Recently, France's Macron mentioned the possibility of sending ground troops to Ukraine, and Russia warned that it would inevitably trigger a head-on conflict between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Russia. The United States and some European countries have expressed their stance and distanced themselves from the rhetoric of "sending troops." The Russian side cited the allusion of Napoleon's fiasco in 1812 to warn Macron not to repeat Napoleon's mistakes. 200 years ago, France, which was in full swing in Europe, "poured all the troops of Europe" into a war against **, but suffered heavy losses, which affected the strength of Napoleon's empire, and he was defeated in the Battle of Leipzig and Waterloo one after another, and Napoleon finally embarked on the road of exile on a desert island.
The two sides of the war have a long-standing grudge.
For a long time, many writings have attributed the reason for Napoleon's attack on the withdrawal from the "Great *** policy in 1810." However, this explanation ignores the tangled bilateral relations between Tsarist Russia and the Napoleonic Empire before 1812, as well as the "dilemma" faced by the First French Empire before the war. The First French Empire at the beginning of 1812 was growing rapidly in all respects, annexing regions such as Catalonia, and growing rapidly in territory and population. However, under the prosperity of the empire lurked a crisis, and France's expansion was largely "passive", and Napoleon believed that "only the inclusion of the coastal areas in the French administrative system could close the 'big *** loopholes". However, in the newly annexed lands, France's tax, conscription, and religious policies provoked more contradictions among the people, and Napoleon's harm to the interests of the former European elites intensified more contradictions.
On the economic front, in 1812, a large number of businesses closed down and hundreds of thousands of workers lost their jobs. In agriculture, natural disasters from 1810 to 1811 caused a shortage of food in France, and the price of food was **. In this context, Napoleon's desire to continue to achieve new victories, get out of internal difficulties, and withdraw from the "big ***" became the goal of action at that time.
* It is also a long-standing grudge against France, and the Franco-Russian peace treaty of 1807 is ostensibly an alliance, but in fact it is not equal to **. The seeds of the Franco-Russian conflict had been planted several years earlier, and Napoleon's expedition in 1812 was only a wrong battle that could not be avoided.
"Logistical supply difficulties.
In order to conquer the world, Napoleon assembled the most powerful army ever built, bringing together the forces of several European countries, numbering more than 600,000, preparing thousands of artillery pieces and hundreds of thousands of horses. The accession of the rest of Europe was not entirely forced, and the European perception of the "** threat" since the 18th century also played a role. Napoleon said that it would be a "war of supremacy", a war in Europe to drive the "barbarians of the north" back to the north.
Tsar Alexander I knew the inevitability of war long ago and prepared in advance. In order to win domestic support, he encouraged the publication of anti-legal, nationalist newspapers and periodicals. Recruiting troops, he issued successive decrees until 1812 to significantly increase the number of recruits. In addition, ** also established an intelligence network in Paris to closely monitor the movements of the French army.
At the beginning of the war, Napoleon's goal was to win quickly and force the tsar to the negotiating table, but the tsar learned from the experience of Austerlitz and other battles, and he knew that Napoleon would concentrate his superiority and forces to seek a head-on decisive battle, and in terms of the quality of the army, the Russian army was not an opponent, so the tsar "refused to fight a decisive battle", cleared the field, delayed the time of the confrontation, and at the same time used the vast space and harsh climate to wear down the strength of the French army.
In June 1812, Napoleon occupied the Vilna area with almost no troops,* and the army retreated. But before the French could celebrate, a torrential rain mixed with hail poured down, the army lost many horses and many elite were injured. In July and August, the Russian army also abandoned Vitebsk, destroying munitions and transportation facilities on the way out, retreating from Smolensk and burning the city. Many ** farmers burn their crops in case they fall into enemy hands. The summer heat was unbearable, and many of Napoleon's soldiers were infected with dysentery and suffered from ** disease.
The Russian army and the French army also engaged in fierce confrontations, Napoleon's army gained the upper hand and even captured Moscow, but the main forces of the Russian army were not annihilated, and the tsar had no desire to sue for peace.
With the elongation of the French front, it is becoming more and more difficult to "go deep" in logistics and supply. By the time Napoleon entered Moscow, he had already suffered a large number of attrition. The burned and plundered city of Moscow had almost no food. In October, Napoleon, realizing that he could not survive the winter in Moscow, had to give the order to return to France. However, at this time, Napoleon's army was only about 100,000 men, and most of them fled, wounded, captured, or remained on the supply lines. Winter came early that year, and with high winds and snowfall, the French army was hit by unprecedented cold, hunger, and endless Russian attacks. In November, the army was almost completely annihilated while crossing the Berezina River. In the end, less than 50,000 demoralized, exhausted, hungry soldiers returned, in stark contrast to the scene of more than 600,000 soldiers who had gone out six months earlier.
Napoleon's empire was devastated.
In fact, Napoleon's command art and the quality of the French army were outstanding in the Battle of Berezina during the retreat, which avoided the end of total annihilation. Overall, however, Napoleon's strategic mistakes made it difficult to recover the defeat. He himself underestimated the impact of special geographical and climatic conditions on the army, went deep into Moscow for too long, and withdrew from Moscow too late. Secondly, Napoleon misjudged the national mood and the sense of resistance of the ** people, until winter was approaching, and pinned his hopes on the opponent to sue for peace.
* Nearly 300,000 people were killed, thousands of villages and towns were destroyed, the city of Moscow was almost reduced to ashes, and the economy was destroyed.
As the defeated side, Napoleon's empire was greatly damaged. The French army lost a large number of soldiers, horses and equipment in **, and suffered heavy losses. After Napoleon's defeat, Prussia, Austria and other countries rejoined the anti-French alliance to fight against Napoleon. After the Battle of Leipzig, the anti-French coalition gradually advanced westward to the French mainland, and Napoleon's European system completely collapsed. Napoleon himself had to abdicate and go into exile. (The author of this article is Yang Guang, an assistant researcher at the Institute of World History, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences).