On February 17, 1979, the Sino-Vietnamese border war broke out. The Vietnamese Army's "History of the Armed Forces of the First Military Region" records the situation of Vietnam's defensive operations in the Lang Son direction. The book declares that the Vietnamese army showed stubborn resistance and heroic sacrifices on this battlefield, inflicting heavy losses on the squadron and eventually forcing the squadron to retreat. However, are these claims true? This article will analyze and evaluate the war history of the Vietnamese army and expose its exaggerated statements and distorted facts.
The war history of the Vietnamese army is divided into eight directions, namely Chang Ding, Lu Binh, Dinh Li, Van Lang, Gao Lu, Dong Dang, Lang Son City, and Chi Ling County. In each direction, the Vietnamese army claimed to have organized an effective defense and counterattack, inflicting a large amount of ** on the squadron. However, these claims could not be further from the truth. First of all, the defensive deployment of the Vietnamese army is very weak, mainly composed of local troops, militia and public security cantonments, lacking sufficient firepower and equipment to withstand the offensive of the squadron. Secondly, the counterattack of the Vietnamese army was in vain and did not achieve any substantial results, but instead increased its own **. Thirdly, the Vietnamese army's ** data is seriously underestimated, while the ** data of the squadron ** is seriously exaggerated, in order to cover up its own failures and improve its own morale.
Specifically, the Vietnamese army has only one regiment and one battalion in the Chang Dinh direction, plus some militia and public security tuns, with a total of less than 5,000 people. Under the attack of the squadron, they quickly collapsed, and the town of Seven Creek was captured on February 25. However, the war history of the Vietnamese army said that they "blocked the attack of the first team in this direction, and at the same time organized more than 10,000 civilians to evacuate the war zone." This was clearly an attempt to disguise his rout and flight.
In the Luping direction, the Vietnamese army also has only one regiment and one battalion of troops, plus some militia and public security tuns, a total of less than 5,000 people. Under the attack of the squadron, they also quickly collapsed, and Luping County was captured on February 28. However, the war history of the Vietnamese army says that they "fought together in Heights 540, 468, and 557 (Zhima), Ban Dinh, Ban Lan, 412, 481, and 402 (private) in this direction." This is clearly an attempt to exaggerate one's own resistance and sacrifice.
In the Dinh Dinh direction, the Vietnamese army has the strength of a division, plus a battalion and a public security canton, a total of about 10,000 people. Under the attack of the squadron, they could not be blocked, and could only defend on some high ground. However, the war history of the Vietnamese army said that they "blocked the squadron" in this direction, and "the 338th Division deployed the 460th Regiment on February 22 to take the initiative to attack the rear of the squadron, eliminating the strength of one of their battalions and destroying the barracks and logistics facilities." In addition, the division also sent ** deep into Chinese territory 20 kilometers deep, blew up 2 bridges, and attacked the Ningming airfield in Guangxi with an elite detachment. "This is clearly to glorify their own offenses and raids.
In the Van Long direction, the Vietnamese army had only one regiment of partial strength, plus a battalion and an An'an tun, a total of less than 3,000 people. Under the attack of the squadron, they could not be stopped, and could only defend in some villages and on high ground. The history of the Vietnamese army, however, says that they "organized an effective defense in this direction, forcing the squadron to make no progress that day." This is obviously to disguise one's passivity and powerlessness.
In the Gao Loc direction, the Vietnamese army had only one battalion and one An'an tun, plus part of a regiment of the 3rd Division, a total of less than 4,000 men. Under the attack of the squadron, they could not be blocked, and could only defend on one high ground. However, the war history of the Vietnamese army says that they "blocked the ** squadron attacking the Ban Ran direction" in this direction. This is clearly an attempt to exaggerate one's own resistance and sacrifice.
In the important direction of Dong Deng, the Vietnamese army has the strength of one division, plus some local troops, militia and public security cantonment, a total of about 150,000 people. Under the attack of the squadron, they could not be blocked, and could only defend on some passes and high ground. However, the war history of the Vietnamese army says that they "stubbornly held their positions in this direction, and at the same time organized counterattacks to recapture the occupied positions, inflicting great losses on the squadron." This is clearly to whitewash their own struggles and heroes.
In Lang Son City and Chi Ling District, the Vietnamese army had two divisions, plus some local troops, militia and public security cantonments, totaling about 30,000 men. Under the attack of the squadron, they could not be stopped, and could only defend in some urban areas and on the banks of rivers. However, the history of the Vietnamese army said that in this direction they "resolutely held this important line of communication to prevent the squadron from crossing the Khanh Khe Bridge into Lang Son City and Wenguan County" and "approved and began to implement the plan for the squadron in the Lang Son area". This is obviously a fiction of their own defense and **.
In short, the war history of the Vietnamese army is a work full of lies and exaggerations, a history made up to cover up its own failures and scandals. It ignored not only the offensive and victory of the squadron, but also the rout and flight of the Vietnamese army.