February 28, 1935, ** Red Army.
The first and third legions will fight Zunyi. ** A temporary operational meeting of divisional cadres was held at the headquarters of the 1st Red Army Corps in Wulipu.
The theme of the meeting was to pursue and destroy the remnants of the enemy, that is, the Guizhou army and Wu Qiwei's ** army, which were defeated in the Battle of Zunyi. **Let everyone change into the student clothes prepared in advance, some people have backpacks, some people hold easels, do not ride horses, do not bring guards, makeup as students on the trip, field investigation of the pursuit route. According to the road signs left by the enemy when he fled and the trampling of the road, ** roughly judged the enemy's strength, whereabouts and retreat order, and then gave an order: Chase! The 2nd Red Division pursued to the south and reached the Wujiang River, and the 1st Red Division pursued to the west along the direction of Yaxi and Bailakan. **Asked**, then Chief of Staff of the 1st Red Division, what was the approximate scope of the pursuit, ** replied:It can be pursued for a hundred miles。This is the "100-mile pursuit of the enemy" in the Long March, the final battle of the Zunyi Campaign. 
In the table of "Statistics of Major Battles and Battle Achievements of Units above the Division Level" in the "Long March Historical Materials Series", there were two battles experienced by the Red Army during the Long March, namely the Xiangjiang Campaign and the Zunyi Campaign. The so-called battle refers to the sum of a series of battles. To put it simply, a campaign is larger than a battle and generally lasts longer. The battles of Zunyi included the capture of Tongzi, the capture of Loushan Pass, the reoccupation of Zunyi, and the victory of Zunyi with the Laoyashan Resistance Battle and the "Hundred Miles of Chasing the Enemy" as the core. If the Battle of Xiangjiang is the "darkest moment" in the Red Army's Long March, then the Battle of Zunyi is undoubtedly the most dazzling light after coming out of the darkness. Moreover, the significance of this battle is not only "a great victory", but also a key battle in the Long March. To fully understand the Battle of Zunyi, we have to start with its background. 01
Pre-war preparations" In the "major event" of the Red Army's Long March, the first in front of the Zunyi Battle was the Second Crossing of Chishui, and then in front of the Tashi Conference.
The Tashi Conference had many important meanings for the Long March, and three of them were related to the Battle of Zunyi. OneThe most direct one, the decision to cross Chishui and return to northern Qianbei, was made at the Tashi Conference. Second, the Red Army was reorganized in Tashi. The reduction of ranks, the "sinking" of cadres, the enrichment of companies, and the reduction of materials have increased the combat effectiveness and mobility of the Red Army through downsizing. After the Tashi Conference, the Central Military Commission of the Central Revolution issued a "Letter to All Red Commanders and Fighters," which was a clear signal of the return of the Red Army's strategic thinking to movement warfare. In a sense, the Battle of Zunyi "verified" the effect of Tashi's reorganization, or in other words, the "return" of the Red Army in Tashi became the "pre-war preparation" for Zunyi's victory. ThirdThe Tashi Conference was the final completion of the Zunyi Conference. The spirit of the Zunyi Conference was not conveyed in time due to the tension of the war and other reasons. According to Li Jukui, who was the commander of the Red First Division at the time, he first learned about the Zunyi Conference when he crossed the Chishui, and he personally went to the Red First Division to convey it. ** also mentioned this in his memoirs, he was directing the crossing of the river at the time and was unable to attend the meeting, but *** wrote to him. Therefore, the Zunyi Conference, which was of great significance to the Long March, gradually affected the whole army from the period of the first crossing of Chishui, and was completed by Zhang Wentian at the time of the Tashi Conference. It is conceivable that the transformation of the Red Army after the Tashi Conference was from the inside out, which stemmed from the dual influence of the Zunyi Conference and the reorganization of Tashi. The entire Zunyi Campaign, which began with a tough battle and ended with a campaign of movement, was a successful implementation of the "flexible and mobile" strategy and tactics. This is not unrelated to the return of military thought in the Red Army. 02
Out of the blue. We all know that the second crossing of Chishui was a successful "surprise" in the Long March. The launch of the Zunyi Campaign was another "surprise" immediately afterward.
Before the second crossing of Chishui, the Red Army was faced with a standard situation of "surrounded by enemies on all sides." To the north was the Sichuan army, which was in high morale after the First World War in Tucheng, and arranged a tight blockade along the Yangtze River, and specially transferred surface ships. To the west was the Dian army, and Long Yun, who had just been appointed commander-in-chief of the second route on February 2, was not to be left behind the Sichuan army, so he ordered the front-line Dian army to "boldly advance and suppress". To the south is Xue Yue's ** army, which is "advancing to Gulin at the same time" from the direction of Guiyang. To the east was the Guizhou Army, which was busy restoring territory and building fortifications after the Red Army left Guizhou. In four directions, Chiang Kai-shek judged that the Red Army was most likely to move north or west. If you go north, you can go directly to the northeast of Sichuan, and if you go west, you can cross the Jinsha River from Yunnan to the northwest of Sichuan, and both routes can meet with the Red Fourth Front Army. However, he unexpectedly chose to go east, that is, to avoid the sharp edge of the strong enemy in the north, west, and south, and broke through the encirclement from the weakest and unstable defense line of the Guizhou army. So, after the second crossing of Chishui, how did Chiang Kai-shek judge the direction of the Red Army? First of all, neither to the west nor to the south is very likely. To the west is to take the "way back", and to the south you will encounter the strongest ** army, and it is "contrary" to the destination. Secondly, the possibility of going north still existed, but the Sichuan army was well defended, and the Shangguan Yunxiang ** army, which had arrived from Chongqing, was not afraid of the Red Army going north. Finally, it is most likely to go east, because it can meet with the ** department in Xiangxi, which is not the destination of the Red Army's Long March in the early days? So Chiang Kai-shek's attention at that time was mainly to the east. In his telegram of 23 February, he focused on "the gap between Tongzi and Songkan" and judged that the Red Army would break through eastward from this line. On February 24, the Red First Army captured Tongzi. In the telegram sent by Xue Yue to the front line of the ** Army on the 25th, he still judged that the Red Army would go east, "having the appearance of joining forces with Xiao and He". On the 26th, the Red Third Army Corps conquered Loushan Pass, and He Jian of Hunan was deploying "to eliminate the Red in Xiangxi."
2. The Sixth Army Corps and the eastward advance of the Red Army in eastern Qiandong". Therefore, the Red Army went south to Zunyi after crossing Chishui for the second time, which completely surprised the enemy. It was precisely because of these successive "surprises" that the enemy's encirclement deployment was disrupted, and finally the Red Army found a good opportunity to annihilate the enemy south of Zunyi. 03
Bravely capture Loushan Pass.
It was the Red Third Army that was ordered to seize Loushan Pass.
At that time, the Red First Army was in Tongzi, red.
Fifth, the Red Ninth Army pinned down the Sichuan army north of Tongzi, not only making a posture of going north to confuse the enemy, but also blocking the enemy's southward movement to create conditions for the capture of Zunyi. ** When mobilizing the Red Third Army, this was compared to the tactic of "morning glory and pig slaughter", going north to "morning glory" and south to "slaughtering pigs". When the Red Third Army was in Tashi, the divisional level was abolished and reduced to four regiments. Zhang Zongxun, head of the Red 10th Regiment, and Huang Kecheng, political commissar; Deng Guoqing, head of the Red 11th Regiment, and Zhang Aiping, political commissar; Xie Song, head of the Red 12th Regiment, and Zhong Chibing, political commissar; Peng Xuefeng, head of the Red 13th Regiment, and Li Ganhui, political commissar. On the afternoon of 25 February, the first to rush to Loushan Pass was the Red 13th Regiment, whose commander Peng Xuefeng was the commander of the Red Fifth Division before its reorganization. He wrote a reminiscence article after the end of the Long March: "Before and After Loushan Pass". The other three regiments also acted at the same time, which was an unconventional deployment, leaving no troops as reserves, which shows the importance and urgency of this battle. The battle of Loushan Pass is roughly composed of four parts: capturing the pass, guarding the pass, detouring and chasing the pass. After several hours of fierce fighting, they captured the commanding heights of Loushan Pass: Dianjin Mountain. At 23 o'clock that night, it was decided that the Red 12th Regiment would take over the Red 13th Regiment after the bitter battle to guard the pass in front (the Red 13th Regiment flanked at Dianjinshan), and arranged for the Red 10th Regiment and the 11th Regiment to make a detour from both flanks to cut off the enemy's rear road at Banqiao. (Note: Banqiao is 40 miles away from Loushanguan and 80 miles away from Zunyi.) ）
The fiercest battle took place on the morning of the 26th, when the Red Army repelled several enemy counterattacks and bravely launched a counter-attack. The reinforcements of the cadre regiment led by Xiao Jinguang also joined the battle at a critical moment. After the enemy retreated, Zhong Chibing led the 3rd Battalion of the Red 12th Regiment to launch a pursuit. But because he rushed too fast, when he chased to the Black Temple, where the enemy's headquarters was located, he was already alone, and a large number of ** appeared. Xie Zhenhua, who was an instructor of the 2nd Battalion of the 12th Red Regiment at the time, recalled that when the 2nd Battalion received an order to reinforce the 3rd Battalion, when he rushed to the vicinity of the Black Temple, he saw that the guards were bandaging Zhong Chibing's wounds, and "blood gushed out from his left leg." Zhong Chibing later underwent three amputations, but he completed the Long March with astonishing perseverance and was awarded the rank of lieutenant general in 1955. At 4 p.m. on the 26th, red.
1. The roundabout troops of the Red Third Army Corps were in place one after another, and the order for a general attack was issued. The remnants of the Guizhou army began to retreat towards Zunyi, and the battle of Loushan Pass came to an end. 04
Chase the enemy for hundreds of miles. The time when the Red Army occupied Zunyi again was on the morning of the 28th, that is, a day and a half after the capture of Loushan Pass.
The Red Army must also fight quickly, because, after the two "surprises" mentioned above, Zunyi is now in the air defense. But this "time window" is only about two days, and Wu Qiwei's ** army in the north is approaching Zunyi. The Red Third Army broke through the enemy's blockade and approached the city of Zunyi on the afternoon of the 27th. Before the siege began, Wang Jialie fled in the direction of Guiyang with a pistol team. The commandos of the Red 12th Regiment and the Red 13th Regiment quietly climbed the city wall that night, and after eliminating the sentries, launched a battle to capture the city. The hearts of the soldiers were full of grief and indignation, because Deng Ping, chief of staff of the regiment, was unfortunately shot and died at the age of 27 while surveying the terrain in the afternoon. After the Red Army occupied Zunyi again, it did not stop, and another fleeting fighter plane appeared. On the way north with his army, Wu Qiwei met Wang Jialie, who had escaped from Zunyi. Hearing that the Qianjun army had folded several times in a row, Wu Qiwei was a little disapproving, on the contrary, with the help of Wang Jialie, who was familiar with the terrain, Wu Qiwei felt more victorious. The Red Army is the best at fighting the enemy army that is alone in the depths, and this opportunity will not be missed. At noon on the 28th, the two armies met at Honghuagang and Lao Yashan south of Zunyi. The Red Army's strategy was to hold these two defensive positions with the 3rd Red Army, and to outflank the enemy's rear with the 1st Red Division of the 1st Red Army, and the 2nd Red Division to prepare to pursue the enemy. 
The battle lasted for a whole afternoon, and the fiercest battle was Lao Ya Mountain, where the Red 10th Regiment was stationed. Regiment commander Zhang Zongxun and chief of staff Zhong Weijian personally led the team to launch a counter-charge and launched hand-to-hand combat with the enemy. Zhang Zongxun was wounded and fell, and Zhong Weijian died heroically, but the position of Lao Yashan was still lost. At the critical moment, ** came to the forefront of the battlefield and organized the strength ** Lao Ya Mountain. But the superiority in firepower of the enemy's ** army was obvious, and several attacks by the Red Army failed. The Central Revolutionary Military Commission ordered again and sent a cadre regiment. The defending troops played the "last card", and the roundabout troops threw out the "Wang Bang" at this time, and the Red First Army hit Zhongzhuangpu, where Wu Qiwei's headquarters was located. Almost instantly, the enemy's will to fight collapsed, and the defeat was like a mountain. Thus, there is the hundred-mile pursuit of the enemy mentioned at the beginning of this article. **In the memoirs, he told a lot of "interesting things" that happened in the process of chasing the enemy. For example, the enemy broke and scattered and hid in the homes of ordinary people, and the Red Army soldiers blew whistles in the streets, shouting to assemble, and then the enemy came out....Collectively captured. There was another incident called "strange thing": a Red Army soldier chased too fast and ran into the enemy's regimental headquarters. When the fighter found out, he pretended to be leggings, stopped and waited for his comrades to arrive, and then caught up with them. As a result, he chased after the regiment commander, but he had not yet found out, and turned his head to ask where the Red Army soldiers had run to....In fact, this incident is not "strange", which shows that the enemy's soul has been chased down by the Red Army. At the forefront was the Red Second Division, which captured more than 1,800 Kuomintang soldiers on the north bank of the Wujiang River, because Wu Qiwei cut the pontoon bridge after crossing the river....05
Connecting link. The "inheritance" of the Zunyi campaign is the one mentioned above, which in a sense "verifies" the effect of Tashi's reorganization.
Whether it was the capture of Loushan Pass or the great victory in Zunyi, the basic logic of the two wars was the same: to face the enemy head-on with high combat effectiveness, and at the same time to outflank the enemy with high mobility. The frontal offensive and defensive battles of both wars were extremely fierce, and the Red Army withstood them; The roundabout outflanking of the two battles was very critical and timely, and became the "trigger point" for the big victory. 
The "Qixia" of the Zunyi Battle refers to the change in Chiang Kai-shek's "pursuit and suppression" strategy after this battle. To put it simply, Chiang Kai-shek was scared and began to emphasize "offensive defense", that is, the "turtle" tactics during the fifth "encirclement and suppression" of the **Soviet area. In fact, this created the conditions for the Red Army's subsequent three crossings, the fourth crossing of Chishui, and the re-crossing of the Wujiang River, because the enemy's mobility began to weaken after the Battle of Zunyi. So, how can you establish a base area? There is such a passage in Wang Shuzeng's "Long March":
If, according to the assumption of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission, the Red Army wants to temporarily settle in the Zunyi area in order to have a place to rest and recuperate, then it must, as *** said, deal a heavy blow to one or even several of the various armies of the Kuomintang - now is the perfect time to strike at Wu Qiwei's Kuomintang Army....In other words, the base areas are fought out, and they must win a big battle. It is best to fight the ** army, because as soon as the ** army falls, the local warlords will turn into a wait-and-see state, or even scatter as birds and beasts.
So, the Battle of Zunyi won a big victory, and it was the ** army, why did the Red Army fail to establish a base in the end? The reason was that Chiang Kai-shek changed his strategy. After the Battle of Zunyi, Chiang Kai-shek was furious, so he quickly deployed the battle plan of "recovering Zunyi" a few days later, on March 3. This plan is another fighter plane that Chiang Kai-shek has "dedicated" to the Red Army, and it is very likely to lead to another great victory of the Red Army in Zunyi, and the conditions for establishing a base area will be more mature. ** and the Central Revolutionary Military Commission targeted the enemy at the two divisions of Zhou Hunyuan's ** Army and set up an ambush in Yaxi. This was due to the fact that the Second Bureau of the Military Commission successfully cracked Chiang Kai-shek's specific operational deployment. 
But Chiang Kai-shek changed his mind at the last moment, and urgently telegraphed Xue Yue and Zhou Hunyuan to abandon the original plan and "temporarily take the offensive and defensive". There is no evidence that Chiang Kai-shek was informed of the disposition of the Red Army, and one possible reason is that he recovered his sanity from his anger, because the ** army could not tolerate another major defeat, and it was not wise to take risks at this time. Chiang Kai-shek's sanity prevented the Red Army's ambush plan from being achieved, and the results of the Zunyi victory could not be further expanded. Moreover, this offensive defense of the Kuomintang army was not "temporary", but lasted for a long time after that. The Red Army failed in attacking Lubanchang before crossing Chishui three times, also because Zhou Hunyuan could not shrink, and the Red Army had to fight a tough battle that he was not good at. After crossing Chishui four times, Chiang Kai-shek was still cautious about the "pursuit" of the Red Army, and he asked the ** army to "deploy defenses and hinder its passage" instead of taking the initiative to pursue. Unsure of the direction of the Red Army, Chiang Kai-shek reminded the front line that "we must not stick to the build-up of troops" and took a conservative posture of "not seeing a rabbit and not scattering an eagle". This is the two-sided nature of things, Chiang Kai-shek's reason made the Red Army lose a good opportunity to annihilate the enemy, but the conservatism brought by reason created conditions for the Red Army to completely break out of the encirclement. The great victory in Zunyi was the tactical flexibility of the Red Army, and after the victory in Zunyi, it was a strategic flexibility. If you go deep alone, I will not hesitate to "eat" you, and if you start to use the numerical advantage to set up a "turtle formation", then I will give up the original plan and leave while you are slow. We must not belittle or even negate the significance of the Zunyi Campaign just because the goal of "establishing a base area along the Sichuan, Yunnan, and Guizhou borders" has not been achieved. The brilliance of the Long March lies in the fact that after various internal and external conditions have changed rapidly, it is necessary to see whose decision-making is closer to the objective facts, whose command is more efficient, and whose troops have more execution and will to fight. In the final analysis, "you fight yours, I will fight mine" is the "magic weapon" of the Red Army's victory.