As everyone knows, in 1955, for the first time, our army conferred titles on all military cadres with military ranks. Among them: 10 marshals;10 generals;57 generals (including those awarded in 1956 and 1958). Among the generals, the most were born in the four fields, reaching 17, accounting for 29 of the number of generals8%, Siye can be described as handsome as a cloud. So, which admirals have stood out the most in the war that has lasted for more than 20 years?Based on a little rough understanding of military history, the author believes that these 17 generals will be classified first, and then their achievements will be analyzed. Since this article is talking about the war achievements, we have to exclude political work cadres and logistics cadres, among the 20 generals in the four fields, political work cadres include Zhou Huan, Chen Qihan, Xiao Hua, and Lai Chuanzhu;Those engaged in logistics include Li Jukui, Lu Zhengcao, Yang Zhicheng, Zhou Chunquan, and Hong Xuezhi. 
Secondly, the generals who joined Siye in the later stage of the Liberation War were excluded, such as Xiao Ke, chief of staff of Siye, who succeeded Liu Yalou, and Chen Mingren, commander of the 21st Corps. Finally, the author believes that although Liu Yalou's command ability is very good, he worked in the Soviet Union for a long time during the Anti-Japanese War, and has been serving as the chief of staff of the Dongye Headquarters during the War of Liberation. The remaining 5 generals, Li Tianyou, like Liu Yalou, worked in the Soviet Union during the Anti-Japanese War, and the third attack on Siping during the Liberation War did not meet expectations. Liu Zhen commanded the Dongye Second Column and the 39th Army for a long time in the War of Liberation, and lacked the opportunity to command the large corps alone. Huang Xuqian is the same, he has commanded the Eighth Column, the Sixth Column, and the 43rd Army for a long time, and his temper is not very good, and he can't get along with many people. 
The author believes that among the founding generals of the four fields, the best are Deng Hua and Han Xianchu, and their command ability and combat record are basically equal. Deng Hua was a political cadre at first, but later he showed outstanding military command skills. In the 1947 Northeast Summer Offensive, the original task of the Seventh Column was to block the New Sixth Army from moving north, but Deng Hua found another way, commanding the Seventh Column to run 180 miles in a day and night, conquer Faku in 40 minutes, and completely annihilate a division of the enemy, which frightened the New Sixth Army from advancing north. This offensive and defensive tactics was greatly praised by 101. After fighting Siping, Deng Hua suggested that the more elite Sixth Column should be transferred to attack Siping with three columns, and he believed that the battle of Siping must be fought well, and if it was not fought well, our army would be passive, and as a result, 101 only listened to a part of it, and transferred a division to participate in the battle, which led to failure. In the Liaoshen Campaign, Deng Hua was ordered to command the 7th and 9th columns to attack Jinzhou, and the initial 101 deployment was to block reinforcements with 7 columns and attack Jinzhou with 4 columns. Deng Hua looked at the overall situation and suggested that Jinzhou should be captured with the strength of six columns. Soon after the telegram was sent, the headquarters accepted it, and our army conquered Jinzhou within 31 hours. 
In December 1948, the Northeast Field Army entered the customs, and 101 ordered Deng Hua to seize Tanggu and Dagu. However, after Deng Hua personally went to the front to observe, he found that the periphery of Tanggu was a flat salt flat, which was not easy to fight. Just in case, Deng Hua first tried to attack with a battalion, and only occupied a small section of salt flats, and our army had more than 400 people. For this reason, Deng Hua reported to 101 and proposed: It is better to attack Tianjin than to attack Tanggu, and the capture of Tianjin will block the enemy's escape route from Beiping by sea. The capture of Tianjin was more advantageous for the enemy to blockade Beiping and flee eastward. The War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea was Deng Hua's second peak. In a battle, Deng Hua put forward the policy of putting the east on top of the west, and suggested that Mr. Peng should not wait for the follow-up troops to arrive, and directly use the 40th Army under the control of Zhisi to encircle and annihilate the four wings of the South Korean Army respectively, and won the first battle. In the second battle, Deng Hua was ordered to command the army to divide and encircle and annihilate the US Ninth Army and the Eighth Army that retreated south. In the five battles, Deng Hua was ordered to command the most difficult third stage - retreat and blocking, which ensured that the large army of volunteers basically retreated. 
After the end of the five battles, General Peng decided to fight six more battles on a larger scale, dispatching 13 armies of the Volunteer Army and 4 corps of the People's Army to annihilate two divisions of the enemy army and defeat the enemy on the eastern front back to the south of the 38th parallel. After careful study and judgment, Deng Hua believed that all units of the Volunteer Army were very tired and the time was not ripe for fighting six campaigns, so he went beyond the level to report to his superiors, and the chairman attached great importance to Deng Hua's suggestion, and after discussion by the Central Military Commission, he agreed to cancel the operational plan for the six campaigns. After President Peng went to Beijing for treatment, Deng Hua became the acting commander of the Volunteer Army for a time, and organized and commanded the tactical counterattack operation in the autumn of 1952, the Shangganling Campaign, and the counterattack campaign in the summer of 1953. Han Xianchu, born in the Red 25th Army, has a very sharp strategic vision, which is very different from Deng Hua's more cautious command style. In the Red Army's Eastern Expedition, Han Xianchu commanded a regiment to attack Shuangchi Town without orders from his superiors, annihilating a battalion of the Jin Sui Army and a regiment of the militia. In May 1936, the Red Army marched westward, Han Xianchu commanded the Red 78th Division. However, Han Xianchu judged that the enemy had 4 battalions in Dingbian City, and he neither took the initiative to attack nor evacuate, clearly thinking that our army was strong and could not afford to lose the city. Therefore, Han Xianchu believed that only by laying a fixed border could the enemy on the northern front be contained to the greatest extent. 
However, General Peng directly rejected Han Xianchu's suggestion and ordered the Red 78th Division to make a feint and quickly move north. Han Xianchu didn't believe in this evil. In the absence of General Peng's order, the tactics of attacking the east and the west were adopted: a regiment feinted to attack the east of the city, and when Ma Jiajun saw the Red Army carrying a ladder to the east of the city, he immediately mobilized most of his forces to gather over, at this time, the two regiments in ambush in the west and south of the city quickly launched an attack, and it took only two hours to completely annihilate the defending enemy. Han Xianchu's real fame in the army was in the Northeast Battlefield. When he first entered the Northeast, Han Xianchu was only the deputy commander of the 4th Column, and there were many generals with higher levels than him, but Han Xianchu quickly proved himself with his achievements: In the Xinkailing Campaign, the leaders of the 4th Column were at odds over whether to encircle and annihilate the ** Qianliju - the 25th Division of the 52nd Army. After Han Xianchu led the 10th Division to rush from the outside line, he fought the basis of reason, prompting the commander of the column to make up his mind to encircle and annihilate the battle. In the battle of encirclement and annihilation, the four verticals attacked the outer heights and were blocked, and some people suggested bypassing the peripheral commanding heights and taking the center directly, while others thought that they would fight in a different direction. Through careful battlefield reconnaissance, Han Xianchu found that the firepower of the defenders on the heights was not strong, and the front and back were far apart. Therefore, it was suggested that the commander of the column should concentrate all the artillery fire of the four columns, bombard the high ground with field artillery and mountain artillery, and bombard the rear of the enemy's position with howitzers, so that the enemy could not take care of each other. Using this method of warfare, our army really quickly captured the high ground and annihilated the 25th Division. 
In the Battle of Linjiang in Sibao, 11 divisions were concentrated and invaded our base area in three ways. Our army was determined to fight all the way with all the 3rd Column and one division of the 4th Column. But which way to fight first, there was a huge controversy in the command. The commander of the third column thought that the weaker Yunnan Army would be temporarily organized into the 20th Division first, and the persimmon would be pinched first. But Han Xianchu thought that the thief would capture the king first, and if he wanted to fight, he would fight the strongest 13th Army and 89th Division. Annihilate the 89th Division all the way, and the enemy's attack will naturally collapse. The two sides disputed, and after consulting the superiors, the superiors agreed to Han Xianchu's suggestion, and our army really annihilated Tang Enbo's starting unit, the 89th Division, in only one day. Han Xianchu's third peak was the battle to liberate Hainan Island. At that time, our army was quite cautious about crossing the sea, and the offensive plan was repeatedly postponed, but Han Xianchu ordered the 40th Army to make all preparations for a quick sea crossing to attack Hainan Island. By the end of February 1950, Commander Li of the 43rd Army proposed to purchase sailing ships from Hong Kong and Macao, and then attack Hainan Island after the sailing ships were in place. However, Han Xianchu believed that in March 1950, the north wind was still blowing on Hainan Island, and if it changed to a south wind after April, the difficulty of crossing the sea would increase many times. Moreover, after several months of training, the 40 th Army has adapted to the sea-crossing operation, and there is still the Qiongya Column on the island to cooperate, so it is suggested that the offensive time should not be postponed any longer, but adopt the policy of smuggling small troops in batches and forcing large troops to cross later. Corps Commander Deng Hua agreed to Han Xianchu's suggestion
After the two groups of smuggling, our army already has 9 battalions on the island, and Commander Deng will smuggle another 5 battalions. Han Xianchu believed that the time was ripe for large-scale forced crossing, and if he smuggled again, it would be a waste of boats. Moreover, the rainy season is coming, and it will be very difficult to delay the forced crossing of large forces. The two sides disputed, and after careful consideration, the superiors agreed to Han Xianchu's plan to immediately launch a large-scale sea-crossing operation. Han Xianchu's fourth peak was to resist US aggression and aid Korea, and in North Korea, Han Xianchu always undertook the task of eating bones. In the second campaign, he commanded the 42nd Army on the Eastern Front to block the Korean Capital Division and the 1st U.S. Army Division. The second campaign came to the 38th Army in person, and supervised Liang Daya to attack Tokugawa and Feibing Sanshori, laying the foundation for a great victory on the Western Front. As soon as the vanguard broke through the depth, Han Xianchu immediately crossed the river and commanded the troops to seize Seoul in a roundabout way. In the four battles, Han Xianchu proposed to fight Pingli first and shake the defense line of the coalition army, but unfortunately Mr. Peng didn't listen and thought that he would go to Hengcheng to eat meat first. Later, he was sent to the south bank of the Han River and commanded the 38th and 50th armies to block the attack, ensuring the final victory of the Hengcheng counterattack.