Tongdao Think Tank 2024-02-07 11:29 Shanxi
According to the Sandbox Network on February 6, Stull Teddy, head of research in the field of defense and security at RAND Europe, said that the United States decided last week to conditionally approve the delivery of F-16 aircraft and upgrade kits to Turkey. The decision of the United States to act so openly seems to put an end to the latest sorties of Eurofighter jets. Turkey sees the F-16 as a viable and attractive alternative amid continued restrictions on sales of the upgraded version of the F-16, but the U.S. decision appears to put an end to its consideration of the Typhoon fighter.
If the plan withstands congressional scrutiny, Turkey will join India, South Korea, Finland, the United Arab Emirates and Switzerland in the list of countries that refuse to acquire the Quad Collaborative Platform, which is jointly exported by the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy and Spain. The development of the Typhoon fighter is the result of complex work-sharing collaboration, and the distribution of industrial and economic benefits is roughly in line with the order commitments made when the platform was first developed. The United Kingdom (33% share) and Germany (33% share) benefited or lost the most from the success of the typhoon.
For some countries, including the UK, the continued commercial success of the Typhoon fighter jets is a driving factor in maintaining a strong defense industrial base.
BAE, as the national integrator of the British Typhoon fighter jets, benefits most clearly when the Typhoon succeeds in the export market. At the same time, typical sales also bring engines, radars, electronics and potential **, which could benefit many of the UK's major defence businesses, including Rolls-Royce, Leonardo and MBDA.
Just last year, after a series of disappointing business setbacks mentioned above, the prospects for the Typhoon fighter in the export market looked promising. Turkey appears to be openly showing a genuine interest in the platform, while Saudi Arabia, Britain's chosen defense export partner, is preparing to replace its aging Tornado fleet. The market suggestion is that the Typhoon could soon benefit from orders for as many as 100 or more replacement aircraft, not to mention sustaining revenue after aftermarket use. It's no secret that defense exports are intrinsically linked to changing foreign policy priorities, and as a result, are fickle. They can be a challenging policy tool for the long-term development and maintenance of the industrial base.
Last week it was announced that the United States is now supporting Turkey's new and upgraded F-16, which will cause varying degrees of disappointment at the Eurofighter Agency, as well as in capitals. Due to the variety of export control methods and the extremely complex institutional framework, not to mention the changing importance of the success of the Typhoon fighter in the export markets of its core partner countries, the Turkish campaign of the Typhoon seems to be over before it really begins. ** Hinting that Saudi Arabia may consider splitting orders for Tornado replacement aircraft with the UK and France, the order channel for the Typhoon fighter jets quickly went from being in poor condition to being problematic.
In short, while Britain will reap industrial benefits from the commercial success of the Typhoon, it will not have influence over potential sales, given its cooperative nature. This can be especially problematic for the UK. While the UK's Tempest and Future Combat Air Systems (FCAS) partnerships are established and operational, laying the groundwork for next-generation platforms and technologies, and providing commercial assurance to key players in the industrial base, the focus of this "start-up pump" is aimed at engineers who are in the development phase of the product lifecycle. Equally important is the UK's ability to signal similar demand to properly sustain a skilled role in defence manufacturing, thereby closing the gap until FCAS technology enters production (possibly beyond 2030).
Strategically, then, the UK may consider the critical role that export capabilities play in sustaining the capabilities and skills of its next-generation platforms; When foreign policy priorities overlap, cooperation in defense procurement, while logical, presents an inevitable challenge to what extent. Perhaps the decision point is closer than it seems, and the UK still has the relevant levers to influence design and industrial integration, and can still pre-set the guidelines and rules of the game for export engagement with partners.
February** Dynamic Incentive Program