Since the defeat and retreat from Kherson and Kharkov in the fall of 2022, the Russian army has changed the light enemy at the beginning of the war, and adopted the strategy of fighting a dumb battle. I never thought that this trick would be quite effective, when the Ukrainian army launched in the summer of 2023, more than 20 well-equipped brigades of the Ukrainian army hit their heads in front of the Russian defense line, and they fought hard for several months with few results, which disappointed the West.
The anti-tank obstacles laid by the Russian army on the front line, and the details of the Russian army's construction of a defensive line can be found in this historical articleThe Ukrainian army is coming, the Russian army is busy digging trenches and defending it, how strong is the "Shoigu defensive line"?
A closer look at the Russian defense line shows that the defensive technology used is almost the same as that of World War II more than 80 years ago, with mines, anti-tank trenches and various obstacles being very traditional means of defense. Why was this World War II-style defense line able to withstand the onslaught of the Ukrainian army with modern equipment? Could it be that the level of offensive warfare in modern armies has been stagnant? In fact, it is not that the attack capability of the human army is standing still, but that the technical and tactical level of the Russian and Ukrainian rivals is regressing, and now the offensive capabilities of the Russian and Ukrainian armies are far inferior to the level of their common ancestor, the Soviet Red Army, in the 80s of the last century, so it will show a situation of attacking weak and defending strong on the battlefield.
Rookies peck at each otherAttack the weak and defend the strong
According to military common sense, in order to break through the enemy's well-fortified field positions, the attacker must enjoy obvious advantages in terms of strength and firepower, especially the mastery of air supremacy, but the Ukrainian army almost does not occupy any of them in the ** operation, and rushes into the offensive when the strength is insufficient, so that the Russian army can wait for work, which is the fundamental reason for the success of the Russian army's defense. Just imagine, if the attacking side is replaced by the US military, it will let the Russian army know what is the integration of air and ground, what is precision strike, what is carpet bombing, and ...... in minutesIn fact, the Gulf War more than 30 years ago proved that in the face of a modern offensive system, static defensive positions are fundamentally vulnerable.
During the Gulf War,Iraqi forces built along the Kuwaiti coastlineofStrong fortificationsHowever, in the face of the three-dimensional strike of the air-ground cooperation of the multinational force,Saddam Hussein's line of defensewithMaginot LineSameFallfor the laughing stock
During the Gulf War, after the annexation of Kuwait, the Iraqi army built a strong defensive position along the front line, known as the "Saddam Line". Iraq's military technicians have just finished the eight-year Iran-Iraq war, and they have also accumulated rich experience in defensive operations, trying to drag the multinational force into a ground war. However, the US-led multinational forces did not intend to run into the Iraqi defense line at all, but launched the "Desert Storm" operation, which completely broke the Iraqi army's will to fight through 43 days of continuous air raids, and then used the "left hook" operation to attack the east and the west, and attracted the main force of the Iraqi army with a feint attack with a small number of troops on the western front, and the main force rushed to the eastern front through long-distance maneuvers, cutting off the land connection between Iraq and Kuwait, forcing the Iraqi army to abandon its position and retreat to Iraq. In the end, the multinational force won the war in just 100 hours of ground combat.
The famous "Highway of Death" in the Gulf War became a cruel portrayal of the defeat and retreat of the Iraqi army.
Under modern air supremacy, it is not difficult to break through the defense system of the Russian army, and it is impossible to carry any defense system by relying on precision strike firepower to blow it all the way. In the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, the Azerbaijani army, which has absolute air supremacy, relied on drones to bomb Armenian defensive positions indiscriminately, so that the runners-up had no power to fight back, and finally had to sign a humiliating alliance under the city.
In 2020** image of Azerbaijani TB-2 drones attacking the air defense positions of the Armenian army in the Nagorno-Karabakh War, a war of small countries that once again proves the importance of air superiority for ground offensives.
The problem in Ukraine is that Zelensky, under the pressure of Western countries and the political need to stimulate morale, forced the Ukrainian army to launch an underprepared big ** under the unfavorable situation of having neither troop superiority, nor firepower superiority, neither air supremacy nor information supremacy, and the Ukrainian army, which has no advantage, can not be defeated in the face of the solid defense line that the Russian army has spent half a year building.
It's a pity that the Russian army is also very good, although it has air superiority, it cannot effectively support ground operations, coupled with the mutiny of Wagner mercenaries, so that the Russian army cannot take advantage of the situation to launch a counterattack. Otherwise, after carrying the three axes of the Ukrainian army, a defensive counterattack can annihilate the main force of the Ukrainian army, and the war situation and even the Ukrainian political situation will take a major turn. I think that during the Battle of Kursk, the Soviet army first successfully thwarted the German offensive through a dense defensive line and stubborn defense, and then turned to a large-scale **, recaptured Kharkov, and advanced to the Dnieper River, thus opening the prelude to the strategy.
Before the defense will blowYesA god-like card52, mThe 28th and other armed *** were forced by individual portable anti-aircraft missilesYesOnly dare to look up to the sky and shoot rockets, and the hit depends on faith
At present, neither Russia nor Ukraine can grasp air supremacy, and the two sides can only peck each other on the ground, while the main body of the ground offensive is still the traditional tanks, armored vehicles and infantry, and the procedures are still artillery preparation, sweeping and destroying obstacles, and infantry charge. Originally, it had shown a trend to replace tanks and armored vehicles, and the flying army once became a fashionable idea for army building. Anyway, with the cabbage of individual portable anti-aircraft missiles, any *** is scum in the face of the sudden "Stinger", and the Antonov airport raid on the first day of the Russian-Ukrainian war is ironclad proof.
Since the fashionable three-dimensional combat does not work, it is necessary to return to the two-dimensional space on the ground to fight. As a result, tanks, armored vehicles, and infantry will still be held back in front of an obstacle field composed of minefields, anti-tank trenches, triangular cones, barbed wire, etc., and there is nothing to do but break down the obstacles inch by inch.
FieldobstaclesCheap and effective
In the field defense system of the Russian army, obstacles such as mines, triangular cones, barbed wire, and anti-tank trenches are the most important components.
Ukrainian deminers are clearing mines laid by the Russian army, which are heavily used by both sides in the Russian-Ukrainian war.
First of all, it is extremely cost-effective, and it wins by quantity. Covering up obstacles on the battlefield may seem costly, but it's a good deal compared to the benefits. The unit price of modern tanks and infantry fighting vehicles is often millions of dollars, while the unit price of anti-tank mines is only tens of dollars,** compared to more than 100,000 1. The Russian army can purchase 100,000 mines with the money for the purchase of a tank, and according to the density of 500 mines per kilometer on the defensive front, a minefield of up to 200 kilometers can be set. It is impossible for 1 tank to defend a position of 200 km in any case, but a mine of the same price can. The triangular cone known as the "Dragon's Tooth" is similar to an anti-tank mine, and can also be laid in large quantities to form a dense anti-tank obstacle field. The construction cost of the anti-tank trench is mainly the amount of excavation earthwork, and the amount of earthwork for 1 km of anti-tank trench is between 7,500 and 10,000 cubic meters, and the construction cost is 5$5,180,000. From an economic point of view, it is definitely cost-effective to lay an obstacle field.
Even in the 21st centuryMines remain one of the most effective ways to stop the offensive of armored forces**.
Secondly, it is easy to mass produce and simple to lay. Most of the obstacles are very simple to produce and lay, and after the "dragon teeth" are prefabricated in the cement plant, they only need to be transported to the designated location by truck, and then hoisted by cranes. The barbed wire only needs to be fixed by the finished product prefabricated in the wire factory. The speed of digging of anti-tank trenches depends on how many excavators the Russian army can muster. The production of the best mines is simpler, and the raw materials of industrialized assembly line products are cheap and easy to obtain explosives and plastics. Laying mines is also very easy, World War II still used manual mines, the efficiency is low, the procedure can be summarized as digging pits - burying mines - installing fuses - covering soil - camouflage. After World War II, with the progress of minelaying technology and the change of tactical concepts, large-scale minelaying has changed from manual operation to mechanical and throwing operation. Mechanical minelaying can lay several mines per minute in buried mode and dozens of mines per minute in placement mode. There are three kinds of throwing mines: aerial throwing, rocket (artillery) throwing, and gunpowder throwing, and the efficiency is several times or even ten times that of mechanical laying.
Rocket minelaying vehicles equipped by the Russian army launched rockets and minefields during the exercise to carry out rapid mine-laying.
The ability to set up obstacles, the dish is not a dish
Although the obstacles are of high quality and low price, they also need to be laid in sufficient quantity and scientifically and reasonably to form an effective obstacle field. In terms of quantity, the Russian army has a strong enough foundation, the ancestor of the Soviet Red Army has enough mines in reserve according to the standards of the Third World War, and there are also a large number of minelaying vehicles in stock. The production of dragon teeth and barbed wire is very simple, and there is no shortage of excavators.
In terms of laying obstacles, the Russian army has ancestral tactics and formation. As early as World War II, the Soviet army gradually explored a set of effective obstacle field setting experience in the confrontation with the German armored forces, and finally gathered the results in the Battle of Kursk. The Soviets laid about 1 million mines of various types at the front of the Kursk defensive position, with a density of 2,800 mines per kilometer in the main defensive directions, and a mixed minefield composed of anti-tank mines and anti-infantry mines, vividly bogged down the German armored forces with herds of tigers and leopards in a mine-pool.
During World War II, Soviet sappers inspect minesSoviet ArmyApplicationThe main amount of mines is enough
Although the Russian army is not a weapon, it is also equipped with a lot of new types of obstacle equipment. The latest "farming" long-range minelaying system of the Russian army, installed on the chassis of the Kamaz 8 8 truck, can launch 50 rocket-laying mine-laying projectiles in 3 minutes with a maximum range of 15 kilometers. In addition, the Russian army is also equipped with a large number of UMZ series minelaying vehicles, using gunpowder to scatter mine-laying methods, although the range is shorter, but the number of one-time mine-laying is more, and the mine-laying density is larger, such as the latest UMZ-G armored mine-laying vehicle using T-90 tank chassis, with good off-road ability and self-protection ability, a high degree of automation, only 2 people to operate, equipped with 9 multi-functional throwing launchers, each with 30 launch tubes, a total of 270, the maximum throwing range of 5000 meters. In addition to professional minelaying vehicles, the Russian army's "Hail", "Hurricane", "Tornado" and other types of rocket artillery can also launch rocket-laying mine-laying shells for rapid mine-laying.
FarmingThe long-range minelaying system resembles rocket artilleryCapable of long-range minelaying.
The Russian army's UMZ minelaying vehicle is using the method of throwing gunpowder to lay mines, although the range is short, but the number of one-time mines is more and the density of mines is greater
In order to make up for the lack of strength of the engineering troops, the Russian army has also paid attention to giving full play to civilian forces, employing civilian engineering and construction companies to engage in the construction and laying of defense facilities through engineering outsourcing, and building a defense system behind relatively safe front lines. As a rule, such works are not of high difficulty and are easy to master even for non-military personnel. For example, the laying of "dragon's teeth" only needs to be buried in rows according to the predetermined direction, and the distance between them makes it impossible for armored vehicles to pass through, and if the time is pressing, it can even be placed directly on the ground. The excavation of the anti-tank trench is simpler, you only need to clarify the specifications and dimensions, and Lan Xiang will dig immediately after graduation!
Russian civilian contractors are deployed in the Kursk region on the territory of RussiaDragon's teethobstacles
Russian civilian contractors were also contracted to dig anti-tank trenchesAs long as there are enough excavators, the trench can be dug as much as it wants
Russia has a clear understanding of the protracted conflict between Russia and Ukraine, and fighting a dumb war is the most efficient tactic at the moment, which can not only consume a large number of the Ukrainian army's vital forces, but also effectively reduce the Russian army's **, drag the war into a protracted war, and Russia's resilience is stronger than Ukraine's.
The ability to break barriers, the dish is more than a dish
As the saying goes, it is easy to set up obstacles but difficult to break through them, and in order to break through the defense system in large depth, the attacker not only needs several times the superiority in troops and firepower, but also needs to prepare special equipment to break through the obstacles. In order to break through the German Atlantic barrier and overcome the complex topography of the beachhead, the 79th Armored Division of the British Army converted a large number of tanks and armored vehicles into combat engineering vehicles with the ability to break through obstacles, and played an important role in clearing mines, removing obstacles, paving roads, and building bridges for the landing force. The 79th Armored Division is nicknamed the "Hobart Circus", a nickname that comes from the division's bizarre armored vehicles and division commander, Major General Percy Hobart.
Used by the British armyChurchillTank chassis modified paving vehicle, effectively overcomeSoft soilSandy beachTerrain.
In the face of the wide-frontal, multi-level and in-depth defensive positions built by the Russian army, the Ukrainian army's ability to break obstacles is very weak, and there is an extreme lack of engineering vehicles. On the one hand, after more than 30 years of abandonment, the family left by the Soviet army has long been dilapidated and unusable; On the other hand, when Western countries provide ** equipment to the Ukrainian army, they first consider combat vehicles, not inconspicuous engineering vehicles.
Zaluzhny, the former commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian army, complained to the Washington Post during the Ukrainian army last year that the lack of demining equipment affected the speed of the Ukrainian army's offensive. At the same time, another unnamed Ukrainian ** also told the newspaper that before **, Kyiv received less than 15% of the amount of mine-clearing equipment from NATO countries.
Zaluzhny finally found the backstabber of the big ** defeatThe West has given too little equipment for mine clearance and obstacle breaking.
Although the Ukrainian army still has a bit of a background, Soviet-style engineering vehicles cannot guarantee the passage of tanks, armored vehicles and other heavy equipment from NATO countries through the obstacle field. The tank bridge-building vehicles originally equipped by the Ukrainian army are matched with the Soviet-style T-64 72 80 three series of tanks, and the total combat weight of the above-mentioned tanks is 40 tons, while the Leopard 2, Challenger 2, and M1 series tanks assisted by Western countries are 60 tons, and the original tank bridge-building vehicles of the Ukrainian army cannot withstand it at all. The width of the passage opened up by the Soviet-style minesweeper is also tailored to the Soviet-style tank, and although it can barely pass through the Western tank with a larger body width, the safety margin is very small, and if you are not careful, you will deviate from the passage and jump into the minefield.
The Mtu-72 armored bridge erection vehicle installed in the Soviet era uses the T-72 tank as the chassis, and the maximum bearing capacity of its bridge body is 50 tons, which cannot withstand itWestTanksexceeded60 tons of combat full weight
The chassis of the BMR-2 armored minesweeper, produced in Soviet times, was derived from the T-54 tank, the width of its hull was only 327 meters, while the Leopard 2 tank hull width reached 375 meters
In addition to using construction machinery to break barriers, the Ukrainian army can also use manpower to break barriers and firepower. However, the efficiency of manpower obstacle breaking is too low, it is not urgent, and it is easy to suffer personnel under the suppression of the Russian army's firepower. Breaking the obstacle by fire is to destroy the obstacle with intensive artillery fire, detonate the minefield, and directly blast a passage for the attacking troops, which means that a lot of ammunition is consumed, but the Ukrainian army.
What is most lacking at the moment is large-caliber artillery shells. Therefore, it is conceivable how much the Ukrainian army's ability to break through obstacles is conceivable.
Ukrainian army**Famous scenes of defeat,BulkWestern armored combat vehicles were trapped in minefields, piled up and destroyed, among others1 BMR2 minesweeper
Conclusion
To sum up, the Russian army will be able to use the defensive tactics of World War II to thwart the Ukrainian army in the summer of 2023, but in the final analysis, the Ukrainian army's offensive capability is relatively low, neither mastering the battlefield air supremacy, unable to carry out three-dimensional strikes on the Russian army's defensive positions, and extremely lacking relevant equipment and resources for demining and breaking obstacles, and is helpless against the defensive positions carefully constructed by the Russian army. As a result, Russia and Ukraine, which were pecking at each other, once again staged a World War II-level offensive and defensive operation with the best equipment of the 21st century. This fact also highlights a fatal flaw in Western military aid to Ukraine: although the West has provided a large number of advanced equipment in the past two years, it has never allowed the Ukrainian army to rebuild a complete combat system, especially the lack of air power has greatly restricted the ability of the Ukrainian army to achieve the best goal.
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