With the development of China, how serious is the China anxiety in Southeast Asia

Billahari Costain, a veteran diplomat in Singapore, once said that small countries destined to be on the periphery of a large country with geographical conditions have a certain degree of anxiety at all times, and this kind of geopolitical anxiety is very common in international relations.

For example, Singapore's most immediate source of anxiety is Malaysia, Malaysia is worried about Indonesia, and Indonesia is worried about Australia's influence.

For Southeast Asia as a whole, the main targets of geopolitical anxiety are China, the United States, and to a certain extent, India.

Just as humans are afraid of beasts, not because they have the idea of killing, but because they have the ability to kill, for Southeast Asian countries, the strength of foreign powers is enough to constitute a reason for anxiety. This anxiety is not diverted by the international situation, ideology, the nature of the regime, foreign policy.

From ancient times to the present, the Chinese anxiety of Southeast Asian regimes, large and small, has caused the consequence that they need to rely on their comparative advantages in space and information to play games with China and seek to maximize their own interests.

At the same time, we have to maintain cooperation with China and find ways to use China's influence. The result of this asymmetrical game is a seemingly erratic style.

For China, the China anxieties of the Southeast Asian regime cannot be evaluated simply in terms of good or bad things. It is an objective factor, and small countries in the international political ecology are anxious about big countries, just as peppers in natural ecology evolved capsaicin. A normal understanding of the mechanism by which "China anxiety" arises is a prerequisite for adapting to it, using it, and even cracking it.

In the history of Southeast Asia in the broad sense, the name of the first famous Chinese anxiety patient was Yelangguo. Thanks to the idiom "Yelang is arrogant", Yelang has the fortune to become one of the most famous southwest frontier regimes in Chinese history, and its popularity is comparable to that of Nanzhao and Dali, far better than the contemporaries of the Dian Kingdom (Kunming) and later the Ming and Qing Dynasties. But are the Yoro people really as ignorant as the legend in the "Yoro Arrogance" story? This is not the case.

Yelang is arrogant" This allusion comes from "Historical Records: The Biography of Southwest Yilie". The original text is the words of the King of Dian and the Han envoy:

Who is older than me? And the same is true of Yelanghou. The road is not passable, so they think that they are the lord of a state, and they don't know the vast Han Dynasty.

In this regard, the "Historical Records" has also made a detailed record. In the 6th year of the founding of Emperor Wu of the Han Dynasty before the "Yelang arrogance" incident, Yelang Guojun Duotong had promised the Han Dynasty to "make an appointment with the envoys and make his son an order." That is, to accept the fetters and rule of the Han Dynasty. If Yelang really didn't know anything about the strength of the Han Dynasty, then it was unlikely that he would accept the Han Dynasty, even if it was nominally ruled.

In fact, the background of Yelang people saying that "Han is big with me" is that Yelang refused to cooperate with the Han Dynasty to deal with his ** partner, Nanyue. After the fall of the Nanyue Kingdom, Yelang soon fled into the Han Dynasty. However, from the standpoint of the Han Dynasty, Yelang's actions were a kind of big ups and downs, swaying from side to side, but from Yelang's point of view, these actions were driven by objective reality and rational judgment.

Yelang was not unaware of the strength of the Han Dynasty, but he also understood that due to geographical barriers and information asymmetry, it was difficult for the Han Dynasty to mobilize forces against him. Military operations require a lot of resources, which means that the gains outweigh the losses; But it also causes the people to have to pay for foreign wars that are thousands of miles away and cannot be fought with eight poles. Moreover, due to the geographical conditions of ancient times, the efficiency of resource and information circulation was low, and the manpower and material resources consumed by a frontier war were often innumerable.

For example, in the battle of Jinchuan during the Qianlong period of the Qing Dynasty, in order to deal with a few Tusi, the Qing court consumed hundreds of millions of taels**, which was equivalent to more than two years of financial revenue at that time. If it weren't for the abundance of wealth during the Qianlong period, this kind of war would not have been fought.

It is on the basis of a clear understanding of this asymmetry that the large and small powers in southwestern China have adopted a highly flexible strategy of interaction with the Central Plains Dynasty, from extremely deferential to frontal, but more hypocritical in between.

The point is, this is a game full of uncertainty. The southwestern regime is well aware of the strength of the Central Plains, but it is not sure how much strength the Central Plains is willing and can use against itself. Nong Zhigao of the Song Dynasty, Yang Yinglong of the Ming Dynasty, and Lu Chuan Tusi, when they launched a rebellion, none of them wanted to enter the Central Plains.

Their goal is to expand their sphere of influence and to be recognized. Although they ultimately failed, it is not uncommon for the Southwestern regime to succeed in Zhao'an. In fact, Nong Zhigao, Yang Yinglong, and Luchuan Tusi also had the opportunity to stop in time and achieve Zhao'an.

The essence of anxiety is the uncertainty in the game, and the uncertainty is how much resources the Central Plains Dynasty is willing and able to take out to deal with itself. Therefore, the stronger the Central Plains Dynasty relative to itself, the greater the uncertainty range. This uncertainty eventually translated into "China anxiety" in the southwestern frontier and even in Southeast Asia.

So the essence of Yoro's arrogance is not ignorance, but knowing too much. It's just that the country of Yelang is asking too high in a game that plays with asymmetry. Unfortunately, after losing the gamble, it becomes the so-called "arrogance".

In 1428 AD, Emperor Xuande of the Ming Dynasty received a letter from Vietnam. Not long ago, the Annam Rebel Army under Le Li defeated the Ming army that occupied Annam, and this statement from Vietnam Jinfeng said that the reason for the collapse of the Ming Dynasty army was that they were frightened after seeing the elephant, and *** happened, so many people died. Annan prayed for forgiveness of sins and the re-establishment of tributary relations.

Emperor Xuande could certainly see the hypocrisy of this statement, but in response to the financial crisis that had gradually emerged since the end of the Yongle period, the Ming monarchs believed that the time had come to end the war and that 20 years of Chinese rule in Vietnam would come to an end.

After showing his loyalty to the Ming Dynasty, Li Li turned his head and issued a "Ping Wu Dahu", declaring that since "Zhao Ding Li Chen Zhizhao created our country and the Han, Tang, Song and Yuan dynasties, and each emperor was on one side." The article refers to Emperor Xuande as a "cunning boy", that is, a treacherous little child.

The article also vividly describes the crushing defeat of the Ming Dynasty army. The arrogant style in "Ping Wu Dahe" is based on the victory of the game. Of course, the power of the Ming Dynasty is still far stronger than that of Annan, but the Ming Dynasty has no choice but to come up with enough resources to deal with Annan.

This means Annan's victory. If the Vietnamese lose the game, "Binh Ngo Dahe" is just another version of "Yelang arrogance". But since the victory has been won, it is not too much to say too much.

However, no amount of ornate language in the evaluation of "Ping Wu Dahu" cannot hide the persistent Chinese anxieties of the Vietnamese. The asymmetrical game is still ongoing, and China's proximity and strong presence is still an indelible fact. The ancient Southeast Asian countries represented by Annan, like the large and small regimes in southwest China, generally adopted the vacillating Yelang model, exploring the boundaries of China's capabilities in a protracted game of asymmetry.

In the 15th century, the Sultanate of Malacca enlisted the support of the Ming Dynasty and became the largest maritime power in Southeast Asia. But this does not prevent the Malays from saying in the "Malay Chronicle" that the Ming emperor, who received the worship of the Malay Sultan, contracted a strange disease and had to drink the Sultan's footwashing water to **. Siam traditionally valued its relations with China and was one of the best countries in Southeast Asia with the Ming and Qing dynasties, but it also always expanded in the direction of Malaya despite Chinese warnings.

After the establishment of the Bangkok Dynasty, the Keri Dynasty lied that it was a descendant of the previous King Zheng Xin, and the Qing Dynasty opened its eyes to recognize it. I do one thing in front of me and one thing behind my back, you know I know one thing in front of me and one behind my back, I know you know you know I know I know, you know I know, you know you know, you know you know. In ancient times, there was a tacit balance between Southeast Asian countries and China.

This state of affairs is precisely the result of a game of geopolitical asymmetry. The Mongol Yuan dynasty, which came to power in the 13th century, tried to upset this balance by unwittingly demanding that Southeast Asian countries accept officials sent by the Yuan dynasty, in an attempt to turn the nominal suzerain-vassal relationship into de facto rule. For this kind of tacit understanding, Annan, Java, Myanmar and other countries have expressed their rejection.

The Javanese Xinghasari dynasty tattooed and humiliated the faces of the Yuan Dynasty envoys, and the Burmese simply killed the Yuan Dynasty envoys and prisoners of war, and even called the Mongols "Tatars". This kind of behavior that seems to be arrogant is actually a showdown that will inevitably occur after the rules of the unequal game are broken. The result?

Annam and Java, by virtue of their home advantage, repelled the powerful Yuan Dynasty army, and only Burma was defeated and lost the bet. But soon after, the Yuan dynasty was forced to abandon Burma. After all, for China at that time, Yunnan was an undigested land.

During the Ming and Qing dynasties, the asymmetrical game between Myanmar and China continued. In the 18th century Qing-Burma War, the Burmese Gongbang Dynasty single-handedly fought against the armies of China and the five southwestern provinces, and there was a draw. The "China anxiety" of Southeast Asian countries also applies to the colonial regimes established by the Europeans.

Out of fear of the growing Chinese population, anti-Chinese events occurred in Spanish Manila in the 17th century. However, the Philippine colony could not function without Chinese merchants. So the Spanish colonists soon opened their arms to the Chinese.

In the mid-17th century, when they heard that Zheng Chenggong of Taiwan was planning to invade the Philippines, the Spaniards were terrified to death. A local separatist power in China was already a great threat to the colonial regimes in Southeast Asia. In 1940, the Dutch East Indies had a Chinese "Red Stream", and the Dutch also fell into a serious "China anxiety".

Later, I learned that the Qing Dynasty's attitude towards this incident was: "Overseas Chinese are self-defeating and kingly, and the blame is to blame." "The Dutch are relieved. This pattern of "China anxiety" and "Yelang" runs through the history of Southeast Asia for hundreds of years.

In the long-term game of asymmetry, in order to strive for and defend its own best interests, the Southeast Asian regime has no choice but to remain suspicious and tentative, oscillating between obedience and arrogance. This anxiety about how small countries get along with big ones is ubiquitous in geopolitics around the world. After the rise of nationalism, geopolitical anxiety evolved into a more intense form.

In the 10s of the 20th century, King Rama VI, known as the father of Thai nationalism, decided to go to war against the Chinese blood that flowed in his veins. Fearing the impact of the Xinhai Revolution and spreading to Bangkok through the Chinese, King Rama VI ordered that the Chinese should be banned from entering the ** department and that Chinese education would be restricted. The first half of the 20th century was a historic low point in China's international influence.

But for Southeast Asian countries, due to the strong influence of the Chinese revolution and the presence of a large number of Chinese immigrants, "China anxiety" is still persistent. In British Malaya, Thailand, and Burma in the second half of the 20th century, fears that the specter of revolution had become uncontrollable as the radio waves of China Radio International spread all the way. It was not until the end of the 70s, when China promised to turn off broadcasting, that these countries were reassured.

But at about the same time, Vietnam's provocations and temptations against China were met with a resolute and forceful response. The story of "Yelang's arrogance" has been staged again in Vietnam, which claims to be the third military power in the world. So, is this asymmetrical game of geopolitical anxiety a fact that is completely uncrackable?

Not necessarily. The Industrial Revolution transformed the human world in a seismic way. Economic historians refer to the ancient world as the "Malthus-Rigato world", and the most important feature of this world is that there is no sustainable exponential growth.

All growth will be constrained by land use, and the population will be balanced in quantity. So the ancient world was necessarily a zero-sum game.

The Industrial Revolution broke the Malthusian curse.

The game between people and countries still exists, but the world is no longer a state of no-growth where you eat one more bite and I have to go hungry. The game is more about competing for increments than about carving up stocks. This means that there may be a new direction to solve the asymmetric game.

China in the 21st century sends a powerful signal to its partners in Southeast Asia: the endless zero-sum game between ancient countries over land, manpower, and commercial monopolies is a thing of the past. Although the asymmetrical game still exists, this kind of game no longer points to poaching and harming each other, but how to jointly create and reasonably distribute new wealth.

This is the fundamental difference between modern and ancient international relations.

Twenty years after the Industrial Revolution, the center of gravity of the world economy is shifting from the North Atlantic back to Asia. In the face of historical opportunities, China and ASEAN countries are exploring a new mode of interaction that goes beyond all the old systems, such as the Westphalian system and the tributary system. The dragon has been freed from the shackles of clouds and mist, whether it is the conceit of the Han Dynasty or the arrogance of Yelang, it will be swept away by the tail-wiggling Shennong with the end of the zero-sum game.

Happy New Year to everyone!

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