Editor-in-Chief: Cui Xiaohan Chief Writer: Xu Yan Adviser: Mao Xinyu From April 22 to June 10, 1951, the Chinese People's Volunteers and the Korean People's Army jointly held the fifth campaign. In this battle, the two sides invested more than 1 million troops and fought fierce offensive and defensive battles against each other. Why did the Volunteers launch this largest offensive after entering Korea at that time? In April 1951, the "United **" again reached the 38th parallel, and the Chinese and North Korean armies launched the first battle in advance under the condition that the preparations were not sufficient, and the campaign became the fifth campaign of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea. In both phases of the offensive, the Volunteer Army achieved certain victories, but failed to achieve the predetermined strategic intentions well, and suffered setbacks at the end. Through this campaign, the Chinese Volunteers gained the most important lessons since they entered the Korean War, and finally gained a relatively comprehensive understanding of the prospects of the Korean War and the characteristics of modern warfare. 
During the Fourth Campaign, the Military Commission and the Commanders of the Volunteer Army were already preparing for a large-scale campaign counterattack to reverse the passive situation at that time. On 6 April, the headquarters of the Chinese People's Volunteers held an enlarged meeting of the party committee in Shangganling Village, near Jinhua, to study the campaign plan. **Explanation: "We are now forced to retreat, and in the next battle, we will destroy several enemy divisions according to the instructions of ***, smash its landing plan, and regain the initiative on the battlefield." "
In view of the lesson of the "lack of success" of the volunteer army during the Fourth Campaign, especially the lack of troops, the ** Military Commission mobilized troops to the DPRK to the maximum extent that the logistics could guarantee at that time. From mid-February to early April, the 3rd and 19th Corps, the 47th Corps, and a large number of newly formed special forces entered the DPRK one after another, and all the 120,000 additional troops (most of them experienced veterans) from the domestic troops arrived, and the Korean People's Army was also reorganized and expanded. In April, the strength of the Chinese and North Korean armies in the Korean battlefield reached 1.3 million, including 950,000 volunteers (770,000 combat troops and 180,000 logistics support troops). In April, there were 15 Chinese troops entering the DPRK, and 11 armies on the first line totaled 5480,000 people. Together with the three legions of the first line of the People's Army, the total strength of the front-line combat force has reached nearly 700,000. At that time, the total number of enemy ground combat troops in Korea was 340,000. Seeing that his own troops were unprecedentedly strong and had a great numerical advantage over the enemy, the commander of the Volunteer Army placed high hopes on the campaign, and planned to annihilate five enemy divisions (including three US divisions) in the first phase of the offensive and advance to the 37th parallel. In view of the haste in the preparations of the new army entering the DPRK, ** had suggested to the ** Military Commission that the campaign be postponed to early May. However, since the 16th Army, which had recently been formed by the US forces in Japan, had landed on the coast of North Korea, in order to avoid fighting on two fronts at the same time, it was decided to first defeat the frontal enemy and then attack the landing enemy. On the evening of April 22, 14 armies of the Chinese and North Korean armies (including 3 corps of the People's Army) began to attack simultaneously along a front more than 200 kilometers wide. In accordance with the predetermined operational principle of combining frontal assault with tactical division and encirclement, the troops adopted the method of multi-pincer combined strikes and interspersed forwards. The 9th Corps and the 39th Army first routed the 6th Division of the South Korean (ROK) Army and one of the 24th US Divisions on the front**, dividing the enemy's front into two parts. Taking advantage of the victory, the Chinese and North Korean armies on the eastern and western fronts attacked the retreating enemy, advancing 70 to 80 kilometers on the entire front in the first phase of the offensive, which lasted seven days. 
On April 29, the 19th Corps reached the northern outskirts of Seoul, and the 3rd and 9th Corps and the Eastern Front of the KPA also advanced to the south of the 38th Parallel. However, the U.S. military no longer abandoned Seoul and pushed most of its artillery onto the streets of Seoul to form a dense network of fire. At this time, the food and ammunition carried by the volunteers themselves were basically exhausted, and ** resolutely decided to stop the offensive and go to rest. Although there was a certain victory in the first stage, according to statistics, only 2 enemies were destroyedWith 30,000 men, it was not possible to destroy a single regiment of the enemy in an organized manner, and only formed a line of horizontal push.
After the end of the first offensive, the eastern front was defended by six divisions of the South Korean (ROK) Army, given that most of the American forces were concentrated on the Western Front. The Sino-Korean Joint Division decided to move the main forces to the Eastern Front. On the evening of May 16, a total of 13 armies of the Chinese and North Korean armies (including nine corps of the Chinese People's Volunteers and four corps of the People's Army) launched the second phase of the offensive. The 19th Corps on the Western Front made a feint attack on Seoul in order to attract the main American force. The 3rd Corps of the Central Front carried out a ** breakthrough and cut off the enemy's east-west front. The 9th Corps and the KPA Corps, which were the main attackers, began to divide and encircle the South Korean (ROK) Army on the Eastern Front. When the offensive began, the fragile South Korean (ROK) army quickly collapsed as a result of a breakthrough in the evening, a deep penetration at night, and a close encirclement before dawn, as well as the bravery of the attacking force. From May 16 to May 21, after three days of continuous offensive, the Chinese and North Korean armies generally advanced 50-60 kilometers on the eastern front, opening a large gap on the enemy front. However, after breaking through the enemy's depth, the troops had to stop for three days and wait for replenishment, and one division of the US army and one division of the South Korean (ROK) Army marched more than 100 kilometers in just a dozen hours, quickly plugging the gap. At this time, most of the armies on the front line of China and North Korea had run out of food, and the troops were very tired from walking long distances, so they could not develop a victory in the campaign. The head of the Volunteer Army decided that the spring offensive would end here, and the main force would be transferred to the north of the 38th parallel, and the counterattack would be repeated in the next battle. On 22 May, the Chinese and North Korean troops began to retreat northward, and many troops were paralyzed because they felt that they were the squad after the victory. At this time, US commander-in-chief Li Qiwei believed that the squadron had been attacking for five days and had basically run out of food and ammunition based on his calculation of the squadron's "shoulder logistics" capability, so he threw in seven divisions of the US army, which were waiting for work, as the main force, and together with a total of 13 divisions of the South Korean (ROK) army, to start a counterattack on all fronts. The enemy formed a "task force" with tank groups and motorized infantry, and under the cover of aircraft, quickly interspersed along the road to the depth of the Volunteer Army, and the follow-up troops followed up to carry out the encirclement. The 12th Army and the 27th Army of the Volunteer Army were each cut off by the enemy, and then bravely broke through to join up with the large army, and only the 180th Division suffered serious losses due to its own confusion due to poor leadership. After 27 May, the Chinese and North Korean armies deployed eight armies to block the attack on the entire front. At the same time, ** instructed to prepare for the establishment of three lines of defense in the rear, and to transfer the 20th Corps from the country into Korea, preparing to wait for the enemy to penetrate deep before launching a large-scale counterattack. At this time, the losses of the "United **" in the counterattack were also very serious. "Once again, the enemy traded space for time and was able to escape unharmed with a large number of his troops and supplies," Ridgway argued. "On June 10, the "United **" ordered the entire front to go on the defensive, and the fifth campaign ended here. 
The fifth battle lasted 50 days, and according to the statistics of the Chinese and North Korean sides, a total of 8 enemies were destroyed20,000 people, 850,000 (750,000 people). In the latter phase of the campaign, 20,000 men were missing when the troops retreated. After the battle, Song Shilun conveyed his opinion on the fifth campaign to the Party Committee of the Volunteer Army, believing that the campaign was fought "in a hurry", "bigger", and "farther away". By summing up the experience of the Fifth Campaign, the Central Military Commission and the General Headquarters of the Chinese People's Volunteers rethought the original strategic vision, campaign guidance methods, and tactical principles, thus effectively promoting the development of the next step of the modernization drive of the whole army.