In the battle of Menglianggu, did Li Tianxia really see death and not save him

Mondo Social Updated on 2024-02-01

As we all know, when it comes to the Battle of Meng Lianggu, there are two seven-word jokes circulating on the Internet: Zhang Lingfu blooms in the center, and Li Tianxia is rushed thousands of miles to help.

It can be seen from this that many people think that there are two main reasons for the failure of the Battle of Menglianggu:

First, Zhang Lingfu stuck to Meng Lianggu, trying to attract the main force of our army to besiege, and then let the main force of the first army come to a counter-encirclement, causing the center to bloom;

The second is that Li Tianxia's entire 83rd Division was close to Zhang Lingfu, but he could not save him when he saw death, so he only sent a company to pretend to be a regiment to reinforce the battlements, but as a result, he was besieged by a column of the People's Liberation Army, the whole army was annihilated, and Zhang Lingfu's only way back was cut off.

Is this really the case? I would like to briefly express my views today.

1. From the perspective of motives, it is impossible for Li Tianxia to pit Zhang Lingfu

(1) Judging from military merits and ability, Li Tianxia is not jealous of Zhang Lingfu

In the 74th Army system, Wang Yaowu, Zhang Lingfu and others are well-known. The former is the military soul of the 74th Army, which single-handedly founded the 74th Army and brought it to become the head of the five main forces. The latter has been praised by many books and **.

As for Li Tianxia, when his name is mentioned, four words come to mind in the minds of many readers - see death and don't save it.

In fact, in the Anti-Japanese War, Li Tianxia's performance was even better than Zhang Lingfu, and she really led the troops to fight the whole field.

On December 20, 1938, Yu Jishi, then commander of the 36th Army Corps, sent a telegram to Chiang Kai-shek, reporting on the adjustment of the corps personnel and captured items.

In this telegram, Yu Jishi recommended a group of outstanding generals of the corps, from division commanders to regiment commanders, and Li Tianxia, deputy commander of the 51st Division, ranked first (the third column of the text). It can be seen that at that time, Li Tianxia's performance was recognized by Yu Jishi, the veteran commander of the 74th Army.

The Battle of Shanggao was a world-famous battle of the 74th Army. In this battle, Li Tianxia led the 51st Division to fight in the north and south of the Jinjiang River, which made the Japanese army independently mixed into the 20th Brigade in a dilemma, and made the first contribution.

Secondly, Yu Chengwan's 57th Division blocked the 34th Division in the early stage of the campaign, laying the foundation for the formation of an outflanking situation by the ** large army against the 20th Brigade of the Japanese Army.

The 58th Division, of which Zhang Lingfu served as deputy division commander, performed the worst. At the beginning of the war, the Japanese 34th Division switched to the direction of the 58th Division and attacked overnight after unsuccessfully assaulting the position of the 57th Division.

The 58th Division was caught off guard and suffered heavy losses, causing the besieged Japanese troops to converge with reinforcements and escape. In the ** stage, the 58th Division also had few successes, even inferior to the 26th Division of the Sichuan Army.

Of course, as soon as some people in modern times blow it, it is very different from real history. As recorded in a certain book:

After the battle, the 74th Army won the "Flying Tiger Flag", and Wang Yaowu, Shi Zhongcheng, Zhang Lingfu and others were commended.

It is a pity that the fact is that after the Battle of Shanggao, the Military Commission did award two meritorious heroes of the 74th Army alone: Army Commander Wang Yaowu and 51st Division Commander Li Tianxia were awarded the Fourth-Class Baoding Medal.

Not only that, Li Tianxia's 51st Division was also awarded the "No. 1 Martial Arts Certificate of the Army, Navy and Air Force" by the Military Commission.

In the Second Battle of Changsha, because the telegrams exchanged between the 9th Theater and the 11th Army of the Japanese Army were deciphered, the direction of the 74th Army's transfer became a clear card. The Japanese army then concentrated on the first.

3. The 6th Division, which slammed the 74th Army during the movement.

Army Commander Wang Yaowu was paralyzed and careless before the war, and did not notice the intelligence of the large-scale movement of the Japanese army, so that the 74th Army was besieged by two divisions in the area of Jinjing, which was extremely heavy.

Even the headquarters of the 74th Army was ambushed by the Japanese army, and the guard company was completely annihilated.

After inflicting heavy losses on the 74th Army, the Japanese army moved south, broke through the position of the 58th Division in Yong'an, and approached Changsha. The division commander Liao Lingqi was shot after the war for leaving his post without permission (said to be a scapegoat). Deputy division commander Zhang Lingfu took over as division commander.

Liao Lingqi. At the critical moment, Li Tianxia gathered the remnants in time, led the remaining troops of the 51st Division to Yong'an, and fought with the 3rd Division, not only successfully stabilizing the position, but also carrying out a fierce flank attack on the enemy in the south.

Yu Chengwan's 57th Division ** Chunhua Mountain, cooperated with Li Tianxia to stabilize the position, and the infantry commander Li Hanqing sacrificed his life for the country.

After the battle, the army commander Wang Yaowu, and the division commanders Li Tianxia and Yu Chengwan were awarded the Baoding Medal.

On April 9, 1945, the Japanese 11th Army invaded Zhijiang in an attempt to destroy the local American airfield. The 115th Division of the Central Route attacked in three directions, in an attempt to cut off the Hunan-Guizhou Highway in a roundabout way.

Li Tianxia, who had been promoted to commander of the 100th Army, used the 19th Division as a bait to stick to Furong Mountain, a key pass on the Hunan-Guizhou Highway, and resisted step by step, successfully causing the 120th Wing of the Japanese Army to advance alone and fall into an ambush.

Li Tianxia then mobilized the 51st Division of the 74th Army and the other two divisions of the 100th Army to transfer to **. In just one day, the 120th Wing was almost annihilated, setting a record of three divisions severely inflicting a Japanese infantry wing since the outbreak of the Anti-Japanese War.

So far, Longhui County, Hunan Province still retains the cemetery of the fallen soldiers of the Battle of Xiangxi presided over by Li Tianxia.

After the victory of the Anti-Japanese War, the 100th Army was organized into the 83rd Division, and Li Tianxia achieved excellent results in the whole army.

On October 1, 1946, the Military Commission reviewed the reorganization division, and the 83rd Division was classified as the first echelon above the first level, which was at the same level as the integrated and new 6th armies.

In December 1946, after Zhang Lingfu laid down the ripple water, he specially wore the military uniform of the People's Liberation Army to see Chiang Kai-shek, and bitterly stated that the military uniform was not as durable and cold as the People's Liberation Army.

Chiang Kai-shek was shocked when he heard the news, and ordered Yu Jishi, the director of the chamberlain, to investigate the matter, and Yu Jishi randomly checked the distribution of winter clothes to more than 10 units, and the results were shocking, and only one unit actually issued winter clothes that matched the report -- that is, Li Tianxia's entire 83rd Division.

It can be seen that although Li Tianxia does not dare to say that he is 100% not paid, at least from the perspective of the winter clothes of the troops, he has done his best.

(2) In public and private, it is impossible for Li Tianxia to harm the entire 74th Division

In fact, compared with Zhang Lingfu and Li Tianxia, Wang Yaowu prefers Li Tianxia. In February 1947, Wang Yaowu proposed to Chiang Kai-shek to appoint Li Tianxia, commander of the entire 83rd Division, as the commander of the integrated army. The submission reads as follows:

Li Tianxia, commander of the 83rd Division, was brave and good at fighting, and distinguished himself for his meritorious service. This time I entered Lunan and was able to achieve the task again. At the time of appeasement of the reorganized army, we sincerely use the commander of the reorganized army to appoint him, and he will certainly perform excellently. The vacancy of the post of the commander of the left division is planned to be filled by Zhou Zhidao, the deputy commander of the division. The officer is loyal and capable, and has been working for a long time. If he is promoted, it is very suitable to receive people and land. Yes, begging for a cut.

Yu Jishi, director of Chiang Kai-shek's chamberlain office and veteran commander of the 74th Army, clearly suggested that the entire 74th Division and the entire 83rd Division be combined into the entire 100th Army, with Li Tianxia as the commander (equivalent to the commander of the corps).

Chiang Kai-shek instructed: After the end of the Luzhong campaign, the army can be organized.

As the commander of the entire 100th Army, who will be in charge of the 74th Division in the future, Li Tianxia has no reason not to go all out to rescue.

Long before Li Tianxia was appointed commander of the 100th Army, Tang Enbo's First Corps divided the 83rd, 25th, 65th, and 74th Divisions into the first column, with Li Tianxia as the column commander and responsible for commanding the 74th Division.

When Li Tianxia was the captain of the column, he really had selfish intentions for the entire 74th Division.

In mid-April 1947, the entire 74th Division attacked from Linyi to Mengyin, successively breaking through the resistance of our small troops and advancing near Jiepai.

Column Commander Li Tianxia made a mistake in judgment and mistakenly thought that the PLA was going to lure the enemy deep and eat the entire 74th Division. So he urgently ordered Zhang Lingfu to retreat 40 kilometers from Jiepai and move closer to the entire 83rd and 25th Divisions.

Later, after reconnaissance, Li Tianxia found that there was no ambush in front of our army, so he used a car to transport the entire 74th Division back to Jiepai.

In all fairness, the main reason why Li Tianxia did this was because he was afraid that the old troops would suffer losses. However, Zhang Lingfu resented Li Tianxia for making him miss the opportunity to make meritorious contributions, and directly sent a telegram to Chiang Kai-shek, causing Li Tianxia to receive a demerit punishment.

In late April, the Huaye troops stormed Tai'an, annihilating more than 20,000 people of the 72nd Division, and then calmly retreated. Chiang Kai-shek was furious, and on May 3, he flew to Xuzhou and scolded Gu Zhutong, director of the Xuzhou Pacification Office, for not fighting well.

In order to shake off the blame, Gu Zhutong reminded the old incident that happened more than half a month ago, accusing Li Tianxia, the commander of the column with the largest command, of cowering when he encountered a small unit of the People's Liberation Army, and did not let the four integrated divisions advance in time to annihilate the "main force", but sat back and watched the defeat of friendly forces.

As a result, Li Tianxia was removed from his post and retained, and the commander of the first column was replaced by Huang Baitao, commander of the 25th Division.

Second, did Li Tianxia try her best to break the siege

According to the battle plan, on May 12, 1947, the entire 74th Division launched an attack on Tangbu, the core of the liberated area in central Lu, in an attempt to find the main force of our army for a decisive battle.

Theoretically, the entire 74th Division had troops on both the left and right flanks - the entire 25th Division on the left flank, and the entire 83rd Division on the right flank, and it was not dangerous to attack Tangbu.

But in fact, the 83rd Division of Li Tianxia on the right wing has been attacked by our army many times since the Liberation War, and its strength has been greatly reduced

The division was previously under the jurisdiction of 3 whole brigades and 7 regiments, the 19th Brigade and the 63rd Brigade each had two regiments, and the temporarily strengthened 44th Brigade had three regiments. It seems that the shelf is larger than other integrated divisions with only two brigades and four regiments.

In fact, the 44th Regiment of the 130th Brigade had been annihilated by Huaye in early May, and the brigade headquarters and the 131st Regiment were responsible for guarding Linyi.

Therefore, during the Battle of Menglianggu, the troops participating in the battle of the entire 83rd Division actually had five regiments.

The 19th Regiment of the 57th Brigade was ordered to enter the old Maowo Mountain south of the battlement village and cover the right rear of the 74th Division. Later, he was attacked by the Six Columns and went to Meng Lianggu.

As a result, Li Tianxia actually only had four regiments in his hands, namely the 19th Regiment of the 56th Brigade, the 132nd Regiment of the 44th Brigade, and the 187th and 189th Regiments of the 63rd Brigade.

However, the two regiments of the 63rd Brigade were blocked by the Huaye Sixth Column at Mashan and could not move. Only the 19th Regiment of the 56th Brigade and the 132nd Regiment of the 44th Brigade were really able to break the siege.

In fact, neither regiment was very good at combat. The Soviet Union and China won seven battles and seven victories. The first thing Su Yu ate was the 56th Regiment of the 19th Brigade. The entire 44th Brigade originally belonged to the entire 26th Division, but it was completely annihilated in the Battle of Lunan four months ago.

When the two regiments were rebuilt after the war, the ** and strength of these two regiments were extremely insufficient, and after walking on the Luzhong Mountain Road for several months, the morale was very low.

In particular, the 132nd Regiment of the entire 44th Brigade, the brigade originally had 3 regiments, the 130th Regiment was annihilated, the 131st Regiment was stationed in Linyi, and only one regiment was left to fight with the entire 83rd Division, which was equivalent to being dismantled, and the war-weariness was extremely heavy, and Li Tianxia did not dare to let him undertake the rescue mission.

After weighing, Li Tianxia could only take the 56th Regiment into the siege, but as a result, he ran into the blocking position of a division of the Huaye Eighth Column, and there was no progress in the fierce battle for two days.

By 16 May, the entire 83rd Division was no longer able to get in touch with the entire 74th Division, and Li Tianxia became nervous and stubbornly threw the entire 132nd Regiment of the 44th Brigade into battle. However, it was too late.

However, the 83rd Division was still the first unit to be stationed in Menglianggu.

It can be seen that Li Tianxia also has a certain responsibility in the battle of Meng Lianggu, but she is not like the black on the Internet.

The main responsibility was that before Zhang Lingfu was besieged, Tang Enbo, commander of the First Corps, ordered the 83rd Division to cover the right rear of the 74th Division with a strong force, while Li Tianxia only sent the 57th Regiment of the 19th Brigade, which had the worst combat effectiveness in the division, to the south of Duozhuang.

Of the three battalions of the 57th Regiment, two were annihilated by our army (seven battles and seven victories in the Soviet Union and China), and the other battalion was formed after the surrender of the puppet army in northern Jiangsu, and the combat effectiveness can be imagined.

If Li Tianxia had sent two more regiments to Duozhuang, would the situation have been different?

Compare the entire 25th division of the left flank that broke the siege together.

At that time, the entire 25th Division had three whole brigades. At first, Huang Baitao only arranged the entire 148th Brigade, which had the weakest combat effectiveness, to break the siege and attack the Huaye First Column, but it was unsuccessful.

Until the situation was urgent, in order to avoid being punished, Huang Baitao hurriedly threw in the main force and rushed and almost took the position of Tianma Mountain.

Later, Liao Zhengguo, commander of the 1st Column Division, "acted arbitrarily" and "intercepted" a battalion of the 4th Column that reinforced Meng Lianggu, so as to stabilize Tianma Mountain. Huang Baitao saw that the People's Liberation Army had reinforcements, and finally stopped the attack.

If you want to throw off the pot that cannot be saved, the author thinks that it is more appropriate to throw it on Huang Baitao's head than on Li Tianxia's head.

Of course, Huang Baitao didn't want to die from the beginning.

When the entire 74th Division showed signs of being alone in the depths and besieged by the main force of our army, Huang Baitao, as the leader of the column, sent a telegram to Zhang Lingfu, hoping that the entire 74th Division would break through to the southwest as soon as possible and move closer to the entire 25th Division.

Who knows, Zhang Lingfu angrily reprimanded Huang Baitao: "My mule, horse and vehicle weigh a lot, if you break through rashly and suffer a lot of losses, can you be responsible?" Can you compensate me? ”

Huang Baitao was very embarrassed, so he had to say: "It's up to you!" ”

Prior to this, when Huang Baitao was ordered to command the first column, he went to the headquarters of the 74th Division and personally advised Zhang Lingfu not to build roads and advance in a big way, exposing his intentions to the enemy prematurely.

Zhang Lingfu said triumphantly: "There are many vehicles in our troops, and the roads to the north are all mountain roads, and you can't walk without building roads, even if the People's Liberation Army knows about it, it doesn't matter, we are looking for him to fight, what are you afraid of?" ”

Seeing this, Huang Baitao had no choice but to leave politely. After he returned to the division headquarters, he said: "Zhang Lingfu has no one in his eyes, and the arrogant soldiers will be defeated!" ”

Therefore, at the beginning of the Battle of Menglianggu, Huang Baitao only sent the weakest brigade to relieve the siege. When his subordinates dissuaded him, Huang Baitao disdained: "His 74th Division has 30,000 or 40,000 people, American-style equipment, do you want me to save him with 20,000 miscellaneous troops?" ”

On the morning of May 16, the entire 74th Division was on the verge of collapse. Chief of Staff Wei Zhenyue used the only remaining walkie-talkie to call Huang Baitao to ask for reinforcements:

For the sake of the party-state, please give the brothers a hand. It became a classic line in the movie "Southern Expedition and Northern War" in the 50s of the last century.

3. Who is the culprit behind the annihilation of the entire 74th Division

After the war, the Kuomintang side investigated and came to the conclusion that there were two main reasons for the defeat of the Menglianggu battle:

First, after May 10, the first suddenly changed the previous battle plan of advancing in unison and fighting steadily and steadily, and changed to attack Tangbu with the entire 74th Division and the entire 25th Division, so that Huaye could discover fighters.

Second, when our army was surrounded on a large scale, the entire 74th Division did not take the initiative to break through to the southwest and moved closer to the entire 25th Division. did not keep the battlement village close to the entire 83rd Division, but became a horseman, and the whole army went to Menglianggu on the stone mountain.

(1) Who let the 74th Division advance alone?

Originally, Gu Zhutong's battle plan for Luzhong was that the three corps would advance at the same time: the eight integrated divisions of the Tang Enbo Corps captured Jucheng, Yishui, and Linqu; 5 integrated divisions of the Ou Zhen Corps attacked Nanma; Attack Boshan with five integrated divisions of Wang Jingjiu's corps.

If this battle plan was continued, the entire 74th Division would naturally not have the opportunity to venture into the mountains alone. It was difficult for Hua Ye to take the rank of general in a million-strong army, so Su Yu had no choice but to continue to "dance the dragon lantern" and look for fighters.

However, on May 10, the situation suddenly changed. Gu Zhutong, who was sitting in Xuzhou, strongly demanded a change in the battle plan, hoping to send some troops to attack Tangbu, a logistics base in Huaye.

On the evening of 10 May, according to Gu Zhutong's proposal, Chief of Staff Chen Cheng canceled the previous deployment and redrew the offensive plan.

With Chiang Kai-shek's consent, Chen Cheng ordered Tang Enbo's corps (under the jurisdiction of the 25th, 28th, 48th, 57th, 65th, 74th, and 83rd divisions, as well as the 7th Army of the Gui Army) to sweep Tangbu with one division when it occupied Juxian and Yishui.

According to this order, of the eight integrated divisions of the Tang Enbo Corps, a maximum of three integrated divisions were used to sweep away Tangbu. And so it is. Tang Enbo deployed the 74th Division and the 25th Division to attack Tangbu, and adjusted the 83rd Division as a reserve.

On 13 May, Chiang Kai-shek gave up his plan to divide his troops into Tangbu after being strongly advised by Guo Rugui, director of the War Department of the Ministry of National Defense. The eight reorganized divisions of the Tang Enbo Corps were required to concentrate their forces to capture Jucheng and Yishui.

However, as soon as the order was issued, Gu Zhutong resolutely opposed it, believing that to attack Yishui, it was necessary to divide troops and take Tangbu, the Huaye logistics base. After some quarrels, Chiang Kai-shek agreed to Gu Zhutong's plan.

On the evening of May 13, our army made a big move, and the next day surrounded the entire 74th Division.

Therefore, after Chiang Kai-shek learned of the annihilation of the 74th Division, he scolded Gu Zhutong in his diary on May 17

Lu Zhong suppressed Gu Zhutong in ignorance and recklessness, all the decisions were wrong, stupid and wrong, and refused to ask for instructions, so the rest of the intentions and plans were shattered by him, and turned into a chaotic phenomenon, so that the 74th Division was completely wiped out by the bandits. I was so angry that I didn't know how to turn it out.

But as we all know, Gu Zhutong is recognized as a good old man who has no opinions, also known as Gu Porridge Bucket. Therefore, Gu Zhutong was not punished after the war. Half a year later, he replaced Chen Cheng and was promoted to chief of staff.

The reason why Gu Zhutong urged the division of troops into Tangbu was actually Zhang Lingfu's meaning.

At the beginning of April 1947, Tang Enbo summoned the commanders of eight integrated divisions to study the deployment of attacking Juxian and Yishui.

Tang Enbo believes that Tangbu is the rear of the People's Liberation Army, with arsenals, hospitals, and warehouses, and its position is very important, and it is unlikely that Huaye will give up easily.

Therefore, the initial deployment of the ** First Corps was to use the 7th Army and the entire division to protect the communication line from Mengyin to Yishui and Juxian.

Then the whole 65th Division went along the road to Tangbu, and the whole 74th Division attacked Tangbu from Duozhuang to the north, and the whole 83rd Division was placed on the right flank of the whole 74th Division, and also marched towards Tangbu.

The entire 25th Division guarded the left flank of the entire 74th Division as a reserve for the corps.

Attacking Tangbu with three integrated divisions without any worries and achieving victory was a sure thing.

But Zhang Lingfu made a lot of noise at the meeting, thinking that Tang Enbo was timid and afraid, and said wildly:

It is estimated that the People's Liberation Army in this area will have no more than three columns, and even if there are five or six columns near Tangbu, if I go to fight with one division, we can take Tangbu in three days at the latest. ”

As for them (referring to the entire 65th and 83rd Divisions), they can go straight to Yishui without fighting. ”

Tang Enbo initially did not agree with Zhang Lingfu's battle plan. But by the end of April, the situation changed abruptly

* Lost the battle at Taean with the loss of a reorganized division. At the beginning of May, the heavy troops did not make good progress in Lunan, and it took a week to advance less than 20 kilometers.

The People's Liberation Army conquered Tai'an.

Chiang Kai-shek was very angry about this, and flew to Xuzhou in person, in addition to blaming Gu Zhutong and punishing Li Tianxia, he also angrily reprimanded Xuzhou for having heavy troops, but he was afraid to move forward, and asked Gu Zhutong and Tang Enbo to seize the time to find and destroy the main force of the People's Liberation Army.

According to the spirit of Chiang Kai-shek, Gu Zhutong and Tang Enbo had to consider changing their previous battle plans. In the end, it was decided to agree with Zhang Lingfu's previous proposal to sweep Yishui with the main force and divide troops to sweep Tangbu.

Why did Zhang Lingfu propose that the entire 74th Division take over the task of attacking Tangbu? It turned out that because Tangbu had hoarded a lot of supplies, Zhang Lingfu was afraid that if there were too many troops attacking Tangbu, he would not get much benefit.

What's more, according to Tang Enbo's initial deployment, the fastest attack on Tangbu was the entire 65th Division of the Cantonese Army that was advancing along the road. Zhang Lingfu has always looked down on the miscellaneous troops and does not want them to take the credit for conquering Tangbu.

(2) Whose order was it to all the 74th Division?

According to the records of the war, the entire 74th Division abandoned the plains and went up the mountain on the afternoon of May 15.

On the morning of 14 May, Zhang Lingfu had already discovered that the PLA was surrounded by a large force, and after consulting Tang Enbo, at 9 a.m., the entire 74th Division began to retreat, in an attempt to get rid of the encirclement of the PLA and open up contact with the entire 25th Division.

At noon, Tang Enbo ordered the entire 74th Division to secure the front line of Menglianggu and Duozhuang and maintain contact with the entire 25th Division.

By the evening of May 14, Tang Enbo suddenly ordered Zhang Lingfu to "stick to Meng Lianggu, occupy the battlements with one unit, and cooperate with the friendly army to deal a severe blow to the bandits, so as to reap the expected great victory." ”

On the morning of the 15th, Wei Zhenyue, chief of staff of the entire 74th Division, informed Tang Enbo of a serious news: the battlement had been lost.

At 10 o'clock in the morning of the 15th, Tang Enbo sent a telegram to Zhang Lingfu, asking Zhang Lingfu to gain a firm foothold in Menglianggu, recapture Wanquan Mountain, and open up contact with the entire 83rd Division.

However, at 12 noon, the situation took a turn for the worse, and Zhang Lingfu abandoned all the plains around Menglianggu and led his troops to climb the mountain.

Tang Enbo was shocked and hurriedly sent the air force to contact Zhang Lingfu, according to Zhang Lingfu's reply: Our army is powerless to **Wanquan Mountain.

After being captured, Li Yuliang, deputy chief of staff of the entire 74th Division, confessed: The division's withdrawal to Menglianggu and its subsequent stubborn standby were all orders from the corps and above.

At that time, the direct superior of Tang Enbo, the commander of the First Corps, was Gu Zhutong, so the author guesses that the order to let the entire 74th Division divide troops into Tangbu and let Zhang Lingfu's entire division go to Meng Lianggu is likely to come from Gu Zhutong.

There are two pieces of evidence - one is that according to Chiang Kai-shek's chronicle - the manuscript of the story records that on May 19, that is, a few days after the end of the Menglianggu battle, Chiang Kai-shek flew to Xuzhou and clearly pointed out that the entire 74th Division was annihilated, and the main responsibility lay with Gu Zhutong

The sharp turn for the worse in the war in Luzhong was all caused by the commander-in-chief Gu Zhutong's command mistakes, and he was deeply indignant at the difficulty of winning people.

The second evidence is that Gu Zhutong wrote a situation report after the war, which did not mention his command for the two days from May 15 to May 16, which shows that he is most likely avoiding the problem of command errors.

From the above, it can be seen that the Menglianggu Battle was a fiasco, and the entire 74th Division was annihilated, and the author believes that the culprit is Gu Zhutong, followed by Tang Enbo, and Zhang Lingfu of the entire 74th Division is also very responsible. And Li Tianxia can be called "strange injustice through the ages".

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