Before the Battle of Eastern Henan, why did Mao Zedong specifically instruct Chen Yi not to partici

Mondo Military Updated on 2024-01-31

At the Chengnanzhuang Conference in early May 1948, after agreeing that Su Yu's three columns would temporarily fight a major battle in Jiangbei, a telegram to Chen, Su, Liu, and Deng on May 21 made it clear that "the annihilation of the Fifth Army is the central goal of the summer operation" and "Su Yu has full command."

The 1st, 3rd, 4th, 6th, 8th, and 11th Columns, and commanded Xu and Tan to cooperate in the operations on the Jinpu Line", and "Liu and Deng were responsible for pinning down the 18th Army so that they could not come to the east's aid". The telegram also specifically stated: "* Do not participate in this operation".

It is intriguing why **'s telegram specifically instructed "** not to participate in this operation"?

Originally, the first major strategy was to prepare to send Su Yu to lead three columns to cross the river first, and then the second batch to enter and form the Southeast Field Army. After agreeing to Su Yu's strategic proposal, the original grand strategy has undergone fundamental changes. This was followed by personnel adjustments to accommodate new mission changes. Based on this, at the end of the Chengnanzhuang meeting, when talking to Su Yu, he clearly instructed: "Comrade * will not go back to Huaye, and you will be responsible for Huaye in the future."

Although Su Yu repeatedly asked ** to return to Huaye, ** still said firmly: "* has been decided, Comrade ** and Comrade *** will work in the Central Plains Military Region and the Central Plains Bureau." In the end, when Su Yu proposed that "the position of commander and political commissar in Huaye should be retained", although he agreed, he still said that "he is very much needed for work over there, and he must go right now."

Through the conversation between *** and Su Yu, it can be seen that regardless of whether he is attached to Huaye's position or not, he has decided to transfer him to work in the Central Plains Bureau. Then, in this case, not participating in the battles organized and commanded by Su Yu since then is naturally the meaning of the topic.

After Liu and Deng leaped thousands of miles into the Dabie Mountains, the strategic focus of our southern line also shifted to the Central Plains. With the strategic offensive of Liu Deng, Chen Su, and Chen Xie's army, hundreds of thousands of our troops gathered in the Central Plains. This is a problem of the need to coordinate a package of work, such as local work, financial and economic work, and pre-support work.

As early as February 1948, Liu and Deng suggested to Huaye that he should preside over the financial affairs of the Central Plains, first of all, the three parts of the field army." According to the "**Biography": Before the Chengnanzhuang meeting, "Liu and Deng came to a corresponding big move: power generation, please transfer** to work in the Central Plains." Liu and Deng said: The Central Plains has a very large jurisdiction, and the leadership force is extremely weak."

It is difficult for us to define, whether the **sent** to work in the Central Plains Bureau was decided to be sent according to the request of Liu and Deng, or whether the *** itself had already considered sending ** to the Central Plains Bureau. But at least on this issue, ** coincides with Liu and Deng's thoughts.

On May 30, ** and *** led 4,700 cadres to leave Puyang to perform their duties in the Central Plains. Since then, ** has left Huaye, where he has been fighting.

In his "War Memoirs", Su Yu mentioned that after adopting his strategic proposal, he said: "Comrade * and Comrade * * adopted the suggestion that the First Corps should postpone the march south of the Yangtze River and concentrate troops to fight a big battle in the Central Plains, and Comrade ** is about to leave Huaye temporarily. ”

Indeed, although he agreed with Su Yu's strategic proposal, he also gave him a fairly high target for destroying the enemy. This target is that "within a period of four months or as much as eight months, the corps, together with the other three columns, will complete the task of preparing to cross the river with the goal of annihilating 56 to 12 regular brigades of the Fifth Army and other units in the north and south areas of the Bianxu Line."

At that time, a Kuomintang brigade was equivalent to a division before the reorganization, about 8,000 people, and the 112th brigade was about 100,000 people, which was equivalent to the total number of troops commanded by Su Yu at that time. It can be seen how heavy the combat mission given to Su Yu is.

In order to create a better command environment for Su Yu, it was decided not to participate in the operations commanded by Su Yu, so that Su Yu could completely let go of planning and commanding. Just like the ** in the Northeast, the party, government and military power will be handed over to the **. In terms of employing people, there are often generous and extraordinary ways. What's more, this has always been the case in ancient and modern times, and whoever sets up the "military order" will be responsible for the program. This time, the ** was turned off, putting pressure on Su Yu, and stimulating Su Yu's passion and fighting spirit, and the same is true.

Main references: "*Biography", "*Annals", "Su Yu Biography", "Su Yu War Memoirs".

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