to participate in the reform of state-owned enterprises, and encourage state-owned capital to invest in non-state-owned enterprises in various ways. Through the market approach, equity investment is made in non-state-owned enterprises with development potential and good growth; Encourage state-owned enterprises to carry out equity integration, strategic cooperation, and resource integration with non-state-owned enterprises through various methods such as investment and shareholding, joint investment, and restructuring.
From the promulgation and implementation of the "Guiding Opinions" to the end of 2015, "Several Opinions on Adhering to the Party's Leadership and Strengthening Party Building in Deepening the Reform of State-owned Enterprises" and other documents have been issued one after another. In 2016, 7 special supporting documents were issued successively. At the same time, the SASAC and relevant departments have issued 36 supporting documents. The "1+N" document system and related rules have jointly formed a set of blueprints for the reform of state-owned enterprises, such as design drawings and construction drawings, which have laid a solid foundation for comprehensively deepening the reform of state-owned enterprises and state-owned assets.
Under the guidance of this document, state-owned enterprises continue to expand into many competitive fields such as real estate, construction, and light industry. In May 2019, the Secretary-General of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) revealed to ** that in 2019, the number of households in the mixed-ownership reform of ** enterprises accounted for more than 70%, an increase of 20 percentage points compared with 2012. From 2013 to 2018, enterprises attracted more than 260 billion yuan of social capital through the property rights market.
* A series of documents to promote the development of state-owned enterprises have been issued, which is of great significance. It has also directly promoted the substantial development of the mixed-ownership economy. While fully affirming the role of the Guiding Opinions, some issues that have emerged are also worthy of attention.
1. State-owned enterprises or private enterprises?
The development of a mixed-ownership economy is mainly considered from the perspective of promoting the development of state-owned enterprises. It is a mixed-ownership reform led by state-owned enterprises. This foothold is worth it in itself. An important practical reason why the planned economy should be transformed into a market economy is that the state-owned enterprises are generally inefficient, and the "one large and two public" enterprises have not shown superiority. Taking advantage of the flexibility and efficiency of the private economy, and by mixing with state-owned enterprises, the purpose of promoting the development of state-owned enterprises is finally achieved. However, it is actually very questionable whether such a mixed economic development, which takes advantage of the flexibility and efficiency of private enterprises to achieve the purpose of promoting the development of state-owned enterprises, conforms to the internal laws of the market economy and is conducive to improving the overall efficiency of society. The reason is very simple, from the global situation, under the conditions of market economy, private enterprises are the foundation and main force of the market economy because they can adapt to changes in market demand, flexibility and high efficiency. Led by state-owned enterprises, although there are some successful cases in recent years, the overall analysis seems to be unsatisfactory.
From the analysis of the historical development process, only the mixed ownership reform led by private capital can be more efficient and vigorous. A hundred years ago, Zhang Jian, an entrepreneur in Jiangsu, absorbed a large amount of private capital, part of the official capital (official shares, or public shares), and the part of the official shares did not interfere in the business activities of the enterprise after the shares, and the official shares only invested, did not participate in the daily business activities of the enterprise, and only distributed dividends according to shares. The management and decision-making power of enterprises are in the hands of private capital. Zhang Jian's enterprises, textile factories, soap factories, and even land reclamation, as far as possible to turn the rights and interests of stakeholders into real property rights, and use shares to combine all the elements, and then increase the attention of participants to the assets of the enterprise, thus achieving success.
Second, mixed reform is not a movement
Mixed economic development should be a natural process, not a vigorous movement. In some places, there is no forced distribution and full coverage under the premise of private enterprises voluntarily. Even in the development of a mixed economy, equality of property rights is a principle under corporate governance, whether it is a central enterprise, a state-owned enterprise, a private enterprise or a foreign enterprise, equity is equal. However, the reality is that state-owned enterprises have "one dominant force", "one power dominates, and one person dominates", and the board of directors and shareholders' meetings are not held on major issues. The phenomenon of the chairman of the board of directors having the final say on major matters is still relatively common. Taking the mixed-ownership reform of CGN Energy Conservation Company and Shihua Company as an example, it is a classic failure case of mixed-ownership reform led by state-owned enterprises.
CGN China Company is a mixed-ownership enterprise of China General Nuclear Power Energy Conservation Company and Jiangxi Provincial Private Enterprise Shihua Company. Due to the inequality of property rights, it leads to the chaos of corporate governance. According to reports, CGN accounts for 51% of the property rights, and Jiangxi Shihua private enterprises account for 49%, with a difference of 2% in equity, and the equity is similar. Of course, no matter how much the difference in equity is, equality of property rights under corporate governance is a principle and a universal law. CGN only accounts for 2% more of the shares, not "one share", but can "one power, one person dominate", major issues do not open the board of directors, do not hold a general meeting of shareholders. The chairman of the board of directors alone has the final say on major matters. On the issue of property rights, logically speaking, whether it is a central enterprise or a state-owned enterprise, a private enterprise or a foreign enterprise, it is normal practice to convene a board of directors and shareholders' meeting to decide on major issues in accordance with the Company Law. And this enterprise is sent by the management personnel to have the final say, do not hold a board of directors, do not hold a shareholders' meeting, and do not even solicit the opinions of the other party when there is a major matter, even if they solicit the opinions of the other party, they are just going through the motions, regardless of the opinions of the other party, or according to their own opinions. As a result of such irresponsibility and chaotic management, the business of the mixed-ownership reform company has collapsed and declined, and its operation has suffered sustained losses, and it has now completely suspended production and business.
3. Equality of property rights is the foundation and premise
The property rights system is the cornerstone of the socialist market economy. Protecting the property rights of private enterprises and the rights and interests of entrepreneurs in accordance with the law is the main content of optimizing the development environment. Equality of property rights is the basis and premise of mixed ownership reform. It involves ownership, management, distribution, supervision, and even the right of employees to participate in management. It is necessary to govern in accordance with the modern enterprise system, so that such mixed reform is reasonable and can be mixed. If property rights are unequal, it may lead to confusion but not harmony, mixing but not harmony, mixing but not changing, and even confusion. Obviously, one of the important reasons is that China Guanghua has turned from prosperity to decline in just a few years.
Through the mixed-ownership reform, some private enterprises have cooperated with central enterprises to enter the natural monopoly industry, which is seen as an important measure to break down the barriers to entry of the private economy. However, in the design and implementation of the system, the mixed ownership reform is to allow private enterprises to enter the monopoly industry by changing the form of enterprise ownership, rather than really breaking down the institutional barriers. Due to the unequal position of private enterprises, it is difficult for social capital or private enterprises to make decisions, make profits, and settle accounts. After a private enterprise participates in a monopoly or participates in a PPP project, it does not have the right to operate or speak, and can only exist as a financial investor, and may not receive dividend returns for a long time. When private enterprises enter the natural monopoly industry in such an identity, there is no equality of property rights, which is not conducive to breaking the monopoly and improving efficiency.
Due to the failure to effectively safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of private enterprises, this practice of developing a mixed-ownership economy may be unsustainable. It is precisely because of this that some people in society have misinterpreted the development of the mixed-ownership economy proposed in the "Guiding Opinions" as a new round of "public-private partnerships," which has affected the healthy development of the private economy to a certain extent. In addition, in the past ten years, although state-owned enterprises have developed somewhat, the contribution of state-owned enterprises to society and their feedback to society do not match the large amount of social resources occupied by state-owned enterprises. This also means that state-owned enterprises occupy a lot of social resources, which actually squeezes the development space of private enterprises, resulting in the failure of the entire social efficiency to be improved accordingly.