The conflict between Russia and Ukraine has lasted for more than a year, and Western countries' ** aid to Ukraine has become more and more bold, from the initial light ** to the current heavy equipment, and even includes depleted uranium bombs using nuclear waste. And Russia, although it has the most nuclear weapons in the world, cannot effectively prevent Western interference and quickly solve the problem of Ukraine. Russia's nuclear deterrent seems to have been greatly reduced, in stark contrast to the glory of the Soviet Union.
The Soviet Union was once the leader of nuclear weapons, and its nuclear tests and military exercises terrified Western countries. For example, in the 1981 "West-81" military exercise, the Soviet Union demonstrated a plan to open the battlefield with nuclear ** and occupy Europe in 8 days. Even on the eve of the collapse of the USSR, the USSR conducted an exercise of "doomsday salvo", firing hundreds of nuclear warheads at the West with strategic nuclear submarines.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia inherited its nuclear heritage and became a nuclear power. Russia has always taken nuclear weapons as its protective umbrella, adopted a tough attitude towards the outside world, and is not afraid of any challenge. However, in the war in Ukraine, Russia has found that its nuclear ** is not very useful, it cannot be used to attack Ukraine, nor can it be used to deter the West. Russia's nuclear ** has lost its military value.
This is not to say that nuclear ** itself is not powerful, but that the use of nuclear ** is subject to a lot of restrictions. Nuclear is currently the most powerful in the world, and its power can destroy entire cities and even affect the movement of the earth. For example, the 1961 "Tsar" bomb test, which had a yield equivalent to 50 million tons of TNT, produced a huge mushroom cloud that could be seen 1,000 kilometers away, its shock wave circled the Earth three times, its **wave could also be felt on the east coast of the United States, and its ** also caused the Eurasian continent to move by 9 millimeters. However, such a nuclear ** is unlikely to be used in a war, because its consequences are too terrible.
Even tactical nuclear ** is difficult to use on the battlefield in Ukraine. Because the Ukrainian battlefield is characterized by urban warfare and guerrilla warfare, neither of which is suitable for the use of nuclear **. In urban warfare, the troops of both sides are scattered in various buildings, and it is difficult for the nuclear ** to destroy them at one time, and the nuclear ** is not very destructive to reinforced concrete and other structures, and it will also produce nuclear radiation and affect its own troops. In guerrilla warfare, the enemy's forces will not be concentrated, but will be concealed and transferred at any time, and it will be difficult for the nuclear ** to find the target, and it will also cause resentment among the population.
In addition, Russia has other considerations that make it reluctant to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine. On the one hand, the four eastern oblasts of Ukraine are relatives of Russia, their inhabitants are mostly ethnic Russians, Russia also considers them its own territory, and it does not want to use nuclear ** on its own relatives and land. On the other hand, Western countries are very sensitive to the use of nuclear **, and they have made it clear that they will not tolerate any form of nuclear threat or nuclear attack, and if Russia does use nuclear **, it could trigger a full-scale nuclear war, which is unaffordable for Russia.
P**el Podvig, a nuclear security expert at the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, said that the Russia-Ukraine conflict has demonstrated the uselessness of nuclear **. At the beginning of the conflict, Western countries were still somewhat concerned about Russia's nuclear **, and only provided some light ** to Ukraine, and when Russia issued a warning, they also showed some fear. However, as the conflict deepens, the ** aid of Western countries to Ukraine is getting bigger and bigger, even exceeding Russia's "red line", while Russia's warnings have no effect.
Some have suggested that Russia use tactical nuclear ** to destroy some important Ukrainian targets, such as bridges, airports, transport nodes, etc., or conduct a demonstration of nuclear ** in Ukraine's no-man's land to warn the West and at the same time undermine Ukrainian morale. However, Russia did not do this, because it knows that since the United States nuclear bombed Japan after World War II, the whole world knows the power of nuclear **, and almost all countries will not accept any nuclear threat or nuclear attack, which will limit Russia's actions.
P**el Podvig said that from the fact that the Russian leader only said "if the West enters the war, use nuclear **", it can be seen that Russia does not intend to use nuclear ** in Ukraine, it just wants to scare the West with nuclear **. This has some effect, but Russia has also found that it cannot use nuclear ** to block other forms of Western aid to Ukraine, and this assistance is getting worse. It is clear that Russia's nuclear ** can only be used to prevent a nuclear attack by the West, but not to attack Ukraine. To a certain extent, the huge arsenal of nuclear ** that Russia has is no longer an advantage, but a burden.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has spent a lot of money on maintaining and developing its nuclear arsenal, while its conventional military forces have been neglected. Russia's military spending is only $40 to $50 billion a year, and a large part of it is spent on nuclear arsenals, which has led to the backwardness of conventional military forces. In the war in Ukraine, the Russian air force lacks precision guidance** and can only support the ground forces with low-altitude bombs, while the navy has nothing to boast about, and even the converted old cruisers have been sunk, and in the end they can only rely on artillery to turn the tide.
If Russia can reduce its nuclear arsenal by half, that is, about 3,000, then its nuclear deterrence will not be affected, and it will also save about $5 billion a year, which is $50 billion in ten years, which can be used to buy more conventional**, such as hundreds of thousands of precision-guided **, or more than a dozen large**, or maintain a huge tank stockpile. Although Russia has 1There are 20,000 tanks in reserve, but most of them are not well maintained, so in the war, Russia is so lacking in main battle tanks that it fought badly in Ukraine.
China should also learn from Russia's lesson, nuclear power will not help China recover Taiwan, and the United States and its allies will not intervene because of China's nuclear power. Fortunately, China has been wise to keep its nuclear arsenal at a level of "just enough" and spend more money on the development of conventional forces, which has allowed China to have three aircraft carriers, as well as a large number of advanced ** such as J-20, J-D, 055, DF-21D and DF-26B, which have made the United States feel powerless. China should not listen to the rhetoric on the Internet that advocates mass production of nuclear weapons, but should insist on building a "small but refined" nuclear arsenal and appropriately increase the number of nuclear weapons according to its own needs, rather than blindly pursuing quantity.
In conclusion, the role of nuclear ** in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict has proven to be limited, it cannot be used to attack Ukraine, nor can it be used to deter the West, and it will also cause a lot of trouble for Russia. Russia should reconsider its nuclear policy, reduce the number of nuclear weapons, increase conventional investment, and raise the level of conventional military strength, so as to better protect its interests. China should also learn from Russia's experience and not rely too much on nuclear power, but develop a strong conventional military force in order to achieve its national goals.