[Text: Observer Network columnist Hu Chunchun].
After more than half a year of marathon negotiations, on February 1, 2024, the summit of the leaders of the 27 countries of the European Union in Brussels made a difficult decision: the EU will provide Ukraine with 50 billion euros (about 54 billion US dollars) in aid within the next four years, that is, by 2027.
European Council President Charles Michel said on social media that Ukraine has access to "stable, long-term, and affordable funding", and this decision shows that the EU is a "leader role" in terms of aid to Ukraine and obligations, because "we understand what the real test is".
Ukraine** Zelensky also expressed his gratitude for the first time, saying that "the EU's continued economic support for Ukraine can enhance Ukraine's long-term economic and financial stability, which is as important as military support and sanctions against Russia." [1]
This is true, for Ukraine, which has run out of ammunition and food, this money is indeed too important. If you compare the 50 billion euros ($54 billion) in aid over four years with Ukraine's 2024 budget of about $43.4 billion, then the amount of aid promised by the EU is considerable. [2] Given Ukraine's high security and defense spending and fiscal deficit in the current situation, the EU's commitment provides strong support for the functioning of the Ukrainian state and society in the coming period.
Recall that the EU's aid plan was proposed on June 20 last year, during which it was met with fierce opposition from Hungary, and the negotiations were at an impasse. In this context, it is necessary to place it in a complex coordinate system to observe it in order to decipher the multiple pieces of information contained in it and give it corresponding meaning.
Orbán Balázs, an adviser to the Hungarian Prime Minister, recently gave an interview to the Austrian "Express", confirming that Hungary was threatened by the European Union on the issue of aiding Ukraine and suffered a "de facto political **" from the Austrian "Express".
Has the EU succeeded?
The reason why this decision is "difficult" is that the provision of assistance to Ukraine is a matter that should have been decided before the end of 2023, but it has been delayed until now due to the opposition of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban. Now the question is what caused Orban to change course after a month.
The first thing observers read is that the leaders of the EU and the member states have shown unprecedented solidarity, expressed a strong will to support Ukraine, and can no longer tolerate Hungary's use of every vote to obstruct the EU's collective decision.
Before the agreement on aid to Ukraine was reached, European Council President Charles Michel, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, and the heads of Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland and Belgium had a small exchange with Orban in advance, which allowed Orban to drop his objections. Moreover, the EU is said not to have unblocked its 2022 fiscal allocation to Hungary in exchange.
This is, of course, a positive and positive narrative, in line with the EU's efforts to portray itself as a geopolitical "global player". Mr. Orban later posted a comment on Facebook defending himself, saying that the European Union had pledged not to transfer the budget for Hungary to Ukraine, which had been Hungary's concern.
However, the news that followed from the parties and those in the know subverted the above interpretation.
The Italian prime minister's office called Meloni the "protagonist" in persuading Orban to change his mind, and as a "return" to Orban, Meloni opposed Hungary's deprivation of voting rights in the European Council because of the rule of law controversy. Orban also told Italy** that in response to Meloni's goodwill, Orban decided to join Meloni's right-wing parliamentary group, the European Conservatives and Reformers (ECR), after the European Parliament elections. [2]
In other words, Italian Prime Minister Meloni obtained Orban's concessions on the issue of aid to Ukraine on the condition that he would win over Orban in the European Parliament and let Orban gain a greater voice in the European right-wing forces.
So the question then becomes: what does Orban mean for the EU, and does the passage of the decision to aid Ukraine mean the EU's success?
Orban's role in the EU is determined not so much by his personal populist overtones as by the EU's structural weaknesses. Many compare Orban's role in the EU to Turkey's Erdogan's role within NATO, as both seem to be playing the role of "opponents" in the Western camp. But the two are actually "very different".
Erdogan agreed to NATO's demands as a quid pro quo for Turkey's national interests, such as Sweden's desire to join NATO, and other NATO members urgently need Sweden to join, then NATO must agree to Turkey's conditions, such as obtaining American F-16 fighter jets, in exchange for Turkey's approval.
But Hungary's Orban is an elusive mystery, and if one were to define his role, it would be the spokesman for the populist and communitarianist lines within the European Union, and Europe's "Trump sympathizer."
On February 1, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban attended an extraordinary EU summit. Picture from Xinhua News Agency.
On January 4, 2024, Gideon Rachman, chief foreign affairs commentator for the Financial Times in London, focused on Orban as the EU's "problem" in a conversation with Charles Grant, director of the Centre for European Reform, entitled "Europe's Future". [3]
According to Grant, Orban is a "huge problem" for the EU. Brussels had previously observed that Orban "always seemed to be a transactional politician, waiting to be sold" and that "if he wanted Orban to do something, he would give him money or some other favor."
But will Orban still make an offer now? Some people even speculate that "Orban actually wants to undermine the EU from within, create huge problems for everyone, and become a new, more powerful and more effective leader of the far right in the European Parliament elections, waiting for Trump to win the US ** election." Orban can then work with Trump and other similar EU countries** to become a transformative force within the EU".
Grant argues that this is a real problem. Therefore, Orban's role is also a structural weakness that the EU needs to overcome in the process of deep integration. Otherwise, what mechanism will prevent politicians such as Le Pen and Wilders from stalling the EU's political decision-making in an Orbán-style way in the future?
So the EU has not really succeeded in this sense. At this time, the EU's adoption of the resolution on aid to Ukraine is still an internal political compromise, rather than a mechanical manifestation of the common political will. As a result, observers' doubts about whether the EU can play the role of self-identified supporter and protector of Ukraine in the Russia-Ukraine conflict have not dissipated.
Will the America of the future still be the America of the past?
On the issue of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, time may not be on the side of the EU.
In the two years since the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, Ukraine has been able to play chess with Russia, in addition to its own will and military capabilities, the biggest contributing factor is military assistance from the United States. This is also the reason why some observers sniffed out the "** human war" in this conflict. According to statistics from the Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IFW) in Germany, the United States has provided 43.9 billion euros in military aid to Ukraine from January 24, 2022 to October 31, 2023, far more than any other Western country, including Germany. [4]
However, in the context of social polarization and fragmentation, and vicious competition between the Republican Party and the Democratic Party for 2024, the United States has already seen a phenomenon of exhaustion in aid to Ukraine, and many Americans have questioned: Why does the United States continue to support Ukraine when there are a lot of domestic problems? Why don't the Europeans take responsibility for supporting Ukraine themselves?
The United States **Biden is constrained by domestic politics and faces difficult repetitions in fulfilling his promises to Ukraine. On February 7, the U.S. Senate — especially Republican senators urged by Trump — voted down the Security Assistance Act, which includes $60 billion in aid to Ukraine. Although the Senate voted again on the 8th to discuss the bill, the fate of the bill in the House of Representatives is still uncertain, especially Trump's supporters have expressed clear opposition. [5]
On February 10, former U.S. Trump said at a campaign rally in South Carolina that he would "encourage" Russia to "do whatever it wants" NATO allies who have not fulfilled their financial obligations. * Screenshots.
Trump himself has no interest in supporting Ukraine and making enemies of Russia, and he has made no secret of his position. Just a day after Russia's Putin said in an interview with American right-wing journalist Tucker Calson that "the war can end in a few weeks",[6] Trump said in South Carolina's Republican nomination campaign that "we must solve this war, and I will solve this war" because supporting Ukraine has cost Americans "hundreds of billions of dollars". [7] Moreover, Trump said he had told the leader of a European NATO ally that the latter would no longer be protected by the United States if he did not meet the defense spending pledges of NATO members. [8]
Trump's remarks caused an uproar among EU allies. Will U.S. domestic developments be able to prevent Europeans' "trumpmare scenario" from becoming a reality in the coming months?
There is no doubt that the question of Ukraine, or whether the United States will continue to support Ukraine once Trump returns to the White House, is no longer just a matter of internal affairs of the United States, but has become a litmus test for the transatlantic relationship between Europe and the United States, the unity of the Western camp, and the future direction of Europe.
Can Germany become a leading force?
In fact, Germany has become the country that has provided the most assistance to Ukraine in Europe and the largest supplier of armaments within NATO after the United States. According to Germany** statistics, from February 24, 2022 to December 13, 2023, Germany's official assistance to Ukraine in the fields of refugees, military, infrastructure, reconstruction, finance, education and medical care reached 27.8 billion euros, of which 2 billion euros in military aid in 2022 and 5.4 billion euros in 2023, and also made a commitment of 10.5 billion euros for future military assistance. [9]
Nevertheless, Germany and the European Union are well aware that without US military and financial support, Ukraine has no chance of winning a military confrontation with Russia, and European countries will not even be able to fulfill their arms aid commitments to Ukraine.
To this end, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz flew to Washington to meet with Biden and members of Congress to demonstrate the strength of German-American unity and build momentum for the United States and Europe to continue to support Ukraine. Before leaving, Scholz posted an article in the US "Wall Street**" on February 7, saying that "we must do everything to prevent Russia from winning" because "if we do not act, we will soon face a world that is more unstable, more threatening and more unpredictable than the Cold War". [10] During his talks with Biden, Scholz called on the US Congress to pass an aid bill for Ukraine, and Biden also thanked Germany for its "leadership from the beginning" in aiding Ukraine. [11]
It has to be noted that the United States and Germany are currently facing a common dilemma - or at the same time, they are caught in two military conflicts that are inseparable from both international politics and their respective domestic politics: the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
In the United States, whether to continue to aid Ukraine and relations with Russia has become a topic of partisan contention between the Democratic Party and the Republican Party, while the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has exposed the "cultural struggle" between left-wing progressivists and right-wing conservative forces within American society. In Germany, although there is a social consensus in support of Ukraine, the fact that millions of Ukrainian refugees have entered Germany and enjoy much higher refugee treatment than those offered by other countries has also caused doubts and dissatisfaction among the people.
On February 9, local time, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz visited the United States and held talks with Biden of the United States. Picture from the Associated Press.
A German ** journalist once openly expressed the feelings of the German people on a talk show: What everyone doesn't understand is that although these Ukrainian refugees deserve sympathy, shouldn't they return to their own countries and fight to defend their country? Funding them is a must, of course, but shouldn't they have to pay for it?
At a time when the German economy is facing recession and social contradictions are emerging one after another, Germany's continued efforts to increase its assistance to Ukraine will push a considerable part of the population to populist and right-wing forces, and then develop into a topic with the potential to tear apart social consensus. The reason why the far-right Alternative for Germany (AFD) ranks second in German polls, and even in some federal states in eastern Germany, is likely to be a trigger for a constitutional crisis in this year's elections in the three eastern states, which is inseparable from the issue of refugees.
As for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, or Israel's fierce retaliation after the terrorist attack launched by Hamas on October 7, 2023, it has shaken the social consensus that Germany is the foundation of the state: because Germany has committed the worst Jewish crimes in history, it developed a reflective narrative of "Israel's existence is Germany's national will" after World War II, and then evolved from an "outcast" of international politics after World War II to a "normal country" and even a "model country" of so-called values. But how can Germany maintain the legitimacy and credibility of its narrative between history (unconditional support for Israel), principles (what Germany now calls "values diplomacy") and reality (especially the large number of women and children killed and injured as a result of Israeli military action)?
In the face of these challenges, which go far beyond political, economic, or social dimensions, whether Germany can take over the banner of Western leadership in the event of a US withdrawal is not a simple question that can be answered.
The future of 2024 is uncertain.
2024 is not destined to be a quiet year for the EU, the United States or Germany.
First of all, 2024 will usher in a number of important elections. Whether it is the election in the United States, which is enough to shape the political landscape of the world, or the European Parliament election with limited political significance, or the elections in the eastern federal states that the traditional mainstream parties in Germany are tired of coping, they will directly or indirectly affect the conflict between Russia and Ukraine from the political, economic and social levels. While the results of these elections are premature, one thing is clear: Europe will have to continue to ramp up its support for Ukraine in order to achieve the goal that "Russia cannot win". Otherwise, Europe will have to adjust its narrative and seek a political solution to the conflict.
Second, as the Russia-Ukraine conflict enters its third year, it has developed into a positional war, material war, and war of attrition similar to that in the late stage of World War I. Without the addition of new forces (such as the United States joining the Entente camp in the latter part of World War I), or the emergence of breakthrough military technologies (such as the view expressed by Zaluzhny, the recently dismissed former commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, in an interview with The Economist in 2023 after his defeat, or the collapse or withdrawal of a party to the conflict for internal reasons (as in the case of the Tsar in the latter part of World War I), it cannot be ruled out that the conflict will be "frozen" for a long time, and the current front line will become the de facto demarcation line of occupation.
This vision is tantamount to a strategic nightmare for Europe, because it means that Europe will have to devote considerable energy and resources to a military confrontation against Russia, and Europe will return to the "Cold War 2."0" era. However, this could be a colder "cold war" without the US nuclear umbrella, and the future facing Europe is bound to be more challenging and uncertain.
Notes: 1]Reuters, eu agrees 50 bln euro ukraine aid package - what are the reactions? 01.02.2024,
2]ministry of finance of ukraine, parliament of ukraine adopts state budget for 2024, 09.11.2023,
3]ansa, meloni, orban h**e more talks before eu summit, 01.02.2024, andrew rettman, meloni-orbán: the new eu 'power couple' but for how long? 02.02.2024,
4]transcript: the future of europe, gideon rachman talks to charles grant, director of the centre for european reform, 04.01.2024,
5]government support to ukraine: military aid, in: ch. trebesch et al., ukraine support tracker. a database of military, financial and humanitarian aid to ukraine,
6]patricia zengerle, richard cowan and makini brice, us senate advances $95 bln ukraine, israel aid bill after failed border deal, 09.02.2024,
7]nicolas camut/sergey goryashko, putin tells tucker carlson ukraine war can be “over in a few weeks” 09.02.2024,
8]stephanie lai/alicia diaz, trump says war in ukraine must end even as us aid advances, 11.02.2024,
9]erik wasson, trump’s nato remark sparks political storm in world capitals, 11.02.2024, a
10]presse- und informationsamt der bundesregierung, bilaterale unterstützungsleistungen der bundesregierung für die ukraine und menschen aus der ukraine, stand: 13.12.2023,
11]olaf scholz, a russian victory in ukraine would imperil us all, 07.02.2024,
12]the white house, remarks by president biden and chancellor olaf scholz of germany before bilateral meeting, 09.02.2024,
13]ukraine’s commander-in-chief on the breakthrough he needs to beat russia, 01.11.2023,