On December 26, 1940, Chairman ** drafted a directive telegram for Xiang Ying, the political commissar of the New Fourth Army. The telegram expressed severe criticism of the New Fourth Army for not carrying out the established policy of developing to the north and behind enemy lines.
At the same time, the telegram also raised concerns about the lack of clear decision-making and hesitation of the New Fourth Army in the face of difficulties. Although the future is unknown, only by strengthening our determination and overcoming difficulties can we preserve the basic backbone and create possibilities for future development.
Otherwise, there will be danger. It is suggested that the New Fourth Army should be clear about its own propositions and direction so that it can better cope with future challenges.
This telegram was mainly a criticism of Xiang Ying, the political commissar of the New Fourth Army. The chairman's telegram was only sent to Xiang Ying, Yuan Guoping, director of the Political Department of the New Fourth Army, and Zhou Zikun, deputy chief of staff, and did not involve Ye Ting, who was the commander of the New Fourth Army and was not a party member.
In the implementation of the major policy on the development of the New Fourth Army, Ye Ting was more firm and correct, while Xiang Ying was more passive. Therefore, the chairman only sent this harsh criticism telegram to Xiang Ying, Yuan Guoping, and Zhou Zikun, but not to Ye Ting, out of deeper consideration.
In addition, the telegram also criticized the New Fourth Army Military Department for not implementing the ** decision-making instructions enough. At the beginning, there were differences between the military headquarters of the New Fourth Army and the New Fourth Army on the strategic development direction of the New Fourth Army.
However, in February 1939, during the inspection in southern Anhui, after discussions with the leaders of the New Fourth Army, a consensus was finally reached on "consolidating to the south, fighting to the east, and developing to the north".
The New Fourth Army implemented the grand strategy, but political commissar Xiang Ying failed to implement it, resulting in strategic passivity. ** asked Xiang Ying to expand the army and establish a base area, but Xiang Ying hesitated and missed the opportunity to join Su Yu.
In addition, Xiang Ying, as the secretary of the Southeast Bureau, lacks enthusiasm, initiative and creativity in his work, and does not implement the best decision-making instructions effectively. The military headquarters of the New Fourth Army should actively develop behind enemy lines and rendezvous with Su Yu in southern Jiangsu, but it has lived in southern Anhui for a long time and finally fell into a situation of strategic encirclement by the Kuomintang army.
The New Fourth Army had illusions about the Kuomintang and lacked a clear position and goals, which led to irreparable tragedy.
The writing of this article mainly refers to three authoritative documents: "** Annals", "New Fourth Army Documents" and "New Fourth Army War History".