The war between Russia and Ukraine has been going on for more than a year, but Russia has not achieved any clear victory, nor does it see the possibility of peace or a ceasefire. The conflict has become a long-standing stalemate.
Ukraine is vital to Russia's geostrategy, as it serves as a buffer zone between Russia and Europe, especially NATO. Before the war, the two countries had close people-to-people, economic and trade ties, and Russian capital occupied an important position in the industrial regions of eastern Ukraine. Russia could have influenced and controlled Ukraine by economic means, not by force. But Russia, which experienced instability and energy dependence after the collapse of the Soviet Union, could not withstand the capital and technological superiority of the West.
Therefore, Russia has chosen force as a means of solving the problem. But Ukraine has the largest territory in Europe, and it takes a lot of troops to occupy and control it. Russia's military has shrunk to less than a million, and economic turmoil and disarmament have made it ineffective. If Ukraine has the ability and will to resist, Russia cannot easily occupy it.
At the beginning of the war, it was thought that Russia would conduct large-scale offensive operations like the Soviet Union, but it turned out that Russia adopted the model of hybrid warfare, trying to destroy Ukrainian resistance by taking Kyiv by quick assault. This shows that Russia is well aware of its capabilities and knows that the only way to achieve a quick victory in this conflict is the ideal strategy. So the Russian Airborne Forces conducted secret drills in preparation for a surprise attack on Kyiv. But the result was unexpected, the Russian Airborne Forces did not suppress the Ukrainian firepower and did not achieve the objectives of the campaign, but worsened the situation of the war.
After the failure of the assault, Russia was forced to switch to positional warfare, which was detrimental to Russia, since the level of technology was now more conducive to defense than offense. Russia does not have enough forces for a large-scale cluster assault, and there is no first.
Second, the support of the third echelon. Russia also lacks the means of informatization and digitization, which hinders the offensive. When Ukraine received a lot of assistance from NATO, Russia was in an even more difficult situation.
In this case, Russia needs more troop mobilization, and if it wants to solve the problem of Ukraine, it is still necessary to carry out a wide frontal and large-depth offensive. But Russia is constrained not only by size and technology, but also by the enormous losses and political repercussions caused by the offensive. Russia is not capable of such an offensive. In the end, Russia was able to carry out only a small and short assault, but did not fight another war of annihilation. Russia can only consume Ukraine with its own stocks.
With the front stable, Ukraine can also continue to mobilize and train new troops. At this time, Russia needs to launch a strategic strike on the rear of Ukraine in order to gradually gain an advantage. But Russia's means of striking are too limited to inflict rapid paralysis on critical systems in Ukraine's rear. Neither the "Iskander" nor the Iranian "motorcycles" are sufficient to inflict a devastating blow on Ukraine's transportation and urban infrastructure, nor can they quickly destroy Ukraine's will to resist and its ability to fight.
It's not that Russia doesn't want to start, it's that there is nothing to do. The current stalemate allows Russia to crush Ukraine through attrition with a high exchange ratio if it wants to win. At present, there are signs that Ukraine's manpower is starting to be insufficient and chaotic, and more and more middle-aged and elderly, untrained or untrained soldiers are being sent to the front, which means that Ukraine's human resources are deteriorating. These low-quality soldiers will be more likely to become corpses or wounded soldiers than well-trained troops, and Ukraine's manpower problem is indeed serious, but it is still a long way from a real turning point.
Now the question is what is the ratio of consumption of Russian resources to Ukrainian human resources. If the exchange ratio is acceptable, then Russia still has hope of winning. But this is a far cry from pre-war expectations, and the process is too long and expensive. Whatever means are used to freeze or end the conflict, Russia will eventually be reduced to a second-class country at the cost of losing its military deterrent.
Russia has been unable to swallow Ukraine, it is clear that Russia has fallen into a strategic trap designed by the West, and it is not a myth that Russia is being led by the nose by the West.