Han Xianchu and Deng Hua, as senior generals of our army, both sides have their own unique views on marching and fighting. In the past, whenever there was a combat problem in the Northeast Battlefield, when Han Xianchu had a conflict or disagreement with others, Mr. Lin would believe in Han Xianchu's strategic vision; In the previous Hainan Campaign, Han Xianchu and Deng Hua also had disagreements about the time of the battle, and Mr. Lin still chose to believe in Han Xianchu.
However, in the 4th Battle to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, in the discussion of the question of whether to fight Hengcheng or Topyeong-ri first, Deng Hua and Han Xianchu respectively put forward inconsistent ideas based on their personal experience and strategic vision, and in the face of the different opinions of the two, Mr. Peng was also very difficult, and after repeated pondering, Mr. Peng supported Deng Hua's plan, mainly because the defenders of Hengcheng were mainly based on the South Korean troops and had low combat effectiveness, but it was this decision that could be said to have had a great impact on our army's follow-up battle plan.
On February 8, 1951, the Western Front advanced the 1st Army of the US Army to the north of the Han River40, and the 42nd Army of the Volunteer Army tracked the battlefield situation and conveyed the battle situation to its subordinate units.
In the direction of Hengcheng, the 17th Regiment, the 21st Regiment, and the 16th Regiment of the US Army, through air cover and ground tank attacks, captured part of the high ground of our army, and the 124th Division of our army found the right time to launch a counterattack and successfully repelled part of the enemy's forces, and the enemy in Qushui launched an attack on the position of the 126th Division without success. According to the statistical analysis of the Military Intelligence Department, on 8 February, the enemy may launch an all-out attack on our troops, and all units must make full preparations and resolutely hold our positions.
The 42nd Army instructed all subordinate units to pay attention to defense when the enemy attacked our troops, especially stressed the importance of the high ground position of the 124th Division, resolutely recaptured, and made preparations for continuous counterattacks and assaults, and the artillery regiments formed within the army should give strong fire support.
The enemy launched a regiment of howitzers to launch an attack on our army's high ground, and there were opposing planes in the sky to restrain it, and there was a fierce artillery attack below. Then the enemy began to launch a more fierce attack, and at noon that day, several important positions of our army were lost one after another. Han Xianchu of the 38th Army and Deng Hua of the 42nd Army sent telegrams back one after another, expressing their respective opinions, and the two had different views on the issue of advocating an attack on Hengcheng or Tuopingli first.
Deng Hua indicated in the telegram that his operational policy was to attack Hengcheng first, mainly because the US troops near Topingli were densely structured, and the neighboring units supported each other strongly, and it was not easy to find a breakthrough in attacking. The Hoengseong area is dominated by South Korean troops, over whom our army has a combat advantage. In addition, although the number of the enemy in the US army and other units was large, the combat strength of the 8th Regiment and the 50th Regiment was weak, and our army was able to attract the support of the enemy's troops from the Tohein-ri side when attacking Hengcheng, and then gather the main forces of our army to outflank and attack them.
Han Xianchu advocated that if the enemy at Hoengseong and Yuanju fled southward, the Korean People's Army would pursue them; Han Xianchu believed that from a strategic point of view, Toping-ri was relatively close to the western front and was a military important place, and if our army occupied this place, the right wing of the US army on the western front would be under the control of our army, and no matter what method of attack was adopted, the situation of our army would be very favorable to our army. Although the attack on Hwangseong could destroy some more South Korean troops, it would have little impact on the main force of the US army.
The two sides reported their respective ideas to the headquarters, and after repeated consideration, it was difficult to choose for a while, and finally considered that Deng Hua, as the commander-in-chief of the counterattack on the Eastern Front, had a better understanding of the situation at that time, so Mr. Peng chose Deng Hua's combat policy, and Deng Hua finally insisted on his own proposition of fighting Hengcheng first and then Pingli.
The Hengcheng counterattack was a great victory for our army, with a total of more than 12,000 enemy troops annihilated, and this battle was a battle of similar levels and results between the two sides in the entire War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea.
In addition to the great victory, our army should have been immersed in the joy of victory in the Hengcheng counterattack, but the defeat of Toping-ri caused heavy losses to our army, and the U.S. army caused great losses to our army by holding Toping-ri.
It can be said that this decision has deprived our army of a temporary advantage, and the corresponding is the action of the US army, and the US army in Toheong-ri realized that it was too aggressive and was likely to encounter a breakthrough by our army, so it submitted a retreat report to the US army headquarters, and Li Qiwei ordered the 23rd Regiment of the US army to hold Toping-ri to the death and strengthen support in the direction of Tohei-ri. From this point of view, Deng Hua's strategy of attacking Hengcheng first did have mistakes, which had a certain impact on our army's attack on the US army and the subsequent results on the Korean battlefield.