The Supreme People's Court, the Supreme People's Procuratorate, the Ministry of Public Security, and the Ministry of Justice jointly issued the "Opinions on Handling Criminal Cases of Dangerous Driving While Intoxicated" (hereinafter referred to as the "Opinions"), which came into force today. The "Opinions" establish a conviction and sentencing model in which alcohol content and circumstances coexist, and clarify a variety of circumstances in which criminal responsibility may not be pursued and suspended sentences may not be applied, making the judicial handling of drunk driving cases more standardized, scientific, and relatively complex. This paper attempts to determine the conviction and sentencing standards for drunk driving cases in the form of **, hoping to serve as an accurate, concise and intuitive practical reference effect. 
Brief Interpretation:
1.This ** takes the drunk driver's admission of guilt and acceptance of punishment as the premise of conviction and sentencing;Where they do not admit guilt and accept punishment, they will basically not be held accountable or given a suspended sentence.
2.Alcohol content refers to the blood alcohol content, measured in milligrams of 100 milliliters, specifically divided into: more than 80, less than 150;More than 150, less than 180 (the range of this range is a bit too narrow);180 or more in three intervals.
3.The circumstances mentioned in the table are different from the "Opinions" in that they only refer to the three types of factual circumstances that have a substantial impact on whether to prosecute and apply a suspended sentence, namely, aggravating circumstances, heinous circumstances, and obviously minor circumstances other than alcohol content, and do not include the lenient circumstances provided for in Article 11. The reason is that leniency circumstances basically do not have a "qualitative" impact on whether or not the crime is prosecuted and whether a suspended sentence is applied, and only have a certain "quantity" of subordinate adjustment function, specifically: such cases are basically seized by the traffic police on the spot, there are few cases of voluntary surrender, and meritorious service is also very rare;Confession and admission of guilt and acceptance of punishment have little "qualitative" impact on whether to prosecute and apply suspended sentences;Compensation for losses or obtaining forgiveness after causing a traffic accident is actually the same as the applicable effect of Article 14 (2). Of course, if there is voluntary surrender and meritorious service, it should also be an important consideration in conviction and sentencing.
4.In specific application, compared with no circumstances, aggravating circumstances can be understood as "crime plus one degree" in each interval;Compared with no aggravating circumstances, it can be understood as "crime plus second degree" in each interval;Aggravating Circumstance Significantly minor circumstance, roughly equivalent to canceling each other out, without circumstance;Aggravating circumstance Obviously minor circumstance is roughly equivalent to only aggravating circumstance "crime plus one degree", and if the aggravating circumstance is exactly the same as the aggravating circumstance (the yellow part of the table), it is directly found to be an aggravating circumstance;Where there are both aggravating and heinous circumstances (including concurrently having minor circumstances), the basic sentence is to be given.
5.Not considering it a crime is first reflected in the fact that the public security organs do not file a case;The second is that the procuratorate does not prosecute. It can be seen that after the implementation of the Opinions, the public security and procuratorial organs have greater power to dispose of cases whether to prosecute and whether suspended sentences can be applied in the process of case filing and review for prosecution. A little puzzled and confused:
The aggravating circumstances in Article 10 and the aggravating circumstances in Article 14 of the Opinions are in essence aggravating circumstances, and it can be concluded through the comparison of specific provisions and the logical relationship between the provisions that the heinous circumstances are more serious than the aggravating circumstances. However, a comparison of the green part of Table 1 shows that the content of the two provisions is the same, but the time limit is different. Taking Article 10 (14) as an example, "a person who has been convicted of a crime or relatively non-prosecuted for dangerous driving within five years" and Article 14 (9) "has been convicted of a crime or made a relative non-prosecution for dangerous driving" in Article 14, for example, the interval between recidivism with aggravating circumstances can be longer, that is, the longer the interval between recidivism, the heavier the punishment. Such a provision makes people feel a bit inverted, and it seems more appropriate to exchange them, I don't know if it is the author's misunderstanding or the omission of the formulation of the "Opinions". Take the case as an example: For example, if the blood alcohol content of a drunk driver is 120, he has a dangerous driving record, and he has been 6 years. Where the interval between recidivism exceeds 5 years as provided for in Article 10(14), it may be found that the circumstances are obviously minor and the harm is not great, and responsibility is not pursued. However, according to Article 14(9), a previous dangerous driving record is an aggravating circumstance and generally cannot be suspended. So is the person not held accountable under Article 12, or is he sentenced to actual punishment under Article 14 (9)?This has undoubtedly created a kind of confusion in judicial practice. It is hoped that the highest judicial organ will pay attention to this and resolve it.