Sword Project Author: Forget in the rivers and lakesThe period from June 1947 to June 1948 was the second year of the War of Liberation.
In the three major battlefields of Northeast China, East China and the Central Plains, the three major field armies of our East Field, East China Field and Central Field have experienced two major days of development in this year.
After the first year of running-in pains, Dongye (the names of the Eastern Union, the Northeast People's Liberation Army, and the Northeast Field Army) sprung up like mushrooms after a rain, and the total strength increased from 460,000 (about 240,000 for the main force) to 1.03 million (about 700,000 for the main force).
In the first year of the War of Liberation, the Huaye and Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Field Army (the predecessor of Nakano), which were shining on the battlefield on the southern front, all had the phenomenon of stagnation or even decline in the development of their total strength.
In the most difficult year of our army's climbing, why is there such a huge disparity in the development of the three major field armies?
Some people hold that the rapid expansion of the Eastern Union, the stagnation of Huaye, and the halving of the strength of the Central Field are mainly due to the different strategic tasks of the three major field armies.
In the first year of the War of Liberation, the Northeast Democratic Alliance Army had not yet established a solid base because it had just arrived, was not accustomed to the water and soil, its troops were weak, and its running-in was insufficient.
The most important thing is that many locals, who have been controlled by the puppet Manchurians for many years, do not believe that the Northeast Democratic Alliance Army can gain a firm foothold, so the Eastern Union did not have a good mass base in the local area at the beginning.
The Liberation War entered its second year, and Mr. Lin finally ushered in the day of his emergence.
Previously, the Northeast Democratic Alliance Army, which had been as aggrieved as an angry little daughter-in-law, finally ushered in the high-brow puff of moving from defense to offense. In the summer, autumn, and winter of 1947, the offensive was successful, and the ability of our army in the northeast to attack fortified positions was greatly improved.
In March 1948, Dongye fought for the fourth time in the strategic location of Siping Street, and finally got his wish and pocketed this difficult bone. By the end of the first half of the year, the eastern field, including all kinds of local armed forces, had already had a million troops, including 700,000 field troops alone, and it was also the only major strategic zone in the national battlefield that surpassed the enemy's army.
By this point in time, the vast rural areas and small and medium-sized cities in Northeast China had already planted red banners, and the enemy had basically been compressed into a few large cities such as Jinzhou, Shenyang, and Changchun.
Unlike Dongye's rapid advance under Mr. Lin, the two strong teams of Chen Su and Liu Deng on the southern front have their own "unspeakable hidden".
In the first year of the Liberation War, Chen Su's Huaye and Liu Deng's Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Field Army were the two best records of our army's seven strategic groups, and they were also the two optimus primes of our army's southern front battlefield at the most difficult moment in the climbing stage in the first year.
However, in the second year, the situation in the border area is tense, and the shortcomings of the hinterland and the bottleneck of insufficient economic strength have increasingly become factors restricting the development of our army. In order to achieve "taking from the enemy" in terms of strategic materials, the chairman made a painful determination to advance behind enemy lines.
This has the "Thousand Miles Leap into Dabie Mountain", Liu Deng, Chen Su, and Chen Xie are the three-way army "product" in response to the Central Plains. In order to implement this strategy, Liu Deng's army paid a huge price, and when crossing the Yellow River in the south, 1230,000 people were reduced, and when they were transferred out of Dabie Mountain seven months later, only 580,000 people.
Even after more than half a year of recuperation, the 300,000 troops of Shanxi, Hebei, Shandong, and Henan, which were strong and strong a year ago, went to the battle-damaged and sporadic localized troops, and the main force was only 150,000.
In this year, due to the lack of heavy **, Nakano's ability to attack fortified positions has decreased sharply. The biggest victories fought during this period were battles in which more than 10,000 enemies were annihilated in Wanxi and Wandong.
Compared with the reduction of nearly half of the troops in Nakano, Huaye after the "division of troops in July" did not fight a major battle in which 350,000 enemies were annihilated at every turn, as in the first year of Lunan, Laiwu, and Menglianggu, and the greatest result was a campaign in which more than 20,000 enemies were annihilated in the Luoyang Campaign, which was jointly launched with the 4th Column of Nakano.
There is a point of view that Mr. Lin's technical and tactical literacy has been greatly improved compared with Huaye and Nakano.
In the first year of the Northeast Battlefield, Mr. Lin was once chased by Du Yuming and was relatively passive. However, after retreating all the way across the Songhua River, Mr. Lin learned from the pain and deeply reflected on and studied technical and tactical issues. It was at this time that tactical principles such as "one point with two sides," "three three systems," "four fast and one slow," and "four groups and one team" began to be put forward and put into practice one after another.
With the "three visits to the south of the Yangtze River, four protections to the river" and several long-term offensives in spring, summer, autumn and winter, the commanders and fighters of Dongye integrated the tactical principles of Mr. Lin, gradually entered a better situation, and gradually reached the first period of perfection.
Su Yu's Huaye, the second year, the army almost stood still.
Compared with Higashino's technique and tactics, Huaye's technique and tactics are not systematic enough. The seven major base areas of the East China Military Region are relatively independent, and there is also a stumbling situation in the run-in between the Shandong Eighth Route Army and the Central China New Fourth Army.
In January 1948, in Huaye's annual summary, it was mentioned that Huaye's problem was too big, and the root cause was the backwardness of tactics and wave charge.
What's more, Huaye, like Nakano, has been at the forefront of the confrontation between the two sides since the victory of the Anti-Japanese War, and has never had a chance to recuperate.
The real root cause of the rapid growth of Mr. Lin Dongye, Su Yuhuaye's inaction, and the loss of more than half of Zhongye is not the above two superficial phenomena. The root cause of the three major field armies lies in land reform.
Some people will think that land reform is a game of chess for the whole country, and the rear of Dongye is in land reform, and the base areas of Huaye and Nakano are also under land reform, so how can there be such a big difference between some growth and some decrease?
In fact, after the Liberation War entered its second year, Lin Zong and Dongye were able to double their strength because they completed the phased victory of the "three major battles" in the large rear base area.
The "three major battles" mentioned here are not the later Liaoshen, Huaihai, and Pingjin battles, but refer to the three major tasks done by our army in the Northeast Battlefield, that is, the suppression of bandits, land reform, and army reorganization
The first major battle, "Suppressing Bandits", was attributed to commanders such as He Jinnian and Liu ZhuanlianThe second major battle "land reform" is attributed to **, Gao Gang and other officials;The third major battle "army rectification" is attributed to political cadres such as Tan Zheng.
Among them, "land reform" is a key link between the past and the next. ** It was pointed out that the land reform has turned over the poor peasants, so that we can gain a foothold and take root in the northeast, and only then can the troops have sufficient resources of soldiers and grain and grass. When Dongye's 830,000 troops entered the customs, Huang Yongsheng even boasted that Dongye alone could fight across the Yangtze River to liberate the whole of China.
Could it be that in the second year of the Liberation War, there was no land reform in Huaye and Zhongye?
Land reform, during the Red Army period, was called "fighting local tyrants and dividing the land". During the War of Liberation, the previous movement to reduce rent and interest rates was practiced for many years, and finally repeatedly tempered and perfected, forming a relatively complete "Outline of the Land Law".
In the second year of the Liberation War, the chairman entrusted Shaoqi, Mr. Zhu, and Mr. Dong to form a working committee to march eastward into the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Liberated Area to solve three major problems: military problems, land problems, and financial problems, and Zhu, Liu, and Dong took the lead in taking charge of these three major problems. The rest of the major strategic areas are responsible for the specific implementation work.
In the implementation of land reform, the Northeast region has done the best, and the young people in the Northeast who have no worries have enthusiastically joined the army, which has contributed to the doubling of the Dongye army and formed an army of more than one million under the command of Mr. Lin for the first time.
In the second year of the Liberation War, there were some disputes in Jiaodong, Binhai and other areas, so Yan'an later sent a steering group to correct and deepen the land reform in East China.
As for Liu Deng's army's advance to Dabie Mountain, it was a strategic action without a rear, and during the seven months of holding on to Dabie Mountain, the land reform work in the old area was obstructed by the landlords, local tyrants, and the "small security team" in every possible way, and failed for a time.
Without the strong backing of land reform, Nakano's 120,000-strong army lacked effective replenishment, so a large attrition was inevitable. This is also an important reason for Chairman Li Chen to drill out of Dabie Mountain and return to the Huanghuai region.
1. Documentary of the Northeast Liberation War, by Zhu Yuepeng, Liu Daoxin, Zhang Wenrong, Long March Publishing House
2. Handbook of Agrarian Reform, Agrarian Reform Committee of East China Military and Political Commission;
3. "A Thousand Miles Leaping into Dabie Mountain", edited by Wang Xin and Wen Lequn, Hainan Publishing House.
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