On November 15 this year, the San Francisco meeting between the Chinese and US heads of state once again ignited the hope that the relations between the two countries would stop falling and stabilize. The vision and efforts of both sides to reasonably avoid risks and miscalculations and return to the track of stability are clearly in line with the expectations of the international community. However, on the evening of November 21, North Korea launched the first reconnaissance satellite "Wanlijing-1".Not only has the world's attention once again turned to the protracted confrontation on the Northeast Asian Peninsula, but the vision of a sustained warming of Sino-US relations has once again been questioned and challenged.
After the incident, the ROK** announced the next day that it had suspended some of the provisions of the "Panmunjom Declaration Agreement on the Implementation of the Agreement in the Military Field" (i.e., the "September 19 Military Agreement") and resumed military reconnaissance on the DPRK side of the 38th parallel. The military agreement, signed in 2018, aims to manage the crisis on the North and South Peninsulas, cease hostile activities between the two Koreas, and establish a buffer zoneIts role is equivalent to the "last safety valve of the peninsula". Following South Korea's statement, the DPRK also announced on the 23rd that it would suspend the implementation of the Panmunjom Declaration, and said that if a conflict breaks out between the two Koreas, South Korea will assume full responsibility.
On the evening of November 21, the DPRK launched the reconnaissance satellite "Wanlijing-1".
The situation quickly heated up with the intervention of the United States. On the 24th, the USS Carl Vinson aircraft carrier docked at its operational base in the port of Busan, South Korea. On the same day, the DPRK began work to repair the frontline posts and deploy troops and heavy ** troops to the border. On 2 December, South Korea's first military reconnaissance satellite was successfully launched in the United States. The series of actions has once again made the situation in Northeast Asia tense, and the space race on the Korean Peninsula has intensified. Unfortunately, in terms of crisis management, China and the United States have not yet negotiated an effective plan for the recent thaw in relations, and on the contrary, the "periphery" with military and geostrategic value still shows that it is difficult to reconcile traditional security interests.
The vicious circle of trilateral interaction between the DPRK, South Korea and the United States
On the 70th anniversary of the armistice, the end of the war on the Korean Peninsula is still far away, and even the Korean Peninsula has not yet formed any peace mechanism that can replace the armistice agreement. Although the United States and South Korea hope to ease regional pressure, military provocations have intensified, and regional countries are mired in security dilemmas. Now that Sino-US relations have warmed up, tensions on the peninsula have intensified, which seems to project the upper limit of cooperation between China and the United States in the core interests and geopolitical fields.
On the one hand, countries in the region face a situation where it is difficult to negotiate with each other in terms of security demands. The North Korean satellite launch once again revealed the dysfunction of the Security Council, which is struggling to effectively implement sanctions resolutions against North Korea. At the same time,Recent contacts between Russia and North Korea have raised alarm among the United States and its allies, which has further led to a vicious circle of security dilemmas in the trilateral interactions between the two Koreas. Over the past year, U.S.-South Korea security cooperation has continued to escalate. On April 26, the two leaders issued the Washington Declaration, supporting the continued implementation of the "extended deterrence" strategy and announcing the establishment of the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG).The two sides also signed a revised version of the Tailored Deterrence Strategy (TDS) document on November 13. All of these measures are aimed at countering the North Korean nuclear threat.
Biden of the United States and Yoon Suk-yeol of South Korea issued the Washington Declaration on April 26.
In addition, Yoon Suk-yeol abandoned the "strategic ambiguity" policy toward China and the United States during the Moon Jae-in period, bankrupting the previous one's efforts to explore South Korea's relatively independent development pathInstead, there has been a policy shift based on the ROK-US Comprehensive Strategic Alliance, sacrificing autonomy for security and using the alliance to enhance its international status. In addition, in order to be elected as a non-permanent member of the Security Council, Yoon Suk-yeol** has set out a strategic goal to make South Korea a "global pivotal state." In the face of potential proximity risks, the DPRK's concerns about the risk have gradually escalated, so it has also taken corresponding countermeasures. Such a vicious circle makes the prospects for inter-Korean dialogue very slim, and the two sides have misaligned paths in building mutual trust and differences in perception on the issue of reunification, which will inevitably be reflected in the zero-sum effect at the security level.
North Korea's growing willingness to acquire nuclear weapons is also seen as a security challenge, and its shaking of stability in Northeast Asia has led countries to reassess their strategy toward North Korea. The United States, out of its commitment to South Korea's nuclear protection, is more willing to send aircraft carriers to show its strength, and at the same time proves with practical actions that it will never give up its attention and involvement in the Indo-Pacific region, emphasizing the maintenance of its global projection capability. The danger of U.S. policy on the Korean Peninsula lies in this, where military deterrence and pressure provide incentives for North Korea to further develop nuclear power, which in turn will inevitably lead regional countries into a confrontational pattern and a security dilemma.
On the other hand, the intricacies of the situation on the Korean Peninsula itself reveal the structural contradictions faced by China and the United States. First of all, problems left over from history have always been the root cause of the obstacles to building mutual trust between the DPRK and the ROK. The way out for reconciliation between the two Koreas lies in the reunification of the peninsula, but the long-term situation on the peninsula has made the nationalism of both sides dependent on state construction, and this process has never been able to go beyond the elite-led struggle for national ** and legitimacy.
Second, nuclear security issues have also further complicated the situation on the Korean Peninsula, and the impact of North Korea's rapidly developing nuclear capabilities on regional security has gradually intensified. Because of its conventional military disadvantage over the United States and South Korea, Pyongyang relies heavily on nuclear weapons and sees it as the core of its national defense strategy. Since 2021, when the North Korean side announced a "five-year plan" for military modernization, its missile capabilities have made significant progress in terms of quantity and quality, and it plans to develop and deploy tactical nuclear **.
The DPRK, South Korea, and the United States already have a structure of intensifying contradictions on the nuclear issue, and when the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula becomes an international issue, the involvement of regional powers will exacerbate the complex situation on the Korean Peninsula. As mentioned above, the Northeast Asia strategy is willing to portray North Korea as a security threat in Northeast Asia in order to consolidate the security dependence of South Korea and Japan and build a composite alliance system to provide a reason to intervene in the affairs of the peninsula. At the same time, any escalation of the situation on the Korean Peninsula may bring security challenges to China, so there are structural contradictions between China and the United States on the North Korean issue. Although Sino-US relations have improved to a certain extent after the San Francisco summit, and there are many positive signals for the resumption of contacts and communication between the two militaries, China and the United States still need to establish a crisis management mechanism similar to that of the United States and the Soviet Union after the Cuban Missile Crisis. The lack of such a mechanism can easily lead to difficulties for the two sides to achieve dialogue and consultation in the first place to eliminate misunderstandings when dealing with regional affairs and the outbreak of conflicts. Coupled with the fact that Pyongyang** has indirectly eased the pressure of sanctions in its external interactions, it is now less motivated to return to the negotiating table, and has fewer concerns about the consequences of escalation, so it seems difficult to move forward with the resumption of talks.
U.S.-China Cooperation: There are challenges but promises
Despite the complexity of the situation on the Korean Peninsula and the structural contradictions between China and the United States, there is still room for cooperation between the two countries. On the one hand, avoiding nuclear war is the core common security goal of the United States, South Korea, and their allies on the Korean Peninsula issue. The most immediate threat is not North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons, but the extent to which the threat perception will prompt the possibility of nuclear weapons being used in a conflict. On the other hand, because the current international situation such as the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the Kazakh-Israeli conflict has caused the United States to be unable to separate itself in its global strategy, and its ability to bear the risk of a resurgence of gunfire on the peninsula has been sharply reduced, it is unlikely that Northeast Asia will be allowed to become a "third battlefield" after Eastern Europe and the Middle East. Therefore, the door to diplomacy is not closed. Measures such as minimizing nuclear risks, reducing Pyongyang's threat perception, and balancing sanctions and relations with North Korea will not only help ease the situation on the Korean Peninsula, but also leave room for consultation and cooperation between China and the United States in a situation where the decline is halted and stabilized.
At the same time, South Korea, as a security party to the Korean Peninsula issue, is not a rational decision to easily discard the achievements of past agreements. In fact, South Korea has become more cautious in handling the Korean Peninsula issue out of concerns about "abandonment" in the ROK-US alliance and the adjustment of the alliance's deterrence focus to conventional armaments in the future. On November 26, the China-Japan-ROK foreign ministers' meeting sent a positive signal, with all three sides saying that they would strengthen strategic dialogue on the Korean Peninsula issue and eliminate misunderstandings through strategic communication. The trilateral cooperation mechanism reflects South Korea's tendency to pursue strategic autonomy. As mentioned above, the military deterrence strategy under the US-ROK alliance has not only failed to alleviate the situation on the Korean Peninsula, but has exacerbated the regional security dilemma, and the restraint diplomacy to prevent the situation from deteriorating deserves to be given priority by South Korea.
Moreover, given North Korea's fundamental interest in avoiding an unnecessary nuclear war, North Korea's assertive behavior may also often provide a window of opportunity to restart diplomacy with the White House, based on past experience. In the future, the DPRK may send a signal of détente to the United States and return to the negotiating table with the United States on the nuclear issue to achieve the goal of easing security threats and economic sanctions from the international community. During the Trump administration, Kim Jong-un held talks with Trump after the Korean Peninsula issue deteriorated to reach a consensus to ease the situation. If Trump is re-elected in 2024, there is a possibility that the situation on the peninsula will be reversed again.
On June 12, 2018, then-U.S. Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un held a historic U.S.-North Korea summit on Singapore's Sentosa Island and shook hands after the signing ceremony. At present, many analysts have pointed out that if the United States wins in 2024, the current foreign policy of the United States towards North Korea may change.
As China calls for a "double suspension" (i.e., the suspension of nuclear and missile activities by the DPRK and the suspension of large-scale military exercises by the United States and South Korea), the ultimate way forward is to face up to the crux of the problem on the Korean Peninsula, maintain strategic communication and dialogue, and resolve the Korean Peninsula issue through political means. It is not in the interests of all parties to allow the situation on the Korean Peninsula to reach a stalemate, and it is not impossible to reasonably deal with the Korean Peninsula issue in the context of China-US relations stopping their decline and stabilizing. As a signatory to the Korean Armistice Agreement, the two sides have achieved positive interaction on maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, as exemplified by the 2003 Six-Party Talks between the DPRK, South Korea, China, the United States, Russia, and Japan aimed at resolving the North Korean nuclear issue.
In short, although the Korean Peninsula issue to a certain extent reflects the limited space for Sino-US cooperation in certain aspects, and its tense geopolitical situation and traditional security issues have once again highlighted the structural contradictions between China and the United States, under the current positive background of China-US relations stopping the decline and stabilizing, the Korean Peninsula may not usher in a good opportunity for relaxation, and even the North Korean issue may create potential conditions for dialogue between regional countries.