And**, two outstanding leaders of the party, they are closely united and work together. Their name, Zhu Mao, has been deeply imprinted on the land of China and has become a symbol of unity within the party.
However, it was against this background that on the eve of the Furuta Conference in 1929, there was a heated debate over different points of view. Despite this, the friendship and unity between them remained unwavering, and their story will always be remembered by future generations.
What is the reason for the controversy between **and ** and what is the final outcome? In late April 1928, ** led the remnants of the Nanchang Rebel Army and the Hunan Rebel Peasant Army to Ninggang City, and successfully joined forces with the Autumn Harvest Uprising led by *** to form the Fourth Army of the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army.
In June of the same year, according to the instructions of **, the unit was renamed the Fourth Army of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army.
When Zhu Mao joined forces, they merged the two armies and named them the "Fourth Army", so as to maintain the great name of the "Iron Army" of the Kuomintang Fourth Army. Serve as a military commander and become a political commissar.
Under the leadership of the Red Fourth Army, the armed forces in the revolutionary base areas were constantly strengthened, which aroused the vigilance of the Kuomintang authorities. In June 1928, the Kuomintang army launched a fierce attack on Ninggang, the center of the Jinggangshan base area, and the Red Fourth Army, under the command of **, Wang Erzhuo and others, defeated the enemy and occupied Yongxin.
This great battle was the first large-scale battle since the creation of the Red Fourth Army.
* The Gan army tried many times in a row and realized that it was difficult to defeat the opponent, so they made contact with the Hunan army and launched an attack on Jinggangshan from two directions. At this time, ** was planning to deploy the main force in the surrounding countryside of Yongxin, and at the same time mobilize the masses to fight with the enemy.
At this time, Du Xiujing, a representative of the Hunan Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China, came to Jinggangshan and asked *** to lead the troops to leave Jinggangshan and go to Zixing, Leiyang and other places in Hunan. Feeling very dissatisfied with Du Xiujing's blind command, ** immediately wrote to the Hunan Provincial Party Committee, making it clear that the Red Army was not suitable to go to Hunan at present.
However, what he didn't expect was that in July 1928, Du Xiujing took advantage of the homesickness of the soldiers of the Red 29th Regiment to guide them to Hunan. In order to prevent accidents, **and** had to follow with their troops.
Du Xiujing's behavior directly led to the almost total annihilation of the Red 29th Regiment, and the Kuomintang army took this opportunity to capture some county towns and plains in Jinggangshan, which was the famous "August Defeat".
In a desperate situation, Du Xiujing's good fortune allowed the 1st and 32nd regiments of the 31st Regiment and the 32nd Regiment left behind in Jinggangshan to successfully block the enemy's attack and force the enemy to retreat. This created conditions for the return of the main forces of the Red Army to the divisions.
In the following two months, the Vermilion Red Army won successive battles and stubbornly survived the enemy's "meeting and suppression" on all sides. This took the Kuomintang authorities, who thought they had "eliminated" the main forces of the Vermilion Red Army, by surprise.
In December 1928, after Teng Daiyuan led the Pingjiang Uprising troops to Jinggangshan, the Red Army was even more powerful than before. On January 1, 1929, He Jian, commander of the 35th Army of the Kuomintang, who had twice participated in organizing the "meeting and suppression" of the Jinggangshan revolutionary base area, was appointed by Chiang Kai-shek as the "commander-in-chief" and mobilized troops of 6 brigades and 18 regiments in Hunan and Jiangxi provinces to launch another "meeting and suppression" against Jinggangshan.
There are different views on how to deal with the enemy's attack, advocating the consolidation of Jinggangshan and attacking southern Gansu. However, ** put forward the strategy of "encircling Wei to save Zhao", that is, Teng Daiyuan, Yuan Wencai, Wang Zuo and others stayed in Jinggangshan, and ** led the 28th Regiment, the 31st Regiment and the army directly under the army to southern Gannan to remove the threat to Jinggangshan.
This tactic was eventually adopted by the Red Fourth Army. On January 14, 1929, ** and ** led more than 3,600 people of the main force of the Red Fourth Army to leave Jinggangshan and march to Dayu County.
Although the enemy did not deploy troops in Dayu County, the Red Army easily occupied the county without spending a single soldier. However, this unexpected victory also presented an unexpected challenge for the Red Army.
When the Jiangxi army learned that the Red Army had occupied Dayu County, they immediately sent troops to counterattack. Unfortunately, there was no party organization in Dayu County before, the Red Army had no mass base, and our army did not receive any news from the people during the enemy's march, and did not react until the enemy hit the position.
In this battle, our army suffered heavy losses, two battalion commanders and one regimental party representative died heroically. When the troops retreated to Wujing, Nanxiong County, and prepared to camp, the enemy caught up again, and our troops were forced to continue to retreat.
Unfortunately, in the process of retreating, martyr Wu Ruolan was wounded and captured, Comrade Mao Zetan was shot in the leg, and Comrade ** was also caught by the enemy when he broke through, but he wittily threw it back with his coat, successfully covered the enemy's head, and escaped smoothly.
This descent was very unfavorable to the Red Fourth Army, which not only suffered serious losses of its own, but also led to the bankruptcy of the plan of "encircling Wei and saving Zhao", and the Jinggangshan base area also fell into the hands of the enemy after holding on for a few days.
On the march, we encountered the opposition of the masses and the pursuit of the enemy, which was described by Comrade *** in his report to ** as "the most difficult time for our army".
At the most difficult moment, disagreements arose within the Red Fourth Army. Due to the large number of troops, the large objectives, and the many difficulties in terms of provisions, camping, etc., some people proposed to divide the troops into two combat units, ** and ** to lead a team to operate.
However, ** was firmly opposed to this proposal, believing that the division of troops now could easily lead to the destruction of the enemy's various parts. At the former committee meeting, he had a heated argument with **, but in the end neither could convince the other.
As time passed, more and more cadres demanded to divide the troops, which began to have an impact on the morale of the army.
At the beginning of February 1929, at a meeting of the former committee held in Luofuzhang Mountain, Xunwu County, a proposal was put forward for the restructuring of the army. He suggested that decision-making on military operations be handed over to the former commissar and that the CMC be temporarily abolished.
The former committee was the highest authority of the Red Fourth Army at that time, and was responsible for governing the party organizations at all levels and the local Red Guards of the whole army. Prior to this, the Red Fourth Army, in accordance with the instructions of **, had already set up a military committee with ** as secretary of the military commission and ** as secretary general of the soldiers' committee.
** The reason for advocating the abolition of the CMC is that some of the functions of the former CMC and the CMC overlap, which is not conducive to unified command. Therefore, he proposed that, in the name of the former secretary of the committee, the military committee of the Fourth Army of the Red Army be temporarily suspended, and that the former committee should directly command the two regiments, the special service battalion, and the special branch of the military department.
At the same time, the organ of the Central Military Commission was changed to the Political Department, and he served as the director of the Political Department and concurrently served as the party representative.
After in-depth discussions, the participants finally approved ***'s suggestion, which made him more handy when commanding the troops. Soon after, in the battle of Dabaidi, the Red Army defeated two enemy regiments in one fell swoop, which was the first major victory of the Red Fourth Army since it went down to Jinggangshan, thus freeing the Red Fourth Army from passivity and seizing the initiative.
Despite the successive victories of our army, there are still some cadres who are dissatisfied with the centralization of power for various reasons. At this moment, ** lettered.
On April 3, 1929, the former committee of the Red Fourth Army received a letter from the Fujian Provincial Party Committee to the two comrades Runzhi and Yujie and to the Hunan and Jiangxi border special committees in Ruijin.
The letter was sent in February, hence the name "February Letter". According to the situation at home and abroad at that time and the environment in which the Chinese Red Army was located, ** believed that the political situation in the whole country was not optimistic.
Therefore, in the letter, he put forward a proposal to preserve strength, mobilize the masses, and disperse the ranks to the countryside. At the same time, ** also believes that **, continue to stay in the army The goal is too big, and they are required to "resolutely leave the army and come quickly".
Although the intention of this letter was good, the problem is that the situation of the Red Fourth Army has changed a lot compared with the time when the "February Letter" was written, and this belated letter has had some bad effects on the Red Fourth Army.
*The spirit of the February letter was not positive enough. "This letter is too pessimistic in its assessment of the objective situation and subjective forces. ”
Liu Angong, as a fellow countryman, once participated in the Nanchang Uprising and has a background in studying in the Soviet Union. Because of this, he was sent by ** to send a "February letter". The Red Army had great respect for people who had studied in the Soviet Union, so it was decided that in order to adapt to the situation at that time, the Military Commission of the Fourth Army of the Red Army was temporarily restored, and Liu Angong was appointed secretary of the Provisional Military Commission and director of the Political Department.
Soon after Liu Angong returned to China, he was sent to the front line. He knew very little about the revolutionary situation in China and blindly followed the example of the Soviet Red Army. Liu Angong's ideas on the "one-long system" and military work learned in the Soviet Union are similar to those of the first one.
During this period, **and** held different views on the issue of "centralization and decentralization", so they both hoped to get Liu Angong's support. As a result, Liu Angong finally chose to stand in the camp of **.
* Soon after Liu Angong became secretary of the provisional military commission, he proposed a provision that the former commissar could only discuss operational issues and could not interfere in other affairs of the army.
At the same time, they also demanded the restoration of the formal military commission of the Red Fourth Army. This move caused extensive discussion within the Red Fourth Army, especially on the issue of the functions and powers of the former committee.
In order to eliminate ideological confusion, unify understanding, and establish the leadership mechanism of the Red Army, ** presided over a meeting of the Front Committee at the end of May 1929. The topics of the meeting included personal leadership and party leadership, as well as the separation of powers between the former and military commissions.
At the meeting, ** advocated the abolition of the Provisional Military Commission, arguing that the current situation facing the Red Army required that the Provisional Military Commission must concentrate its powers and strengthen the party's leadership over the army.
In his opinion, the functions of the Provisional Military Commission are duplicated and there is a problem of decentralization, which is not conducive to the development of the Red Fourth Army. However, Liu Angong believed that the former committee had too much control and had paternalistic tendencies, and advocated the establishment of a military commission.
* Also supports the establishment of the Military Commission. Most of the people present, including many cadres who participated in the Autumn Harvest Uprising, supported the views of ** and Liu Angong, but did not support the ideas of ***.
However, ** did not give up because of this. He firmly believed that only by strengthening the party's leadership over the army could the Red Fourth Army win victory in future struggles. He firmly believed that only in this way could the Red Army truly become a combat-ready army.
What is surprising is that this meeting not only failed to resolve the differences within the Red Fourth Army, but on the contrary intensified the outbreak of differences. ** Feeling that the position of secretary had become very difficult for him, he submitted his resignation.
However, most of the comrades of the former commissar did not accept this request. In order to further discuss whether or not to abolish the Provisional Military Commission, on 8 June the Red Army convened an enlarged meeting of the former CMC in Baisha, Shanghang County.
At the meeting, ** and ** expressed their views on how the party should lead the army, although there were some differences in their views. In the end, the congress voted to abolish the Provisional Military Commission, and ** took the initiative to resign from the post of secretary of the former party committee, and ** served as the secretary of the former party committee.
However, the fundamental issues of this controversy were not resolved, and the debate over the leadership of the party over the army and the nature of the Red Army remained. In order to end the intra-party controversy as soon as possible, the former committee decided to convene the Seventh Congress of the Red Fourth Army of the Communist Party of China in the near future, and asked *** and ** to write an article to explain their views.
In the "Letter to **", they conducted in-depth thinking and ** on some issues within the party of the Red Fourth Army. He stressed the importance of the "political viewpoint and military viewpoint" and pointed out that this is an issue that has a bearing on the political line of the entire party of the four armed services.
**, on the other hand, insisted that the Party should "run everything through the various organs of the proletarian organization (Soviets) playing a central role", and emphasized the close ties between the Party and the masses, and that it should not be separated from the masses because the Party manages everything.
In the new copy, we can keep these core ideas, but present them in a different way. For example: "In the "Letter to **" with **, they had in-depth discussions and reflections on some key issues within the party of the Red Fourth Army.
He stressed the importance of the "political viewpoint and military viewpoint" and pointed out that this is an issue that has a bearing on the political line of the entire party of the four armed services. **, on the other hand, insisted that the Party should play a central role through the various organs of the proletarian organization (Soviets) in order to effectively manage everything.
At the same time, he also stressed the close ties between the party and the masses, and should not be divorced from the masses because the party manages everything. This way of expression can not only retain the original core idea, but also present it in a new way, making the copy richer and more vivid.
On June 22, 1929, the Seventh Congress of the Red Fourth Army was held in the Xingxue Temple of Longyan City Citizen Primary School.
*As the moderator of the meeting, he criticized both *** and **Liu Angong, he thought that they were both wrong, but he mainly criticized *** at the conference
* At the "Seventh Congress" of the Fourth Army of the Red Army, some policies were affirmed, but the proposition of strengthening the party's absolute leadership over the army was not adopted.
After the meeting, ** left the Red Fourth Army to go to Jiaoyang to recuperate. In 1929, the Kuomintang launched the "Three Provincial Capitals" against the base areas in western Fujian.
After discussion, he went to Shanghai to report the situation to the enemy, and temporarily served as the secretary of the former committee of the Red Fourth Army and presided over the work of the Red Fourth Army.
On August 26, 1929, ** successfully arrived in Shanghai and reported in detail to ** the actual situation of the Red Fourth Army. ** attaches great importance to the issue of controversy between Zhu Mao and Mao, and it was decided that *** Li Li.
3. Form a three-member team to resolve the issue.
On September 28, the letter of instruction drafted by ** was officially released by *** after being examined and approved, and the letter successfully and steadily resolved a series of issues in the intra-party controversy of the Red Fourth Army.
* It is correct to insist that there is no need to set up a military commission under the front committee, and that all the power of the party should be concentrated in the organs of the front committee, and there can be no wavering. In addition, ** also instructed that in order to restore the reputation of Comrade Zhu and Mao among the masses, they should remain in the front committee to work, Comrade Mao should continue to serve as secretary of the front committee, and all comrades of the Red Army should understand and accept it.
* admit the mistake to *** and ask to return to the team, and at the same time send **'s "September letter" to *** After receiving the letter, in order to eliminate differences of opinion, immediately set off to meet with **.
During the meeting, ** self-criticized ***, and *** also admitted his mistake and apologized to the two, which made the relationship between the three even deeper.
And**, a scholar and regular soldier, together led the peasant uprising. In the process of initial integration, the two had disagreements, but they eventually resolved the contradictions and found the right path for the troops.
The successful convening of the Gutian Conference further established the principle of the party's absolute leadership over the army, defined the nature, purpose, and tasks of the Red Army, and clarified the relationship between military and politics.