Regarding some thoughts on China's automotive industry in recent years, the initial judgment was that 2025 would be the "endgame" of China's new energy vehicle market, and there would be a "new energy brand showdown" at that time. In this way, 2024 will be more like a "thorough exam", not a "big exam".
Therefore, new forces or traditional car companies that want to survive in 2025 need to be fully prepared in 2024, whether it is products, channels, or organizational systems, in order to have the opportunity to harvest sufficient incremental markets in 2026 and enter a state of rebalancing the auto market.
Why is 2025 the "year of Armageddon" just a "thorough test"?
The logic is very simple, the cards of each car company in 2024 are already open, and the auto market in China in the first half of 2024 can be roughly predicted - but what kind of products and strategies will be in 2025 are basically still in the haze.
In fact, the product and technical route in 2024 will be basically finalized at the beginning of 2021 and early 2022, and even earlier will be traced back to the end of 2020. At that time, the decisions to be made included in the intelligent chip scheme, range extension or pure electric, overcharging or battery swapping, B-class car or A-class car, NOA scheme and other product forms have been finalized.
It can be said that there will not be too many disruptive technologies in 2024, and everyone is crossing the river by feeling the results of the previous years. The only possible change is in the car machine system, Hongmeng and the large model, which should be able to change a little in 2024.
Therefore, for new energy participants, there is actually an opportunity to adjust according to market changes in 2024 and prepare for the Armageddon in 2025.
So, why can it be adjusted in 2024 and not in 2025?
There are several reasons for this:
Clause. 1. Even if adjustments are made to the product definition from the second half of 2023, it will take 24 months to deliver in the second half of 2025. In addition, 2025 can be released one or two quarters in advance, in fact, it is also possible to turn around in 2025.
Clause. Second, in the Chinese market, the cash reserves of many new forces and even traditional car companies are only enough to maintain nearly two years of operation, about 200-40 billion yuan, once the sales volume in 2025 is not up, it will be difficult to get new investment, and it will naturally die down;
Clause. Third, the channel construction should basically be finalized in 2024, and it will be difficult to get new channels in 2025, and there will be no sales without channels;
Clause. Fourth, judging from the rhythm of mainstream global car companies such as Porsche-Benz, BMW, and Toyota, a new generation of products will be intensively launched in 2025, including the new three-electric technology, intelligent technology, intelligent driving experience, etc., which will be equipped on the new cars of these mainstream global car companies, and also have a certain late-mover advantage. Don't forget that Tesla will also bring a new round of products around 2025, and at that time, coupled with the advantages of brands and channels, the impact on new forces and Chinese brands will be obvious.
Therefore, we judge that 2025 is the real "decisive battle" moment for all car companies, and 2024 is only a "thorough test".
Of course, the better the results of the "thorough examination" in 2024, the more "ammunition" can be prepared for the decisive moment in 2025, and "digging deep holes and accumulating grain" will never be wrong.
So what preparations should Chinese automakers, especially new forces, make preparations in 2024?I think that at least we should make full adjustments and preparations in terms of product matrix, technical route selection, channel system, organizational structure, etc.
1. In terms of the positioning of the product matrix, it is necessary to switch from the previous high-end luxury idea of "replacing BBA" to replacing the 15-250,000 yuan products of mainstream brands such as Toyota and Volkswagen.
From this point of view, the new electric vehicles in 2024 generally need to lower their prices, and at the same time be able to predict the pricing trend of the products in 2025, so as to ensure that the monthly sales of the products can be stable at least three to five thousand units after the launch of the products - in a word, to ensure that they stay at the table.
If it is still like the positioning strategy of previous years, "luxury" and "high-end" at every turn, then there is a high probability that it will be "dumb fire" in 2024.
In addition, judging from the consumption trend in 2024, the sales of models above 300,000 yuan are actually shrinking, and the entire automobile market continues to converge on A-class and B-class cars. Judging from the new cars released at the end of this year, whether it is Feifan F7, Star Era ES, Extreme Krypton 007, or Xiaopeng X9, in fact, the core is to reduce the price, and the 5-meter coupe is sold to more than 200,000 yuan, 5The 3-meter MPV is sold for less than 400,000 yuan, which shows that the market is changing.
Therefore, it is even more important for Chinese automakers that are preparing to launch all-new electric vehicles in 2024 to build a product system that is benchmarked against mainstream joint venture brands. This is not only about the pricing of new cars, but also about lowering all trams that may have been "easily" sold for more than 250,000 yuan to match the new system. Otherwise, it is very likely that there will be a situation where there are many new cars on the market, but in the end, there will always be the same one, which will not help the overall scale improvement.
A positive example is Xpeng. In fact, after the launch of Xiaopeng G6, Xiaopeng's entire first-class system has fallen back from "high-end" to "mainstream", including the pricing of P7i, G9 and other models have been comprehensively reduced. After the downward adjustment, basically Xiaopeng aligned with Volkswagen and Toyota brands at the brand level, and Xiaopeng's sales began to stabilize at 20,000 units.
It can be said that it is impossible to change the product layout of each company in 2024, but the positioning of the entire product matrix can be adjusted. Basically, except for a very few brands such as BYD and Tesla, most new energy brands need to reconsider their positioning, especially new power brands need to concentrate on the positioning of "mainstream joint ventures" as soon as possible.
Now there is still an opportunity to seize the sales growth of "mainstream joint ventures", and if you wait until 2025, it is estimated that there will be no such opportunity.
2. In terms of technical routes, if we simply divide the core technology route of new energy vehicles into four aspects: chassis, drive form, intelligent cockpit, and intelligent driving, then we can make corresponding preparations in these four aspects.
First of all, in terms of chassis, for new power products with a positioning of more than 200,000 yuan, the front double wishbone + multi-link is basically the standard, and without the front double wishbone, it can almost only be set below 200,000 yuan. And up to 250,000 yuan to 300,000 yuan of products, air suspension plus CDC variable damping suspension should be standard, and then to 400,000, 500,000 level volume is the intelligent chassis represented by the double-cavity air suspension.
NIO ET9 has made it clear the direction of opening the next electric vehicle chassis "volume" of more than 500,000 yuan, including a fully electronically controlled chassis with functions such as steer-by-wire, active suspension system and so on.
Looking at the drive form, the 800V high-voltage pure electric platform is a very clear route, 250,000 yuan, or even more than 200,000 yuan of products must basically be 800V platform to support, and more than 150,000 yuan can accept 400V products, does not rule out the necessary combination of 400V + SiC.
More importantly, whether the route selection on the plug-in hybrid system is extended range or multi-gear DHT plug-in hybrid?It will be at the heart of each family's current decision-making.
At present, from the perspective of cost strategy, pure electric vehicle companies will directly choose large battery range extension (typically such as zero run), which is less cost-efficient and simpler for platform generalization. Traditional car companies, on the other hand, prefer multi-gear DHT to evolve, because it involves the sunk cost of previous fuel products. However, this also leads to the inability of traditional car companies to unify their plug-in hybrid technology and pure electric technology, and the only advantage is only overseas export projects.
But anyway,Pure electric + plug-in hybrid is a necessary preparation for every car company, and it is the best choice for the pursuit of scale maximization. Except for a few "pure electric schools" such as NIO and Tesla, the rest of the car companies will use 2025 as the node to pre-develop plug-in hybrid technology to ensure that the second growth curve and platform costs are evenly shared.
In terms of intelligent cockpit, it is relatively simple for various car companies, because at present, there is no big problem with the two ways of full-stack self-development and finding the best business, and even there are two sets of interface standards - Tesla or Huawei Hongmeng.
There is a new trend in this, that is, car companies are likely to train their own in-car dialogue needs through AI large models, so as to solve the current gap between traditional car companies and new forces in terms of intelligent experience. Basically, as long as the interface design and voice experience are basically the same, the so-called leading in-car intelligent experience advantage of the new forces will be suddenly reduced.
At the same time, in terms of the hardware of the car machine, it is expected that there will be three sets of standards for the demand in 2025 - low-end 8155, mid-to-high-end 8295, and the flagship is the x86 architecture chip or Nvidia Thor chip. In other words, the smart cockpit experience in 2025 is likely to be flattened, just like the experience of various Android manufacturers now.
The choice of intelligent driving system may be simpler than that of intelligent cabins. After the exploration of the previous car companies in 2023 and the experience of early adopters, the intelligent driving system is likely to directly return to either sell an L2+ level high-speed navigation assistance, or sell "point-to-point navigation assistance (commuting mode)" to its own fans.
Even for non-self-developed car companies, even the demand for lidar can be saved, and the cost of the vehicle can be used more to include air suspension and integrated casting.
3. Channel changes may be a point that many people ignore, and 2024 is almost the last round of opportunities for new energy brands to "** channels."
A clear trend is that in 2024, a large number of traditional brand dealers will still begin to withdraw from the network, and this trend will spread from the third and fourth tier markets to the second tier markets. These dealers who have withdrawn from the network have either stopped doing it at all and have become "charter companies" of new energy brandsEither or take over the new energy brand again. Therefore, at present, traditional brand dealers are very open to new energy brands, after all, after the transformation of the network, new brands are still needed to support, as long as there are new energy brands willing to talk, basically the venue and cooperation mode can be discussed.
At this time, if the new energy brand is still limited to direct sales, supermarkets or super control in network development, then these opportunities to take over the traditional brand dealer channels will be fleeting. If there is no standardized dealer service network of 400 and only a few hundred supermarkets, it is likely that this new energy brand will not develop in 2025.
Because of the model of supermarkets and delivery centers, the entire delivery will be centralized, so that it is impossible to deal with the "explosive model". Once you miss the sales climb in the first three months, then it is very difficult for a new car to stand a chance. Moreover, the actual transaction costs of supermarkets or pop-up stores are too high, and the traffic of high-intent customers is far less than that of traditional auto dealer parks, so taking over the resources of traditional dealers must be the core work of new energy brands in 2024.
One of the points that need to be observed here is that after taking over the traditional brand dealers, whether to adopt the first-class system or the traditional 4S model, or to sell direct after-sales franchise, has become an important decision-making point for new energy brands.
Although at present, the first-class system can also be operated, and the process is almost run through, the biggest problem of the first-class system is that the scale and quantity cannot be increased, and new energy vehicle companies always need to control inventory. After there is no pressure, the transaction cycle and production scheduling of orders will become the "sword of Damox" for new energy vehicle companies, and once the first mistake is made, it may lead to huge submerged costs at the entire business level. At the same time, this may also lead to dealers at the sales level is not so active, after all, there is no financial pressure, many times, as long as you find a low balance point, which is also a difficult point in the management and control of new energy vehicle companies that pursue rapid volume.
4. Regarding the problem of organizational structure, in fact, many car companies have encountered it. Typically, in the process of selling new energy vehicles, traditional car companies have never been able to solve the problem of "how consumers recognize the new energy vehicles of traditional car companies".
One of the core of this is that the marketing strategy of traditional car companies is structured in accordance with the "procurement system", but with the influx of many new technology companies and new players in the new energy vehicle market, the marketing moat of traditional car companies has basically been flattened and cannot achieve effective output.
In fact, marketing is just a small point in the organizational structure. Including we can see that traditional car companies have organizational problems in product modification efficiency, product function iteration, and product definition, which cannot be promoted as quickly as many new energy vehicle companies. And it's not just traditional car companies that can't, some so-called first-tier new energy car companies are also declining in sales, just because they are dragged down by the inefficiency of the entire organizational structure.
Of course, the specific organizational structure problems encountered by each car company are too complex, and it is impossible to generalize. But one thing is clear:At present, most of the car companies have problems in the organizational system, large or small, but the reflection in the front line is low sales efficiency.
Otherwise, it is impossible to explain why the monthly data of China's new energy vehicle brands is so different, BYD with 300,000 units can rank first, and the new forces with monthly sales of just 10,000 can also enter the top 10.
Driver summary. To summarize briefly, in 2024, for all new energy vehicle companies, it will not be the time for the "big test", and the companies will be able to withstand one or two trial and error and mistakes, and the market will also be able to accept the failure of one or two new car companies, which is the so-called "high fault tolerance".
However, if car companies think that this kind of fault tolerance will continue in 2024, it is a big mistake, because from the beginning of 2025, there is a high probability that they will directly enter the "battle mode", and there is little room for error at all.
Therefore, 2024 is a period of "digging deep holes and accumulating grain" for every new energy brand - it can even be said to be a critical period to determine the future life and death. The construction and challenge of the product matrix, the correct reserve of the technical route, the construction and adjustment of channels, and the accelerated construction of brand recognition all need to be completed in 2024.
Only after these are completed, and with one or two popular products, can the brand have a chance to survive the "cruel competition" in 2025 and be qualified to discuss what it can do in 2026.
If the new energy vehicle companies in 2024, just like this year, feel that it is good to be able to maintain monthly sales of 10,000 units and a good ranking, and feel that they can succeed in 2025 as long as they rely on a popular model, then it is better to persuade you to withdraw from the competition as soon as possible.
Because by 2025, if you don't fully prepare and improve the layout in advance, no one will give you the opportunity to "hit the market" and opponents.
Text: Liu Xuexiao.
Figure Network.