In more than 20 years, there have been six anti-Maoist attacks, and the price has been heavy.
The 20 major events of the 20th century evaluated by the Xinhua News Agency not only changed the course of China's history, but also continued to influence subsequent developments. Among them, the Zunyi Conference of 1935 is recognized as a crucial turning point and is undoubtedly included in this list.
Prior to this, the Kuomintang had carried out five "encirclement and suppression" campaigns, all of which ended in failure. As a result, they changed their strategy in the fifth "encirclement and suppression" and decided to no longer "rush forward" but "advance layer by layer" and "consume" tactically with the Red Army and compete with each other for resources and manpower.
In order to achieve this tactic, the Kuomintang built a large number of pillboxes in the **Soviet area and used the local terrain to form a blockade network to block the Red Army's lines of activity.
In the fifth "encirclement and suppression", the Kuomintang invested 500,000 actual combat troops and directly launched 55 divisions and 7 brigades to the battlefield in the Soviet area, which was far more than any previous "encirclement and suppression".
The Kuomintang attached great importance to this "encirclement and suppression", and the goal was "must win", so they not only dispatched armored units, but also purchased a batch of German mountain artillery for the attack.
At this time, the leadership of the first in the Soviet area was in the hands of Bogu, Li De and others, and the operational principles and strategic principles of the first were completely denied. **The total strength of the Soviet districts, including the main Red Army and the local Red Army, was only 100,000 people, and there was a lack of heavy **, not to mention the fact that in the case of the blockade, food could not be supplied in time.
When the Kuomintang was preparing for the fifth "encirclement and suppression", the Red Army chose to fight separately, and part of the troops formed the Eastern Army to fight in Fujian, and the rest of the troops contained the other side in the Fuhe River Valley.
On September 25, 1933, the fifth "encirclement and suppression" began with the Kuomintang attacking Lichuan. The loss of Lichuan did not let Bogu and them see the situation clearly, on the contrary, they immediately asked the Eastern Army to recover Lichuan.
Why were the first four anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaigns successful?This is because the Red Army has made full use of its own strengths, that is, it fights in a mobile manner, does not confront the opponent head-on, and pays attention to the "fastness" and "skillfulness" of combat.
However, this time, after winning in Xunkou, the Eastern Army actually went to attack strongholds such as Zixi Bridge and Tantou City, which were heavily guarded
Can it succeed?The Red Army suffered successive defeats. In this situation of lack of people, lack of **, and lack of food, it is already very difficult to face a "strong enemy", and at this time, there are still discordant voices.
Instead of cherishing the successful experience of the past and seriously summing up the war, Bogu and others pursued a series of policies that undermined the hard-won foundation, including military-civilian relations.
The news of the defeat from the front made them timid, and they did not actively think about how to counter the encirclement and suppression, but only thought about how to defend, the positional defense, as long as they could delay the opponent's attack.
It is often said that victory or defeat on the battlefield is a common thing, as long as you adjust your strategy and tactics in time, the final victory will be yours. However, they even gave up the opportunity to send it to the door, and it is really dangerous not to understand the military.
In November of this year, the Kuomintang 19th Route Army rebelled against Chiang, ** and others saw the opportunity, this is a godsend, should send troops to support Fujian, force the other side to shift strategy, not only to destroy the "encirclement and suppression", but also to jointly promote the anti-Japanese resistance.
However, Bogu and others refused, thinking that this was someone else's housework, so why should we care?It is not necessary to sacrifice their own troops. In this way, a door to "help others and save yourself" was closed.
While the Red Army was struggling to resist the opponent's fortress line, the Kuomintang took full control of Fujian, and the reorganized Fujian army turned to join the attack on the ** Soviet area. While the two sides were fighting fiercely, the leaders of the Soviet region were still busy with the "field investigation movement", and because serious problems had arisen, they presided over the work of correcting deviations, but they were soon criticized again.
During that period of history, the Red Army faced a serious dilemma. In October 1934, the Red Army was forced to withdraw from the ** base area and began the arduous Long March. At that time, everyone was full of doubts about the future of the Red Army, and anyone would have thought that the reversal of the Chinese revolution was coming
However, 3 months later, the Zunyi Conference established the leading position in the Red Army and ***, which was a major turning point in history. Of the five military encirclements and suppressions that began in October 1930, the first four were victorious under the correct command of *** and others.
However, the failure of the fifth "anti-encirclement and suppression" was due to the fact that he took the wrong path and did not continue to adhere to the correct line represented by ***. It is worth mentioning that before the Long March, those leaders were not willing to bring ***
But later, they adopted the advice of ***, and the Red Army forcibly crossed the Wujiang River and captured Zunyi, which caught the other side by surprise and bought valuable time for themselves.
After that, the situation of the Red Army was reversed, and they completely controlled the right to speak on the battlefield by crossing the Chishui River four times and forcibly crossing the Dadu River.
History always speaks with facts, but some theories that have been proven are still ignored. There have been many times against it, so how much did it cost us?
The price of the fifth anti-encirclement and suppression was heavy, and even the ** base area was lost. And what about the other times?The cost of the Jinggangshan struggle period cannot be ignored. At the beginning of 1928, the revolutionary cause was flourishing, but Zhou Lu, the representative of the Hunan Special Committee from Ninggang, forced his troops to leave the border on the grounds of "too right-wing action".
At that time, the "armed secession of workers and peasants" on the Hunan and Jiangxi borders had just taken shape, and the enemy was always waiting for an opportunity to move. As soon as the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army left, the White Terror followed.
At that time, if only one person joined the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army, the whole family would be killed. The base areas were quickly occupied by the enemy, the party organizations were seriously damaged, and the revolutionary cause suffered heavy losses, which was the "March Defeat".
At that time, ** first blocked the enemy who was chasing the Shonan rebel army, and then led his troops back to Jinggangshan, and the situation in the base area was reversed. At that time, the development of the Hunan and Jiangxi borders was decided after several failed attacks on Changsha.
At that time, ** chose to retreat to the countryside in time, and the facts also proved the correctness of this road. However, many people did not see the situation clearly, and still believed that "the city is the center of the riot", and were in a hurry, which led to an arbitrary demand, asking *** to lead his troops to attack Yucheng and respond to the riot in southern Shonan.
It was originally planned to operate in March, but it failed and did not wake everyone up, and in August there was another even bigger failure. In June, the Chinese Communist Party of China Hunan Province sent Du Xiujing and Yang Kaiming to the Red Fourth Army, ordering them to leave Jinggangshan and go to Leiyang, Yongxing and other four counties in southern Hunan to develop "rural secession".
** Opposing this decision, he believes that the time is not ripe to carry out the mission, and that we are at a disadvantage due to the disparity between the forces of the enemy and us. However, this decision led to the downfall of the Red Twenty-ninth Regiment.
At the beginning of July, the enemy attacked, ** led the Red 28th Regiment and the 29th Regiment down the mountain to meet the attack, and the results were good, but on the way back, something went wrong. The Red 29th Regiment privately decided to go to southern Hunan under the pretext that it was an order from the Hunan Provincial Party Committee.
*, * forced the troops to return to Jinggangshan, but at this time the military spirit of the 29th Regiment had already dispersed. Most of the officers and men of the 29th Red Regiment were from Yizhang, and they felt that life in Jinggangshan was hard, so they wanted to go home, and they wanted to use this order to leave.
Under these circumstances, ** had to convene an enlarged meeting of the Military Commission, and Du Xiujing and the representatives of the 29th Regiment insisted on carrying out the instructions of the provincial party committee, so the troops left for Chenzhou.
At this time, the officers and men of the 29th Red Regiment were more worried about their families and had no intention of fighting. The enemy retreated first and then counterattacked, the 29th Regiment was quite passive, and more than 200 of more than 1,000 people were left in the end, and many people fled.
After the main force of the Red Army withdrew from Jinggangshan, in the face of the fierce attack of the enemy, in order to preserve its strength, the remaining personnel could only conduct guerrilla warfare in the mountainous areas. Subsequently, the enemy carried out frenzied retaliation against the base areas, and the Red Fourth Army suffered heavy losses, and both Shonan and the border failed.
**and** had no choice but to leave Jinggangshan with the Red Fourth Army and move to southern Jiangnan. Although the road of the Chinese revolution was tortuous, it also lost the base areas it had worked so hard to open up many times, and the cost was huge.
However, this did not stop the progress of countless revolutionaries. However, there are some people who desperately oppose *** when the situation gradually becomes clear, and finally pay a heavy price.
Eight years later, it became popular.
When the 1st and 4th Front armies met, Zhang Guotao had already heard about the influence of the Red Front Army, which made the enemy frightened. However, when he saw the force in front of him, he had the idea of "something else" in his heart.
This unit cannot be compared with its own Red Fourth Front Army in terms of equipment and personnel quality, especially since its number is less than 20,000.
** It is believed that after the two armies meet, it is necessary to resolve the consistency of decision-making and execution to ensure the smooth implementation of the plan to go north. However, at the meeting on the second day, Zhang Guotao proposed to go south to Chuankang, which he thought was the best plan.
However, in fact, Zhang Guotao's real intention is not the next plan, but a certain position. When he learned that the strength of the Red Fourth Front Army was four times that of the Red First Army, Zhang Guotao's mentality changed.
He tried to use the "discord scheme" to provoke everyone's dissatisfaction with ***, and first sent a secretary to test ***, but *** became vigilant, thinking that this was a despicable old warlord faction.
Then, Zhang Guotao personally came forward to invite *** and *** to dinner, and said that he would allocate troops to them. However, everyone knows that the position of *** in the army cannot be shaken, so the "soft" approach does not work.
The Sichuan-Shaanxi Provincial Party Committee sent a telegram asking for a reshuffle of the leadership, which can be said to be "forcing the palace". Taking into account the overall situation, ** made concessions and gave Zhang Guotao the position of general political commissar.
However, after Zhang Guotao took over the Military Commission, he did not attack Songpan, but talked about the "Zunyi Conference", believing that because he and the other four people were not present, the election results of the meeting were invalid.
During the war years, time was of the essence, and many concessions were made in order to gain time. However, someone's delayed action, which wasted 60 days, deprived the Red Army of the first opportunity.
Hu Zongnan was well prepared, and the Red Army had to make a detour through the meadows and advance north. ** led the Right Route Army in the Zoige steppe, a place Xi known as the "Sea of Death", where about 10,000 Red Army soldiers were buried according to relevant historical records.
However, this force did not stop there, and after seven days they were out of the meadow, but to continue north, they had to pass through Baoza, where the enemy had already been stationed.
Nevertheless, this "tired" Red Army, with firm conviction and tenacious perseverance, managed to break through the enemy's defenses.
Zhang Guotao was delaying the movement of the large army at this time, he was not willing to go with the Right Route Army, but expressed dissatisfaction with the unauthorized revision of the original military plan. Despite the continuous urging of the Politburo, it was not until August 30 that Zhang Guotao ordered the Left Route Army to enter the grassland.
However, when the troops reached the Gaqu River, it rained heavily, and Zhang Guotao sent electricity to ** on the grounds that the river was **, unable to cross the river and build bridges, claiming that he wanted to "return to the original road".
** and Chen Changhao tried to persuade Zhang Guotao to continue to go north, but because Zhang Guotao took advantage of the old relationship between them, he directly ordered the two to go south, and did not even forward the telegram to **.
** Objected to this, arguing that going south was a dead end. However, Zhang Guotao did not listen to the advice, which led to the size of the Red Fourth Front Army being halved, leaving only 40,000. At the same time, the Red Army marched north alone, joined up with the Red 15th Army Corps, and annihilated the enemy along the way, expanding its strength.
Under pressure from many parties, Zhang Guotao was forced to go north. After arriving in northern Shaanxi, he began to oppose the strategic policy of **. ** The strategy of first delaying the pursuit of the enemy on the southern front and then crossing the Yellow River was formulated, but Zhang Guotao opposed it and insisted that the whole army of the Red Fourth Front Army cross the river.
In the end, Zhang Guotao made a compromise under pressure. ** and *** repeatedly emphasized that now we can only fight the Hu enemy first, and then attack Ningxia, otherwise it is impossible to attack Ningxia.
However, in March 1937, the Western Route Army failed after 6 months of continuous fighting in the Hexi Corridor, 2More than 180,000 people died. The Western Route Army was led by the Red Fourth Front Army.
Three. The 10th, 9th, and 5th armies had not had had that much opposition at the time, and the result would have been much better.
In addition, Zhang Guotao also opposed the Xi'an Incident and held an opposition to it.
After analyzing the situation, Mao Zhudu and the Politburo put forward the key task of "resisting Japan." In the course of cooperation between the KMT and the CPC, our party adheres to the tactics of "independence and self-determination" and "guerrilla warfare."
Some, however, disagreed and voiced their views at important conferences and publications. This personal bias and opposition has led to the loss of some of our ground.
In November 1937, Wang Ming returned to Yan'an from abroad, and he had been away for six years. At that time, it was made clear that we needed to maintain the positions we had already achieved and develop new ones, which was the strategy of "independence and self-determination".
However, Wang Ming has his own views on the "united front", and he puts the Chinese Communist Party in a "subordinate" position, which is obviously despising us. On December 27 of the same year, Wang Ming wrote an article entitled "The Key to Saving the Times", in which he expressed praise for Chiang Kai-shek, calling him "a figure who resolutely led the War of Resistance Against Japan" and "China's immortal national hero".
While continuing to expound his views, Wang Ming published an article entitled "Summary of the March Politburo Meeting" and claimed that the Kuomintang was the largest political party in China. At the Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Wang Ming even declared that the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningbo Border Region was willing to obey the leadership of the Kuomintang.
Wang Ming's thinking has "surrendered," and he will only become more unprincipled on military issues and strategic principles. The success of the Chinese revolution was due to the contribution of guerrilla strategy and tactics, but this was "too earthy" in the eyes of Wang Ming, who openly said: "Guerrilla warfare cannot defeat Japan."
Wang Ming stressed the need to have a unified national defense force and regular army, so he came up with his "five unifications" and "seven reunifications." * It has always been emphasized that in the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, it is necessary to independently carry out guerrilla warfare in mountainous areas, but in Wang Ming's view, it is necessary to "focus on movement warfare, cooperate in positional warfare, and guerrilla warfare is the auxiliary."
At that time, was there a situation for a head-on confrontation with the Japanese invaders?It will only consume their own combat power in vain. **At that time, it was said that China's war of resistance was long-term and should be based on self-reliance.
** Seeing very clearly the forces at home and abroad at that time, he believed that he could only rely on himself, so he should develop more anti-Japanese areas, form "encirclement" and "counter-encirclement" between the enemy and us, and vigorously develop the popular movement.
Wang Ming was adamant and believed that keeping in touch with the KMT's top brass was more important than anything else, and that the focus should be on the big cities rather than the countryside.
However, when Xuzhou fell in 1938 and the focus of Central China shifted to arming the people and preparing to wage a guerrilla war, Wang Ming did not realize this. He believed that the work in the areas behind enemy lines in Central China was not important, so he did not seriously carry it out.
As a result, Wang Ming insisted on his own ideas in the work of the Yangtze River Bureau, which caused the work of the Yangtze River Bureau to suffer heavy losses, and the opportunity to develop the New Fourth Army and revolutionary base areas in the Yangtze River valley was also wasted.
In order to promote his own ideas, Wang Ming often belittles the claims of ***. At the December Politburo meeting, he criticized the guerrilla warfare theory, and in March of the following year, he continued to criticize the guerrilla warfare theory and the proposition of the base areas behind enemy lines.
However, those who do not understand the Chinese revolution cannot truly understand the great contribution of guerrilla warfare and base areas. The Chinese revolution has gone through hardships, and every success is the result of countless efforts.
Wang Ming did not participate in the course of the Chinese revolution, but he liked to arm his theories with speeches, which once led to confusion in the party's ideological understanding, and the consequences were very serious. Before leaving Jinggangshan, he wrote "Why Can China's Red Regime Exist?".
and "The Struggle in Jinggangshan". Looking at the subsequent historical developments, it is to confirm the viewpoint.
Since 1928, his opinion has often been opposed in several important decisions, resulting in a heavy price for us. First of all, the opposition of the special commissioner of the Hunan Provincial Party Committee made our achievements go to wasteThen in the **Soviet zone, our decisions were completely repudiated, which led to the forced relocation of the Red Army;Then there was the opposition of Zhang Guotao and Wang Ming, which caused us to suffer heavy losses.
In addition, at the beginning of 1929, Liu Angong, who had returned from the Soviet Union, came to the Red Fourth Army, and he announced at the meeting of the Provisional Military Commission that "only the question of action will be discussed", and this decision was actually aimed at ***
Liu Angong accused *** of disobeying ** instructions and creating his own principles". In July of this year, ** left the Red Fourth Army, and Liu Angong went to the Second Column as the commander.
During the attack on Fengshi on October 21, the second column encountered a strong enemy, Liu Angong used a machine gun to cover the soldiers, and unfortunately was shot in the head and died, which was a heavy loss after the Red Fourth Army entered Fujian.
If *** had stayed in the Red Fourth Army instead of going to the Fujian Special Committee to help, then this battle might have had a different ending. Despite the success in capturing Tiger City at that time, defeating two enemy battalions, it came at the cost of losing an important commander.
In May 1930, he put forward the idea that "without investigation, there is no voice" ("Against Essentialism"). Looking back at these "six objections", most of them were against *** while ignoring the facts
Later, in the painful experience, we realized that we had taken a detour, from the commissioner in Jinggangshan to Wang Ming in the Yan'an period, in just over 20 years, these six opposition acts have paid a heavy price.
When being surrounded and intercepted by the Kuomintang army ten times larger than himself, there were still people who insisted on the original plan, and at this time *** proposed to move to Guizhou, and the decision at this critical moment reversed the situation.
** We have always emphasized "independence and self-determination", and not only the Chinese revolution must follow its own path, but also China's construction and development must adhere to its own road.
** Ideology is a treasure in the revolutionary struggle, tested by countless painful lessons. These costs serve as a wake-up call for future generations, reminding us that we can only follow our own path, not blindly imitate them.
So, if you want to learn from history, start by reading it.
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