3. The "strangulation battle" to smash the enemy in the air was a contest of strategic significance between our army and the US military in the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea.
In the first edition of this book, I did not write enough about the enemy's air "strangulation warfare" and our army's counter-"strangulation warfare," and it was a great pity. Now, when it is republished, I must add a section to explain the strategic position and significance of the "tattoo killing war" and the anti-"strangulation war" in the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea from a strategic perspective.
In the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, the enemy had absolute air superiority, and although our army had a young air force to participate in the war, it could only fly to the north of the Cheongchon River in Korea, and it could only fight during the day. The enemy's air force had absolute numerical superiority, both fighter-bombers and heavy strategic bombers. The pilots were all experienced in World War II. The enemy's navigation equipment is also advanced, and it can fly and fight during the day and at night. The enemy's aircraft also have a long radius of movement, and the enemy's air force (naval aviation can take off from aircraft carriers in the eastern and western seas of Korea) can cover the entire territory of North Korea. Empty.
Since the outbreak of the Korean War, the US military entered the war, and the enemy has relied on its powerful air power to carry out wanton and indiscriminate bombing of North Korea; after the Chinese Chinese People's Volunteers entered the DPRK, North Korea's towns and main transportation hubs have been destroyed by the enemy's air force. After the first campaign of the Chinese Volunteers in October 1950, the enemy discovered that our soldiers were participating in the war, and the enemy used the air force to carry out countless air battles. Attempts to use "carpet" bombing to wipe out or hinder our army's entry into the DPRK to participate in the war, sabotage our rear transportation lines, and attempt to paralyze our army's rear, suffocate our front's best support, and sabotage our army's combat operations. In the five battles in which our army carried out the campaign counterattack stage, the enemy's air offensive really played a role, forcing our army to carry out each campaign for only one week, that is, because the rear could not come up, the offensive could only be stopped. After the third battle, although the enemy had already retreated, because he had mastered the greatest weakness of our army's offensive, Li Qiwei, the new commander of the US Eighth Army, took advantage of his superiority in equipment to quickly launch a counterattack against our army while gathering the defeated troops and reorganizing them slightly, that is, the so-called "magnetic tactics," which did not give our troops time to recuperate and wait for replenishment.
Therefore, there is a marked difference between the entire War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea and the civil war, that is, there is no distinction between the front and the rear in the war, and sometimes even the rear and the enemy's air force are fighting more fiercely than the front. The enemy's blockade and sabotage of our rear facilities and communication lines has always been an important strategic part of the entire Korean War between the enemy and our army.
A brief overview of our army's anti-air defense operations some time before the enemy's air force officially began the air "strangulation war":
After our volunteers entered the Korean War and participated in the war, the number of various types of aircraft of the enemy's air force (including naval aviation) has increased from 553 at the beginning of the Korean War to more than 1,100, of which about 50 percent were used to bomb and destroy the rear of our army, mainly attacking the areas where our army is assembled. , supply bases, highways, railways, bridges, transportation hubs, and transport vehicles have caused great harm to our army. By July 1951, the enemy's air force had increased by a large margin, and the enemy's air force had not only increased the number of aircraft, but also greatly improved the combat performance of its aircraft.
There were about 1,700 aircraft of various types, and there were 375 of the most advanced aircraft of the US military at that time, the F-84 jet fighter-bomber and the F-86 jet fighter.
In the early days of our volunteers' entry into Korea, their air defense and logistical support capabilities were very weak. Before the end of 1950, there was only one antiaircraft artillery regiment in the air defense units, and the struggle against the enemy's air forces was mainly carried out by passive means of protection, such as camouflage, concealment, and evacuationUnder the bombing blockade by enemy aircraft, the work efficiency was very low, and the losses of vehicles were large. From October 25 to November 8, 1950, 339 cars were lost in 15 days, accounting for more than 40% of the total number of cars in China. During the 1st to 3rd campaigns, the grain was only 25 percent of the demand, and in the 4th and 5th battles, it was only 50 percent of our army's needs, which was far from meeting the needs of our army.
In January 1951, after three counterattacks, the Soviet Volunteers repelled the enemy to the south of the "38th parallel" in North Korea, and Stalin of the Soviet Union believed in the combat capability of our armyIn order to strengthen our rear air defense and improve our army's best transportation, after consultation with the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union agreed to dispatch two MiG-1 fighter divisions of the Air Force to help cover and lead one brigade of our young Volunteer Air Force to start actual combat exercises, but the Soviet Union proposed that their planes could only fly north of the Cheongchon River in North Korea and could not cross the Cheongchon River.
Since January 1951, the antiaircraft artillery units of our ground air defense have been strengthened one after another. By the end of July 1951, China had equipped 4 divisions and 3 regiments of anti-aircraft artillery and 50 independent anti-aircraft artillery battalions from the Soviet Union on a bookkeeping basis. The entire anti-aircraft gun **76There are 733 2-mm guns and only 72 85-mm guns, and most of the independent battalions are attached to various corps and armies to cover the front-line troops.
Our army's rear service units and rear service work have also been strengthened one after another. After the Volunteer Army Logistics Work Conference was held in Shenyang, the Party Committee of the Volunteer Army reported to the Military Commission for approval in May 1951, and the Volunteer Army established the Volunteer Army Rear Service Command (referred to as Zhihou) in June. The task of establishing a "steel transportation line" was gradually proposed, a fixed line of military stations was established, and night air surveillance posts were set up along the main highway lines (note: night air surveillance posts, commonly known as air defense posts. A group is set up on the top of the hill every one to three kilometers on the main highway line, and the task is to monitor the activities of enemy planes, and when they find the sound of enemy planes, they will fire a warning shot, and the driver of the car will immediately turn off the lights and drive or quickly evade when he hears the alarm. This measure has improved transportation efficiency and reduced the loss of transport vehicles and personnel).
The logistics support force has reached 6 subdivisions, 24 major stations, 11 automobile regiments (more than 3,000 vehicles), and is also equipped with 1 division of the public security force (the 18th division, later rotated to the 1st public security division), 6 engineering regiments and 2 battalions. The railway corps was increased to 4 divisions and 1 regiment (i.e., the bridge regiment); There were also 6 divisions of the railway engineering troops to aid Korea, and by 1953, the total strength of Zhihou reached more than 220,000 people. In August 1951, the China-DPRK Joint Railway Transport Command (hereinafter referred to as the "Intermodal Transport Division") was established as an agreement with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea** to manage railway transportation and the emergency repair and maintenance of railway lines in the DPRK. Although these measures have greatly improved our army's logistical support compared with the previous one, they have not fundamentally changed the situation of insufficient logistics.
In late July 1951, the worst flood in 40 years occurred in Korea, which lasted until the end of August. The rear transport lines of our army were seriously damaged: 94 railway bridges were washed away, 116 lines were washed away, the maximum time of interruption of transportation was 45 days, and the shortest time was 13 days; 50% of road bridges were washed away by floods. This has increased the difficulties of our army's food and ammunition.
The enemy's official name "Strangulation Campaign", also known as the "Air Blockade Campaign", began in August 1951.
In mid-August 1951, in order to cooperate with the armistice talks, the enemy exerted military pressure on us, and at the same time as the enemy's ground forces launched a summer offensive, they also took advantage of the flood disaster to concentrate their air forces and launched a large-scale "strangulation war" aimed at separating our army's front line and rear and cutting off our army's transportation lines, also known as the "air blockade campaign." In order to carry out the "strangulation war," the enemy mobilized 80 percent of its Far East air force, and almost all of its fighter-bombers and strategic bombers were put into human use, and planned to completely destroy the railway system in northern Korea within three months, in a vain attempt to bring our "railway transportation to a complete standstill."
The headquarters of our Volunteer Army and the headquarters of the Zhihou Army paid close attention to the new movements of the enemy. The Operations Department of the Zhi Division studied and analyzed the new situation, reported to General Peng and other leaders of the Zhi Division in a timely manner, and put forward opinions and suggestions. It is suggested that the rear command of all arms of the armed forces in the rear should be under unified command, closely coordinate and cooperate, closely collect and study the combat patterns and activity patterns of the enemy's planes in conducting "strangulation warfare" against us, and that all antiaircraft artillery battalions, regiments, and divisions in our rear should strengthen their air defense operations, establish close contact with our air forces, and never accidentally damage our planes. Our railway troops, railway engineering troops, engineering troops, and various transport regiments should study the law governing the activities of enemy planes and strictly organize the rush repair and transportation of railways and highways.
In accordance with the instructions of General Peng and other leaders of the Zhi Division, the Logistics Command of the Volunteer Army forcefully organized and commanded this long period (10 months) anti-air "strangulation war" and won the final victory. I will now briefly summarize the circumstances of this long period of intense struggle.
Our army's struggle against the "strangulation war" is divided into three stages.
The first stage of our army's anti-"strangulation war" lasted from mid-August to the end of August 1951.
This stage is characterized by the fact that the enemy took advantage of the flood disaster to carry out a comprehensive and repeated bombardment blockade of our transportation lines, with the railway line as the main target, and prevented us from repairing it. The key areas are the section of Lichuan, Dingzhou to Xuanchuan, and Huangzhou to Heiqiao.
Beginning in mid-August 1951, the enemy launched an all-out bombing and destruction of our lines of communication, and in addition to non-stop bombing by convoys, they also made two sorties in large formations of 32 to 64 planes every day. The bridges of the Yalu River, the Secheongcheon River, the Sucheon River, the Baekryeong River, the Heecheon River, the Dongcheongcheon River, the Dullu River, and the Deokji River on the Pyeongwon Line (Pyongyang to Wonsan) were all continuously bombed by the enemy. By the end of August, my entire railway traffic was in a state of inconsistency. The bombing and damage of hostile road transport lines and transport vehicles was also very intense.
At this time, the rear of our army was concentrating on the struggle against the flood disaster and was not fully prepared for the enemy's "strangulation war." The main measures I took were: to protect key targets with anti-aircraft artillery covering lines of communication; The railway corps and the railway engineering corps adopted various technical means to concentrate their forces on rushing to repair the damaged bridges and railways; Engineers and automobile transport units are to organize the erection of temporary bridges or boat bridges, submarine crossings, or sectional reversal of bridges and routes at the places where bridges and lines are destroyed, so that all sections of lines are organically connected so as to keep transportation uninterrupted. In this way, I managed to secure the opening of part of the line. Throughout August, we rushed about 34,000 tons of war materials to the front line, which initially improved the food and ammunition on the front line.
The second stage of our army's anti-"strangulation war" lasted from September to December 1951.
The characteristics of this stage are: Our struggle against the "strangulation war" is in full swing, and the focus of the enemy's bombing and blockade has shifted to the triangle areas of Sin'anju, Yuanchuan, and Xipu, which are the hubs of our railways, and to prevent and destroy our airfields.
Sinanju, Valcheon, North Korea. The Xipu Triangle is the hub of three railway lines, connecting Beijing (Seoul) Yi (Sinuiju), Manpo (opposite the bank of Jilin Province in China, both longitudinal), and Pyongyang (Yang) Yuan (Mountain) Line (horizontal), and is the throat of China's railway transportation. This area will be destroyed, and the railway transportation of our army to the south, north, east and west will be completely interrupted; In addition, the section from Xipu to Sinanju is mostly paddy fields on both sides, while the roadbed from Suncheon to Yuanchuan is high, and it is difficult to repair after being damaged. After the enemy shifted the focus of its bombing to the triangle area, it dispatched an average of more than 100 sorties in five batches a day to carry out concentrated bombing, and gradually reduced the bombing range. By November, the bombardment area was reduced to one or two points between Suchon and Wancheng and one kilometer between Quandong and Yongwon-ri, in an attempt to inflict deep damage on these two points that we could not repair and interrupt our transportation and supplies.
Several segments in the triangle are only 73 years longOn the 5-kilometer route, a total of 38,186 bombs were hit in four months, with an average of 1 bomb per 2 meters. The length of this section of the railway accounts for only 5 percent of the total length of the railway used by our army4%, but the number of damaged places accounted for 452%, resulting in the area not being able to open to traffic for 80% of the time in the past four months, causing great difficulties to our army.
In September 1951, when the rainy season in Korea ended, the rear units of our army also switched from fighting floods and rescuing people to going all out to counterattack the enemy's air "strangulation warfare".
The air force of our volunteers gradually increased to 10 divisions, and under the cover of two aviation divisions of the Soviet army (sometimes our air force took off to fight independently), it began to operate in rotation in late September 1951, and each time two to three aviation divisions and two divisions of the Soviet air force were jointly stationed at the four airfields of Donggou, Langtou, Kuandian, and Fengcheng along the Yalu River, and put them into air operations. The task of protecting the main highways and railway lines of communication between the north and south of the Cheongcheon River from the air and covering the construction of an airfield in the Anju area (the airfield was built entirely by our side in case of a forced landing of our planes in an air battle). By the end of 1951, our air force had taken off a total of 3,526 sorties, shot down US planes, and damaged 25 planes. As a result of the active operations of our air forces, the enemy's air force was soon forced to retreat southward to the south of the Cheongchon River in Korea, and the enemy's B-29 strategic bombers were forced to refrain from flying during the day from October onwards, but to switch to high-altitude bombing by night invasion. (Because our plane has no night flight equipment, nor does it have night ground-to-air command and navigation equipment, our pilots have not yet had time to conduct night flight training.)
During this period of time, Zhi Si promptly reported to the ** Military Commission on the enemy's air "strangulation warfare" and the situation of our air force, ground anti-aircraft artillery units and other arms of the armed forces against the "strangulation war", and reported to the ** Military Commission, Zhi Si decided to strengthen the air defense forces in the railway and Qingchuan Jiangqiao area, in addition to the original antiaircraft artillery covering traffic, from the cover to build security. Among the troops at the state airfield, 1 anti-aircraft artillery regiment was transferred, and 11 independent anti-aircraft artillery battalions and 6 anti-aircraft machine gun batteries were transferred from the various armies resting in the rear to form 4 air defense zones on the railway line (Pyongyang, Anju, Jeongju, Valcheon, Sunchon districts; Yinshan, Xincangli District; Yangde, Longchi courtyard area; Pyongyang, Mukkai-ri districts), further strengthened the air defense forces on the railway line. Beginning in mid-October, most of the anti-aircraft artillery units covering the construction of airfields were redeployed to the triangle and other heavy areas. To the railway lot. At the same time, the Central Military Commission also transferred one radar company and five searchlight companies from China to cooperate with antiaircraft artillery and aviation units in combat.
In order to unify the command, under the leadership of the Logistics Command of the Volunteer Army, a railway anti-aircraft artillery command post was established. In accordance with the principle of "concentrating forces and focusing on defense," the entire air defense deployment was adjusted. By December, the antiaircraft artillery units covering the construction of the airfield had arrived in the designated areas one after another, and the covering force for the railway transportation lines had been strengthened, so that the antiaircraft artillery units covering the railway transportation had reached 70 percent of the total strength of our army's antiaircraft artillery units in the DPRK (a total of 11 regiments and 11 battalions, and two antiaircraft machine gun battalions), of which two-thirds of the troops were deployed in the triangle area. In December alone, 38 enemy planes were shot down and 68 were damaged, which played a great role in protecting the safety of targets.
In mid-September 1951, the number of emergency repair forces on our railway lines reached more than 70,000. In the struggle for emergency repairs, in light of the bombing situation of enemy planes and our needs, we adopted the policy of focusing on emergency repairs, that is, concentrating the main forces to secure the triangle area and the three bridges over the Qingchuan River in the east and west and the Datong River in the east. The emergency repair units gave full play to their enthusiasm and creativity, such as erecting movable bridges (moving them away during the day and moving them back at night) and filling in large bomb craters with the method of sleeping on sleepers, which not only saved the number of troops and time for emergency repairs, but also confused enemy planes, reduced the losses of bridges, and improved transportation efficiency. By the end of December, all railways in the triangle had been reopened.
In the area of railway transport, the intensive "one-sided continuation of trains" (i.e., on one or several sections, two or more trains take a certain interval and run continuously in the same direction without opening apart), and on the blocked sections of trains, the method of reversing long sections by car has been adopted. In order to solve the problem of insufficient transportation capacity, the various armies of the Volunteer Army were also mobilized to send a certain number of troops to rush to transport winter clothes.
In December 1951, the Forward Railway Transport Command (referred to as the "Forward Transport Division") was set up with Liu Juying as commander and political commissar, and under the leadership of the Combined Transport Department, it was responsible for the unified command of air defense, emergency repair, and rush transportation work on the railway transportation lines in the DPRK, thus strengthening the leadership of the anti-"tattoo warfare" operations on the railway lines.
With the assistance of the Korean people, the seven engineer regiments and the armies and the units directly under the corps that had been resting on the second line and the units directly under the corps were, with the assistance of the Korean people, have generally strengthened and widened 2,158 kilometers of highways and opened 292 kilometers of new highways, thus greatly improving the situation of China's road transportation.
As a result of the active struggle of our air force and antiaircraft artillery against enemy planes, the careful and proper command of the organization of the emergency repair and transportation of the railway, and the heroic struggle of all the railway staff and commanders and fighters, by the middle of October, the situation of our railway transportation had improved for a time, and it had won more than half a month in a row to open to traffic, and in the seven days from 16 to 22 October, the materials that passed through the east and west Qingchuan River Bridge reached 1,947 carriages, of which 490 carriages passed through the West Qingchuan River Bridge on the night of 21 October. It has set a record for the highest number of people since the beginning of the dynasty. To this end, I railway employees, railway troops. , aviation units, and anti-aircraft artillery units were commended by the Military Commission and the Volunteer Army Command.
In late October 1951, the bombing blockade by enemy planes intensified, and railway transportation in our triangle was once again suspended. Shiji immediately ordered Shihou to quickly adjust his deployment and redeploy his forces, and by December, he had finally completely broken the blockade of the hostile triangle. According to incomplete statistics, at this stage, more than 15,400 wagons of war materials were rushed through the blockade area by our railways. At the same time, China's road transportation has also been greatly improved, and the capacity of automobile transportation has increased by more than 75%. As a result, the situation of our army has been gradually improved, the basic needs of our army have been ensured, and all front-line armies have begun to have food and ammunition reserves.
The third stage of our army's anti-"strangulation war". From January to June 1952.
This phase was characterized by a duration of up to half a year, with even more serious damage to hostile railway lines.
By the end of 1951, the enemy had carried out a "strangulation war", which had exceeded its original planned time by one month (the enemy's original time was three months), but it did not achieve its intended purpose. Lee Qiwei, commander-in-chief of the "Joint Forces" invading Korea and the United States, also admitted that the air blockade campaign he carried out "did not prevent the enemy from transporting supplies needed for the defense of his position, nor did he stop the enemy from transporting troops to North Korea." However, he believed that "if the air blockade of lines of communication is suspended, or the scale of such activities is reduced, the enemy will be able to accumulate sufficient supplies in a relatively short period of time to be able to launch a sustained, large-scale offensive." Therefore, Li Qiwei was unwilling to stop there, and in order to prevent me from launching an offensive, in 1951In late December, it was decided to continue the "strangulation war" against us, declaring that it would continue until "a tactical posture or a ceasefire agreement allows us to (.]).Note: refers to the enemy) when the change must be made". (All of the above are quoted from the U.S. Air Force in the Korean War, Volume 2).
In order to achieve the goal of "strangling" our volunteers from the air, the "Joint **" General Command headed by the US military is determined to strengthen and strengthen the strength of the air force. At the end of 1951, the enemy transferred from Japan to Korea an additional squadron of F-84 fighter-bombers (25 aircraft) and modified new F-86 fighter-interceptors, increasing to 150 units. At the same time, a group of pilots with combat experience who participated in the Second World War was replenished.
In the first three months of 1952, in order to avoid our army's ever-increasing anti-aircraft artillery fire, the enemy's air force was forced to abandon the day and night bombing and destruction of the triangle area, and instead adopted the tactic of mobile and focused surprise bombing at both ends of our railway line, that is, blocking the way to and from our combat materials, and carried out even more frenzied bombing and sabotage on our railway transportation line. January 1952 was the worst month for railways since our army entered the DPRK, with 136 bridges damaged and 2,202 lines and stations damaged.
After March 1952, the enemy adopted the so-called "saturation bombing" tactic in the triangle, that is, 24 hours a day, around the clock, concentrating all aircraft that could be used to carry out the task of blockading the railway line, and attacking several key sections of the railway line. At this stage, our railways were destroyed by the enemy.
The sum of the first and second phases increased by 42 6 %。o
The headquarters of our Volunteer Army and the headquarters of the Zhihou Army took corresponding countermeasures in a timely manner according to the changes in the bombing and sabotage tactics of enemy aircraft
In terms of air operations, our fighter air units continue to adopt the method of rotating operations, often keeping three divisions in the front line to conduct air operations with the enemy's air forces, while the antiaircraft artillery units have changed to adopt the operational principle of "focusing on defense and highly mobile," with divisions as units and attached to a number of independent regiments and battalions, and divided into three operational zones, using medium and antiaircraft artillery to defend bridges, stations, and other key targets, and using small antiaircraft artillery to carry out mobile combat missions. From March to May, two additional companies of searchlights and three companies of radar troops were transferred from China to the DPRK to coordinate with the aviation and antiaircraft artillery units.
With regard to the rush repair of railways, our army has adopted the principle of "centralizing for concentrating and maneuvering for maneuvering." That is, under the principle of ensuring that the triangle area and the Qingchuan River Bridge are opened to traffic, the enemy planes should bomb the key areas, appropriately allocate a relatively large number of troops, and quickly rush to repair them; In other areas, depending on the degree of damage caused by enemy planes, temporary mobile forces will be used for emergency repairs. In order to deal with the bombing of China's railway bridges and important areas by enemy planes, we have also built a large relocation line and a simple temporary line and temporary bridge to ensure the smooth opening of traffic.
In the area of railway transportation, in view of the fact that enemy planes mostly carry out night bombing between 22 and 24 o'clock every night during the bright and bright months of the month, we have adopted such methods as taking advantage of the monthly deficit period to concentrate on surprise transportation, "rushing to 22 o'clock," and "circulating transportation of empty and heavy vehicles."
On the highway routes, we will continue to widen and strengthen the existing highways and construct new highways, and set up additional surface or underwater ('insert markers') temporary bridges at the crossings of major rivers, set up additional shelters for cars along the highways, set up anti-air surveillance posts (on 32 large and small transport lines) with the 18th Public Security Division (later rotated to the 1st Public Security Division), and set up a total of 1,308 teams on the 2,500-kilometer main trunk lines to ensure the smooth flow of road transportation and reduce vehicle losses.
In the course of the third phase of the anti-"strangulation war" operation, our army actively struggled against enemy planes as a result of the above-mentioned effective measures, and won a great victory. The number of railway lines opened to traffic per night reached 68Between 9 and 96 percent, the road transport capacity has increased by 70 percent, and in May, the six-month transportation task was exceeded, and the task of supporting the transportation of materials and relief food to the Korean people was completed ahead of schedule. It has effectively guaranteed the military and civilian needs of our volunteers and the DPRK.
The enemy in the third stage of the "strangulation battle", there is one more peculiarity. That is, while the enemy is concentrating on bombing both ends of our railway line, he is constantly carrying out devastating bombing of our important military station bases. For example, on 8 May 1952, the enemy flew 485 sorties and continued to bomb the warehouse area of Nantingli, north of Sui'an, for 13 hours, dropping more than 2,000 bombs of various kinds, which was the largest bombing of our warehouse area by enemy planes. In the struggle against enemy planes, on the one hand, our military station base organized and directed antiaircraft artillery units to actively attack enemy planes, and at the same time, it also adopted such measures as rushing to unload and load, evacuate and transfer in a timely manner, strengthen camouflage, and vigorously build tunnels and warehouses, thus effectively protecting the safety of combat materials and dealing a serious blow to enemy planes. On that day (8 May), the 24th Battalion of Antiaircraft Artillery set an excellent record of shooting down 7 enemy planes and damaging 18 in one day in the anti-aircraft operation in Nantingli, and won the general order commendation from the Volunteer Army Headquarters.
In the third stage of the anti-"strangulation war" of our army, our anti-aircraft artillery fought a total of 3,277 times, shot down 198 enemy planes, and damaged 779; Our air force flew a total of 2,588 sorties, shot down and damaged 148 enemy planes, and dealt a heavy blow to the enemy's air force. As a result, the enemy's fighter-bomber strength has been reduced to the lowest point (the enemy's planes in two groups have dropped by almost 50 percent), and they are no longer able to carry out "saturation bombing" at both ends of our railway at the same time, but can only bomb one end on the north bank of the Qingchuan River.
In late June 1952, the enemy forces were forced to abandon the "strangulation war" and shifted the focus of their bombing to power stations, factories, mines, important towns, and targets 80 kilometers deep in the front of our defense.
According to the changes in the enemy situation, our army adjusted its deployment. The focus of the air struggle against the enemy has gradually shifted to the frontal front, and a part of the antiaircraft artillery has been transferred to the front line, and since our air force can only fly to the Qingchuan River area, in order to cover the smooth flow of our ground communication lines, it has strengthened its air operations against the enemy north of the Qingchuan River and seized most of the air supremacy during the day.
In the struggle against the "strangulation war" of our army, the air force, antiaircraft artillery, railway troops, railway engineering troops, engineering troops, and various service units in the rear, as well as various military units resting in the rear, waged an extremely tenacious struggle against the enemy with incomparable bravery and wisdom, made tremendous contributions, and many heroic and exemplary figures emerged who could sing and weep. According to incomplete statistics, there were more than 2,300 antiaircraft artillery and railway rush transportation and repair troops, and more than 80 planes, 30 antiaircraft guns, 502 locomotives and 4,550 vehicles were bombed.
The aerial "strangulation battle" of our volunteers to counterattack the enemy lasted for 10 months from September 1951 to June 1952. After a long and extremely severe and dangerous contest with the enemy, the enemy's "strangulation battle" was finally completely crushed by our army.
On May 31, 1952, Van Vliet, commander of the 8th Army of the U.S. invasion of Korea, admitted at a press conference in Seoul: "Although the air force and navy of the coalition forces tried every force to stop the Communist Party, the Communist Party still sent supplies to the front line with incredible tenacity and perseverance, creating an amazing miracle." After the war, the U.S. Air Force's official book, "The U.S. Air Force in the Korean War," also admitted, "The total air blockade of the railway line, which lasted ten months, did not frustrate the railway line to the point of forcing it to accept the terms of the armistice on the joint side." This fully shows that the enemy's "strangulation warfare" in the air has been completely defeated. In the 10-month anti-"strangulation war," our army built a "steel transportation line that cannot be broken and bombed continuously," gradually achieved the goal of ensuring the adequate supply of our volunteers' combat materials, and has won a major strategic victory.
The reason why it is said that our army's victory in the anti-"tattoo killing war" is strategic. What about a major victory? The truth is obvious. As you can see, because our army has won a victory in the anti-"strangulation war" in the rear, it has provided material support for the troops of our front line to defend their positions. In this way, our front-line troops will be able to continuously consolidate their positional defense operations and hold on to the frontal defense for more than two years. Only then can our army have the strength to defeat the enemy, and at the beginning of the defense, constantly launch continuous attacks on our defensive positions, and remain immobile; Only then will our army be able to rely on defensive positions to launch a counterattack operation in front of the enemy's defensive positions from small to large, thus seizing the initiative in the war from strategic defense. I will give two examples to fully illustrate the strategic significance of our army's victory against the "strangulation war", for example: our army is in Shangganling 3On the one hand, the correct command of the heads of the military history department and commanders at all levels, and the heroic and good fighting of the commanders and fighters on the two hills of 7 square kilometersOn the other hand, with a steady stream of logistical support, we can hold on for a long time and achieve victory. For example, a very important reason why our army won a great victory in the Jincheng offensive and counterattack campaign launched at the end was that the support of all kinds of materials in our rear was already very sufficient, and all kinds of materials transported to the front line not only fully guaranteed the victory of our army's Jincheng counterattack campaign, but also ensured that our army would fight one or two more large-scale offensive campaigns of large corps. The enemy was forced to demand from our side that the Korean armistice agreement was signed.